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PALMERSTON





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Portrait

Palmerston

THE
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

BY THE
HON. EVELYN ASHLEY, M.P.



IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.

LONDON
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1879



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LIFE OF
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

VOL. I.

LONDON : PRINTED BY
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AND PARLIAMENT STREET

PREFACE.

THIS WORK is, it is hoped, an improved edition of that 'Life of Lord Palmerston' which has already appeared in five volumes. While, however, it contains many letters already published, and several passages adopted from the former work—the two first volumes of which were by Lord Dalling and Bulwer—some fresh letters have been added and other new matter inserted.

I have, after full consideration, retained the same preponderance of Lord Palmerston's memoranda and correspondence over the text which marked the former publication, because I feel that the proper distinction to be observed between a biography and a history (not always sufficiently remembered) is, that in the former case the events of the day should be subsidiary to their relation to the attitude and opinions of the subject of the memoir. If he has left few papers behind him, the biographer must, perforce, do his best in his own way

and his own language; but if there is an abundance of original writings, he should, even without being a lawyer, remember the old legal maxim, 'Melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivulos.' To go, therefore, to the fountain-head has been my aim, rather than to make the reader dabble among shallow tributaries. There is, besides, an instruction, as well as an interest, to be found in contemporary views of historical events which is necessarily lost under treatment by a posthumous recorder.

E. A.

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LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE

THIRD VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G., G.C.B.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

PARENTAGE AND BOYHOOD—HARROW—GOES TO EDINBURGH AND CAMBRIDGE—STANDS FOR CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY—DEFEATED, AND COMES INTO PARLIAMENT FOR HORSHAM; BUT IS UNSEATED—BECOMES JUNIOR LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY—STANDS AGAIN FOR CAMBRIDGE—AGAIN DEFEATED, BUT IS RETURNED FOR NEWTOWN—JOURNAL.

THE most distinguishing quality of the eminent Englishman whose career we are about to follow, was a nature that opened itself happily to the tastes, feelings, and habits of various classes and kinds of men. Hence a comprehensive sympathy, which not only put his actions in spontaneous harmony with the sense and feeling of the public, but by presenting life before his mind in many aspects, widened his views and moderated his impressions, and led him away from those subtleties and eccentricities which solitude or living constantly in any limited society is apt to generate.

In the march of his epoch he was behind the eager, but before the slow. Accustomed to a large range of

observation over contemporaneous events, he had been led by history to the conclusion that all eras have their peculiar tendencies, which a calm judgment and an enlightened statesmanship should distinctly recognise, but not prematurely adopt or extravagantly indulge. He did not believe in the absolute wisdom which some see in the past, which others expect from the future; but he preferred the hopes of the generation that was coming on to the despair of the generation that was passing away. Thus throughout a long political life there was nothing violent or abrupt, nothing that had the appearance of going backwards and forwards, or forwards and backwards. His career went on in one direction gradually but continuously from its commencement to its close, under the impulse of a motive power formed from the collection of various influences—some modifying others—and not representing in the aggregate the decided opinion of any particular party or class, but approximating to the opinion of the English nation in general. Into the peculiar and individual position which in this manner he by degrees acquired, he carried an earnest patriotism, a strong manly understanding, many accomplishments derived from industry and a sound early education, and a remarkable talent for concentrating details. This last, indeed, was his peculiar merit as a man of business, and wherein he showed a masterly capacity. No official situation, therefore, found him unequal to it; whilst it is still more remarkable that he never aspired to any situation prematurely. Ambitious, he was devoid of vanity; and with a singular absence of effort or pretension, found his foot at last on the topmost round of the ladder he had been long unostentatiously mounting.

Born on October 20, 1784, at Broadlands, the family seat in Hampshire, he succeeded his father in 1802, and took his degree at Cambridge University in 1806. The ascending steps of a prosperous life, towards the end of which he reached the summit of public distinction, were as follows:—

LINEAGE OF THE TEMPLE FAMILY.

3

Lord of the Admiralty . . .	April 1807—Oct. 1809
Secretary at War . . .	28 Oct. 1809—26 May 1828
Secretary for Foreign Affairs . . .	22 Nov. 1830—15 Nov. 1834
	18 April 1835—31 Aug. 1841
	3 July 1846—22 Dec. 1851
Home Secretary . . .	28 Dec. 1852—30 Jan. 1855
Prime Minister . . .	20 Feb. 1855—20 Feb. 1858
	30 June 1859—18 Oct. 1865

It must be admitted, however, that he engaged in public affairs with advantages which are great at all times and in every country, but which were especially great in England during what may now be called 'the old régime.' He was of a good family, with a well-known name, and a fair fortune.

The Temples were gentlemen in the reign of Henry VIII. They boasted their descent from the Saxon Algar, Earl of Mercia, and one of their branches is represented by the ducal house of Buckingham and Chandos. At the opening of the seventeenth century some of the Temples established themselves in Ireland. A Sir William Temple was the secretary of Sir Philip Sidney, and afterwards of the unfortunate Earl of Essex. He seems to have been a man of letters, with the chivalric temperament that characterised his age. His son Sir John held posts of confidence and authority in Ireland, having been Master of the Rolls and Vice-Treasurer; and Sir John's son was the celebrated diplomatist who had William III. for his friend, and Swift for his dependent. Lord Palmerston descended directly from a younger brother of the great diplomatist; this brother rising to be Attorney-General and Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. His son Henry, created a Peer of Ireland in 1722, was for several years a member of the English Parliament. The heir to his title died young, but left issue, and thus the second Viscount was grandson to the first. He was known as an accomplished and fashionable gentleman, a lover and appreciator of art, and a friend of Sir Joshua Reynolds, who bequeathed to him one of the

works of his own easel—as a testimony of his regard.¹ His second marriage² was to a Miss Mee, a young lady of a good family in Gloucestershire; into the house of whose father, then residing in Dublin, the peer had been carried, in consequence of a fall from his horse. Our late Prime Minister was the son of this nobleman and of Miss Mee, who appears, from all accounts, to have been not only handsome, but accomplished and agreeable, and to have held a high position in Dublin and London society. Her husband's artistic tastes led him at various times into Italy; and it was thus that a portion of the future minister's boyhood was passed in that country, in the fate of which he always took an interest. Till he went to a public school he appears to have been educated at home, and to have had an accomplished Italian refugee, named Ravizzotti, who was also intimately acquainted with the Latin and Spanish languages, as one of his early instructors. Ravizzotti dedicated to his pupil an Italian grammar, and bore testimony in this dedication to the correctness and purity of the boy's French and Italian. When about eleven years of age Henry Temple went to Harrow School, having about the same time formed an intimate acquaintance with a lad of the name of Hare, who became in after years one of the best known and most accomplished gentlemen of his time. There has been preserved a curious letter from young Francis Hare to young Harry Temple, then at school, and a letter from Harry Temple in reply:—

Francis Hare³ to Harry Temple, vale.

Bologna: Jan. 5, 1798.

I hope, dear Harry, that you continue always well, and that you profit much at school, both in Greek and Latin. I make

¹ The 'Infant Academy.'

² His first wife, whom he married in 1767, was Frances, only daughter of Sir Francis Poole. She died in 1769, without leaving issue.

³ Hare was the eldest of four brothers (Francis, Augustus, Julius, and Marcus), of whom Augustus and the Archdeacon—Julius—authors

you this wish, as I think it the very best that a true friend can make, and I think I ought to believe that you place me in this number.

I hope you take no part in those vices which are common to a public school, such as I suppose Harrow, as swearing and getting drunk; but I imagine the son of a gentleman so well taught cannot partake in things like these.

Pray give a kiss to each of your two amiable sisters, but particularly to Fanny, and tell her to write me a letter whenever you answer mine. I still persist in my opinion of never marrying, and I suppose you think the same, as you must have read, as well as myself, of the many faults and vices of women.

Perhaps I at Bologna may have learnt more Greek than you, and that you at Harrow may know best how to fight with your fist; however, if you challenge me I shall not hesitate to accept, for I remember I am an English boy, and will behave like a brave one. Pray salute for me Willie Ponsonby, whom you and I knew in Italy. Billy desires not to be forgotten by you. I have no more time for writing, so shall only add that I shall wait for your answer with impatience. I protest myself, with all my heart, your most affectionate friend,

FRANCIS GEORGE HARE.

of the 'Guesses at Truth,' became the best known publicly, though all were remarkably accomplished, and held in high esteem by the scholars and poets of their time. In Mr. Forster's 'Life of Walter Savage Landor' several notices occur of Harry Temple's correspondent Francis, who met Landor at Tours in 1815, and during their joint residence in Italy became his most intimate friend. When Hare first went to Christ Church, Cyril Jackson referred to him as the only rolling stone he had ever known which was always gathering moss; and Landor, of whom the same might with equal truth have been said, told Mr. Forster that from Hare's society he had derived the animation and excitement that had helped him most in the composition of his 'Imaginary Conversations.' Excepting a few remarks (signed F.) in the 'Guesses at Truth,' Francis Hare published nothing; but so accurate and extensive were his classical attainments that his brother Julius, a most distinguished scholar, told Mr. Maurice he owed as much to him as to any of his instructors. 'I remember our Consul-General at Rome,' writes Mr. Seymour Kirkup, 'calling him a monster of learning.' And Landor, in introducing him in 1827 to Southey and Wordsworth, dwells even less on his prodigious scholarship than on 'his wit and the inexhaustible spirit and variety of his conversation.' He died in Sicily in 1840, and there is an allusion to him in a poem by Landor as one—

... 'Who held mute the joyous and the wise
With wit and eloquence; whose tomb, afar
From all his friends and all his countrymen,
Saddens the light Palermo.'

Harrow : March 29, 1798.

Dear Hare,—I have just recovered from the measles, which, however, I have had very slightly, and am now very well. I am sincerely obliged to you for your kind wish, and trust that I make as much progress as boys in my situation at school generally do. I have begun Homer's Iliad, which I did in that beautifull episode, in the 5th¹ Book I think, in which Andromache takes leave of Hector, when returning from the war to Troy, to order a general supplication to Minerva, at this line—

“Ὡς ἔρα φωνήσας ἀπίβη κορυθαίολος Ἐκτωρ·

I suppose, however, that you have made considerable progress in your learning, more than is perhaps in my power ; we have tasks regularly allotted for each day, as long as we stay in each form or class. I am now doing Cæsar, Terence, Ovid, Homer, Greek Testament, and a collection of Greek epigrams, and after the Easter holidays, which are now drawing near, I shall begin Virgil, Horace, and some more. I am perfectly of *your* opinion concerning drinking and swearing, which, though fashionable at present, I think extremely ungentlemanlike ; as for getting drunk I can find no pleasure in it. I am glad to see that though educated in Italy you have not forgot old England. Your letter brings to my mind the pleasant time I spent in Italy, and makes me wish to revisit the country I am now reading so much about ; and when I am sucking a sour orange, purchased by perhaps eight biochi, I think with regret upon those which I used to get in such plenty in Italy ; and when eating nasty things nicknamed sausages, envy you at Bologna, who perhaps now are feasting off some nice ones. I have begun to learn Spanish, and have also begun to read Don Quixote in the originall, which I can assure you gave me no small pleasure. Mr. Gaetano, if you remember him, desires to be remembered to you. I can assure you I have by no means left off my Italian, but keep it up every holidays with Mr. Gaetano, who has published a new Italian grammar, which has been very much approved of here in England. I cannot agree with you about marriage, though I *should be by no means precipitate about my choice.*² Willy is come to Harrow, and sends his love to you. I send you no news, as I know none. Adieu !

Believe me ever your affectionate friend,

HENRY TEMPLE.

¹ Really 6th Book, line 116.

² This intention was literally carried out.

The following letter, from one of Henry Temple's contemporaries, shows that the brave and gentle nature manifested throughout a long career was traceable from early life :—

Westfield, Ryde : September 21, 1870.

When I went to Harrow in 1797, the late Lord Palmerston was reckoned the best tempered and most plucky boy in the school as well as a young man of great promise. We were in the same house, which was Dr. Bromley's, and by whom we were often called, when idle, 'young men of wit and pleasure.'

The late Lord de Mauley—then William Ponsonby—Poulett, a son of Lord Poulett, and myself, were fags to Althorp, Duncannon, and Temple, who messed together ; and the latter was by far the most merciful and indulgent.

I can remember well Temple fighting 'behind school' a great boy called Salisbury, twice his size, and he would not give in, but was brought home with black eyes and a bloody nose, and Mother Bromley taking care of him. I went to sea shortly after, and though I cannot bear testimony to his future career, I can to the invariable kindness he has always shown me, and the happy hours I have spent in his society.

In this letter from Admiral Sir Augustus Clifford we see the plucky Secretary of State, who forced his political opponents to say they were proud of him, refusing with a black eye and a bloody nose to give in to the big boy, whilst in the Hare correspondence it is amusing to find two boys, then about thirteen years old, discussing the question of marriage, on which Lord Palmerston does not like to compromise himself. He declares, however, stoutly against drinking and swearing—vices which he acknowledges to be *fashionable*, but condemns as *ungentlemanlike*. The distinction is not unimportant ; for boys who do not think for themselves fancy that to be fashionable is to be gentlemanlike.

We are glad to go back to the early years of those who in maturer age become eminent, and mark how much of the man was in the boy. A youth whose English is far from perfect admiring a beautiful passage in Homer, keeping up his Italian in an English school, feeling a greater interest in Latin literature

from his recollection of the spots to which it frequently refers, voluntarily learning Spanish, stating that he had not made up his mind about wedlock, but that he regretted Italian oranges and Bologna sausages, ripened naturally into a man who would turn his attention to foreign affairs, admire the classic oratory of Canning, prove industrious in office, speak a good deal without compromising himself, keep racehorses, have a good appetite, and be generally at once what is so charming and so rare—gay and thoughtful, manly and refined.

The Harrovian did not on quitting, at the age of sixteen, the school so celebrated for producing statesmen, move on directly to an English university. It was the fashion of the time for young men to take the University of Edinburgh as an intermediate preparation for that of Cambridge or Oxford; for Scotland at that period had acquired a reputation both in philosophy and history which she never previously possessed, and has not since fully maintained. This pre-eminence may be accounted for by the writings of Hume, Robertson, Dugald Stewart, and Adam Smith; and also by the variety of distinguished scholars who had been formed by such men as these, or by their works. Brougham, Horner, Jeffrey, Henry Petty (afterwards Lord Lansdowne), had preceded Henry Temple; Lord John Russell and William Lamb (Lord Melbourne) were his successors.

A letter from his father to Professor Stewart, with whom the son was to lodge at Edinburgh, gives us an insight into the character which he had already gained. He had risen nearly to the top of Harrow School, and his father thought that he was more likely to profit by intercourse with persons older and better informed than himself, than by longer remaining in the upper class of a public school to pursue the common routine of classical instruction, and to associate principally with companions in no way superior to himself. After stating these views, Lord Palmerston the elder proceeds to say:—

Hanover Square : June 13, 1800.

My son thinks of his situation at school just as I do, and though perfectly satisfied both with his masters and his companions, is pleased with the thought of a removal and of the situation in which I wish to put him. . . You will find him perfectly disposed to conform himself with cheerfulness to all such regulations as you shall think fit to prescribe to him ; and though he is forward enough in all good points, he is still a boy, and has not assumed the airs and manners of a premature man. Knowing that you are justly anxious not to receive pupils without some competent testimony as to their character and disposition, I venture to enclose a letter I have just received from the Rev. Mr. Bromley, one of the masters of Harrow School, in whose house both my sons are placed. As soon as I came to a determination to remove Harry, I thought it a proper attention to his present masters to give them the earliest notice of it. The letter I enclose is Mr. Bromley's answer. You will see by it that he thinks well of him, and does not part with him willingly. The principal part of it relates to the public speeches at Harrow, in which Harry has twice acquitted himself with credit in Latin ; and it was my wish, in case he had spoken a third time, that it might have been in English.

The lectures that principally attracted attention at Edinburgh University, were Dugald Stewart's on political economy and moral philosophy ; and to these studies, than which none are better calculated to be the foundation of a statesman's education, it would seem that Mr. Temple especially applied himself. The notes which he made form, indeed, the principal part of the text which is now given as ' Dugald Stewart's Lectures on Economical Science ; ' for it appears that the lectures in question were in a great measure *extempore* ; and when Sir William Hamilton undertook to publish them he was obliged to consult the memoranda of the pupils by whom they had been attended, and he found none so complete as those taken originally in shorthand, and subsequently copied out, by Henry Temple, who, speaking of this time, says, ' I lived with Dugald Stewart, and attended his lectures at the University. In these

three years I laid the foundation of whatever useful knowledge and habits of mind I possess.'¹

It should be added, that if the scholar so highly esteemed the advantages he owed to his professor, the following will show that the professor entertained a high opinion of his scholar :—

Extract from a Letter of Professor Dugald Stewart to Mr. Bromley, dated Edinburgh, April 27, 1801.

With regard to Mr. Temple, it is sufficient for me to say that he has constantly confirmed all the favourable impressions of him which I received from your letter. His talents are uncommonly good, and he does them all possible justice by assiduous application.

In point of temper and conduct he is everything his friends could wish. Indeed, I cannot say that I have ever seen a more faultless character at his time of life, or one possessed of more amiable dispositions.

We find him during this period varying his studies by taking lessons in drawing from Nasmyth, diving into the mysteries of book-keeping, attending lectures on natural philosophy, and making athletics a systematic part of his daily work.

In 1803 the student from Edinburgh went to St. John's, Cambridge. He says :—

I had gone further at Edinburgh in all the branches of study pursued at Cambridge than the course then followed at that university extended during the two first years of attendance. But the Edinburgh system consisted in lectures without examination; at Cambridge there was a half-yearly examination. It became necessary to learn more accurately at Cambridge

¹ This quotation is taken from a fragment of autobiography from which further extracts will be given. It owed its compilation to Lady Cowper having asked Lord Palmerston some little time before they were married how it happened that he was for so long a time in a comparatively obscure official position. In reply Lord Palmerston wrote for her this short autobiographical sketch, which covered his career down to 1830. Soon after their marriage he took it back in order to carry it on to a later date; but having mislaid it, could never lay hands on it again. It was not until after his death that it was found under a mass of papers—exactly in the condition in which it had been returned to him.

what one had learned generally at Edinburgh. The knowledge thus acquired of details at Cambridge was worth nothing, because it evaporated soon after the examinations were over. The habit of mind acquired by preparing for these examinations was highly useful.

Dr. Outram, my private tutor at Cambridge, more than once observed to me that, as I had always been in the first class at college examinations, and had been commended for the general regularity of my conduct, it would not be amiss to turn my thoughts to standing for the University whenever a vacancy might happen.

My father died in April 1802, and I lost my mother in January 1805.¹ The last misfortune delayed a few months the taking of my degree as master of arts, which it was usual at that time for noblemen to take as an honour, conferred without examination, at the end of two years after admission.

In January 1806, Mr. Pitt died, and the University had to choose a new member, as well as the King a new minister. I was just of age, and had not yet taken my degree, nevertheless I was advised by my friends at St. John's to stand: the other

¹ Henry Temple, now become Lord Palmerston, thus expresses himself as to this great loss:—

‘Broadlands: Jan. 31, 1805.

‘My dear Sullivan,—You will, I am sure, not attribute to any other than the real motive, my not having before this answered your very affectionate letter. The kindness and sympathy of friends afford indeed one of the few alleviations of which such afflictions as ours are susceptible, and I am confident none feel more than you do. Consolation is impossible: there are losses which nothing can repair; and griefs which time may fix and mellow, but never can obliterate. After the example, however, of fortitude and resignation set us by a being who was the model of every human excellence, it would be criminal in us not to imitate the resignation as well as every other perfection of her character.

‘She was conscious, it is true, that she was but passing to that happiness which her virtues had secured her; and beheld with calmness and composure an event which, to the generality of mankind, comes clad with all the terrors of doubt. It will, I am sure, give you satisfaction to hear that my sisters are as well as after such a loss could be expected. William comes to-morrow. Adieu. Pray remember me to Mr. and Mrs. Sullivan, and believe me ever yours affectionately,

‘PALMERSTON.’

Lord and Lady Palmerston left, in addition to the subject of this biography, one son, Sir William Temple, K.C.B., who died in 1856, H.M.'s Minister at Naples, and two daughters, Fanny and Elizabeth, the latter of whom married Lord Palmerston's college friend, Mr. Sullivan, to whom the letter just quoted was addressed.

candidates were Lord Althorp and Lord Henry Petty. I was supported by my own college, and by the exertions of the friends of my family; but the Pitt party in the University was broken up. Most men thought that the new Government would for many years have the disposal of the patronage as well as the command of the power of the country; and I stood at the poll where a young man circumstanced as I was could alone expect to stand; that is to say, last:—Petty,¹ 331; Althorp,² 145; Palmerston, 128.

It was an honour, however, to have been supported at all, and I was well satisfied with my fight.

Lord Palmerston was no doubt right: to have stood for one of our great universities, before he had even taken his degree at it, with any chance of success, took a young man at once out of the crowd of young men and brought him individually into notice.

Neither did his success as a candidate seem at one time improbable, if we may judge of his prospects by a letter written during the election, which seems pretty well charged with the electricity of youth and hope:—

St. John's: Jan. 28, 1806.

My dear Sullivan,—Things go on very well, thanks to you, Shee, and the Malmesburys. This morning's accounts from town were excellent; here we advance too, I think. Mansel³ has promised not to oppose me. Pearce, Sumner, Milner, Turner are for me, and, I hope, the masters of Emanuel and Catherine Hall. I am very glad to hear Lord Spencer declares Althorp shall not yield to Petty. '*Divide et impera*' is true and applicable. The small colleges cannot but look with jealousy upon Trinity,⁴ when they see it start candidates for every honour in the gift of the university: the representation, the high steward-

¹ Afterwards Lord Lansdowne. He had just been appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer.

² Then a Junior Lord of the Treasury; well known as leader of the House of Commons and Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1830 to 1834, when he became, on the death of his father, Earl Spencer.

³ Dr. Mansel was Master of Trinity, afterwards Bishop of Bristol; Dr. Pearce, Master of Jesus, Master of the Temple, and Dean of Ely; Dr. Sumner, Provost of King's; Dr. Milner, President of Queen's and Dean of Carlisle; Dr. Turner, Master of Pembroke and Dean of Norwich, and also Vice-Chancellor that year.

⁴ Lord Palmerston was at St. John's College.

ship, and the Duke of Gloucester for the chancellorship. Little Gill and I are as thick as three in a bed, and he talks of the great civilities experienced from his particular friend Lord Grantham.¹

I am glad I know Petty and Althorp, as, since we run foul of each other perpetually, it would otherwise be awkward. I took my degree yesterday, and got a very short buttering. Outram was taken quite unawares, and did not expect to be called upon till to-day or to-morrow, as the Vice-Chancellor thought no other business could be done the day the king's answer was read. I heard that Percy² was expected this week; I hope he may come, if he intends to be of use to me, of which I have no doubt, if the old Boy will let him.

Pray thank Knox for his friendly communications. The election will probably come on this day week. I own I *entertain strong hopes of success*, if my two rivals do not coalesce, and even then do not despair. At any rate, whatever be the event, I shall consider my having stood as one of the most fortunate circumstances of my life, it having procured me such gratifying proofs of the warmth of my friends' attachment to me. Adieu! my dear Sullivan. I wrote to Shee³ last night, but that with several other letters were, unluckily, too late for the confoundingly precise Cerberus of a fellow who guards the post office.

Ever yours affectionately,

PALMERSTON.

In November 1806 [continues the manuscript] Parliament having been dissolved, a general election took place. Lord Fitz-Harris⁴ and I stood for Horsham. The borough was burgage-tenure, and the right of voting disputed. There was a double return; each party petitioned, and the committee seated our opponents. Fitz-Harris and I paid each about 1,500*l.* for the pleasure of sitting under the gallery for a week in our capacity of petitioners. We thought ourselves very unlucky; but in a short time came the change of Government and the dissolution

¹ Afterwards Earl de Grey.

² Afterwards third Duke of Northumberland, K.G., Ambassador Extraordinary in 1825 at the coronation of Charles X., King of France, and Chancellor of the University of Cambridge from 1840 till his death in 1847.

³ Sir George Shee, second baronet, born 1784. Was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1830 to 1834, and was afterwards Minister at Berlin.

⁴ Afterwards second Earl of Malmesbury. He was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for a few months in 1807.

in May 1807, and we then rejoiced in our good fortune at not having paid 5,000*l.* (which would have been its price) for a three months' seat.

I was at Broadlands at Easter 1807, when, on April 1, I received a letter from Lord Malmesbury, desiring me to come up to town immediately, as he had found me a seat, if not in Parliament, at least at the Admiralty. The Duke of Portland¹ had been appointed First Lord of the Treasury. He was an old and intimate friend of Lord Malmesbury, who had been one of my guardians, Lord Chichester² being the other; and he had obtained from the Duke that I should be one of the Junior Lords of the Admiralty.³

Shortly after this we see young Palmerston standing again for Cambridge:

When Parliament was dissolved I stood again for Cambridge, and having entered the lists when nothing perhaps could be reasonably expected but an honourable defeat, I had established a kind of right to support from the Government and its friends in preference to any other ministerial candidate. It was, however, considered that one candidate against two would have no chance; and Sir Vicary Gibbs was sent down to assist me against Lord Euston⁴ and Lord Henry Petty. But I soon found that my colleague was as dangerous as my opponents, and that every supporter of the Government who had but one vote to give was requested to give it to Gibbs.⁵

¹ He had already been Prime Minister, in 1783, of the administration which combined Fox and Lord North, and Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland in 1782. He died in 1809.

² Lord Chichester, as Mr. Pelham, had for many years been M.P. for Sussex. He was Secretary of State for the Home Department from 1801 to 1803, and in 1807 Postmaster-General.

³ Lord Palmerston's father, who had represented East Looe, Hastings, Boroughbridge, and Winchester in the House of Commons, had occupied a similar post in the Duke of Grafton's administration in 1766.

⁴ Afterwards fourth Duke of Grafton, K.G. His father was Chancellor of the University at the time.

⁵ Attorney-General, and successively a Puisne Judge of the Court of Common Pleas (1812), Lord Chief Baron (1813), and Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (1817). 'Endowed by Nature with acuteness and an unlimited power of application, he became, to use his own somewhat unseemly expression towards as considerable a man as himself, and a far more amiable one (Mr. Justice Bayley), "as good a lawyer as that kind of man can be." Disciplined by an excellent classical education, the fruits of which stuck by him to the last, and somewhat

Our committees canvassed separately, and there was no coalition. The night, however, before the polling began, Gibbs and myself and the chairmen of our committees met to go over our returns. It appeared doubtful from the books who was the strongest, and there was no sufficient evidence to show who ought to give up in order to bring in the other; for Lord Euston was known to be stronger than either, and the only question was whether one of us could beat Lord Henry Petty. We therefore agreed to combine, and that each should give to the other the second votes of all his disposable plumpers.

Towards the end of the polling Sir Vicary Gibbs came up to me in the Senate House, and said that my friends were not acting up to my agreement, and were going to plump for me. I said I would immediately see that this was not done, and went and placed myself at the bar through which the voters went up to poll, that I might beg each man as he went by to vote for Gibbs as well as for me.

Dr. Outram,¹ my tutor, was standing there. He urged me to let my friends do as they chose. That they wanted to bring me in, and not Gibbs. That the votes had been counted by people in the galleries posted for that purpose. That Euston was far ahead and Gibbs was running me hard. That my committee and a few more stanch friends had reserved their votes, and if they plumped for me I should certainly come in, but if they split their votes I should be thrown out. That they were no parties to the agreement of the night before, and were not to be bound by it. I said this would not do. I was bound in honour. Gibbs' friends had, I believed, given me their second votes: but be that as it might, and be the result what it

acquainted with the favourite pursuits of Cambridge men, his taste was always correct, and his reasoning powers were as considerable as they ever can be in a mind of his narrow range. . . . In the House of Commons he really had no place at all; and feeling his nullity, there was no place to which he was with more visible reluctance dragged by the power that office gives the Government over its lawyers. He could only obtain a hearing upon legal questions, and those he handled not with such felicity or force as repaid the attention of the listener. He seldom attempted more than to go through the references from one Act of Parliament to another; and though he was doing only a mechanical work, he gave out each sentence as if he had been gifted and consulted like an oracle, and looked and spoke as if when citing a section he was making a discovery.—*Statesmen of the Time of George III.*, by Lord Brougham.

¹ Public orator; afterwards Canon of Lichfield and Archdeacon of Derby.

might, I must insist, if they had the slightest regard for me, on their giving—every man of them—a second vote to Gibbs. They consented, though with much ill humour and grumbling ; and Gibbs beat me by four votes. It turned out that I had no reason to complain of want of good faith, as Gibbs, after all, had only seven plumpers whilst I had twelve.

The following letter relates to the same circumstances that Lord Palmerston has just been recounting. Both illustrate his simple straightforward way of looking at right and wrong, and display a character which was of more advantage to him on commencing life than a mere seat in Parliament.

Cambridge : May 8, 1807.
12 o'clock, Friday night.

My dear Sullivan,—We are beat by four votes :
Euston, 324 ; Gibbs, 313 ; Palmerston, 310 ; Petty, 265.

It is provoking to think that four men wished me in the Senate House to let them give me plumpers instead of giving their second votes to Gibbs. I did not conceive myself at liberty to recede from the agreement I had made, particularly as Gibbs had honourably adhered to it ; and these four votes turned the scale. However, I did not certainly expect so large a number of supporters, and possibly at some future time I may meet with better success. The poll continued open till ten o'clock, and the votes have only just been declared. I mean to remain here two days longer, just to thank my voters, and shall then return to town. Adieu ! many many thanks for your kindness and labours.

The autobiography thus notes his first step in Parliament :—

Soon after this I came into Parliament for Newtown in the Isle of Wight, a borough of Sir Leonard Holmes'. One condition required was, that I would never, even for the election, set foot in the place. So jealous was the patron lest any attempt should be made to get a new interest in the borough.

Lord Palmerston was thus at last in that great council wherein he sat so long, and played eventually so conspicuous a part. Nor was he altogether untrained for the career he entered upon, as may be proved by some extracts from a journal that he commenced in

June 1806, and carried on till the formation of the Portland Ministry—when he seems for a time to have abandoned it.

His observations in this journal on the policy of Napoleon, who, he says, instead of concealing his projects in order to take his enemies by surprise, published them purposely beforehand, in order that, the world being accustomed to expect them, might not be shocked when he executed them, are shrewd and profound; his description of the Prussian campaign, memorable for the defeat of Jena, is good and graphic. His remarks on the death of Fox are, for one who was so ardent an admirer of Fox's great rival, liberal and impartial; his accounts of the different election contests are interesting, as describing the parliamentary manners of the times; and his review of the conduct of the Whigs in the quarrel with George III. which ended by their dismissal—though evidently that of a Tory partisan—is an able and considerate statement for so young and decided an opponent.

EXTRACTS FROM JOURNAL.²1806 *b* 1806

June 29.

On June 12, Lord Melville's trial in Westminster Hall was brought to a conclusion. The proceedings in the Hall had lasted fifteen days, after which the Lords had discussed the evidence for eight or ten with their doors shut. In the course of these discussions two questions were submitted to the judges, which were very material in influencing the ultimate decision of the Lords.

The first question was, whether, subsequent to the Act by which the office of Treasurer of the Navy was regulated, it was legal for the Treasurer to take money from the Bank and vest

¹ *Note to this Journal by Lord Palmerston.*—The opinions and remarks contained in this volume are the exact expressions of my feelings at the moment when they were written. Upon many points, however relative both to persons and things, cooler reflection, and a few more years' observation and experience, have, as is natural, very much altered my sentiments.—P., April 15, 1812.

it in the hands of a private banker, provided that such money was drawn *bond fide* for naval purposes. The judges were unanimously of opinion that there was no provision in the Act forbidding such a transfer of the public money.

The second question was, whether, previous to the passing of the above mentioned Act, but subsequent to the issuing of the warrant by which the salary of the Treasurer of the Navy was increased upon condition of his not making use of the public money, his having made use of that money would subject him to a criminal or to a civil prosecution. Upon this the judges also unanimously declared that such an act would render the Treasurer liable to a civil prosecution only.

These two decisions led the public to expect the acquittal, which was pronounced by a large majority of the Lords on the 12th. The question of 'Guilty or Not Guilty' was put by the Chancellor to each Lord in succession upon each article separately. But had it been put upon the whole case collectively, Lord Melville would still have been acquitted, as out of 135 who attended the trial, fifty-seven acquitted him on every article. The Scotch evinced their joy upon this occasion by general illuminations.

July 9.

Fox's illness, which has for some time confined him, has within these few days assumed a more alarming appearance, and is supposed to be decided dropsy.

The King's health is extremely good. He walks as firmly as anybody at his age (68) could be expected to do, and scarcely avails himself when on the terrace, of the assistance of a stick which he holds in his hand. His eyes, however, are scarcely of the smallest use to him.

July 15.

Negotiations for peace appear to be going on with much activity. Messengers are continually passing backwards and forwards between Paris and London.

Fox is extremely anxious to conclude peace, having disapproved the war from its commencement ; but how Lord Grenville can join in that wish is not easy to conceive. Neither do the acts and language of Buonaparte bear a very pacific appearance. The establishment of Louis as King of Holland,¹ and a declaration implying that he will insist upon the restitution of the Dutch colonies, present some difficulties to any negotiations ; but, indeed, if we are to have peace now it seems very imma-

¹ On July 5, 1806.

terial what the terms may be, as any peace at present would be ruinous. To disband our forces and dismantle our navy would be, in the existing state of things, impossible, as no reliance could be placed on Buonaparte's pacific professions; and if a large military and naval establishment has to be kept up, *we should suffer all the expenses of a war without enjoying any of its advantages.*¹

London: July 23.

Parliament was this day prorogued by commission. The speech was short, and contained little. It concludes by saying that, 'His Majesty, being always anxious for the restoration of peace on just and honourable terms, is engaged in discussions with a view to the accomplishment of this most desirable end.'

A change has taken place in the Russian Cabinet. Czartoryski² has resigned, and is succeeded by Count Budberg. The former was a favourite with the young Empress. But a reconciliation having taken place between her and the Emperor, the minister is dismissed, and a lady whom the Emperor is said to have preferred sent to travel.

July 29.

A separate peace has been signed between France and Russia at Paris.³

Gaeta still continues to hold out under the Prince of Hesse, and Sir Sidney Smith has thrown some succours into the town, which have restored the spirits of the besieged. Joseph Buonaparte has taken possession of Naples and declared himself King of the Two Sicilies. He will not find the island so easy a con-

¹ The correspondence of Napoleon, recently published, shows the justice of this argument, which at the time was not unreasonably disputed.

² Prince Adam Czartoryski was born in 1770, and educated in England. He fought against Russia in the war on the second partition of Poland in 1793, and on the defeat of the Poles was taken to St. Petersburg, where he was patronised by the Emperor Paul, and became the friend and favourite of the Emperor Alexander, who intrusted him for a time with the department of Foreign Affairs, which post he filled till the peace of Tilsit. The high places he had occupied in the Russian Government had never alienated him from his own country, and in the Revolution of 1830 he suffered himself to be placed at the head of the National Government, risking thereby his immense fortune and estates in Poland, which, after the suppression of the insurrection, were confiscated. He, however, escaped to Paris, where he died at a very advanced age, devoted to the last to the cause of his country and the relief of the exiled of his countrymen.

³ On July 20 by M. d'Oubril, afterwards disavowed by Russia.

quest as the continent. Our force there amounts to near ten thousand men, and a reinforcement is now fitting out from Ramsgate.

Minto: August 2.

This day Lord Lauderdale left London for Paris, in order to carry on the negotiations which had been commenced between the two Courts. Professor Stewart accompanied him; but it is not known whether he went in any official capacity, or merely as a private individual. The selection of Lord Lauderdale as a negotiator does not lead one to form any favourable conjectures as to the termination of the negotiations. A man who has professed such violent principles,¹ and has shown himself such an advocate for France, cannot be supposed to be very hearty in the cause he has undertaken, or likely very strenuously to uphold the honour and interest of his country; and though, probably, but little would be left to his discretion, yet the anxiety displayed by ministers to send a man who should be the most agreeable to Buonaparte and Talleyrand indicates a spirit of concession not very consonant with the dignity of the country they govern.²

August 26.

It is a singular circumstance in Buonaparte's political conduct that, so far from concealing his designs, he purposely publishes even the most violent of his projected innovations some time before they are put in execution; and the consequence has uniformly been, that instead of being alarmed and prepared to resist, the world has, by anticipating conquests and changes, become by degrees reconciled to them, and submitted almost without a murmur to the mandates of the tyrant. It is thus that for some years he has thrown out hints of some grand confederated European system of which he is to be the head, and of which the hitherto independent states around him are to be the subordinate members. At length his plans have been more boldly exhibited, and, by a sort of manifesto lately issued from the Cabinet of St. Cloud, the whole German Constitution is declared to be

¹ Thought at that time to be what we should now call a great radical, and even to have sympathised with the Irish rebels. He was an intimate friend of Mr. Fox.

² *Subsequent Note by Lord Palmerston.*—Lord Lauderdale's judicious and spirited conduct during his embassy fully justified the appointment. But so far from his being agreeable to Buonaparte, the latter is said to have asked, when Lord L. was named to him, 'Pourquoi m'envoie-t-on ce Lor Jacobin? Croit-on que j'aime les Jacobins?' (April 1812).

dissolved, and a union, called 'the Rhenish Confederacy,' is established, of which France is the protector. The Constitution is digested into about thirty articles, enumerating the States which are included, namely—France, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Baden, &c. : inviting others to join, and instituting an alliance offensive and defensive among all the members of the league, settling the quotas of troops to be furnished by each of the parties, and providing, among other arrangements, that if any neighbouring State or States shall arm, the Confederacy shall do the same as a matter of precaution.

The election of Cardinal Fesch as Arch-Chancellor of the Empire gave rise to a remonstrance on the part of the Emperor of Austria, to which Buonaparte has since replied—that as there now exists no Empire there can be no cause or pretext for complaint. The Emperor was, indeed, immediately upon the formation of the Rhenish Confederacy, required to resign his crown, with which demand he has without hesitation complied; and in a public instrument published at Vienna the 7th of this month, he declares the German Constitution dissolved, and renounces a title which, he says, the present state of Europe renders useless. Thus has that confederacy of states, which has for ages occupied the attention of statesmen, been annihilated by the decree of a man who, little more than ten years ago, might have considered it as the summit of his ambition to equal in power the smallest of its independent princes.

Gaeta, after an obstinate resistance, has been obliged to capitulate. The Prince of Hesse was wounded by a cannon-ball while inspecting the breach, and his absence was soon followed by a capitulation. The Calabrians still continue to hold out against King Joseph.

Sept. 10.

The Emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the treaty signed at Paris by d'Oubril.¹ It was submitted to his council for discussion, and, after much deliberation, rejected. The terms were reported to be so disgraceful to Russia that a ratification would have been submission to France.

Sir John Stuart has gained a splendid victory, near Maida, on the plain of St. Euphemia, in Calabria. He landed at the town of that name with four thousand men. Regnier, who com-

¹ D'Oubril, though deprived of his post and left out of employment, was not disgraced, and doubts have been entertained as to whether he had really exceeded his instructions, or as to whether it was deemed advisable to say he had done so.

manded in that district, fell back in order to concentrate his forces, and was posted with seven thousand men at Maida. Sir J. Stuart advanced to attack him, and, after an obstinate engagement, totally routed him. The French fled in all directions, leaving a thousand dead on the field. Those who were taken in the battle, and picked up among the woods and mountains afterwards, amounted to three thousand; the last accounts which came away from Messina state that on the 25th Regnier was at Colrone, surrounded by the Calabrian levy in mass, and that by the assistance of the English he would probably be obliged to surrender. The Calabrians appear to have harassed the French excessively, and to be actuated by the most violent detestation of their new masters. The above-mentioned victory was gained entirely by the undaunted bravery of the British troops. Two corps of equal force were opposed to each other at the distance of a hundred yards; after a few rounds had been fired they, as it were, by mutual agreement ceased firing, and advanced to the charge. When, however, their bayonets were just crossing, the French were panic-struck, and fled with precipitation, but too late to prevent their entire annihilation. This decided the fate of the day; our loss was trifling.¹

Walcot Park: Sept. 16.

On Saturday last, Sept. 13, Mr. Fox expired. He had been tapped three times. His last moments were free from pain, and he retained his faculties till a very short time before his death. He had transacted business three days previous to this event with as much coolness as if he had been in perfect health. It is singular that the two great rival statesmen should have died in the same year; that the one should have obtained that high station to which he aspired only by the death of the other, and have found in the attainment of this object of his wishes the cause which accelerated his own demise. Had Fox lived in times less troublesome than those in which he was thrown—or had he not been opposed to such a rival as Pitt—he would,

¹ *Note by Lord Palmerston.*—January, 1807. This victory was not followed by any of the important consequences which we were led to anticipate. Sir John Stuart re-embarked and retired to Sicily, where he was soon after superseded by General Fox. Had our force in Sicily been as numerous as it ought, there is no doubt but that after the affair at Maida we might have expelled the new King of Naples. But the pending negotiations seemed to have completely paralysed all the energies of ministers, as they sent out no forces anywhere until Lord Lauderdale's return.

undoubtedly, have been ranked not only among those statesmen the brilliancy of whose genius has reflected honour upon the country that produced them, but among those illustrious patriots whose names, consecrated by the applause of a grateful people, are held up to the admiration of posterity as fathers of their country and benefactors of the human race. He set out in life by being the supporter of the royal prerogative, and took part with the Crown against Wilkes. But being thrown into opposition by Pitt, he quitted a line in which he saw his rival would eclipse him, and became a strenuous advocate for the rights of the popular part of our constitution. In this course the ardour of his temper carried him further than prudence could justify; and, as it generally happens in controversies, he frequently in the violence of debate supported doctrines which, perhaps, his cooler reflection would have led him to disavow. With this impetuosity of temper it is less to be wondered at than regretted that, in the general delirium produced by the French Revolution, he should have been infected with the disorder, and have connected himself with the most frantic of the reformers. It was well remarked in one of the papers of the day, that there scarcely ever lived a statesman *for whom as an individual the people felt more affection, or in whom as a politician they placed less confidence.*

Park Place: Oct. 5.

Sir Samuel Hood, with two seventy-fours and a sixty-four, the 'Mars,' fell in, off Rochefort, with a French squadron, consisting of five frigates and a sloop. The French, it is supposed, mistook our men-of-war for Indiamen, as they allowed themselves to be overtaken. As soon as our headmost ship came up a severe engagement took place, which terminated in the capture of four of the frigates. The other having escaped, in company with the sloop, one of our men of war was detached in pursuit. The loss on our side was nine killed and thirty-two wounded. That of the enemy must have been great, as they had on board two thousand land troops, destined, it is supposed, for the West Indies. Another French frigate was taken at the same time by another squadron. They are all fine ships of the first class. Sir Samuel Hood was the only officer wounded. His right arm was shattered by a bullet, and was immediately amputated.

Oct. 11.

A telegraphic despatch was received yesterday at the Admiralty from Deal, stating that a messenger was just come over

from Paris with the intelligence that Lord Lauderdale was immediately to return; that he had got his passports, and was to leave Paris on the 8th. A bulletin was sent to the Lord Mayor, who immediately went to the Exchange, where he read it to the merchants. They received the news with *three cheers*, and in every part of London it occasioned the most lively demonstrations of joy,—so firmly is everybody impressed with the conviction that none but a dishonourable peace could have been obtained, and that continued war is preferable to an ignominious treaty. It is said that our Government did not expect Lord Lauderdale's return so soon, but that it arose from some categorical demand on his part.

In a work by F. Gentz, entitled 'Fragments upon the Political Balance of Europe,' published in 1806, is the following excellent definition of the meaning affixed to *peace* by Buonaparte :—

'What, in his vocabulary, is meant by *peace*—the liberty of doing whatever is suggested to him by the feelings of unbounded power or momentary desire, and the unconditional subjection of his neighbours to every form of his increased and insupportable domination.'

Dec. 30.

A succession of events as rapid and extraordinary as those which occurred in the close of the last year, have marked the termination of this. In 1805, Europe saw with astonishment the ancient and powerful empire of Austria laid in the dust in the course of three months. The battle of Ulm, the consequent surrender of the Austrian army, and the battle of Austerlitz, reduced the Emperor to the abject conditions of the treaty of Presburg. This year one single battle has annihilated the former rival of Austria.

Prussia and France had for some time been upon terms less friendly than their usual good understanding—when the publication of the Rhenish Confederacy and the demand of Buonaparte for some of the smaller possessions of Prussia, in order to complete his confederate system, opened the eyes of the latter, and convinced the Prussian court that the unprincipled system of aggression, which they had assisted France in enforcing against every other state of Europe, would at length be applied against itself, and that it had no choice left but resistance, or an unconditional acknowledgment of vassalage and submission. The King of Prussia sent, therefore, to Buonaparte three demands; to which he required an answer by October 8.

These were, that the French troops should retire from Germany, that no opposition should be made by France to the establishment of a *Northern Coalition*,¹ of which Prussia should be the chief and protectress, in order to counterbalance the Rhenish Confederacy. In the meantime both parties prepared for the contest, which now became inevitable, since it was very obvious that Buonaparte could not with honour accede to the requisitions of Prussia. By the 8th both sides were in the field : the Prussians commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, the French by Buonaparte. After some partial skirmishes, in one of which Prince Louis of Prussia was killed in defending the passage of a bridge, a general and decisive battle took place on the 14th between Jena and Auerstadt, which ended in the total defeat and annihilation of the Prussian army. The force on each side was nearly equal, amounting to about 120,000 men. The two armies had for some days been near each other ; but the Prussians were so destitute of intelligence that they did not know where the French were till a day or two before the action. The reason of this is stated to have been the spirit of desertion prevalent in the army, which rendered it useless to send out patrols, who generally joined the enemy instead of returning with intelligence. Two days before the battle 10,000 French penetrated between the centre and left wing of the Prussians, got to Naumburg in their rear, and burnt their magazines. Upon finding that a body of the enemy had got into their rear, and that the main body of the enemy were making a demonstration to turn their left wing, the Prussians threw that wing back. In the meantime the French fell upon them, and an action commenced which lasted from eight in the morning until three in the afternoon, when victory declared in favour of the French. The loss of the Prussians—killed, wounded, and prisoners—amounted to 50,000 men, and the rest of the army was entirely dispersed. Mr. Ross, who went as secretary to Lord Morpeth, said the rout of the Prussians exceeded belief. The flying troops were scattered in all directions. Corps without their officers, and officers without their corps, cavalry and infantry, cannon and waggons, were all mixed in one general confusion. To rally or re-assemble them was impossible, and the only limit to the captures and slaughter of the Prussians was the inability of the French to pursue them.

¹ A project which it seems had even then been formed, and, as usually happens with plans long meditated, was ultimately consummated.

The king fled to Berlin, whence he retired immediately to Custrin.¹

This day, the last of the Prussian monarchy, was also fatal to its veteran hero, the Duke of Brunswick. His regiment of grenadiers, a favourite corps, refused to charge. Enraged at this disgrace, and determined not to survive the calamities of the day, he seized a standard and rode headlong into the midst of the enemy. A French chasseur shot at him with his musket at a few yards' distance. The ball pierced the bridge of his nose, and he was carried off the field senseless, by some of his officers, who had followed their commander. He was conveyed to Altona, where he languished some weeks in the greatest agony, having been blinded by the wound, and at length expired, worn out by the sufferings of his mind as well as the torture of his body. Before his death he wrote a letter to Buonaparte, entreating that the neutrality of his states might be respected, since they had taken no part in the war, and urging that he acted as a general in the Prussian service, and not as Duke of Brunswick. Buonaparte having read the letter threw it down upon the table, and haughtily replied to the officer who brought it, '*Cette excuse ferait très-bien pour un conscrit, mais pas pour un prince souverain; ni lui ni aucun de ses enfans ne mettront jamais le pied dans le Duché de Brunswick.*' After his death, permission was requested to bury the Duke in the tomb of his ancestors, which the usurper arrogantly refused, saying he was unworthy to lie with them.

Lord Morpeth, with his two secretaries, Ross and Frere, had been sent by Government, as soon as hostilities commenced between Prussia and France, to open a communication with the former. Lord Morpeth reached the head-quarters at Erfurt a few days before the battle, and finding the King of Prussia was preparing to withdraw, and that a general engagement was expected, he resolved to retire also. Instead, however, of following the king, he allowed himself to be taken in by Haugwitz, who desired he would follow him, and having described the way he meant to go, took another road. Lord Morpeth discovered the trick, pursued Haugwitz, and overtook him at

¹ *Note by Lord Palmerston.*—He fled from thence to Osterade, in the neighbourhood of Dantzic. Such was his apathy with regard to his affairs, that when Count M. Woronzow, who was sent from Petersburg on a mission to him, reached Osterade, he was immediately invited to attend the king on a hunting-party. They had good sport, and killed a wolf and an elk. The queen, though ill and disgusted with this ill-timed amusement, was forced to join the party.

Weimar the night before the action. Haugwitz, however, went off again early in the morning; and Lord Morpeth, after having been detained some time by a want of horses, set out to return to England by Nordhausen and Osterhausen; a step, this, extremely unjustifiable in a man who was sent to remain with the King of Prussia. It is true that the action commenced before he left Weimar; and by the approach of the noise of firing he could clearly distinguish that the Prussians were giving way; and before he got far he was overtaken by a hussar, who informed him of the fate of the day: but the more evident the defeat the more necessary was it to have somebody with the king, to prevent, if possible, its probable consequence, the signature of an ignominious peace. Lord Morpeth, however, was a very improper person to be intrusted with so difficult a mission. A young, inexperienced fine gentleman could not know how to act with firmness when surrounded by artillery on one side and cunning diplomatists on the other. Soon after Lord Morpeth returned, ministers determined to send a military man, and Lord Hutchinson was selected; but a whole month at the most critical period was suffered to elapse before he sailed, and by that time the French had made such progress in Prussia that it was uncertain where Lord Hutchinson¹ would be able to land. Dantzic was believed to be the only place where it was practicable for him to disembark.

After such a signal overthrow as that of Jena, it is natural to endeavour to find out reasons in the treachery or incapacity of the officers concerned, and it often happens that much injustice is in this manner done to men whose only fault has been a want of success. In the present instance there can be no doubt that to the above-mentioned causes, in part, the defeat of the Prussians may be ascribed. All possible allowances being made for superior skill and generalship on the part of the French; still, had the Prussians done their duty, the catastrophe could not have been so complete. It is, however, known that they did not. In the first place, Haugwitz and Lombard, the two ministers of the king, were traitors. Lombard is a Frenchman by birth, a man of very low origin, and introduced by Haugwitz

¹ A general officer, Colonel of the 18th Foot, G.C.B., and Governor of Stirling Castle. He succeeded to the command of the British army in Egypt in 1801, on the death of Sir Ralph Abercromby, and for his services was raised to the peerage, and granted a pension of 2,000*l.* a year. He inherited the earldom of Donoughmore on the death of his brother in 1825.

to the king; he was a known spy of the old French Government. If any circumstantial proofs were wanting of Haugwitz's perfidy, the following account, given by Count Woronzow, ci-devant ambassador here from Russia, would be sufficient for his condemnation:—When first the Emperor of Russia found in the cabinet of Berlin a disposition to break with France, he sent an offer to renew his alliance of last year, and to put 150,000 men at the disposal of Prussia; the only request he made was, that General Zastrow, on whom he could rely, might be sent to Petersburg to arrange the march, &c., of the troops. For three weeks Haugwitz sent no answer to this offer, and at length sent, not Zastrow—whom it was alleged the King of Prussia could not spare—but some colonel, a creature of Haugwitz. This envoy, on his arrival, said that 150,000 men were too many by far; that for so large a force they had no magazines or supplies, but that if the Emperor would send 50,000 men they should be glad to receive them; the Russians, however, were by this time on their march; and subsequent events proved, that had the Emperor waited for Haugwitz' answer, or complied with his requests, the only chance of recovering Prussia would have been lost.

It is said that some of the Prussian generals, amongst whom were Mollendorf and Hohenlohe, strongly urged the expediency of attacking the French as soon as possible after the 8th, the day fixed by the king as the last on which he should wait for an answer to his demands. The Duke of Brunswick, however, was for delay, and wished to wait the attack of the enemy, and his opinions prevailed. The duke was a man who carried personal courage even to rashness,¹ but wanted that firmness and decision of character so necessary for a great commander. No one could execute with more ability and courage the orders of others, but, placed at the head of an army on which depended the fate of a kingdom, he shrunk from the responsibility of his situation, and lost in hesitation and doubt those moments which should

¹ *Note by Lord Palmerston.*—His uncle said of him, when he served as a young man in the Low Countries, that he was the only person he had met with who really loved danger. Lord Malmesbury, when ambassador from England at the Hague, hearing that the duke, who was then commanding in the Low Countries, exposed himself unnecessarily, wrote to him to request he would recollect the importance of his own life, and take more care of it. The duke thanked him for his attention as one would thank a person who desired one not to catch cold, and added, that with regard to his life he was very indifferent about it, as he knew he should lose it '*par un coup de feu*': a curious prophecy.

have been employed in vigorous exertion. Had the Prussians attacked the French earlier, before they had collected and assembled their whole force, the event might have been very different; and at any rate, if they had been defeated, their army would not have been so entirely cut to pieces. By this delay, too, they suffered the French to take possession of a small knoll which commanded the field of battle, and on which the French established a battery of 120 pieces of cannon, whose fire mowed down whole ranks of the Prussians, and in a great measure decided the fate of the day. Of this they might have made themselves masters in the first instance; but when once the enemy had fortified it, it became impregnable, and we find in the bulletins that the Prussians failed in several attacks which they made upon it. But such was the treachery of some of the officers and the cowardice of most of the men, that at whatever time the battle had been fought, its fate would probably have been the same. The Duke of Brunswick's aide-de-camp, who caught him in his arms when he fell, and afterwards brought over his blue riband, said, that as soon as the *feu de mitraille* commenced the Prussians fled *comme des perdreaux*. A strong proof how inefficient mere parade discipline is towards making good soldiers, and that nothing but actual service will accomplish that end.

After the action, the Prussian army being, as has been already observed, entirely dispersed, and having the enemy interposed between them and the Oder, it could not make again any general stand. Some few corps got into Magdeburg, but the largest number that escaped in a body were about 20,000 or 30,000 under Prince Hohenlohe and General Blucher. Finding it impossible to get to the Oder in a straight line, Hohenlohe attempted to reach Stettin by a circuitous march. By uncommon exertions he succeeded in getting as far as Prentzlow, only seven German miles from Stettin, when the French overtook him; and his troops being worn out by excessive fatigue, and totally destitute of provisions, he was obliged to surrender with the main body of his corps, amounting to above 16,000 men. The rest, under Blucher, were at Liechen, behind him; and, hearing of his surrender, Blucher, despairing altogether of escape, determined to render his country all the service he could, and saw that the only thing in his power was to draw off a portion of the French army from the pursuit of the flying Prussians. Accordingly he began to retreat to the north-west, and having defended himself with the greatest skill and courage against

three French divisions, each much superior in numbers to his own corps, he reached Lubeck. Here he meant to make a stand ; but the town was forced, in consequence of the treachery of the officers who commanded one of the gates. Blucher had now no alternative but to violate the Danish territory, or sustain an attack by a force infinitely superior to his own. The first, for obvious reasons, he declined doing ; and his men being reduced in numbers by the various actions they had been compelled to fight, and weakened by the fatigues of three weeks' incessant forced marching, without having during that period tasted bread, and being almost starved, he was obliged to surrender. His force was reduced to 9,000 men, and he had the glory of having drawn from the Marches of Brandenburg to the shores of the Baltic three large divisions of the French army. Had all the Prussians behaved like Blucher, Buonaparte would have found the road to Berlin not quite so easy as he expected. The disaster at Jena was soon followed by the surrender of Magdeburg, Stettin, Custrin, and Gros Glogau. The easy capitulation of these places afforded another decisive proof of treachery somewhere. If, as was alleged by the officers commanding them, they were destitute of provisions and other supplies for sustaining a siege, Haugwitz deserved to be hanged for not taking his measures beforehand ; if that be untrue, and they were able to make a defence, the officers who surrendered ought to be shot for their cowardice. Magdeburg is very strong, but Custrin is almost impregnable, being surrounded by the Oder and the Waarta on two sides, and on the other by deep morasses. Buonaparte, having nothing to oppose his progress, marched to Berlin, and thence to Warsaw. The Russians, who had come with the expectation of joining a large Prussian army, found themselves too weak to resist long, and although they had advanced as far as Posna when the French got to Berlin, as the latter advanced they were obliged to retire and fall back upon their reinforcements.

The Parliament which had been summoned to meet for the despatch of business at the end of October was unexpectedly dissolved. The country was taken completely by surprise, for although rumours of a dissolution had prevailed during the whole of the summer, the proclamation summoning Parliament for the end of October convinced people that, if dissolved at all, it would not be till the spring. It was indeed a sudden determination, and the king was not made acquainted with it till a week before the event took place. The method adopted by

ministers with regard to their borough seats was very politic and ingenious. They purchased seats from their friends at a low price, making up the deficiency probably by appointments and promotions. These seats they afterwards sold out at the average market price to men who promised them support; and with the difference they carried on their contested elections. The sum raised in this manner was stated by a person who was in the secret to be inconceivably great, and accounts for an assertion afterwards made by Lord Grenville in the Lords, that 'not one guinea of the public money had been spent in elections.'¹ It may be imagined that if seats were bought for two thousand five hundred, or even two thousand pounds, and sold again for five thousand pounds, a comparatively small number of such transactions would furnish a considerable fund; and Government had so many seats passing through its hands that, at last, in one or two instances, it sold them to people who only professed themselves in general well disposed towards them, without exacting a pledge of unconditional support.

The elections were in general carried on very quietly; the principal contests were in Westminster, Middlesex, Southwark, Norfolk, and Hampshire. In the first, Sheridan and Hood stood upon the Government interest against Paull. Sheridan, at first relying upon his popularity, refused ministerial assistance, asserting that he should walk over the course. He soon, however, found how uncertain the *popularis aura* is. Paull, being the greatest blackguard of the two, quite supplanted him in the affections of the Covent Garden electors; and if Sheridan had not received timely assistance from Hood, he would have been shamefully distanced. Even as it was, his majority above Paull was very trifling: and the general opinion is that it will not stand the test of an examination by a committee, before whom Paull has pledged himself to bring it.² Paull's failure was, in a great degree, owing to his uncalled-for adoption of Sir F. Burdett's principles, which rendered it quite impossible for any well-disposed persons to give him their support. Sheridan's unpopularity was said to have arisen chiefly from his never having paid his debts. Numbers of poor people crowded round the hustings, demanding payment for bills which he owed them.

¹ Lord Palmerston's observation seems to imply that the spending public money for party elections would not have been deemed, on the part of any Government, a very extraordinary occurrence.

² Sheridan was not, however, unseated, but in the following year Burdett and Cochrane were returned over him and Elliot.

At Southwark, Sir Thomas Turton, the old antagonist of Tierney, drove him out of the field. The latter had to contend with all that violence of popular clamour which had so often on former occasions been exerted in his favour; and he was scarcely allowed to speak during the whole election. Few people would have believed, ten or twelve years ago, that the time would ever have arrived when Sheridan and Tierney would be objected to by their electors as candidates, and would complain of the clamour and violence of the mob!

The Middlesex election was conducted with the greatest quiet. The candidates were Byng,¹ Mellish, and Burdett; and the latter having previously declared that he would give neither cockades nor postchaises, his former voters, who were not of a description to sacrifice much to disinterested affection, deserted his cause, and the two first candidates were returned by very large majorities. The mob also, who were so outrageous in their demonstrations of regard for Sir Francis at the two former elections, not being paid at this one for making a riot, were peaceably disposed; and it was no longer dangerous to appear at Brentford in any colours but purple.

The Norfolk election did not afford a very striking proof of the popularity of ministers. Windham was brought in solely by the great influence of Mr. Coke,² assisted by all the exertions of Government. Windham³ had, indeed, rendered himself so generally odious in the country, by his ungrateful conduct towards Pitt, and the incessant abuse and ridicule which he had lavished upon the volunteers, that it was with the utmost difficulty that even Mr. Coke's friends could be induced to vote for him.

His triumph, however, will be but short, as both Coke and himself will be turned out upon the Treating Act. All the candidates had agreed not to take advantage of that Act, and

¹ Mr. George Byng, a type of the country gentleman in the time of Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, and the last M.P. who was seen in the House of Commons with the top-boots that formed part of the costume of that epoch. He represented Middlesex in Parliament for fifty-six years—from 1790 till his death in 1846.

² Afterwards created Earl of Leicester.

³ It would be absurd in anyone not a young politician enthusiastically attached to Fox's rival to talk of such a man as Mr. Windham as ungrateful to Mr. Pitt; but this statesman, though so celebrated for his attainments as a scholar, and his wit and delivery as a speaker, was so uncertain as a politician that each party alternately abused him, and in his own county he was never spoken of by the farmers without the nickname of 'weathercock' being applied to him.

accordingly opened houses for their electors. But two ladies, friends of Wodehouse (Coke's and Windham's opponent), having appeared every day in a barouche and four at the hustings with his colours, the friends of Windham determined to drive them away, and accordingly put two women of the town in another barouche, decorated with the same ribands, and drew them alongside the carriage of the ladies.

This unmanly insult so incensed those who were the objects of it, that they determined to be revenged. They consequently prevailed upon some of the electors to petition against the sitting members; and as the fact of their having treated is notorious, there is no doubt of their being turned out.

With regard to the county of Hants, the old members were Sir William Heathcote and Mr. Chute, both for many years attached to the politics of Pitt. Neither, however, had at any time taken a violent part in public affairs. Sir William Heathcote, a quiet country gentleman, naturally of a retired disposition, lived like a recluse at Hursley; and Chute, a hospitable squire, preferred entertaining his neighbours at 'The Vine' to mixing with much zeal in parliamentary disputes. The latter, however, had in the course of the last session voted three times in opposition to ministers: an offence not easily to be forgiven: and it was determined to turn him out. Accordingly, in the month of September Lord Temple rode to Hursley, and said to Sir William Heathcote, that Mr. Chute having gone into a systematic opposition to ministers, it could not be expected that they should give him their assistance, but that as Sir William had not attended last session, if he would now declare himself favourably disposed towards Government they would vote for him: but that if he and his friends intended to make a common cause with Chute, Government must set up two candidates instead of one. This communication Lord Temple gave to understand came from Lord Grenville. Had Sir William acted with becoming spirit, he would immediately have taken down what Lord Temple had said, desired him to read it, and then ordered the servant to show him the door. However, he answered, that with regard to himself, he never would pledge himself to support any administration, not even that of Pitt, were he alive; and that as to his friends, he must consult them before he could give any answer with regard to them. He then, when Lord Temple was gone, wrote down the substance of what had passed, and laid it before the County Club. The indignation excited by this attempt to dictate to the county members was universal;

and it was immediately determined to support the two sitting members, and in them the freedom and independence of the county. Two candidates, however, were now set up by ministers, Mr. Herbert and Thistlewaite; the former, a clever young man, but third son of Lord Carnarvon, and in no way connected with the county; the latter, a very stupid but respectable young man, possessing considerable property near Portsmouth. Hereupon Sir William Heathcote, alarmed at the trouble and expense of a contest, declined standing, upon pretence that his age and infirmities would not allow him to attend Parliament any longer: and though Sir H. St. John Mildmay, after hesitating ten days, was prevailed on to stand in conjunction with Chute, the delay produced by these arrangements gave the ministerial candidates a fortnight's start in their canvass, and this, and the great mass of voters in Portsmouth at the command of Government, decided the fate of the contest.¹

Jan. 20, 1807.

The new Parliament met a little before Christmas, but no business of any importance was transacted till January 2, when the papers relative to the late negotiation with France, which had been laid before Parliament, were discussed in the House of Lords. Lord Grenville opened the debate by an excellent speech, in which he detailed the progress of the negotiation and the causes which led to its rupture. The speech appeared, however, more intended for Europe than the audience to which it was addressed, as it consisted chiefly in a laboured defence of the rupture of the negotiation and a proof of the insincerity of the French Government. Two subjects upon which, probably, not one of his auditors was likely to disagree with him.

Feb. 5, 1807.

This day Lord Grenville moved the second reading of the Slave Trade Abolition Bill, which was carried after a long debate by a large majority. The numbers were 100 contents, thirty-six non-contents; majority sixty-four. The time fixed for the importation to cease was January 1, 1808.

Feb. 8, 1807.

Yesterday arrived the Russian official account of the battle of December 26. The Russians had continued retreating till they arrived in the neighbourhood of Pultusk, beyond the Vistula.

Here, on the 26th, an action took place, in which the French

¹ This story is curiously illustrative of the manners of the times.

under Buonaparte, having attacked the Russians under Benningsen, with a view to cut them off from their magazines, were completely defeated and repulsed with the loss of 4,000 killed and 6,000 prisoners. The two armies amounted each to about 50,000. The Russians were, however, unable from want of provisions to pursue their advantage, and both armies fell back, the French to Warsaw and the Russians to Ostrolenka and Rozau. The French army has suffered dreadfully from the dysentery occasioned by damp and fatigue; it is also believed that they have got the *plica polonica* among them. Buonaparte is gone into winter quarters at Warsaw, and Benningsen will probably attack him if he can advance through the country lying between them, which has been rendered a perfect desert by the retreating Russians. The uncommon mildness of the winter renders operations less difficult.

Oct. 1, 1807.

There has seldom happened in this country so sudden and unexpected a change of ministers as that which took place last March. The broad-bottomed administration (or, as they were called, from a foolish boast they made when first they came into power, 'All the Talents') appeared in the beginning of the month so long that it seemed beyond the power of events to shake them.

They had called a new Parliament, in the elections for which the influence, direct and indirect, of Government had been exerted to an extent and with a success beyond example. They and their adherents had so long and assiduously made the country re-echo with the boast that they alone were fit to conduct the affairs of the nation, that the multitude—who seldom take the trouble of judging for themselves, and are apt to believe what they perpetually hear—began at length to give them credit for the abilities of which they claimed such exclusive possession; and keeping the king as a sort of state prisoner, by allowing none but themselves to approach him, they began almost to consider themselves a fourth branch of the government of the country. From this height of power nothing but their own conduct could have brought them down.

The question as to the propriety of taking off from the Catholics in these kingdoms those restrictions which prevent them from holding various offices of trust and power is one of a very important, extensive, and difficult nature. Aware of the impossibility of forcing the whole extent of the measure which they had in 1805 submitted to Parliament, the ministry

resolved to carry it by subdivisions ; and the first proposition with which they began related to the admission of Catholics to the higher situations in the army. By the existing laws Catholics may, in Ireland, hold any commission below that of major-general on the staff ; but this privilege, which was conceded to them by the Irish Parliament in 1793, never was granted to the Catholics of England ; so that a man entering the army legally in Ireland might upon the removal of his corps to England, become subject to severe penalties. This is certainly an absurdity in theory, although the inconsistency has been remedied in practice, the penal laws having been suffered to sleep in England as far as they have been abrogated in Ireland. This inconsistency, however, was what ministers resolved first to correct ; and some insignificant disturbances that took place about this time in some counties of Ireland, occasioned by disputes about tithes, and carried on by a set of people calling themselves 'Threshers,' afforded a pretext for what was to be called a measure of conciliation. In point of fact, these disturbances were totally unconnected with religious differences, since the 'Threshers,' were many of them Protestants ; and at any rate no legislative concession could be required to quiet them, since it was a boast of the Duke of Bedford's friends that he had suppressed these commotions by the ordinary course of law. The truth, however, probably was that the coalition had so deeply pledged themselves to the Catholics when out of power, that now they were in office they found it impossible wholly to withstand the solicitations they received in consequence of their former professions. In fact, the language held by Lord Grenville when he brought forward the question in 1805 rendered it impossible for him ever to put it off upon the ground of circumstances. 'It is urged,' he said, 'that this is not a proper time to bring this question before Parliament. I answer, this year is the proper time—next year is the proper time—the year after, and every year, is the proper time. It is a question that cannot be too often discussed and brought under the consideration of Parliament and the country.'

Finding it, therefore, difficult altogether to refuse the Catholics their support, and at the same time feeling that a full concession of their demands would be impracticable, the Ministers thought that by granting some smaller boon they should, for the present, satisfy one set of people without going so far as to alarm another. It was thus that they determined to extend to both countries the provisions of the Irish Act of 1793.

When the proposal was made to the King he expressed a considerable repugnance to accede to it. But after a correspondence with the Cabinet, at length he was finally induced to consent to it. He accompanied this consent, however, with the following written declaration: 'That while his Majesty agreed to the measure proposed, particularly adverting to the provisions of the Act of 1793, he felt it necessary to declare that *he would not go one step further.*' Lord Howick then gave notice that he should propose certain clauses in the *Mutiny Bill* to enable the Catholics to hold *certain* commissions in the army; and a despatch was sent to Ireland, containing those clauses, which Mr. Elliot, the Secretary, was to communicate to the Catholics. In the conference which took place upon this subject the Catholic deputies asked Mr. Elliot whether it was meant merely to extend to England the Irish Act of 1793, or whether *all commissions* in the army and navy were to be opened to them. To this question it appears Mr. Elliot was unable, from the want of precision in the despatch in which the views of the Government had been explained, to give a decisive answer, and consequently he wrote back to ascertain clearly the intentions of the Cabinet. Another despatch was then sent to him, and this despatch clearly expressed that his Majesty was to be empowered to confer *any commission* or appointment in the army or navy upon *all descriptions* of his subjects *without any exception whatever*: it added that this concession was no longer to be made by a clause in the Mutiny Act,¹ but by a separate enactment. This second despatch was sent to Windsor to the King, and being returned without comment was transmitted to Ireland. On the following Wednesday, the day on which the Mutiny Bill was to be committed and the separate Bill brought in, Lord Howick had an audience with the King upon the business of his office, and after it was over the King asked him what was coming on that day in the House of Commons. Lord Howick said that the committee on the Mutiny Bill stood as the order for the day, and explained to the King the nature of the change that had taken place, and the reasons which had induced it. The King then asked whether the separate Bill intended to be brought forward was not the same as the Irish Act. Lord Howick, in reply, stated the degree in which they differed, observing that this difference had

¹ The measure extending now to the *navy*, to which the Mutiny Act does not apply, it became obviously necessary to make it the subject of a separate Bill.

been explained to his Majesty in the last despatch which had been submitted to him. 'And here, Sir,' said Lord Howick, in his explanatory speech on the 26th March,¹ 'I must acknowledge that his Majesty, upon that occasion, did express a general dislike and disapprobation of this measure—I mean to state everything frankly—but I did understand our conversation to conclude by the King giving his consent—a reluctant consent, I admit—or perhaps it would be more correctly stated by *not withdrawing the consent which he had originally given*—to carrying out the views of his Government. I conceived, therefore, that I had still sufficient authority, as a member of that Government, for the introduction of the Bill that had been prepared.'

In consequence of this conception, Lord Howick, the next day or the day after, introduced the said Bill, and some discussion took place between him and Perceval, who opposed it. On the following Wednesday, Lord Howick did not attend the levée, on account of the death of a near relation; but the King signified to Lord Grenville his decided disapprobation of the measure that had been brought forward, and the misconception of its extent, under which his consent to it had been originally given, having before expressed his objections to it; and in consequence of this explanation Lord Howick on the next day postponed the further reading of the Bill, which ministers finally resolved to drop altogether. A minute was accordingly transmitted to the King, stating this determination, but making three demands—1st, that they should be allowed when they dropped the Bill to state the strong persuasion they entertained individually of the advantage which would result to the Empire from a different system of policy towards the Catholics of Ireland; 2nd, that they should be allowed openly to avow these sentiments, not only on withdrawing the Bill, but in the possible event of the discussion of the Catholic petition in Parliament; and, 3rd, that notwithstanding the deference which they had thought it their duty to show on the present occasion to the opinions and feelings expressed by his Majesty, they should be free to submit from time to time, as their duty was, for his Majesty's decision, such measures respecting Ireland as the course of circumstances should appear to require. In answer to this minute, the King expressed some dissatisfaction that the ministers should feel it necessary as individuals to express their opinions on withdrawing the Bill, but required them absolutely to withdraw the latter part of their declaration, stating that he

¹ From which the account of this audience is taken almost verbatim.

never would consent to any concessions to the Catholics which they might in future propose to him, and requiring a positive assurance in writing, which, as they conceived, would not only preclude them from proposing concessions to the Catholics, but from all measures connected with such concessions. The ministers refused to withdraw their statement, or to give the written assurance demanded; and the King communicated to them his intention of intrusting the management of his affairs to other ministers. Lord Grenville and Lord Howick then asked and obtained from the King permission to state to Parliament the circumstances which led to the change of ministry; and their statements, made in the Lords on the 26th March, and in the Commons on the same day, were subsequently published.

In reviewing this transaction, it must immediately strike one as a singular circumstance that, in submitting to the King a proposition connected with a subject upon which he was known to entertain such a decided opinion, sufficient care should not have been taken by Lord Howick to avoid the possibility of a misconception. Is it possible that he or Lord Grenville are so unused to composition, or so ignorant of the force of words, as not to be able to draw up a despatch without leaving doubtful and ill explained so very material a point as that upon which the essence of the measure they were about to adopt depended? It is but a poor excuse for them to say that the King misunderstood them. It was their bounden duty to take care that he should not misunderstand them; and suffering him to misconceive their proposal was nearly as culpable as an attempt to deceive him with regard to it would have been.

But if ministers cannot be acquitted of some degree of insincerity in their transactions with the King previous to the explanation, neither can their subsequent conduct be in any way reconciled with the respect which they owed to their Sovereign, or the constitutional principles by which it was their duty to have been guided. When, from deference to the King's opinions, they dropped the obnoxious Bill, there were but two lines of conduct which they could with propriety pursue. If they thought that the safety of Ireland was consistent with the King's ideas respecting the Catholics, they should have adopted those ideas without reserve; but if it appeared to them that nothing could permanently secure the tranquillity of the country but such an enlargement of the political privileges of that description of its inhabitants as it was contrary to the King's

determination to grant, it was incumbent upon them to resign situations which they could no longer hold without compromising their own honour, or sacrificing the public advantage. *But they viewed the matter in another light, and insisted upon retaining both their places and their opinions.* They asserted that nothing but their strong conviction of the imperious necessity of adopting some measure to relieve the Catholics from the restrictions under which they laboured would have induced them to propose the measure which they had framed for that purpose: and yet, though nothing had occurred to diminish that imperious necessity, they consented to withdraw their proposals and retain their places, thereby taking upon themselves all the responsibility of any of those fatal effects to the country which they prophesied would be the inevitable consequences of rejecting their advice. It is idle to contend that, by stating in Parliament the opinions on which they did not act, they exempted themselves from the responsibility which might result from the Sovereign's disregard of those opinions, since ministers are and must be responsible for any policy, whether active or passive, that is adopted while they remain in power. If this were not so, an unprincipled minister might sanction and give effect to the most profligate policy by his acquiescence in it, and yet secure himself from punishment by saying that he had disapproved of it. The course, therefore, which, till this instance has invariably been pursued, is, that so long as the King and his ministers think together, or the former is willing to give way to the latter, the administration goes on; that upon points not concerning the great interests of the country, the latter may even concede to the opinion of the former; but that whenever discussions arise between the Sovereign and his Cabinet upon great and important questions, if a difference of opinion should unfortunately take place, and neither party succeed in convincing the other, the ministers are bound in honour to retire from their situations and give the King an opportunity of ascertaining whether he can find other servants who will enter more readily into his views. Should he succeed, and the new ministers begin to execute his ideas, either by proposing or omitting to propose any particular measure, then those who went out may properly, as individual members of Parliament, oppose to their utmost what they resisted when in office. Should he fail in his search, then comes into operation one of those salutary checks which the practice of the Constitution has imposed on the royal prerogative, and the Sovereign must necessarily abandon a line of

conduct which he cannot find men of character and ability willing to pursue.

This review of the circumstances and constitutional bearings which surrounded the fall of the notorious ministry of 'All the Talents' is dated in October, when Lord Palmerston, after six months of office, found leisure to carry on his Journal. The new ministerial arrangements consequent on the fall of the Grenville Administration had, however, been completed at the end of March. Outgoing ministers had, as if in mockery of their boastful demeanour, been succeeded by a body of men who were directed by a nobleman whose natural incapacity was aided by indolence and aggravated by sickness. The Duke of Portland, however, on becoming Prime Minister, had secured a powerful colleague in the person of Mr. Canning, who went to the Foreign Office. Lord Palmerston, as we have seen, became one of the Lords of the Admiralty, thus beginning his official even before his Parliamentary career.

CHAPTER II.

IN PARLIAMENT—SPEECH IN REGARD TO THE COPENHAGEN EXPEDITION—VISITS HIS IRISH ESTATES—IS OFFERED THE CHANCELLORSHIP OF THE EXCHEQUER—REFUSES, AND BECOMES SECRETARY AT WAR—MEMBER FOR CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY—SPEECH ON BRINGING FORWARD THE ESTIMATES—DESCRIBES A SHOOTING PARTY IN ESSEX—CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AS TO THE POSITION OF SECRETARY AT WAR.

A FEW months after Lord Palmerston's entry into the Admiralty he very nearly exchanged it for a place in that office with which his later career was so closely identified. Lord FitzHarris had resigned the post of Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Lord Malmesbury, knowing Lord Palmerston's wishes in the matter, asked Mr. Canning to appoint him to the place. Canning expressed himself very willing to do so, should a Mr. Bagot decline, to whom he unfortunately had already offered it. Mr. Bagot, however, accepted; and although, as Lord Malmesbury records, Canning even then wished to bring about an exchange, so as to secure Lord Palmerston's services at the Foreign Office, it could not be effected. It was not till after nearly a quarter of a century that Lord Palmerston was called upon to carry out the policy of that statesman, close association with whom he had sought and so nearly attained during his first year of official life.

This was also, as we have seen, the commencement of his Parliamentary life. There was not so much and such constant talking in the House of Commons then as there is now. People did not take up the morning's reports of the debates and again put them down, lost amidst the wilderness of commonplace remarks of com-

monplace men on commonplace subjects, which, in the flattering way it has become the fashion to adopt in speaking of ourselves, we call business-like speaking, but which in reality is for the most part twaddle, and prevents or impedes the transaction of business.

The ordinary affairs of Government, which after all have to be gone through as a matter of course, with little or much speech about them, were permitted to pass off quietly, without every member making a speech which no other member wanted to hear. Any great affair was debated in a great manner by the leading men. When a new member was animated by ambition, he made a trial of his strength, and was judged by the assembly he addressed as fit or unfit to be one of the select to be listened to. The ordeal was a severe one. But the novice who passed it with tolerable credit in the judgment of those men whose opinion was the test of success and failure, and who knew at once how to detect mind—which, if accompanied by energy, ends in giving ascendancy in any body of men who live much together—was henceforth classed, and almost certain, if he persevered in a Parliamentary career, to obtain place and distinction.

A first speech under such circumstances was an important affair. Lord Palmerston thus speaks of his own :—

In September of this year (1807), Copenhagen was taken, and the Danish fleet carried off.

The Danish expedition was the great subject of debate at the beginning of the Session in 1808. Papers relating to it were laid before Parliament. At that time lay Lords of the Admiralty had nothing to do but to sign their names. I had leisure, therefore, to study the Copenhagen papers, and put together a speech, on which I received many compliments. Robert Milnes,¹ better known as Orator Milnes, had made a splendid speech on the first night of the discussion.

He chose to make a second speech on a following night, to show that he was as good in reply as on preparation. His

¹ Father of the present Lord Houghton.

speech was a bad one, and my first speech was thought better than his second.

The motion in opposition to which Lord Palmerston, then 24 years of age, made his maiden speech was for the production of papers which should show the grounds on which the Administration had advised His Majesty to employ naval and military forces in the expedition against Copenhagen. His address was chiefly remarkable as giving an early indication of those views with regard to secrecy as being necessary in diplomacy, which he in his after career so persistently advocated. He thus writes modestly to his sister:—

Admiralty: Feb. 4, 1808.

My dear Elizabeth,—You will see by this day's paper that I was tempted by some evil spirit to make a fool of myself for the entertainment of the House last night; however, I thought it was a good opportunity of breaking the ice, although one should flounder a little in doing so, as it was impossible to talk any very egregious nonsense upon so good a cause. Canning's speech was one of the most brilliant and convincing I ever heard; it lasted near three hours. He carried the House with him throughout, and I have scarcely ever heard such loud and frequent cheers. Ponsonby¹ was dull and heavy, and neither Windham nor Whitbread were as good as usual; in fact, Canning's speech was so powerful that it gave a decisive turn to the debate. Lord Granville Leveson² made a very good speech, and stated an important fact—that all the impartial people in Russia, and other parts of the Continent, as far as he had any opportunity of collecting their sentiments, highly applauded, instead of condemning, our Danish expedition. Our division was not so large as I expected.³ The Opposition were not more numerous, but we were less so than I expected. I thought we should have had three to one, but during this weather it is difficult to get people to come up to town.

Adieu! my best love to all.

¹ Described in the *Whig Guide*, it is said by Palmerston, as a 'squat gentleman, prolific in commonplaces.'

² Then Secretary at War. He became Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and afterwards at Paris, and was created Earl Granville.

³ For the motion, 108; against it, 253; majority for Government, 145.

Admiralty : Feb. 6, 1808.

Many thanks for your congratulations. I certainly felt glad when the thing was over, though I began to fear I had exposed myself; but my friends were so obliging as to say I had not talked much nonsense, and I began in a few hours afterwards to be reconciled to my fate. The papers have not been very liberal in their allowance of report to me; but the outline of what I said was as follows. In the first place, that the House was, to a certain degree, pledged by the address, in which they expressed their approbation of the expedition; but that the papers were in themselves improper to be produced, as they would betray the sources from whence we obtained intelligence, and expose the authors to Buonaparte's vengeance. That they were unnecessary, because the expedition could be justified without them. That Zealand and the Danish fleet was an object to France; that the neutrality of Denmark would have been no protection, as Buonaparte never did respect neutrality, and was not likely to do so now, when the temptation was the strongest, and his facility the greatest: and that in fact it was evident he did intend to seize the fleet. That Denmark was unable to resist; but, if she had possessed the means, was unwilling to have exerted them, since it was evident from various circumstances that she had determined to join France. Her refusal to accept our offers of alliance proved this. If we could have defended Denmark, the Crown Prince proved his hostility by refusing our guarantee; if we could not, how could the Danes have defended themselves without our assistance? on either supposition ministers were equally justified. In conclusion I adverted to the slight inconsistency in those who, having sent out orders to Lord St. Vincent to do the same thing at Lisbon which we did at Copenhagen, although subsequent events prevented these orders from being executed, now blame ministers for having acted at Copenhagen on their own principles. I was about half an hour on my legs; I did not feel so much alarmed as I expected to be.

Ever your affectionate brother,

PALMERSTON.

The speech to which this correspondence alludes was evidently composed with much care, and in those parts which had been carefully consigned to memory was spoken with great ease and facility; but in others there was that hesitation and superabundance of gesture.

with the hands, which were perceptible to the last when Lord Palmerston spoke unprepared, and was seeking for words; for though he always used the right word, it often cost him pains to find it. This marred, no doubt, the continued effect of his delivery, and made him doubtful, as we have seen, at first as to the impression he had produced; but everyone recognised that a clever, well-instructed young man had been speaking, and made ready allowance for defects which might not remain, and to which if they did the House would become accustomed.

If there are any still entertaining doubts as to the necessity of the action which the orator defended, it may be as well to direct their attention to two letters to be found in the recently-published correspondence of Napoleon:—

A M. DE TALLEYRAND.

Saint-Cloud, 31 Juillet, 1807.

Le même courrier continuera sa route sur Copenhague, et sera porteur d'une lettre à mon ministre, par laquelle vous lui ferez connaître mon mécontentement de ce que les promesses qu'a faites le Danemark n'ont point d'effet, et que la correspondance continue avec l'Angleterre.

Dimanche, au plus tard, vous aurez une conférence sur ce sujet avec M. de Dreher. Vous lui direz que, quel que soit mon désir de ménager Danemark, je ne puis empêcher qu'il ne se ressente de la violation qu'il a laissé faire de la Russie, il faut nécessairement qu'il choisisse, ou de faire la guerre à l'Angleterre, ou de me la faire.

NAPOLÉON.

Au Maréchal BERNADOTTE, Gouverneur des Villes Hanséatiques.

Saint-Cloud, 2 Août, 1807.

Je ne veux pas tarder à vous faire connaître mes intentions, qu'il faut tenir secrètes jusqu'au dernier moment.

Si l'Angleterre n'accepte pas la médiation de la Russie, il faut que le Danemark lui déclare la guerre, ou que je la déclare au Danemark. Vous serez destiné, dans ce dernier cas, à vous emparer de tout le continent danois.

NAPOLÉON.

Another letter from Lord Palmerston to his sister, though it relates to matters strictly private, shows in the most agreeable manner his business-like habits and generous and liberal views, and might serve as a lesson to English landlords having Irish estates :—

Cliffoney : September 12, 1808.

.... The rain, which had commenced the morning we left Dublin, and had continued with little intermission, was more particularly violent this day, and William,¹ who was not so much interested in seeing the estate as in keeping himself dry, returned home very soon. We, however, persevered, and saw the greatest part of the estate. Thursday I employed in walking and riding about the town of Sligo with Chambers, and Friday we took another ride over the whole of that part of the estate which lies connected by the sea-coast. I find there is a great deal, I may almost say, everything, to be done, and it will be absolutely necessary for me to repeat my visit next summer, and probably make it annual for some time. It is a tract of country about two miles broad and six long, bounded on one side by the sea, and on the other by bog and high, craggy mountains. It is wholly unimproved; but almost all the waste ground or bog is capable of being brought into cultivation, and all the arable may be rendered worth three times its present value. This, however, must be the work of time, and to accomplish it much must be done. The present objects which I must in the first instance set about, are to put the parish church in a state of repair, so as to make it fit for service; to establish schools, to make roads, and to get rid of the middlemen in some cases where it can be accomplished. After that, as opportunities occur, I mean to endeavour to introduce a Scotch farmer, to teach the people how to improve their land; to establish a little manufacturing village in a central part of the estate, where there are great advantages of water and stone; and to build a pier and make a little port near a village that stands on a point of land projecting into Donegal Bay, and called Mullaghmore. The schools and roads, however, are the most important points at present, and the condition of the people calls loudly for both. The thirst for education is so great that there are now three or four schools upon the estate. The people join in engaging some itinerant master; they run him up a miserable mud

¹ His brother, Mr. William Temple.

hut on the roadside, and the boys pay him half a crown, or some five shillings, a quarter. They are taught reading, writing, arithmetic, and what, from the appearance of the establishment, no one would imagine, Latin, and even Greek.

Roads are the first necessity for the improvement of the land. The sea-coast abounds with a shelly sand, which is the best possible manure for boggy ground; and roads of communication between the shore and the upper country will enable the inhabitants of the bogs to reclaim their waste ground with this manure, and the people on the seaside to get turf for fuel from the bogs; and both are in need of a ready communication with Sligo market.

The worst circumstance attending the property is that it is so populous. Every farm swarms with little holders, who have each four or five, or at the utmost ten or twelve, acres. They are too poor to improve their land, and yet it is impossible to turn them out, as they have no other means of subsistence. Their condition, however, will be improved as I gradually get rid of the middlemen, or petty landlords.

These people take a certain quantity of ground, reserve to themselves a small portion, and let out the rest to under-tenants. They make these unfortunate devils pay the rent of the landlord, and an excess, which they keep themselves, and call a profit-rent, while they live upon the part they reserve without paying any rent for it. In my last ride the day was very fine, and the whole tenantry came out to meet me, to the number, in different places, of at least 200 or 300. The universal cry was, 'Give us roads, and no petty landlords!' . . .

What admirable news from Portugal! Last night we heard of the surrender of Lisbon and the fleet by an express from Cork to Dublin; but it was a necessary consequence of the battle, and one did not feel anxious about it. What will the croakers say now? They have not a twig left to perch upon. I only hope Saumarez¹ will fall in with the Russians in the Baltic, and then I think we shall have beat Alexander into the warmest friendship and regard for us. What a triumph to the Orders in Council is the opening of the Dutch ports! It is a complete confession of defeat by Buonaparte in the commercial as well as military contest he is waging with us; and I doubt not of equal success in both.

¹ The distinguished admiral, afterwards created, for his brilliant achievements, Lord de Saumarez. He was Nelson's second in command at the battle of the Nile.

A new era now takes place in Lord Palmerston's life. He had spoken but once since his entry into the House of Commons, and he was but twenty-five years of age when, by a singular combination of circumstances, he had an offer which would have turned most heads, but seems to have steadied his own.

The well-known quarrel between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, about the conduct of the Walcheren expedition, had ended in a duel, and led to the necessity of a change of ministry, though not to the downfall of the party in the possession of power. Mr. Perceval became Prime Minister, and had to fill up important places without any very ready means of doing so with men of established reputation. He turned, not unnaturally, therefore, to those young men who had given promise of ability; and amongst these was undoubtedly the Junior Lord of the Admiralty, who could hardly, however, have expected the proposal which he now received, and to which he thus alludes:—

I was at that time (the breaking-up of the Portland Ministry) at Broadlands (October, 1809), and received a letter from Perceval, desiring me to come to town immediately, as he had a proposal to make to me which he thought would be agreeable: I went up to town, and he offered me the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. I was a good deal surprised at so unexpected an offer, and begged a little time to think of it, and to consult my friends. Perceval said that if I declined to be Chancellor of the Exchequer he should perhaps be able to offer me the War Office; but he felt bound to offer it first to Milnes. I wrote to Lord Malmesbury, then at Park Place, and consulted with Lord Mulgrave, then First Lord of the Admiralty. The result was that I declined the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, as too hazardous an attempt for so young and inexperienced a man, and accepted the offer of Secretary at War.¹

The following is the correspondence to which Lord Palmerston alludes:—

Oct. 16, 1809.

My dear Lord Malmesbury,—I got to town this morning, and went to Perceval's, and was, as you may imagine, infinitely

¹ Sworn a member of the Privy Council on November 1.

surprised at the proposal he had to make to me. He stated that, having been deprived of the assistance of Huskisson¹ and Sturges Bourne, he felt much in need of some one to take off his shoulders part of the labour of his offices in and out of the House; that he meant for that purpose to divide the situations of Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Lord of the Treasury, and proposed to me to take the former. Annexed to this office he offered a seat in the Cabinet if I chose it, and he thought it better I should have it. I, of course, expressed to him how much honoured I felt by this very flattering proof of the good opinion he was pleased to entertain of me, but also my great fears that I should find myself wholly incompetent for the situation, both from my inexperience in the details of matters of finance, and my want of practice in public speaking. To this he replied that he should of course take the principal share of the Treasury business, both in and out of the House. That in the office Harrison and his own secretary would be able to afford me great assistance, and that in the House practice would soon enable me to get on well enough for the purposes of business. He said that he felt great difficulty in finding anyone to take the situation, and that he did not at the moment know of anyone else to whom he could offer it. He named Milnes, Member for Pomfret—the man who made so great a figure as a speaker—as the only other person he had thought of. Upon further conversation, he appeared to think it possible that I might come in at first as a Lord of the Treasury, and afterwards, if upon fagging at the business between this and the meeting of Parliament, I found it likely I could take the Chancellorship, I could be promoted to it. The inconvenience, however, of this arrangement would be, that if I declined it ultimately, he might not be able to find anyone else in the short interval which would possibly elapse, and that then I should not be of so much use to him in the House, as not carrying so much weight as if I held the Chancellorship. Thirdly, he suggested that it was possible that if I felt objections to either of these proposals, the office of Secretary at War² might be to be disposed of, if I chose to take that. I own I feel the most extreme embarrassment to know what answer to give. Of course one's vanity and ambition

¹ Huskisson had been Secretary of the Treasury, and Sturges Bourne one of the Lords of the Treasury.

² This office, which had to deal with the accounts of the War Department, was distinct from that of the Secretary for War, who was, properly speaking, the war minister, and usually held the Colonial Department.

would lead one to accept the brilliant offer first proposed ; but it is throwing for a *great stake*, and where much is to be gained, *very much* also may be lost. I have always thought it unfortunate for anyone, and particularly a young man, to be put above his proper level, as he only rises to fall the lower. Now, I am quite without knowledge of finance, and never but once spoke in the House. The approaching session will be one of infinite difficulty. Perceval says that the state of the finances of this country, as calculated to carry on the war, is very embarrassing ; and from what has lately happened in public affairs, from the number of speakers in opposition, and the few debaters on our side of the question, the warfare of the House of Commons will certainly be for us very severe. I don't know upon which of the two points I should feel most alarmed. By fagging and assistance I might get on in the office, but fear that I never should be able to act my part properly in the House. A good deal of debating must of course devolve upon the person holding the Chancellorship of the Exchequer ; all persons not born with the talents of Pitt or Fox must make many bad speeches at first if they speak a great deal on many subjects, as they cannot be masters of all, and a bad speech, though tolerated in any person not in a responsible situation, would make a Chancellor of the Exchequer exceedingly ridiculous, particularly if his friends could not set off against his bad oratory a great knowledge and capacity for business ; and I should be apprehensive that, instead of materially assisting Perceval, I should only bring disgrace and ridicule upon him and myself. The second proposal of coming in first as simply a Lord of the Treasury, at first sight is liable to fewer objections of the above sort. I might, to a certain degree, qualify myself for the other office in the interval between this and the meeting of Parliament ; but still the same objections hold good as to the parliamentary part if I ultimately take the other—and it would not be fair to Perceval and the Government to come into the Treasury unless with a pretty determined view of taking the Chancellorship, as it might be difficult, if not impossible, when near the opening of the session, for Perceval to make the division of his offices which he wishes. There are now two seats in the Treasury vacant, and of course one must be filled by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whoever he may be : it would therefore be impossible, probably, to keep one vacant for any great length of time ; so that I think I am in a great degree called upon to make my determination as to the office now. And thus the second proposal, I think, reduces itself to

a choice between taking the office now, or being raised to it gradually by a previous seat at the Treasury board. I should myself strongly incline to being Secretary at War. From what one has heard of the office, it seems one better suited to a beginner, and in which I might hope not to fail, or in which one would not be so prominent if one did not at first do as well as one ought to do. Perceval said, however, that he must see me again before he could positively say that this was at his disposal. He has given me till *Wednesday* to consider. He at first proposed to have my answer to-morrow, but I begged to have till the next day, as I thought by that time I could have your sentiments upon the subject. I think the choice lies between being Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary at War, since the latter I should certainly prefer to being a Lord of the Treasury simply, another being the Chancellor and Perceval First Lord. Perceval did not mention whether the seat in the Cabinet would go with the War Office; but that, though a great honour, and certainly an assistance in debate, should not, I think, alone determine my choice. One consideration not to be wholly overlooked is, that we may probably not remain in long enough to retrieve any blunders made at the outset; and the ground of the War Office is, I think, *quite* high enough for me to leave off upon. Our party is certainly ill off for second-rates, but if Perceval cannot find another as good as me for the Exchequer, it's clear, I think, that we are too weak to stand. Milnes would probably not take it unless his ambition got the better of his partiality to Canning and his aversion to Perceval; and though a man of very brilliant talents, I should much doubt his steadiness; but there must be many well fitted for the office.

Yours most affectionately,

PALMERSTON.

New Hall: Oct. 17, 1809.

My dear Harry,

Nothing can be more flattering to you nor of course more pleasing to me than Perceval's offer to you. In different times, and under less perplexing circumstances, I should not demur as to the propriety of your accepting the Chancellorship of the Exchequer; for although it is a post which requires great labour and knowledge of finance, yet you would easily get habituated to the first, and soon acquire the latter. By what I say of the 'times,' I do not refer to the probable short duration of this Government—that consideration would be a narrow and

selfish motive for refusing to become a member of it ; but I mean the peculiarly irritated state of the country, and the dangers which menace it from abroad ; and I cannot wish you to be placed at once *in the breach*, to experience all the buffetings to which this would expose you, without the adequate means of resisting and counteracting them. I therefore am decidedly of opinion that you would not act fairly either by Perceval, by the public, or by yourself, were you to undertake the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, either in the first instance, or after the sort of preparatory seminary in which he proposes to place you ; since, by taking the one post, you would virtually pledge yourself to accept the other ; and if, at the expiration of the time stated, you were to decline it, you would increase the difficulties you are desirous to alleviate. Without hesitation, I advise you to decline the greater office, and I do it more confidently, since every reason I could possibly urge you have anticipated in your very judicious and most rational remarks.

But, on the other hand, I am strongly inclined to recommend you to take the Secretaryship at War (with the Cabinet). It is a very reputable situation, which, without bringing you too forward at *once*, will, if you hold it a short time, infallibly lead you to the higher posts in the Cabinet, and one from which if you are dismissed you will not fall from a perilous height, or quit with any discredit.

I have not time to add a word more. I can have no objection, if it be of any use to you, for you to tell Perceval my opinion. I wish his Government to be strong and lasting from the bottom of my heart.

Most truly and affectionately yours,
M.

Admiralty : Oct. 18, 1809.

My dear Lord Malmesbury,

I have many thanks to give you for your very kind letter, which afforded me great satisfaction, by confirming the opinion which I had at first entertained of Perceval's very flattering proposal, and which had been strengthened by all the reflection I had been able to bestow on the subject during the time that has elapsed since I wrote to you. I am just returned from Perceval, to whom I stated the result of my deliberation ; and that, fully sensible of the honour he did me in offering me the Exchequer, I thought it most prudent to decline it, but should, however, feel much gratified by the appointment of Secretary at War, if it should be at his disposal. He then told

me very frankly that, as he had mentioned in our former interview, it depended upon certain other arrangements whether he should be able to give me the office. That, conceiving that Milnes would be a very great acquisition to Government, if the bias he had in favour of Canning did not prevent him from joining us, he had written to him to say that he had to offer him such an official situation as (if inclined to take any) he would probably be disposed to accept. That, should Milnes come up in consequence, he meant to offer him the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. But that it was possible Milnes might decline so ostensible a post, and that then, rather than run the risk of losing his support, he wished to offer him the War Office, which, in case he declined the other, he possibly might accept. That in such a case he would only have it in his power to offer me a seat at the Treasury, which he still hoped I would take, as it would let me more into business, and, if we stood our ground, pave the way to some further advance. He said he felt that this preference of Milnes might not appear very flattering to me, but he trusted that I should view it in its right light, as proceeding from his great anxiety to secure a doubtful friend who might be of essential service to our cause. I assured him that my principal wish was that his Government should receive every possible accession to strength, and that no personal considerations would prevent me from acquiescing in any arrangement which could conduce to that end, but that in point of fact the first offer he had made me of the Exchequer was so very flattering, that, having declined that, I could not in any case object to giving Milnes the preference as to the War Office, and that should he decide to take it, I should very willingly take a seat at the Treasury. I trust you will approve of this resolution. It may not at first sight appear worth while to move from hence to the Treasury; but in as far as it will initiate me into Treasury business, and give me better opportunities of communicating with Perceval and others as to the matter and conduct of debates which may arise, it will be a desirable move. Perceval then told me, in strict confidence (which, however, I do not consider myself as violating in mentioning it to *you*), that there was an idea of making George Rose Chancellor of the Exchequer; that the King had objected to it upon the ground of his being Clerk of the Parliament—an office he thought inconsistent with the other; that this objection, however, might perhaps be obviated; that this appointment would, however, be considered as temporary, and that if the Administration lasted, I might still look forward

to the situation. Whatever may be the result of this business, it must always be a source of great pride and gratification to me to have been thought worthy of so splendid an offer; and I am persuaded that no after thoughts will diminish the satisfaction I feel of having been right in declining it.

Admiralty : Oct. 23, 1809, 6 o'clock.

I have time only just to tell you that Milnes has come to town, and having had a long conference with Perceval, and also one with Canning, he has determined, upon hearing both sides, heartily to support Perceval, but declines office altogether. This latter resolution, which surprised me exceedingly, is founded upon real and unaffected diffidence. I think it a great pity, both for him and for us, as he would be more useful in office than out of it. The War Office has consequently come to me, conditionally, however, upon arrangements I will presently mention. In the meantime, Perceval having very handsomely given me the option of the Cabinet with the War Office (if I go to it), I thought it best on the whole to decline it; and I trust that, although you seemed to be of a different opinion at first, you will not, on the whole, think I was wrong. The office is one which does not invariably, or, indeed, usually go with the Cabinet. A seat there was consequently not an object to me for appearance' sake; and considering how young I am in office, people in general, so far from expecting to see me in the Cabinet by taking the War Office, would perhaps only wonder how I got there. With the Exchequer it would have been necessary, but with the War Office certainly not; and the business of the Department will, I take it, be quite sufficient to occupy one's time without attending Cabinet Councils. It would undoubtedly have been highly interesting; but for all purposes of business or debate, Perceval will of course keep one sufficiently informed to answer all one's wishes, at first at least. The situations which Perceval wishes to keep unsettled till to-morrow, with the intention of giving me one or other, according as it may best suit his other arrangements, are—the War Office, the Treasurer of the Navy, and the Board of Trade, should Rose¹ take the Exchequer.

Admiralty : Oct. 25, 1809.

I am to dine to-morrow at Perceval's to meet Milnes and Lowther, and shall probably hear something more about my

¹ Right Hon. Geo. Rose was Vice-President of the Board of Trade and Treasurer of the Navy.

own fate. We have had very bad accounts this morning from Flushing. There are but three thousand five hundred men fit for duty out of the whole garrison, and the enemy are rapidly increasing their preparations for attack. The Cabinet have not yet decided whether the island is to be, or, indeed, can be, retained or not. The officers of the two services have given twenty different and contradictory opinions on the subject, and Strachan himself has changed his mind three or four times about it. His present opinion is, that it is not tenable without an enormous naval force, amounting to what would be equivalent to at least eighteen sail of the line, besides the same fleet which would be necessary for the blockade if we had not the island. The navy continues perfectly healthy, but the land sickness seems rather to increase than abate.

Admiralty : Oct. 27, 1809.

Upon Rose declining to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Long,¹ I believe, giving the same answer, it was yesterday settled that I should be Secretary at War, and I accordingly entered upon my functions this morning. There appears to be full employment in the office, but at the same time not of a nature to alarm one, and I think I shall like it very much. The jubilee seems to have been very happily celebrated everywhere. Nothing could be better than its effect in London, and the town appeared in the evening to be as quiet and orderly as could possibly be wished. The public offices and a few other buildings were illuminated, and the mob were occupied the whole night in gazing at them, and cheering as any carriage passed by. The only exercise of their sovereign authority was compelling all the coachmen and servants to pull off their hats as they passed the illuminated crowns over the Admiralty gate. We were the great attraction, and the bulk of the mob were stationed opposite this building the whole of the night. Nothing seems yet to be known of the terms of peace, although no doubt can be entertained of its having been signed. But Strahremberg,² two days before the news arrived, was presenting papers, containing assurances from persons at his court, that peace would not take place, and that they were resolved upon breaking the armistice.

War Office : Nov. 9, 1809.

It has at length been determined to abandon Walcheren. I

¹ The Right Hon. Charles Long was joint Paymaster-General of the Forces.

² Prince Strahremberg, Austrian ambassador in London.

fear it could not possibly have been retained without an expense infinitely beyond its value ; and the peace between France and Austria will at least furnish a pretence for the measure. It is only to be regretted that this decision was not sooner taken, as the Cabinet have for a month had all the documents before them on which it is founded, and in the mean time a great number of lives have been lost by the disorder in the island. I am going to Cambridge this evening, to vote at an election for a public orator to-morrow, and return to town on Saturday or Sunday. I continue to like this office very much. *There is a good deal to be done ; but if one is confined it is some satisfaction to have some real business to do ; and if they leave us in long enough, I trust much may be accomplished in arranging the interior details of the office, so as to place it on a respectable footing.*

Its inadequacy to get through the current business that comes before it is really a disgrace to the country ; and the arrear of Regimental Accounts unsettled is of a magnitude not to be conceived. We are now working at the Treasury, to induce them to agree to a plan, proposed originally by Sir James Pulteney, and reconsidered by Granville Leveson,¹ by which I think we shall provide for the current business, and the arrear must then be got rid of as well as we can contrive to do it.

War Office : Nov. 24, 1809.

I am glad to find Lord Wellesley has so readily accepted the offer made to him, and that he does it with such cheerful views of the prospect before him. He writes to Arbuthnot that, although the present situation of affairs in Europe was certainly far from promising, he yet hoped that much might still be accomplished, and felt, at all events, confident that as much could be done as had been performed by any ministry since the death of Mr. Pitt. He was to set out in the *Donegal* immediately, and may be expected to arrive in the course of a week or ten days. I find old Dundas has a strong national propensity to a job. He sent me a letter the other day to say, that the King having signified his pleasure that *General Delancey* should be made a Commissioner for managing Chelsea Hospital, he requested I would make out a warrant appointing him one accordingly. It struck me that this was so very objectionable a thing, and one for which I should perhaps be held so personally responsible, that I communicated the thing to Perceval, who fully

¹ The two Secretaries at War, who had held that office in succession immediately before Lord Palmerston.

agreed with me as to the impropriety of the appointment, and the affair has, in consequence, been stopped. I wonder that Dundas was not aware of the impolicy to himself and General Delancey of bringing the latter again under public discussion, when the best he can hope is to have his conduct forgotten.¹ The Treasury are endeavouring to sound the disposition of members by letters announcing the time fixed for the meeting of Parliament; but, generally speaking, they do not seem apprehensive of any great defalcation. Some speculating politicians will probably not attend at first, and some votes will be unavailable the first day or two, from their seats being vacant by office; but it appears to be thought that if we stand the first brunt of attack we shall rather gain than lose strength. Petty's elevation to the Upper House is a great circumstance for us, not so much from the harm which he would have done us by his individual attacks, as from the unity and vigour the Opposition would have acquired by placing him, ostensibly at least, at their head; a situation for which he was well qualified, but into which there is not another individual among them whom they can with equal advantage elect.

It is supposed that Tierney will succeed Ponsonby, who decidedly retires; but Tierney is not the man whom many on that side of the House would willingly follow; they neither respect nor trust him.

The acceptance of the War Office, as detailed in the above correspondence, is perhaps the most remarkable

¹ Sir David Dundas, Commander-in-Chief. Lord Palmerston here alludes to the first report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, presented in 1806, 'from which it appeared that General Delancey, late Barrack-Master-General, who filled that office from 1793 to 1804, had been accustomed, in making up his accounts with the public, to take credit to himself for one per cent. on the whole expenditure of the barrack department, under the title of *contingencies for additional charge and responsibility for unsettled accounts*. It appeared also that he had charged the public twice in one year with his pay and allowances; from the whole of which it followed that, supposing his accounts, not yet audited, to be in other respects correct, but subducting these charges, which on no account could be allowed, he was indebted to the public in the sum of 97,415*l.*, instead of 6,865*l.*, which was the balance he acknowledged to be due by him.'—*Annual Register*, vol. xlviii. p. 79. He was also, according to the third report of the Commissioners, somewhat mixed up with Mr. Alex. Davison, Treasurer of the Ordnance, whose fraudulent transactions with the public money were brought before the notice of Parliament in 1807.—Vide *Annual Register*, vol. xlix. pp. 100–102. Sir David Dundas was his son-in-law.

circumstance in this biography. Nineteen out of twenty young men either hastily grasp at the highest post they can get, or, shrinking from the temptation to be great in their youth, consent to embrace mediocrity in after years. It requires more than an ordinary lantern to discover a man who is daily testing his own strength with confidence and without vanity; ready to use it to the full extent of its powers, and wary as to exerting it beyond them. But, though Lord Palmerston had declined the brilliant offer to accept the safe one, the addition which his position received from his new post was still considerable, and he was about to increase it by becoming member for the University which he had twice already essayed to represent; he was also in a foremost post in that great fight which was waging between the universal tyranny of Napoleon and the spirit of liberty which still defied him in Great Britain. The following letters to his sister relate to these two subjects and the ordinary occupations of a gay though busy man's existence. He is playing whist and drinking punch with the fellows at Cambridge. He is making, with considerable success, his first speech on the war estimates in the House of Commons. He is reading despatches from Lord Wellington in Portugal; he is shooting, and nearly shot by a spring gun at Mr. Conyers'; he is lending one of his comical hats for the hunting-field to his brother William at Broadlands. He is going in for life at every corner of it.

Admiralty: Jan. 4, 1810.

My dear Fanny,—I went to Cambridge on Monday evening, and spent Tuesday and yesterday in paying visits and playing whist and drinking punch with the fellows. I found everything looking very well, although a number of new candidates have been showing themselves; but I am not much apprehensive of their doing me much harm. Law,¹ a son of Lord Ellenborough, who is also of St. John's, has been about with Lord

¹ Afterwards Earl of Ellenborough, and Governor-General of India from 1842 to 1844.

John Townshend,¹ intending to stand upon Petty's interest; but among my friends I do not find that he has made any way, and though it has been expected that from being a Johnian he would draw off much of my strength, I do not much fear him. He is, besides, only nineteen and a half, so that at all events he cannot stand for a year and a half. I left Cambridge last night, and arrived here between six and seven this morning. The weather has been remarkably favourable for my purposes, being both mild and dry; and I suppose it has been equally propitious for William's snipe shooting.

Lower Grosvenor Street; Feb. 27, 1810.

I have been of late so busily engaged in preparing the army estimates, that I really have not had time to write to you. However, that ordeal is now nearly over, though there is still hanging over me some little discussion on the report. It is very gratifying to me to find that I got through the business in a manner that was generally considered satisfactory. My friends were of course bound to say that I had acquitted myself well; but I have received expressions of commendation from the Opposition which are the more flattering, as they may be considered as conveying the real opinion of those from whom they proceed. Windham was pleased to make honourable mention of me in his speech; and, what I certainly least expected, Whitbread, with whom I had never before exchanged a word, took occasion, as he met me entering the House yesterday, to say some very handsome things to me about perspicuity and information. The 'Courier' gives a very good report of what I said, barring a few mistakes in figures, of which, however, it is only surprising there are so few.

We had last night a most extraordinary display of folly, coarseness, and vulgarity from Fuller, who, because Sir John Anstruther,² Chairman of the Committee, would not take notice of him when he several times attempted to rise, in order to put some very gross and absurd questions to Lord Chatham, flew out into such a passion, and swore, and abused the Chairman and the House to such a degree that it became at last necessary to commit him to custody. As he went out he shook his fist at the Speaker, and said he was a d——d insignificant little puppy, and snapping his fingers at him, said he did not care *that*

¹ Lord John Townshend had formerly represented the University in Parliament from 1780 to 1784.

² A distinguished lawyer, who had been Chief Justice of Bengal from 1798 to 1806.

for him or the House either. He is now amusing himself with the Serjeant-at-Arms, and I think was very lucky in not being sent to Newgate or the Tower.

I shall not be able to get down to Park Place this week, but I have ordered a new pair of *pumps*, and as soon as they are ready I shall take the first opportunity of running down to join your dancing parties. . . .

Did you see the following epigram the other day in the 'Chronicle'? If you did not it is a pity you should miss it, and I send it to you; it is by Jekyll':—

'Lord Chatham, with his sword undrawn,
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
Sir Richard, eager to get at 'em,
Stood waiting—but for what?—Lord Chatham!'

It is very good, I think, both in rhyme and point.

Yorke, you see, has succeeded poor Eden² as Teller of the Exchequer. I cannot help thinking, on the whole, that it is almost a pity he has taken it, as he stood so high as an independent character; and the other day in the House, having said that he should support every and any Government during the life of the present king, he added, in answer to a taunting cheer from the Opposition, that he did it from independent conviction of what was right, and that he had nothing to *hope* or fear from any set of ministers. On the other hand, he is a very fit man for any mark of favour, and is, moreover, very poor. At all events it is a great instance of self-denial and disinterestedness on the part of Perceval that, with his large family, he did not give it to his son. It certainly would have made an outcry; but there is not a man, I am persuaded, on the Opposition side who would not have taken it under the same circumstances.

War Office: Friday, Oct. 19, 1810.

Despatches are just arrived from Lord Wellington, dated the 5th inst. The French had pushed on their outposts towards Coimbra on the 30th; and on the 1st Lord Wellington fell back by Pombal to Leyria and Alcobaça, where he arrived on the 5th, and on the 7th, the day on which Walsh, the messenger, left Lisbon, he was expected at Rio Mayor, near Santarem.³

¹ Afterwards a Master in Chancery, a post which the Prince Regent obtained for him by personally soliciting it from Lord Eldon.

² The Hon. Wm. F. Eden, eldest son of the first Lord Auckland, was found drowned in the Thames, Feb. 24, 1810.

³ When Massena retired, he took up a defensive situation before Santarem. He was now blockaded by the British forces, and had to depend for his supplies on the bare country behind him. On March 6,

Lord Wellington says,¹ the army are within a few leagues of the ground on which he means them to fight the enemy; and as the French were advancing with the evident intention of fighting, a battle must ere this have been fought, which will decide the fate of Portugal, and probably of Spain. The French were at Condeixa. Nothing of consequence had happened in the retreat, only a few skirmishes between the cavalry and light troops. Stuart sends an intercepted letter from Massena, dated Vizeu, September 27, which gives a striking picture of the state of his army. He complains dreadfully of the roads: '*Nous passons par des chemins affreux hérissés de rochers.*' His artillery and baggage have suffered much, and must, he says, rest two days at Vizeu to repair damages. He says he means to go to Coimbra, where he hears the English and Portuguese army is. He says: '*Monseigneur, nous passons à travers un désert; on ne rencontre nulle part une âme;*' that consequently he could get no guides; that his men lived on potatoes they dug up, and grain they gathered in the fields. Our army were in high health and spirits.

War Office: Oct. 29, 1810.

Still no news from Portugal, and, as the wind blows, no probability of any for some days.

I went down to Conyers' ² on Monday morning to breakfast, shot there on Monday, and returned to town on Tuesday morning. The party consisted of William and Lady Caroline Lamb, and a Dr. Dowdeswell. The day was terribly stormy; it blew an absolute hurricane, and *therefore* I killed only one brace of pheasants. Lamb ³ was luckier, and always found the wind *lower* when he fired, by which means he killed four brace.

Mrs. Conyers and Julia were as delightful as usual, and Mr.

Wellington, who long maintained, contrary to general opinion, that Massena would be forced to retire from want of provisions, received information that he had retired, and immediately put his troops in motion in three columns. He pursued the enemy with skill, and on the 6th the French crossed the Aquado into Spain.—Knight's *History of England*, vol. vii., p. 539.

¹ *Note from an Officer in the Guards.*—'As Lord Wellington said, the army at the time he spoke of was within a few miles of the spot where it was intended to fight a battle. But we met with no provocation from Massena, whilst the game of our chief was a defensive one. We were covered by the lines of Torres Vedras in a triple defence. These lines were maintained harmlessly for six weeks, when Massena broke up and retired, Nov. 16, 1810.'

² This was at Copt Hall, in Epping Forest.

³ Afterwards Lord Melbourne.

Conyers as entertaining as ever. The chief objection to the shooting is that it is all wood shooting, the fields being entirely grass; and those woods contain more spring-guns and steel-traps than pheasants. I was unpleasantly disturbed in my progress by the wire of a spring-gun, which on looking round I saw staring me full in the face. Luckily, however, it was not loaded, or at least the powder in the pan was quite wet and useless; but I did not feel quite comfortable during the rest of the day whenever a bramble caught my legs. Old Conyers says he is sure some dreadful accident will happen some day with them, but he is overruled by the *youthful ardour* of his sons; in the meantime he dares not go into any of his woods, and, though fond of planting, is afraid of putting foot into any of his numerous plantations, lest he should leave it behind him.¹

War Office: Dec. 29, 1810.

I enclose a draft for 50*l.* for clothing for the Romsey people as usual. Tell William he may hunt Pitch whenever he likes, and I am sure he will be well and pleasantly carried. I am much amused at William becoming a Nimrod, and complaining the first time he goes out of the hounds pottering about the covers. I expect to hear of his leading the field next. He may wear any of my various comical hats if he likes them.

The King is a little better, but has been, I believe, very dangerously ill. We are, I think, all on the *kick and the go*, but have probably a month to run.

The following passage from Lord Palmerston's speech made on the first occasion of his moving the army estimates in 1810, and much noticed at the time, shows our force at that period in arms:—

Our military force is at this moment as efficient in discipline as it is in numbers; and this not only in the regular army, but in the militia, volunteers, and other descriptions of force. We have 600,000 men in arms, besides a navy of 200,000. The masculine energies of the nation were never more conspicuous, and the country never at any period of its history stood in so proud and glorious a position. After a conflict for fifteen years

¹ It was not till 1827 that spring guns were declared illegal by Act of Parliament, after a gamekeeper had been tried in Scotland for murder on account of the death of a man who was shot by one of those instruments.

against an enemy whose power has been progressively increasing, we are still able to maintain the war with augmenting force and a population, by the pressure of external circumstances, consolidated into an impregnable military mass. Our physical strength has risen as the crisis that required it has become more important; and if we do not present the opposition of those numerous fortresses to invaders which are to be found on the Continent, we do present the more insuperable barrier of a high-spirited, patriotic, and enthusiastic people.

The indulgent critic might probably have pardoned the introduction of further extracts from this very able and carefully prepared speech, if it were not undesirable to overload these volumes with already published matter; whereas it may be thought, on the other hand, that letters have been injudiciously quoted which may seem frivolous when introduced into the biography of a veteran statesman. But we may dwell with detail and pleasure on this early epoch of Lord Palmerston's life, because, to those who only saw or knew him in his old age, there is something that freshens and brightens his memory in recurring to his youth, when we see him stepping on to the platform of life with the same gay and somewhat jaunty step, and yet with the same serious and business-like intent, that carried him on cheerfully and steadily along a sunshiny path through his long career.

That, indeed, which here more particularly calls for attention, is the universality of the man, who makes the business-like speech, writes the lively letter,—boasts of the 'new pumps,' &c. He was not a prig or a coxcomb, but naturally grave and naturally gay; hearty in any pursuit, whether of business in the senate or of pleasure in the ball-room; taking pains to please without seeming to expect admiration. Hence he never made those enemies who are aroused by high pretensions, and he gathered round him that general good-will which gives a slow but steady current to a statesman's fortunes. There was, moreover, under the apparent mixture of seriousness and frivolity which

marked this portion of Lord Palmerston's life, a steady pluck and character, and a reliance on the strength of a right cause, which contrast favourably and singularly with the diffidence shown when, the question being merely a personal one, he put aside the temptation of a seat in the Cabinet and one of the first offices of state. These qualities were tested in a very trying manner not long after his entry into his new office.

There existed at that time a Secretary *for* War, who had little or nothing to do with details, but to consider the general war policy and the direction of the great military operations of the country. He was usually the Minister of the Colonies, or at times of another department. There was then the Commander-in-Chief of the army, who was exclusively charged with the discipline, recruiting, and promotions of the army; and there was then the Secretary *at* War, who was charged with and responsible for the expenses and accounts of the army; or, in other words, with controlling the military disbursements and superintending the settlement of the military accounts.

On the whole these duties were pretty clearly separated and defined. The one nevertheless ran in certain instances into the other, especially in respect to forms; and two cases occurred almost immediately after Lord Palmerston's installation at the War Office, concerning which the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary *at* War came into conflict.

1st. Generals on the home staff had the right to a certain number of aides-de-camp, for whom the Government paid; and they often got paid for aides-de-camp whom they never had. The Secretary *at* War, deeming this a question of expense, required a return from the Horse Guards of all generals on the staff and their aides-de-camp on duty, in order to make his payments accordingly.

2nd. The colonels of regiments were allowed so much to clothe the men, the sum granted being paid to their agents. But the Secretary *at* War said that

he ought to have proof that the clothiers who had furnished the articles required were satisfied with the public money being paid to the colonels' agents, and not to themselves—that is, in fact, he ought to be satisfied that the clothiers were paid, or were satisfied they would be paid, for the goods delivered.

There can be no doubt that what the Secretary at War required in both instances was essentially for the public service, and intimately connected with the military expenses. But Sir David Dundas, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief after the temporary retirement of the Duke of York, deemed that Lord Palmerston had greatly overstepped his province in interfering on his own authority in these matters. He contended that the Secretary at War was his subordinate, that all orders ought to come from him: but admitting that a general ought not to be paid for aides-de-camp when he had not got them, he undertook to inform the Secretary at War when this was the case. With respect to the clothiers, however, he objected altogether to any interference. It was something, in his own language, 'so novel, so extraordinary, and likely to lead to such consequences,' that he could not attempt to answer it offhand. He applied on the subject to Mr. Perceval, advancing as his theory, that though the payment made to the colonels was public money, to be applied for a public purpose, they were to deal with it as private money; owing the persons they employed for regimental clothes as they would for their own clothes; and that the War Office, if the clothes, &c., were approved, had no business to inquire as to whether the persons who furnished them were paid or not.

He complained, moreover, generally that the War Office was becoming too arrogant and independent. The Secretary at War, however, would not recede. He maintained that with respect to the clothiers he was merely fulfilling his duty according to a recent Act of Parliament, and that as to his general position he held, as the representative of Parliamentary control over

the military expenditure, and as the civil servant of the crown in military matters, an independent post, which, though inferior to that of Commander-in-Chief, was not subordinate to it.

'I have always understood,' he says, 'and the doctrine seems also recognised in the sixth report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, that the Commander-in-Chief presides over the discipline, and the Secretary at War over the finance of the army; that each is responsible and competent to act independently on matters which concern his particular province; but that on questions in which the two are blended, previous mutual communication should take place.'

On the one hand, Lord Palmerston referred for his independence to an order, November 1, 1804, which says :—

All applications relative to military disbursements or to pecuniary claims to pay allowances, &c., and all letters which have for their object the construction and explanation of Acts of Parliament regarding the military service, or which have reference to the civil police of the country, are, as formerly, to be addressed to the Right Hon. the Secretary at War.

On the other hand, Sir David Dundas founded his superiority on the instruction given in the Secretary at War's commission under the sign manual :—

You are to observe and follow such orders and directions as you shall from time to time receive from us or the general of our forces for the time being, according to the discipline of war, in pursuance of the trust reposed in you and your duty to us.

There were certainly two sides to the shield. But Mr. Perceval refused to decide which was the right one, and contented himself with begging both parties to pocket their differences. This Sir David, however, refused to do; and though when the Duke of York returned to his post he was more moderate and courteous in his language than Sir David, he persisted in the same theory. The views of the parties were consequently brought before the Prince Regent, to whom

Lord Palmerston clearly stated that he considered himself placed 'as a sort of barrier between the military authority of the officers in command of the army, and the civil rights of the people,' stating that 'no alteration could take place in this situation *without the interference of Parliament.*'

This consideration, in fact, regulated his Royal Highness's decision, which was to leave things as they were, without saying what they were; adding, that if anything new was suggested by the Secretary at War relative to his functions, then it should be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, and adopted if the two authorities were agreed; whilst, if they disagreed, the nature of the disagreement should be placed before the First Lord of the Treasury, who would take the pleasure of his Royal Highness the Regent thereupon.

This, in fact, solved none of the questions that had been raised; but it prevented the entire subordination of the civil authority to the military one—a result of which Lord Palmerston may fairly claim the merit, and in another way he successfully vindicated this important principle.

The state of the King's health and his residence at Windsor, during the period when Lord Palmerston's predecessor, Sir James Pulteney, was in office, and the general disinclination felt by Sir James to form and etiquette, had led him to abstain from going in person to the King except on very particular business, which, of course, seldom occurred. Out of this had arisen the view which was eagerly adopted by the military authorities, that the Secretary at War (representing the civil element) had no 'right of entrée to the Closet;' but, being entirely subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, was in fact his secretary, and received only from him those commands which were notified to the army as those of the King. Lord Palmerston felt that the efficiency as well as the dignity of his post was involved in resistance to such a doctrine. Though comparatively young, and though a Royal Duke was his adver-

sary, he showed a bold front and appealed to the Cabinet. He successfully maintained that the Secretary at War always had been and continued to be actually and personally the depository of His Majesty's pleasure as to all matters which concerned his department, and was entitled to communicate it authentically to the army and its parts.

An explanation that he wrote at this time of the historical character and position of the Secretary at War is one of the ablest papers in the War Office.

CHAPTER III.

PERCEVAL'S DEATH—PALMERSTON REMAINS IN LORD LIVERPOOL'S GOVERNMENT—SPEAKS IN FAVOUR OF CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION—POLICY AS TO COLONIES—VISIT TO FRANCE—ESCAPE FROM ASSASSINATION—CORRESPONDENCE AT HORSE GUARDS—SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT—GENERAL POSITION—NEW PARTY FORMED—ELECTION FOR CAMBRIDGE SEPARATES HIM FROM THE OLD TORIES—CORRESPONDENCE.

A CONSIDERABLE space now intervenes in the private correspondence. Meanwhile the ministry of Perceval, which, as may be seen by one or two of the letters quoted, was but a rickety one, terminated by the melancholy death of that statesman, May 11, 1812, who was on that day shot by a man named Bellingham in the lobby of the House of Commons. The general desire produced by this event was to see a Government formed equal to the critical situation of affairs; but this desire was rendered abortive by the public and private differences existing at that time amongst leading statesmen, and the country saw with disappointment the advent of an administration under Lord Liverpool universally considered the weakest that ever undertook to hold the helm of a great state, yet which suffered less from opponents, and was more favoured by events than almost any other that has conducted the affairs of England. In this administration Lord Palmerston, having refused—before the offer was made to Mr. Peel—the Secretaryship for Ireland, maintained, without rise or fall, during fifteen years the post which he had received in 1810 from Mr. Perceval, uniting during this period the pleasures of a man of the world with the duties of a man of business. No one went more

into what is vulgarly termed 'fashionable society,' or attended more scrupulously to the affairs of his office; no one made better speeches on the question, whatever it was, that his place required him to speak on, or spoke less when a speech from him was not wanted. His ambition seemed confined to performing his peculiar functions with credit, without going out of the beaten track as a volunteer for distinction. To this general rule, however, there was one exception; when Mr. Grattan, in 1813, brought forward the question of Catholic Emancipation, he made an eloquent oration in support of it. Still the line he took was cautious, and eminently characteristic of his practical mind. He did not assert that the State had not the right to exclude the Catholic body from participation in its affairs; a consideration for the public interests was, according to him, supreme over all other considerations; but in this case he contended that the State imperilled itself by the measures it adopted for its security.

'If I think,' he said, 'that there is no real danger in the removal of these disabilities, accompanied by such other corresponding regulations as the House may ultimately adopt, I do think there is both inconvenience and danger in the continuance of the present anomalous state of things.'

* * * * *

'Is it wise to say to men of rank and property, who, from old lineage or present possessions, have a deep interest in the common weal, that they live in a country where, by the blessings of a free constitution, it is possible for any man, themselves only excepted, by the honest exertion of talents and industry in the avocations of political life, to make himself honoured and respected by his countrymen, and to render good service to the State;—that they alone can never be permitted to enter this career: that they may, indeed, usefully employ themselves in the humbler avocations of private life, but that public service they never can perform, public honour they never shall attain? What we have lost by the continuance of this system it is not for man to know; what we might have lost can be more easily imagined. If it had unfortunately happened that, by the circumstances of birth and education, a Nelson, a Wellington, a

Burke, a Fox, or a Pitt, had belonged to this class of the community, of what honours and what glory might not the page of British history have been deprived? To what perils and calamities might not this country have been exposed? The question is not whether we would have so large a part of the population Catholic or not. There they are, and we must deal with them as we can. It is in vain to think that by any human pressure we can stop the spring which gushes from the earth. But it is for us to consider whether we will force it to spend its strength in secret and hidden courses, undermining our fences and corrupting our soil, or whether we shall at once turn the current into the open and spacious channel of honourable and constitutional ambition, converting it into the means of national prosperity and public wealth.'

He argued in this manner; for his nature was not one that lingers over abstract rights or speculative theories: the broad fact which struck him practically, and which struck him the more forcibly, as being one of a school which considered the power and greatness of his country the main object of a statesman was, that the discontented condition of a large portion of British subjects weakened, when their contentment would strengthen, England. He saw, in the one case, Ireland, a snarling cur worrying our heels; in the other, a gallant and faithful mastiff standing by our side.

The war in the meantime took a sudden turn; light penetrated the gloom that had long obscured the prospects of Europe; the great conqueror became the conquered; and he who had refused to have his sway limited by the Rhine accepted as his empire a microscopic island in the Mediterranean. In such a position it was certain he would not long remain; but in a new struggle with fortune he was again overpowered; and in the last and fatal battle at Waterloo which decided his fate, and that of Europe, a British commander at the head of British troops had been victorious. This was a proud time for England, and the more severe and exciting labours of the Secretary at War were over. But if he had lighter work at the War Office, he had

heavier in the House of Commons, with which it was easier to deal when the Minister who had to ask for the means to support a large army could plead we were engaged in a gigantic conflict, than when, with an army which still seemed large to those who had to pay for it, he could not pretend it was wanted for a foreign foe.

On one of these occasions (in 1816) he had to encounter Mr. Brougham, who had just been making one of those powerful but discursive harangues with which he used to overawe the Treasury bench; and one cannot but admire the readiness and courage with which the usually silent Secretary at War puts aside the arguments of a speech it would have been difficult to answer, and retorts the sarcasm of an antagonist whom most would have feared to provoke. We can see him rising, with an undisturbed and half careless air, as he says :—

The honourable and learned member has made an accusation which I certainly cannot retort upon that honourable gentleman himself, namely, that *he very seldom troubles the House with his observations*. I, at all events, will abstain from all declamation, and from any dissertation on the Constitution, and confine myself to the business at present on hand—the Army Estimates of the current year.

It may be interesting to notice the extent and employment of our army at this period. Exclusive of the troops in India, and the army in occupation of France, the total number of men proposed in the votes was 99,000. These were divided under four heads: those stationed in Great Britain; those in Ireland; those in our old colonies, that is, the colonies we had possessed previously to the war; and those in our new colonies, which we had acquired during the progress of the war. It was proposed to have 25,000 troops in Great Britain; the same number in Ireland; 23,800 in our old colonies, and 22,200 in the new. Add to these 3,000, as a reserve for reliefs to the colonial garrisons.

‘With respect to the old colonies, the estimates provided

only,' says Lord Palmerston, '7,000 men more than had garrisoned them previously to the outbreak of the war. In the whole of our North American possessions, the Bahamas included, there were only 4,000 men more than there had been in 1791. There were many causes,' he urged, 'for this augmentation. The increasing population required larger means of defence—*certainly not to be used against the inhabitants*. Upper Canada had been almost entirely peopled and settled since the war commenced. He did not insinuate any suspicions of broils with the United States. He hoped that each country had equally made the discovery that peace was the preferable policy. Still, as a matter of political prudence, we must always provide for possible contingencies. He was firmly convinced that amongst nations weakness would never be a foundation for security. The navigation between the two countries was moreover suspended during the winter, and, in the case of a rupture, *many months might elapse ere reinforcements could be sent*.

'The new or captured colonies were Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape, the African Settlements, Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucia, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. In all, the enemy's garrisons there had capitulated to the number of 30,000. This was after all their losses by deaths in action and from sickness. The Government only proposed 22,000 for these colonies, not two-thirds of the garrisons that the enemy had kept up. The 25,000 men for the home station exceeded by 7,000 the numbers in 1791. But the large increase in our colonial possessions rendered it necessary to keep up a considerably increased reserve at home.

'The plain question for the House to consider was, whether they should reduce all the military establishments of the country below their just level; and whether, if they did so, the saving would bear any comparison with the injury that it might produce. For, after all, even if the plans of retrenchment so loudly called for were adopted, the diminution of expenditure would not be half so great as the country and the House seemed to imagine. Would it, therefore, be a wise or expedient course, under these circumstances, to abdicate the high rank we now maintained in Europe, to take our station amongst secondary powers, and confine ourselves entirely to our own island? He would again repeat that the question was not whether we should carry into effect such diminution of the military establishment of the country as would save the people from the income tax—for he contended that no possible reduction in those establish-

ments could accomplish that end—but whether we should compel the Crown to abandon all our colonial possessions, the fertile sources of our commercial wealth, and descend from that high and elevated station, which it had cost us so much labour, so much blood, and so much treasure to attain ?’

A discussion no doubt was then commencing which is still going on, and which will pass through many phases during the present generation, before it is terminated by the decision of posterity. You should not ask the opinion of a healthy man as to the value of health; it is the invalid alone who can estimate it. You should not ask a great and powerful state in the height of its prosperity what are the advantages of being great and powerful. It is a state that finds its greatness fallen, its power diminished or menaced, that feels the loss it has incurred, or thinks it is about to sustain. In fact, it was only when the consolidated power of the United States was in serious peril that the resolve of preserving it intact, at any sacrifice, became intense. So, there has been a tendency of late years in England amongst a certain class of politicians to underrate the advantages of vast empire and great consideration. This is natural; men undervalue what they possess. Who has not seen statesmen fatigued with office and pining to lay down its burthens, and found them, after a brief repose in obscurity, willing to undergo any amount of toil and responsibility in order to reach once more that point in the political ladder from which they not unwillingly descended? It is just so with a people. What efforts has not Poland made, what efforts did not Italy make, to regain the independence and recover the glory of past but unforgotten years! The expense of dignity and influence is, however, more frequently brought before a popular assembly than their importance.

Let us admit that a great gentleman, be he a distinguished peer or commoner, is the same individual, whether he opens his house and keeps up a large establishment, or whether he lodges in a cottage and never

offers a glass of wine to a friend. His ability is the same, his rank is the same, his wealth is the same, but his influence is different. A certain degree of show and hospitality gives influence—quietly, insensibly, but irresistibly. Lord Palmerston himself, in later years, gained much by a conspicuous mansion and frequent dinners and assemblies. It is all very well to sneer at these things; they affect us in spite of our philosophy.

As three or four servants in livery and a large house place a man in this world of ours higher than he would be placed if inhabiting a small lodging with a dirty maid to open the door, so a nation has its servants in livery, its large house, its large establishments—things not absolutely necessary to its existence, but the accompaniments of its position, and without which its position would not be duly represented and sustained.

Every Englishman has, or ought to have, a certain pride and interest in the figure made by the English nation. He likes that it should be 'a great nation,' and appear 'a great nation.' All that seven-eighths of us ask is, that the proper effect should be obtained without needless or improper cost.

No man is thought the more of for muddling away his money. He should have for his expenditure what his expenditure ought to bring him. The minister who is careless as to what he spends, and the minister who is niggardly as to what he ought to spend, are equally acting against the instincts of our people; and they who think to acquire an honourable or durable popularity by bringing down this country from its traditional rank amongst the leading states of the world, do not know the spirit which still burns in the breasts of Englishmen.

If, indeed, the member of Parliament who affects to despise prestige or consideration as an object for the government of his country, would merely look into his own mind, and examine the motive which brings him into the House of Commons and directs his conduct there, he would find that, though actuated in some degree by public and party motives, he was also in most

cases influenced by an honourable desire for public distinction. It is this desire which is at the bottom of much of our individual honesty—much of our individual energy—which is, in short, one of an Englishman's great individual characteristics. It is, and should be, one of England's great characteristics also: for a nation which has no longer a wish for distinction has already a propensity to decline.

These were the ideas of Lord Palmerston, both for himself and for his native land. He wished to make himself one of England's leaders and to make England the leading power in the world.

In the speech just quoted especial reference is made to our colonies. Every age wishes to assume to be wiser than its predecessor; and inasmuch as there was formerly a somewhat exaggerated value attached to colonial possessions, without any distinct or accurate idea as to the profit to be derived from them, so there is now a supercilious and narrow-minded tendency to underrate their importance. There are many places presenting no peculiar advantage to us by their possession, but of which the loss would be exceedingly disastrous if they were in the hands of an enemy. From many, though we derive no direct revenue, we indirectly feed our national resources. The wealth of nations is frequently formed and nourished by means only perceptible in their results, as you see the vital energies of the human body maintained or restored by certain springs, the analysis of whose waters gives no indication of the nature of their powers. An encouragement to enterprise, to navigation, to speculation produced by colonial relations, often carries capital into particular channels through which it would not otherwise flow, and through which it circulates, enriching our distant possessions and returning to centre in our revenue at home.

Nor does wealth, though it is one of the main contributors to national greatness, alone or in itself constitute that greatness. Commercial prosperity soon vanishes when political importance departs, and no

small portion of political importance depends on political prestige. When Mr. Webster says, 'There is not an hour in the day in which the British drum is not beating in some region of the earth,' he not only fills the minds of others with a vast idea of the power and majesty of Great Britain, but he gives us, the British people, an elevated sense of our own dignity; animating us thereby to noble achievements, and bracing up our minds for great deeds on great occasions.

The power of the imagination is not to be overlooked by those who assume to direct the destiny of empires; and it is singular to find so many of the gentlemen who cite to us as a model the great Transatlantic commonwealth, altogether forgetful of the imperial spirit which, since the extent of its dominions was menaced, is the peculiar characteristic of the American republic. Whilst we, talking about the United States, are daily loosening the bonds which formerly bound our empire together, the people of the United States are strengthening, enforcing, and fighting for the permanent solidity of theirs. You find no statesman there talk of abandoning a territory—no general or admiral advocate the resignation of a fortress. The historian who in after times shall write on the decline and fall of British greatness, may possibly question the policy with which we have from year to year been separating ourselves from possessions that we might, with the advantages of steam and telegraph, have more closely connected with our central power. There is, in fact, already rising a new school of economists who, without disputing as a general axiom the advantage of buying at the cheapest markets and selling at the dearest, are still disposed to consider that under our peculiar circumstances a system of colonial commerce combined with a system of emigration—relieving the mother-country from a superfluous population on the one hand, and creating new and certain customers for her on the other—maintaining the feeling of Englishman for Englishman in every quarter of the globe, by giving to our distant

countrymen a regular market for their produce, and to our people at home a regular market for their manufactures, might on the whole have been more adapted to our safe and steady prosperity, as well as to our united empire than a system which destroys the sentiment of national affection by referring everything to individual interest, and sends us into the world on a speculation for customers whose demands must be regulated by laws over which we have no control, and who in a free struggle for competition must force us, if we mean to surpass them, to produce better articles at cheaper labour—a necessity already resisted by trades unions and limitations on working hours, as well as by a poor law which deranges the first movements of the machinery by which the principles of free trade are to be worked out. But without dwelling further on theories which the present is not disposed to accept, and which the future—already compromised—could only, looking to the condition of things now established, achieve by such arrangements with the colonial legislatures as it may be possible to imagine, but hardly possible to realise, we must remember that the defence of our colonies, though jealously provided for at the time, was not the only reason for maintaining the standing army which was asked for on their behalf. It is strange to us, who can judge the past dispassionately, to read in contemporary memoirs of the panic which existed even amongst thinking persons during the five or six years which succeeded the war, as to the probability of a general rising against law, order, and government. There were no leaders of any authority in favour of such rising; there were no funds or arms to aid it; there was nothing but the pamphlets of a few seditious writers, and the speeches of a few mob orators to threaten the peace of the country. Still, the administration and the friends of the administration had persuaded themselves, and contrived to persuade many others, that we were on the eve of a terrible catastrophe, from which nothing but a few thousand men, each of whom was furnished with a

musket and a bayonet and paid a shilling a day for his patriotism, could protect us. He, then, who was for maintaining the army was the friend of the throne and the altar, of the King and of the Archbishop of Canterbury, as he who was for reducing it was in atheistic league with Cobbett, Carlile, and all the other democrats and demons who were menacing us with irreligion and a republic. A good speech on the Army Estimates was thus a good speech on the question which most excited the interest of the wealthy and the peaceful, and collected that interest round the speaker. But it is to be observed that, though Lord Palmerston advocated officially the maintenance of a force which was thought necessary to preserve public tranquillity, he never spoke in favour of any of those measures that were adopted to suppress public liberty. One of his biographers, in an able sketch, says :

The sole link by which, in the researches of the careful student of his life, Palmerston is brought into connection with the successive suspensions of old-established liberties which distinguish this gloomy epoch of our history, is the series of speeches delivered from year to year in defence of the magnitude of those military establishments, which, as some would say, the dangerous spirit of the country, or, as others would have it, the oppressive policy of the administration, rendered necessary. He spoke no word in favour of any of the 'Six Acts.' He took no public share in the attempts to cramp the liberty of the press. His name was never identified with the attempts—by many alleged to be unconstitutional—to increase the severity of the laws against so-called sedition and libel. The yeomanry, who sabred their poor, starving fellow-countrymen at Peterloo, found in the War Secretary no apologist. Nor was his voice ever heard in justification of the odious inhumanity which employed spies to lure and incite such pitiable wretches as Thistlewood and Brandreth to the crimes which resulted in their deaths as traitors.

At the peace Lord Palmerston joined the general rush of Englishmen and Englishwomen who visited Paris, which had been so long cut off from them by the tide of war. His account, in a letter to his sister,

of the operations carried on by the allies to restore Napoleon's plunder to its rightful owners, vividly recalls the feelings of satisfied justice which this restitution must have excited in contemporary minds.

Paris : September 25, 1815.

My dear Elizabeth,—I begin now to have seen almost everything. The allies saved me some trouble in the gallery by meeting me halfway ; however, they did not begin their operations till I had taken a general view of the best, although I was not able to go through a regular survey of the Flemish school. But I rejoice most exceedingly in the thing, and would have foregone the sight of every work of art in the gallery sooner than have them left there. The French, however, that is to say the Royalists, are furious ; and Lady Malmesbury, who lives almost entirely with them, has taken it up in so tragical a tone, that literally there is no talking of it to her. She says the Duke has disgraced himself, that it is *impossible* for him to stay at Paris, and that it *must* end in the murder of all the English. When first she talked to me about it, I felt like a person who is holding his countenance for a wager, while somebody tickles his nose ; and when, in spite of all my endeavours, a smirking smile crept into my face, she said in the most serious manner : ‘ No, indeed, this is no laughing matter ; I can assure you it is very serious indeed.’ The Netherland pictures are gone. The Austrians are beginning to take the Italian school belonging to them ; and then the Pope takes his property. The statues will go after the pictures, and the horses are to be taken down to-day or to-morrow.

It was a most gratifying sight to see a guard of the dirtiest looking soldiers in our army marching up and down the gallery while the workmen were taking down the pictures. As to the convention—there is a complete answer to the French. They originally proposed two articles : one, as it stands, about public property, which was understood by both sides to relate merely to public institutions, such as hospitals, &c. ; another expressly stipulating that the Gallery (or Musée) should remain untouched ; the first was agreed to, but Blücher immediately objected to the second that the Prussians were resolved to take away everything belonging to them. The French then proposed that the article should stand with an exception in favour of the Prussians. To this, however, Wellington would not consent ; he said he could not sign away the property of others, and the Gallery must

stand over for the decision of the Sovereigns on their arrival in Paris, and that article must be struck out. It was difficult, however, to carry the arrangement of restitution, as an idea had gone about that we were to get what belonged to the Pope, and were influenced by interested motives. To put an end to this it was stated on our part that as one objection made was that the Pope could not afford to pay for the removal of his property, sooner than let the thing drop on this ground we would pay the expense for him. This made a great impression, and, I believe, decided the question.

The most notable event of Lord Palmerston's life at this period was his escape from being killed, when a madman, Lieutenant Davis, shot at and slightly wounded him above the hip, on the 8th April, 1818, as he was going up the stairs at the War Office. The man was tried and sent to Bedlam, having been defended at his trial at the expense of Lord Palmerston, who sent money for this purpose to the ordinary of Newgate. Lord Palmerston thus owed the last forty-seven years of his existence, and the right to be considered one of the most distinguished of England's statesmen, to the happy and accidental turn of his body which it was said prevented the ball taking a fatal direction. In other respects he pursued undisturbed the smooth and even road of his rising career; and within this period there are found abundant proofs of the truth, that but a small part of the merits of an able public man is ever seen by the public. Whoever reads through the private correspondence of Lord Palmerston, as Secretary at War, must feel bound to own that he has rarely, if ever, found in any compositions of the same kind, so clear, straightforward, and simple a style, such attention to details, such comprehensive views, such regard for private and public interests, and such independence of thought—for the highest authority only weighs with him where the arguments are authoritative. Extracts from this correspondence would, however, be of too special a kind to justify their introduction to the general reader.

Meanwhile the Secretary at War had become perfectly at his ease in debate, and at times indulged in a certain flippant and overbearing manner, which, with the view of at once discountenancing an opponent, he was occasionally tempted to employ, but never inopportunately to persist in. Thus he says on one occasion, when defending the Government from the accusation of having unconstitutionally called out the veterans :—

He could only repeat now what he had said before, that the reasons for this increase of force were so notorious to every person in the country, that he should consider any attempt on his part to argue the necessity, *not only a waste of the time of the House, but as trifling with the public understanding.* If the justification of this measure was not sufficiently established by the events that had taken place since August last (the month of the Manchester tragedy), he was certain that no argument he could use, and no eloquence ever heard within these walls, would carry conviction with it.

But when this way of waiving the question at issue was found insufficient, and it was again brought forward, he came clearly and boldly to the direct justification of the course which the Government had thought fit to pursue.

With respect to calling out the veterans, the noble lord [Nugent] considered it to be a violation of the Constitution. If, however, he looked back to the Constitution of this country, he would find many instances in which an augmentation of our forces had been made in time of peace, under an apprehension of approaching war, or of internal commotion. . . . Many instances had occurred in time of peace, where an augmentation of the military force had been effected, without any bill of indemnity, or any measure of the kind mentioned by the noble lord being deemed necessary. He admitted the argument of the noble lord, that no force could be constitutionally embodied without the consent of Parliament; but that consent, he contended, had been obtained. In the speech from the throne, the intention of calling out this additional force was mentioned, and both Houses of Parliament, in their answer to the speech, plainly adverted to the circumstance.

The following sentences, rapidly strung together, are rather in the style of Mr. Canning :—

The noble lord would ask, 'Is it necessary now to keep up this additional force?' In answer to that, he would only ask gentlemen to turn their attention to the events which had passed since the period to which he had referred. He would forbear from advertg to the conspiracy that was discovered in London. A conspiracy to destroy some hundreds of individuals, to burn different parts of the metropolis, and to create a provisional government, was, it appeared, a matter of no importance to the gentlemen opposite. Did not the noble lord know that special commissions were issued for the North of England, and for Scotland, to bring persons to trial for the highest crime the law of this country contemplated—the crime of high treason? Did not the noble lord know that meetings of armed men had taken place in Scotland? Was he not aware that, in one instance, a body of these men had acted in hostility to the regular troops? Had he not seen the proclamation that was posted up in the town of Glasgow, purporting to be issued by a provisional government—the object of those signing it being, as they stated, 'to obtain their rights by force of arms'?

A few words by which he defends the establishment of a riding-school give a specimen of his lighter manner.

During the recent war a foreign officer had praised in the highest degree the *British cavalry*, regretting only that *they did not know how to ride!*

Nor is it amiss to cite the argument, so pregnant with British preferences, by which he advocates British education for British officers.

The effect of discontinuing this establishment (the recently founded Military College) would be to drive these young men to other quarters; and as they would have no means of defraying the expenses of a private education, they would probably be compelled to seek for instruction in German or French establishments at that critical period when the impressions they received were calculated to decide the character of the future man. For his own part he wished to see the British soldier with a British character, with British habits, with a British education, and with as little as possible of anything foreign.

The Secretary at War, however, could appreciate foreign troops, and his impartial criticism shows the interest he took in them. He thus relates to his sister what he saw at the great reviews of 1818 in France:—

Brussels : October 29, 1818.

My dear Elizabeth,—We reached Valenciennes, and saw the grand review on Friday 23rd and the inspection of the Russians on Thursday 22nd. It is needless to say that both, but especially the grand review, were magnificent sights, and that we were gratified beyond measure. Fred. Ponsonby lent us two troop horses, which carried us remarkably well. On Saturday went on to Maubeuge, a dirty filthy hole, fit only for a Russian army, but I wonder that Woronzow should not have managed better for himself. We were put into an unoccupied and unfurnished building, out of which a Russian major had been turned to make room for us, and every civility was offered us by two servants who spoke no language but their mother tongue, and wanted only to be tattooed and covered with a mat. to pass for South Sea Islanders. Woronzow gave us a very good ball in the evening, at which the Emperor and King of Prussia and Duke of Wellington were present.

On Sunday we started soon after daybreak, and got on to Sedan by three o'clock the following morning. We travelled very slow, for the Russian artillery drivers had such an invincible affinity for ditches, into one of which we actually descended, and just stopped upon the brink of several, that we soon discarded them, and took to the French post; but the horses were always either tired or engaged, and we worked our way slowly on by means of cart-horses and ploughboys. At Sedan we found a comfortable quarter in the Duke's house, and on Monday went to see the Prussian review on the plain of Donchery, about three or four miles to the westward of the town. At half-past two we dined with the king, and went to a ball in the theatre. The dinner was in a riding-house, very neatly fitted up with the Russia duck prepared for the soldiers' trousers, and the scarlet cloth of which their facings are made, and the ball-room was ornamented with the same materials, none of which were cut so as to be less useful afterwards.

The Prussian troops amounted to about 25,000, and made a very pretty review. They are in most respects of dress and discipline in imitation of the Russians, but with a great deal of

their steadiness they combine much of our quickness and activity, and seem a more manageable army.

We did not leave Sedan till near ten o'clock on Tuesday 27th, and got on very slowly, as there were swarms of Grand Dukes and Generals, &c., travelling the same road, who greatly interfered with our motions. However, we reached Namur about four in the afternoon next day. The fortress now making there is on the top of a hill, 400 feet from the level of the river. It will be strong, but I did not like to hear the engineer who superintended the works expatiate so much as he did upon the advantage of some works '*pour encourager la garnison*,' and the aptitude of others '*pour faire peur à l'ennemi*.' I am afraid our allies the Belgians want much of that 'spirit never to submit or yield' which is necessary to enable them successfully to defend their territory. We slept at Namur, and came on to this place to-day, seeing Quatre Bras and Waterloo in our way. By the assistance of a good plan and description, and some peasants we met on the ground, we satisfied ourselves completely about Waterloo; walked over the position of our army, picked some bullets out of the orchards of La Haie Sainte and Hougmont, cut a bundle of sticks at the latter enough to beat clothes with during the rest of our lives, bought a French sword which probably never saw the battle, and came on here by eight this evening.

During the next few years we heard little of Palmerston in Parliament. He seems to have preserved an absolute silence while the repressive measures adopted by Lord Liverpool were being forced upon the country. He was, however, very active in the world of fashion, was considered a dandy, and one of the leading lights of the famous Almack's. It is worth a passing remark that Lady Cowper, afterwards destined to become Lady Palmerston, was at this time one of the most assiduous of the lady patronesses who ruled that circle of fashion. In the following extract from a letter of Lord Palmerston to his brother describing the Westminster Election at which the Whig candidate—William Lamb—afterwards Lord Melbourne, and brother of Lady Cowper, was returned, we find a graphic description of the violence which at that time seemed to assert itself as a defiance to the high-handed acts of the adminis-

tration. The Whig candidate had received the support of the Government as against the 'Jacobins,' Burdett and Hobhouse.

Stanhope Street : March 12, 1819.

There was not much row till the last day. They meant to chair Lamb, and their infantry, consisting of some hundred bruisers and blackguards, were to have got possession of the ground, and then an escort of about sixty Whig equestrians were to have come up to have accompanied the procession through the streets to Brooks' and Burlington House. But, alas! how short-sighted are mortals. Crib, Gully, and Caleb Baldwin declared that to chair was impossible, that they and Lamb should all be murdered if it was attempted. On this the Committee gave it up, and sent to stop the cavalry. The messenger missed them, and at the appointed hour they arrived, found the avenues to Covent Garden blocked up by an immense crowd, cut their way through, found the chairing given up, and had to cut their way back again. They were covered with mud and dirt, and some received some severe blows with stones thrown at them. The mob chased them to Pall Mall, and some even to Grosvenor Square. Lady Cowper had a very narrow escape. She was returning from the Ladies' Committee of Almack's at this time. Her coachman happened to have Lamb's colours in his hat, and in passing through St. James's Square to Pall Mall on her way to Melbourne House the mob began pelting the carriage, and one large stone nearly broke through the panel of the carriage, about three inches below the side glass. Lady Caroline Lamb's carriage was also attacked in St. James Street, and a boy who was in it cut on the forehead by something thrown. These brutal outrages are quite peculiar to the present day. Lamb himself would certainly have been demolished but for the protection of a detachment of Life Guards.

Though standing aloof from the general acts of the administration, Lord Palmerston continued diligent in his own department. Tormented, like other ministers, by Mr. Joseph Hume, after that gentleman had entered the House of Commons and assumed the character of financial economist, he replies much in the strain which those who saw him in his later days will remember. He says :—

He recollected that he had heard of an ancient sage who said that there were two things over which even the immortal gods themselves had no power—namely, past events and arithmetic. The honourable gentleman, however, seemed to have power over both.

This is a pleasant remark, but the merits of the speaker did not lie in making pleasant remarks, but in coming to right conclusions; and the principles which he lays down as those that ought to guide us in times of peace as to our military establishment, are no doubt those which a wise Government should still follow. ‘Let such establishment,’ he says, ‘be economical; let it be efficient; let its organisation be so framed as to enable us, in the event of war, to recruit the different regiments rapidly and cheaply.’ At the same time he was writing to his brother about his economising antagonist.

Stanhope Street: March 25, 1822.

I have not had half the trouble with estimates this year that I had last year: indeed, we had made such large reductions, that little was left for Hume to object to, and the body of the Opposition did not support him much in his objections even to that little. He is going down-hill very fast: indeed, so dull and blunderheaded a fellow, notwithstanding all his perseverance and application, cannot long hold his ground in the House of Commons. It requires some degree of talent, and he does not come up to the mark.

The accession of the Grenvilles has been of use to us, not so much by the strength it has added to our forces, as by the reduction it has made in the ranks of our Opponents. They gave a certain degree of respectability to the opposition, and afforded many a Trimmer a plausible excuse for going over without absolutely sacrificing his political principles, and without precluding him from returning when the job was done, for want of which he ran sulky.

You see Blomfield is ousted; it is a vile intrigue of Knighton and the Conynghames. The Cabinet, however, have taken this opportunity to insist upon the abolition of the office of Private Secretary, which was a most unconstitutional intervention between the King and his confidential advisers: the Secretaries of State are the secretaries of the King.

The Grenville clique formed a small but influential party which hung midway between Toryism and Whiggery, and their infusion exercised a salutary influence in liberalising the complexion of the administration. The opinion of the Cabinet of that day should be noted as to the constitutional position of a sovereign's private secretary.

Lord Palmerston's ability was by this time fully acknowledged, and his public position a good one. Yet he was still very isolated. His private friends were never such as could be called political friends. Mr. Sullivan, his brother-in-law, and Sir George Shee, whom he afterwards made Under-Secretary of State, were the only men with whom he could be said to be intimate. Neither did he belong to any of the particular sections which divided the House of Commons and the Tory party. He was not then an adherent of Canning, never having followed that statesman out of office; nor was he an adherent of Lord Eldon, nor even of Lord Liverpool, for he had voted since 1812 in favour of concessions to the Catholics. He certainly was not a Whig, and yet he lived chiefly with Whig society, which, since the time of Mr. Fox, was the society most in fashion. George IV. always disliked him. No one, therefore, had a very lively interest in him, or felt a strong desire to make his parliamentary position more important. Thus, he was offered by Lord Liverpool on one occasion the Governor-Generalship of India, and on another the Post Office, with a seat in the House of Lords:—it being intended, if he accepted, to satisfy Mr. Huskisson with his place. He stuck, however, steadily to the House of Commons, as if foreseeing his future destiny, and circumstances now gave his fortunes a direction which they ever afterwards followed.

In the war which we had waged on the Continent against Napoleon, we had marched with the various nations who finally subdued him, not merely against the tyrant, but against the tyranny which he had everywhere

established. The people of Germany were rallied under the cry of 'liberty'; all who joined the standard of the allies thought that if victory crowned their efforts they were to live hereafter under the shelter of free institutions. The sovereigns, however, who were liberal in making promises during the contest shrunk from fulfilling them when the battle was over. Out of the disappointment which fear or duplicity created grew up a general feeling of distrust and anger. Long smouldering, it at last burst forth. In Spain and Italy there were revolutions; in the North of Germany many revolutions seemed impending. In this crisis the military monarchies united in order to overthrow the constitutions that had been established, and to prevent any others from being formed. The doctrines of the sovereigns thus leagued together, and who honestly believed that their power was divine, shocked the feelings most common with the English people. We ceased for a moment to think of reform in England—our minds were fixed with disgust on despotism abroad. Lord Castlereagh, who was thought, in some degree unjustly, to sympathise with crowns and courts rather than with popular rights, was accused of lackeying the heels of a confederacy of which almost every Englishman would have grasped the throat; nevertheless he was about to proceed to Verona to take part in the congress which was to decide the fate of Spain, when his sudden death brought Mr. Canning to the Foreign Office: and Mr. Canning, at once seeing the means by which he could acquire a popularity which he had always coveted and never yet been able to attain, undertook a task by no means easy—that of satisfying the predominant feeling in England, which was for resisting the despotic pretensions of the great continental powers, without going to war for constitutional opinions. The extraordinary tact and skill with which he did this, appearing at times rash, but never really being so—inspiring Englishmen with the conviction of their power, and satisfying them with regard to the principles for which it was to be exerted, rallied by

degrees public opinion around him, and led most men, whose general tendencies were liberal, to look up to him as their leader. This was more especially the case with those who advocated the Catholic claims. On the other hand, the anti-Catholic party, as they saw Mr. Canning rising in power, became more jealous of those who were, or who seemed likely to be, his partisans. Under these circumstances, Lord Palmerston, who had been returned for Cambridge University as a friend to Catholic Emancipation in 1812, 1818, 1820, again came forward with the same colours in 1825.

This is what he himself says of this election :—

In November, 1825, it being generally understood that Parliament would be dissolved the next summer, Sir J. Copley, then Attorney-General, wrote to me to say that he was going to begin to canvass the University, with a view of turning out Bankes; and shortly afterwards Goulburn, who was chief Secretary for Ireland, announced himself as a fourth candidate. Bankes, Copley, and Goulburn were all anti-Catholics. I was the only one of the four who voted for Emancipation.

The canvass lasted from the end of November, 1825, till the dissolution in June, 1826, and a most laborious task for myself and my friends it became. It was soon manifest that the object of certain parties was to eject me as well as Bankes, and the active influence of the anti-Catholic members of the Government was exerted in favour of Copley and Goulburn, and, therefore—as there were but two to be returned—against me.¹

The Church, the Treasury, and the Army were in anti-Catholic hands; and though the Duke of Wellington and Peel condemned the cabal, Eldon, Bathurst, the Duke of York, the Secretaries to the Treasury, and many others did all they could against me.

I stood on my personal interest in the University, and threw

¹ Extract from a letter from the Right Hon. Charles W. Wynn, President of the Board of Control, to the Duke of Buckingham :—

‘May 12, 1825.

‘I have heard nothing lately about Lord Palmerston, but, from all accounts, his re-election for Cambridge is so doubtful (to say the best of it), that I fully expect him to withdraw from it into the Upper House.’—*Duke of Buckingham’s Court and Times of George IV.*

myself on my political enemies, the Whigs, for support against my political friends the Tories.

This support, which I asked on the ground of our accordance upon Catholic Emancipation, was handsomely granted, and enabled me to triumph; Copley, indeed, headed the poll, but I beat Bankes by 122, and Goulburn by 192.

I had complained to Lord Liverpool, and the Duke of Wellington, and Canning of being attacked, in violation of the understanding upon which the Government was formed, and by which the Catholic question was to be an open one; and I told Lord Liverpool that if I was beat I should quit the Government. *This was the first decided step towards a breach between me and the Tories, and they were the aggressors.*

The destruction of every party begins by its more violent members driving the more moderate into union with their opponents.

The following letters to his brother relate in part to this election, but are mingled with others, singularly illustrative of the man of the world—gossiping, racing, and looking after his property. Apart from the interest which they possess as affecting the private life of a man so well known to the public, they illustrate how every occupation or amusement which has brought a statesman in contact with his fellow-men, and which has not alienated him from graver pursuits, has been useful in awakening for him sympathies and giving to him knowledge which, at the proper time, melt advantageously into his main career.

Stanhope Street: July 19, 1825.

My dear William,—George Dawson marries Miss Seymour. Three objections in my opinion insuperable. He has no money, and she not more than she has been accustomed to spend entirely upon her own dress and amusements. He is four inches shorter than her, and two stone lighter.

As to weather, we are fried alive: thermometer above 80° every day for the last week; on the leads out of my study window it stood yesterday at 93°, hanging on the wall, and completely shaded from the sun, though somewhat raised by the reflected heat from the opposite walls. Watson says that two days ago the thermometer on one of the walls in the kitchen garden stood at 130° in the sun, and at 100° in the shade on

the other side of the same wall ; of course the heat had got through the wall ; but they say it has been 92° fairly in the shade. The wind, too, is to the eastward, and the weather likely to last. We shall have plenty of birds, but not a turnip-leaf to cover them.

August 5, 1825.

I have been unlucky in my racing this year as yet, my horses having been ill and lame at the moment when they were to run for stakes which, if well, they would probably have won, and which would have been worth winning. As yet I have just won within two pounds of the amount I have had to pay for stakes and forfeits, so that I have all my training-bills to boot ; but I hope to bring myself home yet before the end of the season. I am going in a fortnight to Sligo again, to see the progress of my harbour, and to settle some further improvements with Mr. Nimmo, the civil engineer whom I have employed to survey my bogs. He recommends me to lay down an iron railroad of about six miles in length, by means of which I should be enabled to bring up a shelly sand from the sea-beach to reclaim the bogs, and to carry down in return to my new harbour turf from the bogs, prepared as fuel ; and he thinks that a very considerable export-trade of this turf could be carried on with the town of Sligo and the coast beyond it. This would require a capital of between five and six thousand pounds to be immediately laid out ; but I am inclined to think it will answer, and I could get the money advanced by the commissioners in Ireland, who are authorised by Parliament to issue Exchequer bills in aid of public works of this kind for the internal improvement of Ireland, taking repayment by annual instalments of so much per cent. added to the interest. But this matter I shall settle when on the spot.

Stanhope Street : August 8, 1825.

As you take an interest about my racing concerns, I send you the list of the Salisbury races last week, by which you will see that I won five races out of eight ; and the cup is, luckily, an exact match to that which I won the other day at Southampton. The result of Salisbury is, however, greater in glory than in profit, as it amounts to a cup and 170*l.*, as I only got 15*l.* for Biondetta's walking over. Conquest is a three-year-old filly by Waterloo, dam by Rubens, which I took in the early part of the year from Tattersall, in exchange for my brood-mare Mignonet. Day thought ill of her ; but she has turned out tolerably well, as she beat 'Black and all black' in a canter ;

but she had, according to the conditions of the race, a great advantage in weight, in consequence of her age and of her competitor having won this year, of which she had been guiltless till that day. Grey Leg turns out very well. He won the Coronation Stakes at Stockbridge, value 39*l.*, the cup at Southampton, and a 25*l.* stake, and the cup at Salisbury. He would have done more if he had not had the distemper just as he was to have run at Bath and Cheltenham for good stakes ; but in a trial with Luzborough, giving weight for age, he was found to be as good as Luzborough.

Stanhope Street : December 2, 1825.

It is so long since I have written to you that I really almost forget when it was, and you have been so excellent a correspondent that my silence is the more unpardonable. I received the other day the very pretty little bronzes you sent me, which do credit to the Prussian artists. They have really contrived to give a sharpness and fineness of execution to their iron of which one hardly supposed that metal to be susceptible.

I am just setting off for Cambridge, where I am obliged to begin a canvass, as the Attorney-General and Goulburn have both declared themselves candidates for the general election. It is rather a bore to have to go through the labour of a canvass so long before the time ; but this is just a time of year when I have more leisure to attend to it, and I shall not be sorry to get the matter over. I do not feel much apprehension as to the result, because I think I am sure of a great many Protestants, from a coincidence of opinion on other questions ; and of many Whigs, from an agreement on the Catholic question. Indeed, if there is no Whig candidate, I should expect to have all the Whig interest at Cambridge. I believe I gave you a report of my Irish journey, which was very prosperous and satisfactory. I found the general aspect of affairs in that country rapidly improving. I had Nimmo, the engineer, with me for ten days in Sligo ; and we made arrangements for carrying into effect divers operations, which I trust will materially improve my property in the course of a few years. From Ireland, after passing a day at Powis Castle, I struck across to Yorkshire, where I also was well satisfied with the state of my Fairburn property. I shall soon bring my lime-works into play, and have some chance of finding coal. I have lately been for a week at Brighton, which is really increasing in the most extraordinary manner. There literally are as many lodging-houses in different stages of progress as there are completed and occupied. Where they are

to find inhabitants for them all I do not understand; but it may fairly be said that by next summer the accommodation of the place will be nearly twice what it was last summer, and all the new houses are upon a grand style of architectural decoration.

I saw our quarry as I returned from Ireland, and found it a remarkably fine one, and I think the undertaking likely to answer well.¹ All we want is a railroad to the sea, as at present the slates are sent twelve miles along an infamously bad road; but some other slate owners, whose quarries are near ours, are equally interested in this, and a survey has been made of a line for a railway, and in the course of this next year it is probable that such a road will be made.

I have just agreed with Breton for the purchase of his estate at Ashfield. I give him 12,000*l.* for it, which is fully 1,000*l.* more than it can by possibility be worth to anybody else: but from local contiguity it is so desirable to me that I think the money well laid out. I trust it will enable me to turn the road, and extend the park to the canal.²

We have had quantities of partridges this year; but as I returned late from Ireland they were wild as hawks. I hear a good account of the pheasants, but have not as yet broke cover.

Adieu! my dear William. I will let you know the result of my canvass.

Cambridge: December 4, 1825.

I am going on as well as I could expect—in fact, as well as possible; I think I shall have all the Johnians and most of the Trinity men. The Protestants will support me as a Tory, and the Whigs as a Catholic. That is if no Whig candidate starts, for that was the qualification with which Smyth of Peterhouse tended me his vote before I could ask it. The small colleges I have not yet gone into, for I attacked

¹ These slate mines proved a happy speculation. In a moment of panic many of the shareholders withdrew. Lord Palmerston, as a Director of the Company that conducted them, felt bound to remain, and he took the shares of all his friends who wished to retire. The ultimate success of the undertaking was complete, and his foresight and perseverance were rewarded.

² This was an improvement for which Lord Palmerston had to wait just forty years. In 1865, a few months before his death, he went down to Broadlands, on purpose to superintend the marking out of his new park wall along the line of the old canal. It was the reward of perseverance, because he had been obliged to wait and work for an Act of Parliament for the construction of the Andover and Redbridge Railway, which, when passed, enabled him to get the high road turned.

St. John's and Trinity first ; and I do not hurry, but let every man talk his fill, and many have much to say about the Catholic question, and I encourage them to open their minds and state all their objections, because it gives me an opportunity of explaining my views, which are more rational than some of them fancy ; and of suggesting answers to some of their arguments, which may give them matter for reflection ; and a man who has been used to hear certain positions echoed about as self-evident among a small knot of his friends, is sometimes surprised to find how much may be said on the other side. The greatest number of those I have spoken to do not promise, saying they wish to keep themselves disengaged, but generally accompanying this with expressions of personal goodwill, and an admission of a certain degree of claim on the part of an old member. I am collecting a nominal committee in order to have people engaged ; but it is useless to go through all the manual exercise of a contest now, unless, at least, one is driven to it by the measures of one's competitors. People are all extremely civil, and I have not yet had one refusal, though I expect one from Webb of Clare, who is the Dragon of Wantley of the Protestants. I cannot yet say how long I shall stay here, but I shall not leave this till I have seen every man.

Stanhope Street : June 5, 1826.

I have been a horrid bad correspondent for some time past : but I have been overwhelmed with business including my canvass, which for the last six months has hung upon me like a nightmare, filling up every interval which anything else allowed to exist. Next week will decide the matter. The election begins on Tuesday 13th, and lasts till Thursday 15th, inclusive. I think I shall succeed if I can prevail upon people to come up, which I hope to do. My own opinion is that Copley will be first, I next, Bankes third, and Goulburn fourth.¹

The Whigs have behaved most handsomely to me ; they have given me cordial and hearty support, and, in fact, bring me in. Liverpool has acted as he always does to a friend, in personal questions,—shabbily, timidly, and ill. If I am beat, I have told him he must find another Secretary at War, for I certainly will not continue in office.

Stanhope Street : July 17, 1826.

Many thanks for your letters and congratulations, and many apologies for my apparent remissness as to writing, but I really have been so much occupied for the last six months by my

¹ This opinion proved correct.

Cambridge canvass, that it threw me into an arrear of every other business, public and private, which I am only now beginning to work down. I have within the last five minutes finished working up my War Office arrears, and am even with the papers of this very day, and I turn accordingly to write you a few lines.¹

The result of my contest was most gratifying, and beyond my expectations; I knew my own strength, but not that of my opponents. All the various possibilities and contingencies made me feel the result might be extremely doubtful; and on the day of the dissolution I wrote to Liverpool to tell him that I thought it fair to give him notice then, that if I should fail at Cambridge, I should be unable to continue my connection with a Government under which and by which such a result would have been brought about. Liverpool wrote me a civil answer, begging me not to come to any decision in the event of failure without communication with him, and so the matter rested; but if I had been beat I should most indubitably have immediately quitted the Government. In fact, as it is I feel that I have been dealt with by them in a way in which, probably, no official man ever was before. The first two days of our polling I kept back everybody who had not some particular reason for wishing to vote early—such as wanting to go away, or wishing to give me a plumper, and to avoid being plagued by other candidates. Bankes, on the other hand, was urging his friends up as fast as he could, in order to get ahead of Goulburn, in order that the anti-Catholics might think him the most likely of the two to beat me, and might throw their weight into his scale. When I found on Wednesday evening that, running this sort of race, I was still ahead of him, I began to think myself pretty sure of victory; but even to the last I did not venture to hope for so large a majority. The number of my majority is most satisfactory, because it makes me feel pretty secure as to the future, and because, also, many of the anti-Catholics who voted for me from personal regard or college feeling, and who would perhaps have regretted their sacrifice of opinion if we had been beat, or had won by a small number, are now carried away by the pride of triumph by becoming parties to so decided a success. One advantage at Cambridge will be, that party feeling on the Catholic question must abate; for all the Johnians

¹ Everyone must be struck with the kind and affectionate feeling which this correspondence manifests, as well as with the writer's conscientious attention to business.

who supported me cannot hold now on this subject the violent language which they formerly did. The Whigs supported me most handsomely, and were indeed my chief and most active friends ; and to them and the Johnians I owe my triumph over the No Popery faction behind the Government, if not in it. I think the question has gained by the general election. In the first place, in numerical strength I am inclined to believe that it will be found that we have rather increased upon the anti-Catholics ; but the grand point is, that the No Popery cry has been tried in many places and has everywhere failed ; and we may now appeal to the experience of facts to show that there does *not* exist among the people of England that bigoted prejudice on this point which the anti-Catholics accused them of entertaining. The breaking loose of the Irish tenantry from their landlords, too, is a very important advantage. In the first place, it will make the representation of Ireland almost entirely *for* the question ; and then it will teach the landlords the folly of splitting their estates into forty-shilling freeholds, and lead them to adopt a system of management more advantageous to themselves and to the progress of society in Ireland.

As to the commonplace balance between Opposition and Government, the election will have little effect upon it. The Government are as strong as any Government can wish to be, as far as regards those who sit facing them ; but in truth the real opposition of the present day sit behind the Treasury Bench ; and it is by the stupid old Tory party, who bawl out the memory and praises of Pitt, while they are opposing all the measures and principles which he held most important ; it is by these that the progress of the Government in every improvement which they are attempting is thwarted and impeded. On the Catholic question, on the principles of commerce, on the Corn Laws, on the settlement of the currency, on the laws regulating the trade in money, on colonial slavery, on the Game Laws, which are intimately connected with the moral habits of the people : on all these questions, and everything like them, the Government find support from the Whigs and resistance from their self-denominated friends. However, the young squires are more liberal than the old ones, and we must hope that Heaven will protect us from our friends, as it has done from our enemies. The next session will be interesting. All these questions will come under a new Parliament, in which there are about 150 new members.

I have started most prosperously with my racing concerns. I have four horses this year—Luzborough, Grey Leg, and a

mare now four-year old, which I got last year, and call Conquest, as she is by Waterloo out of a mare by Rubens, and my fourth is a three-year old colt I call Foxbury, bred by myself, got by Whalebone out of Mignonet, the large Sorcerer mare, which you must remember, and which I bred also, and have had some time. Last year my horses were ill a great part of the season; and, though I won several races, I had to pay forfeits for many which were the best worth having, because my horses could not start.

I ran for the first time this year, the other day, at Bath. Luzborough won the Bath Stakes—a very good stake—beating several good horses. Conquest won a race also, beating some tolerable nags; and Foxbury won one race, and lost a second only because he swerved from the course—the boy, probably, not knowing just how to manage him. I thus won three out of four. Foxbury is to run to-day at Wells, and I think may win; and Luzborough is to run at Cheltenham next week for a race which will be worth 700*l*. probably, and is favourite for it among the bettors, his most formidable rival being Shakespear, who was second for the Derby, but with respect to whom, age considered, Luzborough has the advantage. I shall let you know how I go on, but I hope to make a brilliant campaign of it.

There is no betting in all this. Nothing but the love of horses and sport, and the idea that his expenses might probably be repaid him by his stables. The next letter shows him no less keen and careful as a landlord than as a sportsman—no trouble was too great and no details too insignificant for him. The harbour referred to was completed at a great expense, and still remains as a monument of his anxiety to improve the condition of his tenantry, but his anticipations of trade have not been fulfilled, and it is of service only to a few fishermen. The work, however, which he describes, connected with the reclamation of blowing sand by means of bent grass, has proved a signal success. Not only has a vast extent of barren shore been converted into excellent pasture, but the whole neighbourhood has been benefited, by being saved from the periodical ‘tourbillons’ of sand which during the frequent high winds used to be carried a long way inland.

Londonderry : Oct. 21, 1826.

I have been busily employed or actively moving about in Ireland. I went on to Sligo, where I remained eighteen days, the greater part of the time at Cliffony, with Nimmo the engineer, looking over the progress of my improvements, and planning arrangements for the future. My harbour is nearly completed, and will be an excellent one for my purposes : it will be about one and a quarter English acres in extent, and will have fourteen feet water at high spring tides—enough depth to admit vessels of 300 tons, and as much as any harbour on the west coast of Ireland, and it has an excellent anchorage in front of it, where ships may wait the tide to enter. I have no doubt that in a short time it will be much frequented by the coasting trade ; and if I can get people—which Nimmo thinks probable—to lay down a railroad to it from the end of Loch Erne, a distance of fourteen English miles, it would become the exporting and importing harbour for a large tract of very fertile country lying on the banks of that lake, and would communicate with an inland navigation of nearly forty miles in extent. This speculation, however, I shall leave to others, and only profit by it if they undertake it ; in the meantime it will give much scope to the industry of my tenants. I have begun cultivating my bogs, of which I have about two thousand Irish acres : I have got thirty acres now producing potatoes, turnips, and rape, which in March last were wet unwalkable bog. The process was first to drain them slightly, which was begun in April ; then to dig up the surface and pile it in heaps and burn it ; then to level the ground, and form it into ridges and plant it with potatoes, or sow it with turnips and rape, throwing the ashes on as manure, and adding a top-dressing of sea-sand and clay ; as far as I am able to calculate at present this is likely to answer extremely well. It seems probable that in the fourth year after an acre of bog has been thus taken into cultivation it may be let on lease at a rent of from twenty to thirty shillings ; and that, setting on the one hand all the expense incurred upon the acre in the four years, and on the other all the profit made by selling the crops which it will have produced, and which will consist of potatoes, turnip, or rape the first year, oats the second and third, and hay the fourth, the permanent outlay at the time it is so let cannot exceed 8*l.*, and may possibly fall short of that sum, so that a proprietor may in this manner make twelve per cent. at least upon his money, while he gives employment to his tenantry, and provides the means of enlarging their holdings and improving their

condition. I do not expect to be able to accomplish more than about sixty acres a year, and at that rate I shall have scope enough for a tolerable number of years to come. I have, however, begun upon my worst bog, and that which was the most troublesome to cultivate, so that my future progress will be more rapid and less expensive. I have been planting bent upon a great tract of blowing sand, and I think with success. I have about 600 acres of that description on the coast, and this year I planted bent on about 140 acres, which only cost me 50%. The bent was taken up from parts where it grows in clusters, and planted closely in rows fourteen feet apart; it is almost all growing, and I see that in another year it will very much stop the sand, and I have no doubt that, by extending my plantation, I shall succeed in covering the greater part of the 600 acres with green bent, and when that has stopped the blowing of the sand it soon gives way to grass, but it is itself very good food for cattle. I have established an infant linen market at Cliffony, held once a month, and have no doubt of its prospering and increasing. I have just got two schools on foot, but am at war with my priest, who, as usual, forbids the people to send their children. I know that if I was resident I should beat him in a moment, and I hope to do so, even though an absentee. I am getting the people to build some houses according to a plan of village which Nimmo and I have laid out; and, as a proof that my tenants and I are not upon very bad terms, I found when I arrived there the other day that one fellow was building a good house, two stories high, and to have a slated roof, and which when finished will not cost him less than 150%, upon a piece of ground of which he has no lease, and of which he is merely tenant at will. Of course, my friend Timon—not of Athens, but of Cliffony—will have his building lease, and, as an encouragement, I have promised to give him the cost of his slates. I have established a lime kiln at the foot of a mountain, where I can make lime at 6d. a barrel, which sells in the neighbourhood for 1s. a barrel; and, by contenting myself with a profit of 4d., I can undersell the others, and supply the people with an article of great importance to them, both for the improvement of their land and the cleanliness of their houses. On the whole, I find a considerable improvement going on in the country, and I trust its progress will be accelerated by the operations I am carrying on. They really are a good and simple-minded people, though they quarrel among each other without end or reason, and get most joyously drunk whenever they lose a relation or friend.

The Catholic and Anti-Catholic war is, however, carried on more vigorously than ever, and the whole people are by the ears, like an undisciplined pack of hounds. It is most marvellous, to be sure, that sensible statesmen should be frightened by the bugbear of foreign interference clashing with domestic allegiance, and should see with calmness and apathy a civil war raging throughout Ireland, engrossing all the thoughts and passions of the people, diverting them from the pursuits of industry, and retarding the progress of national prosperity, and menacing, in the event of foreign hostilities, inconveniences of the most formidable and embarrassing description. I can forgive old women like the Chancellor, spoonies like Liverpool, ignoramuses like Westmoreland, old stumped-up Tories like Bathurst; but how such a man as Peel, liberal, enlightened, and fresh-minded, should find himself running in such a pack is hardly intelligible. I think he must in his heart regret those early pledges and youthful prejudices which have committed him to opinions so different from the comprehensive and statesmanlike views which he takes of public affairs. *But the day is fast approaching, as it seems to me, when this matter will be settled as it must be;* and in spite of the orgies in this town and Armagh, the eloquence of Sir George Hill and Lord G. Beresford, and the bumpers pledged to the 'Prentice Boys' motto of '*No surrender*,' the days of Protestant ascendancy I think are numbered. It is strange that in this enlightened age and enlightened country people should be still debating whether it is wise to convert four or five millions of men from enemies to friends, and whether it is *safe* to give peace to Ireland.

Lord Palmerston had now been for nearly twenty years a member of the Administration, but outside the Cabinet. Strenuous in his work, while not neglecting the claims of society, he yet had been during this long period a comparatively silent member of the House of Commons. Except on matters relating to his own department he had only spoken about a dozen times; and, curiously enough, considering his later career, not so much on foreign as on domestic affairs. Canning used often to complain of his failure to bring 'that three-decker Palmerston' into action, and his silence was much noticed. It was characteristic of the man, who had no love for display. He was too practical to take pleasure in mere

declamation, and too busy to indulge in idle repetition of what had been already said by others, while his official position had debarred him from initiating anything beyond the sphere of his proper duties. The estimation in which he was all the same generally held illustrates the maxim, which will be ratified by all keen observers of mankind, that what a man does now and then may get him momentary reputation or applause, but what he does every day will be the basis of his character and ultimate reputation. He was now about to take a more fitting because a more prominent position, preparatory to being called to that post at the head of the Foreign Office with which his name will always be associated.

CHAPTER IV.

MR. CANNING PRIME MINISTER, AND PALMERSTON OFFERED THE CHANCELLORSHIP OF THE EXCHEQUER—ENTERS THE CABINET FINALLY AS MINISTER OF WAR—CANNING DIES—LORD GODERICH PRIME MINISTER—PALMERSTON AGAIN OFFERED THE CHANCELLORSHIP OF THE EXCHEQUER, WHICH THE KING, HOWEVER, SECURES FOR HERRIES—LORD GODERICH SUCCEEDED BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

It will be seen from preceding quotations that the partisans of Mr. Canning and those of Lord Eldon were become two factions in Lord Liverpool's Government; that Lord Palmerston had taken his place with the former, and that only an event was necessary to range under hostile standards persons who were already of opposite opinions.

That event came on the death of Lord Liverpool, and the necessity of choosing his successor. The successor, as we know, was Mr. Canning. His ascent to the Premiership is, no doubt, one of the great events of our later history. It broke down for ever the 'resistant,' or, as it was then termed, 'Protestant' party, which, under the protection of George III., had held the greatest share of political power since the deaths of Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, and brought forward a Liberal party of various colours, in which, after the change in our constitution which took place in 1832, the democratic hue has become gradually more and more predominant.

Lord Palmerston naturally was selected for promotion in this new change. Mr. Canning had, in the first instance, to form his Administration within a very small circle. A large division of the Tories had de-

served him. It was necessary that some little time should elapse before he could form an open coalition with the Whigs. The Secretary at War was therefore at once summoned to the Cabinet, and his reputation as a man of business suggested the idea of making him Chancellor of the Exchequer. But, on the other hand, Mr. Canning shrewdly foresaw that his present condition could not last long, and that before the ensuing session he must join those as friends whom he had so long faced as opponents. He was not indisposed, therefore, as the necessity of this junction became more and more apparent from the bitterness of his former associates becoming more and more intense, to have as many high offices as possible to dispose of; and he made, though in a very friendly way, two or three offers to Lord Palmerston, which, if accepted, would have removed him from England.

Lord Palmerston thus records these offers:—

In February, 1827, Lord Liverpool was taken ill; and in April of that year Mr. Canning was declared Minister, and commanded to form a Government. Upon this the Tories retired in a body. Lord Eldon, the Duke of Wellington, Peel, Lord Bathurst, Lord Westmoreland, Lord Melville, Lord Bexley (who, however, retracted), Wallace, Beckett, Wetherell, Duke of Dorset, Duke of Montrose, Lord Londonderry, all sent in their resignations, leaving Canning 'alone in his glory.' Canning had, some little time before, desired me not to leave town for Easter without letting him know; and upon this break-up he sent for me, to offer me a seat in the Cabinet and the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. He said he wished to keep the Foreign Office as Prime Minister, instead of being First Lord of the Treasury; but he found that there were official attributes attached to the first Lord of the Treasury which rendered it necessary that the Prime Minister should be First Lord; that he wished, however, to have a separate Chancellor of the Exchequer, to relieve him both in the Treasury Office and in the House of Commons, and to leave him more leisure for general matters, and should be glad to have my assistance.

I accepted both offers.

Canning gave a great dinner at his house at the Foreign Office just before the recess; and after dinner he proposed to me to take immediately the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, in order that I might be re-elected during the holidays, and be ready to start again as soon as the House met. Croker, who had *not* resigned, but who remained in office, and who was standing by, artfully suggested that there was going to be a contest at Cambridge between Goulburn and Bankes, for the seat vacated by Copley—made Chancellor and created Lord Lyndhurst—and strongly advised me to wait, in order that I might not incur the danger of being mixed up with that contest: saying that, by the usual courtesy of the University, I should have no contest if I vacated upon changing office, but might be in danger if I ran my head into a battle begun by other people. Canning said that I must take the Exchequer *then*, or else wait till the end of the session, as it would not be convenient that I should be out of Parliament for a fortnight during the session. It was then agreed that I should remain Secretary at War till the end of the session, when I should go to the Exchequer.

In the meanwhile intrigues were set on foot. George IV., who personally hated me, did not fancy me as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He wanted to have Herries in that office. There were questions coming on about palaces and crown lands which the King was very anxious about, and he wished either to have a creature of his own at the Exchequer, or to have the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer held by the First Lord, whose numerous occupations would compel him to leave details very much to George Harrison, the Secretary, and to Herries, Auditor of the Civil List.

Towards the end, or rather about the middle, of the session, Canning sent for me, and, evidently much embarrassed, said that he wished to speak to me about the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. That it had been arranged that I was to have it, and he had at that time much wished that I should; but that since then it had been strongly pressed upon him by all the financial department that it was extremely important that the First Lord should also be Chancellor of the Exchequer; and that the union of the two offices in the person of the Prime Minister, when that minister was in the House of Commons, was attended with great official convenience; and the result, he said, was, that he felt himself unable to carry our intended arrangement into effect.

Having finished his statement he walked to the other end of the room, like a man who wishes to hide from another the emotions of embarrassment which for a moment were shown upon the countenance. I was a little surprised, and saw that there was something behind which he did not choose to tell. I said that my only wish was to be useful to his Government, and that I had no selfish objects in view; that if he thought it better for the public service that I should remain as I was, I was perfectly contented to do so; that, moreover, as the office of Commander-in-Chief had been vacant since the death of the Duke of York in January, and as I was administering the discipline and patronage of the army by virtue of my office of Secretary at War, I might well, for the present at least, be satisfied with the importance of my functions.

Canning seemed much relieved by the manner in which I took his communication, admitted the justness of my last remark, and said that he would take care that when my double functions ceased, by the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, some arrangement should be made that would be satisfactory to me.

I told him that I thought there ought to be a military man as Commander-in-Chief; but that he should well consider who that man should be, as he had the power of doing much mischief, military and political, as well as good.

Some weeks after this Canning sent for me again, to say he had a proposition to make to me which he should not himself have thought of, but that the King had said he knew, and was sure, that it was just the very thing I should like, and that was to go as Governor to Jamaica. I laughed so heartily that I observed Canning looked quite put out, and I was obliged to grow serious again.

Not long afterwards he again sent for me, and said he had an offer to make which might be more worth my consideration, and in making which he had only one difficulty, and that was lest I should think he wanted to get rid of me, which he could very sincerely assure me was far from being the case. The offer was the Governor-Generalship of India.

I thanked him very kindly for his offer, assured him I was not insensible to the splendour of the post which he was now proposing. That I felt what means it afforded for increasing one's fortune, for gratifying one's love of power, for affording a scope for doing good upon a magnificent theatre of action; but my ambition was satisfied with my position at home. I hap-

pened not to have a family for whom I should be desirous of providing, and my health would not stand the climate of India. I had already, I said, declined the office when offered me by Lord Liverpool, at a time when I was not in the Cabinet, and the same motives which influenced me then still operated now.

The following letters tend to complete the sketch, thus rapidly drawn :—

Stanhope Street : April 19, 1827.

My dear William,—You must have been surprised, like the rest of the world, at all the resignations of last week. Peel's was expected by Canning, as he had all along explained that, from his peculiar connection with Oxford, he should think himself obliged to go out if a Catholic were at the head of the Government ; but the others were unexpected, and generally without a public ground. Westmoreland, indeed, stated fairly that he could not serve under a Catholic chief ; the Duke of Wellington gives out that he went because Canning's letters were uncivil ; Melville, because the Duke persuaded him, and told him that if he did not go now he would be turned out six months hence ; Bathurst, because his colleagues went ; Bexley, that he might have the pleasure of coming back again. *Peel is a great loss ; but he parts with undiminished cordiality, and one understands and respects his motive.* The Duke is a great loss in the Cabinet, but in the command of the army an irreparable one ; and it is the more provoking that he should have resigned this office, because it is not a political office ; and he felt this so strongly that when it became a question, three months ago, on what footing he should hold it, he declared himself perfectly ready to quit the Cabinet if it was thought not tenable with that situation. The King is very angry with him, and wrote a short and equivocal answer to his letter of resignation, simply saying he received it 'with the same regret with which the Duke *appeared* to have sent it.' I take it that this was worked about by Eldon, and no doubt he thought it his master-stroke. In the mean time, however, I am glad to find that nobody else is to be appointed. The situation will be left vacant, and the duties done as in the late interregnum ; and when arrangements for the new Government have been made, and personal feelings on both sides have cooled, I have no doubt the Duke will return to his command. The appointment of Clarence¹ to the navy has given great satisfaction to that

¹ Duke of Clarence, afterwards William IV.

service, and is certainly a wise measure. The Heir-Presumptive cannot be always quite passive, and it is useful to bring him into action by placing him in official communication with the King, and by giving them, as it were, a community of interest, prevent the Heir from being drawn into cabals and intrigues. The present state of things is, that the King has placed everything at Canning's disposal, stating that he wishes the Government to contain as many Protestants as possible, but that if none can be found he will be satisfied with an entirely Catholic list.¹ Canning is at present First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer; and Granville Foreign Affairs, but retaining his embassy, to which he will ultimately return, as Canning will remain Foreign Secretary, having taken the other situation only for the moment, and till final arrangements are made. The Home Office is not filled; the King particularly wishes to have a Protestant there, but it is not easy to find one fit for it. I am the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but as Copley's move makes an immediate vacancy at Cambridge, and a contest will thereupon ensue, it is postponed in order that my re-election may not involve me in this contest; but in the meantime I am to be put immediately into the Cabinet. Canning has all along received from the Whigs assurances of their support in the event of his forming a Government of which he should be the head, even though he made no stipulation on the Catholic question, because they are wise enough to know that in the present state of the King's opinion, no Government can be formed upon the principle of carrying that question as a Cabinet measure, and the next best thing is to secure the influence of Government in the hands of men favourable to the question. My own opinion, however, is that some of them ought to be brought into office. And I should not be surprised if this were to happen. The Government would then be very strong; and without some such arrangement its chief reliance must be upon a party upon whom we shall have no hold, and who may throw us over at any moment of caprice or cabal. For as to the Tories, who would hardly vote for our measures before, we must not look for any cordial support from them now. Not but that, by degrees and one by one, they will all by instinct come round to the oat-sieve; I know, however, that Canning means to deal out that sieve very sparingly, and to found his Government

¹ By 'Protestants' are meant, of course, those opposed to Catholic Emancipation; and by 'Catholics' those in favour of it.

upon public opinion rather than borough interests, *in which I think he is as right as possible.*

Lord Palmerston's wishes and prognostications were fulfilled. A coalition with the Whigs made Mr. Canning's administration thoroughly Liberal. There was, indeed, no good reason why the two parties should not join. Though differing about Reform, they were agreed on the leading question of the times, namely, 'Catholic Disabilities,' as well as in all matters of foreign policy and of finance. It was only names, recollections, and insignia that kept them apart, and they were wise enough to recognise that principles are of more importance than badges.

Stanhope Street : May 4, 1827.

My dear William,—All arrangements are now settled, at least as to general principle. The Whigs join us in a body and with zeal, and some of them will come into office immediately. I am in the Cabinet, but continue Secretary at War till the end of the session, having in addition to my own duties those of the Commander-in-Chief to perform. This is the natural constitution of my office, that in the absence of a Commander-in-Chief the patronage of the army devolves on the Secretary at War. At the end of the session I shall be Chancellor of the Exchequer, and then, in my opinion, some military man ought to be placed in the command of the army. The advantage of the present arrangement is, that it leaves the door open for the Duke of Wellington's return when the other arrangements are made, without dispossessing any individual. You will see by the debates that the Whigs have joined us manfully and in earnest, and have boldly faced all charges of inconsistency, declaring that they know it to be impossible that the Catholic question should be made a Cabinet measure, and do not join us upon any such expectation, but simply because they see as well as Peel that the having Canning at the head of the Government must of itself necessarily give a great advantage to the question ; and because they agree with him on almost all other great questions of foreign and domestic policy ; and because, if they did not support him, he could not, by reason of the defection of his colleagues, maintain his position. Nothing can be more satisfactory to Canning than the footing on which their accession is placed ; he gives up no opinion either on parliamentary

reform or any other question, and distinctly said so last night in the House. They make him a compliment of most of the questions on which they differ with him. He, in the first place, makes his Government and carries it through the session, and they come in as joining a Government already formed, and not as original ingredients in its composition.

The Tories are furious at this junction, because they see that it puts the Government out of their power, and excludes them from a return. Peel parted good friends with Canning, but it is easy to foresee that their lines of march must daily diverge, and yesterday showed a good deal more personal opinion between them than might have been looked for. Indeed, Peel's speech two nights before was rather of a hostile complexion. His reference to Canning's correspondence in 1812 was needless; and such a reference, where not necessary, is always more or less personal. If Canning had blamed Peel for retiring then Peel would naturally have defended himself by referring to Canning's former course; but as Canning had, on the contrary, gone out of his way to acquit Peel of blame or any want of perfect candour, the reference could only be looked upon as unfriendly.

The Duke is, I think, very sorry now that he gave up the army, and I am sure he was worked upon to do it by the old Chancellor; the King, however, is very angry with him for it, and return at present is impossible.

Poor Canning enjoyed but a short time, as we know, the brilliant triumph of his genius. Harassed in mind and body by the virulent personal attacks which during the session he had to meet and repel, he retired, when Parliament rose, to rest at Chiswick, and there rested from his labours for good and all. He died on the 8th of August.

The annexed letters extend over the period which intervened between the rise of Lord Goderich to the premiership—one hardly sees why—and his sliding down from that eminence—one hardly sees how!

The first gives a singular evidence of that nice tact with which Lord Palmerston always discerned the place that suited him, at the time when his own advancement was in question, and put aside at once any idea of a higher one. Some friends had probably been speak-

ing of him as fit to be leader of the House of Commons. He was in the prime of life, and had attained a certain degree of eminence; but he saw instantaneously that the distinguished post suggested to him was above the position he had then acquired. He felt, moreover, that to undertake it would exact a strain on his faculties and a change in his habits that he was indisposed to encounter. Singular destiny! Mr. Fox said that no man after sixty could undertake the leadership of the House of Commons. Lord Palmerston—justifying the proverb that *'everything arrives to the able man who can wait for it,'* and owing much, no doubt, to his marvellous constitution—arrived at this proud and laborious situation when age, according to a man well qualified to judge, disqualified him from filling it—and held it with undiminished aptitude many years subsequent to the period when, according to the general rule that fixes the term of human existence, he should have been in his grave.

We shall see in these letters the usual traces of a kind heart and of a busy life, occupied with public affairs, and with the management of his paternal property, which he never neglected.

August 14, 1827.

My dear Sullivan,¹—I quite agree with you that Huskisson is the man who ought to represent the Government in the House of Commons. He has every qualification for it in a great degree, except eloquence; but, without having that, he has quite sufficient faculty of speaking to enable him in these times, and in the present state of the House, to perform his duty with credit. He is fully equal to speaking up to the mark of any opponents he is likely to be pitted against; for even Peel's style of speaking is not so much remarkable for eloquence and brilliancy as for those very qualities which Huskisson shares with him. Brougham is the man whose style of speaking would be the most embarrassing to a man of Huskisson's turn of mind, whose powers lie in argument and statement, rather than in ridicule and exaggeration; but Brougham is with us. As to myself, I have heard nothing; and though I know

¹ His brother-in-law—afterwards Right Hon. Lawrence Sullivan—Under-Secretary at the War Office.

Goderich's good-will towards me, it may not be easy for him to make any arrangement. As to the lead of the House of Commons, *there are very few things indeed in this world which I should so much dislike ; even if I felt that I was fit for it. But in various ways I should be quite unequal to it.* To go no further than one point, the person so placed must be in a perpetual state of canvass ; and of all irksome slaveries there is none more difficult to me than that ; besides the character of the Government is, as it were, identified with the debating success of the individual. I think it not unlikely that Tierney may risk it, and in some respects he has strong claims. *But he would not do ; people think him too sly.*

August 15, 1827.

I am to be Chancellor of Exchequer, and Herries Secretary at War. The first office was offered him by the King's desire ; but he did not feel his health equal to it—at least, without going abroad ; and Goderich could not wait his return. Goderich sent for me to-day, to propose this to me, saying he had written yesterday to the King about it.

War Office : August 24, 1827.

My dear William,—I have not time to make excuses for not having written to you sooner, since the great loss we have all sustained, and I now only state briefly the present situation of things. The King wants Herries to be Chancellor of the Exchequer ; the Whigs object to *him* pointedly, and Goderich wishes to have me. Neither party will give way ; and there is a great possibility of a dissolution of the Government. The Whigs certainly have some cause to complain. The King refuses, for the moment at least, to take in Lord Holland, whom they pressed, and presses Herries, whom they reject. Herries is anti-Catholic and anti-Liberal, and I believe has held some indiscreet language about the Whigs. Still, however, I think they would be very foolish to go out on a personal question of this kind, and to give up the means which office affords them of giving effect to all the great principles of national policy, foreign and domestic, to forward which they avowedly joined Canning's administration. But looking back to the conduct of that party, in trying moments when personal feeling came into play, I think it too probable that they will go out, if some means cannot be found to parry the question ; and I certainly should consider their secession as a great public misfortune. One of two things must follow : either a mixed Government

would be made by Goderich of some of his present colleagues and the Tories, or the whole Cabinet would march, and the Tories come in bodily. The last, it is obvious, would be most unfortunate in every possible way, and would produce the worst consequences on our foreign relations and domestic policy, including commerce and Ireland. The first event would bring back a Government just like Liverpool's, consisting of men differing on all great questions, and perpetually on the verge of a quarrel; the result of which is that nothing is done, each party giving up their views on condition that a corresponding sacrifice is made by the others. Huskisson has arrived at Paris, and is expected here in a few days, and it has been agreed to let the matter stand over till his return. Dudley remains at the Foreign Office, where he has done incomparably well, and has surprised all those who only knew him by seeing him abstracted and absent in society, or muttering to himself while chinking his sovereigns.

Our Portuguese affairs are beginning to clear up, and we are getting Austria to take much the same view of the matter as ourselves, and I trust we shall find her co-operate with us in the ultimate arrangement.

Austria engages to keep Miguel at Vienna till the negotiations with Brazil shall be brought to a close—that is, at least to the end of the year. If this and the Greek affair can be well settled, the state of Europe will be as satisfactory as it can perhaps ever be expected to be; for when Portugal is put to-rights the French *must* quit Spain.

The Duke of Wellington will be gazetted Commander-in-Chief to-night. He comes in without any stipulations or conditions whatever.

The Cabinet, as reconstructed under Lord Goderich, was the third administration which had existed within seven months, and gave no great promise of stability. The Whig section were very near going out at once, but were persuaded to stay and make a trial; and, on the whole, the Cabinet remained of a Whig character. Meanwhile the 'Greek affair,' alluded to above, was very far from settled. Ever since 1820 the Greeks had been fighting for their liberty, atoning by their conspicuous gallantry for their faults and weaknesses. Lord Palmerston, who at Harrow had been the school-

fellow of Byron, now shared to the full that sympathy for the Greek cause of which the poet was the bard and champion. The Turk, though ravaging and slaughtering, made little impression on the armed forces of Greece, until the Pasha of Egypt came to the help of his suzerain. Then, indeed, the prospects of freedom darkened. But Canning came to the rescue. He induced Russia and France to join England, in a treaty signed at London, by which the three Powers engaged themselves to bring about the pacification of Greece on the basis of liberty for the rebellious provinces. It was, however, contemplated at the time that they were to remain in dependence upon the Ottoman Porte. In accordance with the provisions of the treaty, both sides were ordered by the Allies to suspend active measures. The Turkish and Egyptian fleets, under the command of Mehemet Pasha, trying to evade this embargo laid on their operations and movements, were destroyed at Navarino by the allied squadrons. Canning was dead, but the event, unexpected though it was, did not in any way make those who had shared Canning's hopes and aims less anxious to carry out the designs and objects contemplated by the treaty. This was not, however, the case with what might be called the Tory section of the Government. They called Navarino an 'untoward event,' and only looked out for an excuse to make the treaty a nullity.

We had also under Canning's auspices sent troops to Portugal to repel the hostile aggressions of Spain. The Liberal movement in this latter country had been repressed by the aid of French arms, and the restored despotic faction had attempted to perform a similar outrage on Portugal, whose liberality of government they regarded as a reproach as well as a danger.

Stanhope Street: Oct. 19, 1827.

My dear William,—I am off to-morrow for Ireland for three weeks, but must be back again in London by the 12th November, as the Cabinet hold their usual autumnal assembly

on the 13th, to make arrangements for the business of the session, &c.

European affairs have been arranging themselves in a satisfactory manner. Miguel will, I hope, come here soon, and if we can send him to Lisbon imbued with proper sentiments as to the necessary dependence of Portugal on England, and can undo a little of Metternich's absolutism in his mind, the affairs of Portugal may yet turn out well. Our troops will probably be withdrawn as soon as Miguel arrives, because then, all danger of invasion from Spain being over, the ground of our occupation will cease. France would, I believe, be very glad also to get out of Spain, where the position of her army becomes every day more false and unpleasant; and we have reason to think that when our troops are gone, or actually going, France will publicly proclaim the approaching departure of hers from Spain. Greece is an object of more uncertain interest; but yet I cannot believe that the Turk will hold out when he finds the three allies really in earnest. Austria has, I believe, been playing her usual double game on this point, professing to us her anxiety to assist us, and that her only reason for not being a party to the treaty was an abstract principle, which forbade her to recognise the existence on earth of such a state of things as a continued resistance of subjects to their sovereign; while, on the other hand, she has been urging the Porte not to give way, assuring her that the allies would separate, and the alliance end in nothing. Metternich has even had the face to make to the allies, through the French Government, an indirect offer of the mediation of Austria and Prussia between the allies and Turkey, stating that it was now evident that the treaty was become a dead letter, and never could be executed. Damas gave him a very proper answer, saying that the three Powers humbly thought that they were strong enough to execute their own intentions; and that the treaty, so far from having become a dead letter, happened to be just beginning to become an effective measure; that we needed no assistance in the way of mediation from our obliging friends at Vienna and Berlin, but that if they chose now to become parties to the treaty, they might still be admitted, and their assistance in that shape would be willingly received. Metternich, however, will gradually connect himself a little more with England. There was a personal dislike between him and Canning, which influenced the public policy, perhaps, of both; but Metternich must be an idiot if he does not see that Russia is the windward quarter of

the heavens, and that his dirty weather must come from thence, and that he should look for shelter to the westward. The Whigs are getting into good-humour again, and Whig and Tory will soon be erased from our vocabulary. The King has not yet forgiven the seceders.

Stanhope Street : Nov. 27, 1827.

I returned about a fortnight ago from a three weeks' trip to Sligo, where I found my improvements going on well; and I hope to find my people in a few years somewhat resembling a civilized race. My harbour is just finished, and will be very useful for the fishery, and in the end will be a little commercial port. I made a concordat with my bishop about my schools, and, by agreeing to all he asked—which after all was not very unreasonable—I have got him to assist me, and have heard since my return that my girls' school has increased from five scholars to one hundred. The boys' school has not yet got a master; but when I get one it will be equally thriving, I have no doubt. By our last accounts from Constantinople, dated the 5th, the Turks seemed as much puzzled as surprised with the smash at Návlarino. My own conjecture is, that it will smooth and not increase our difficulties. It is a display of power and an indication of determination which they will appreciate. It deprives them of all possibility of keeping up their army in the Morea; for as to supplies by land, the march is too long and difficult. The only question then is, how long it will take for the Greeks, and sickness, and fatigue to consume their present force in Greece, and whether there is any chance of the alliance falling to pieces before that time; and, on the other hand, they must calculate that if what has been done should not be effectual, something more may perhaps be done in the shape of those 'ulterior measures' alluded to in the treaty. Metternich has acted a shabby and a foolish part. He thwarted us under hand, while a different course might have prevented the collision; and now he is frightened, and really wishes to help us, when his influence is diminished. From what I have seen of him since I came into the Cabinet, I am convinced he prefers the tortuous to the straight course, where the option is before him.

Dec. 4, 1827.

We are still in uncertainty about Turkey and Greece. What is most probable is, that the Turk will sit cross-legged, and with his hands before him, and say he will do nothing; or,

as the French express it, *qu'il se retranchera dans son inertie*. The question then for us will be, how we shall compel him to move; because the treaty of London *must* be carried into effect, cost what it may, and oppose it who will. I should think that Metternich must by this time be sick of his double-dealing on this subject, and wish that he had inculcated less obstinacy into the Divan. Cunning men are always foolish actors; and nothing could be more silly for Austria than to throw secret obstacles in the way of the allies, as Metternich has done. The protraction of the discussion between Turkey and the allies can do Austria no good; and if it ends in war she will heartily repent not having used her best efforts to prevent such a crisis.

It did end in a war between Russia and Turkey, as will be seen further on. Lord Palmerston's opinion was that Turkey was the aggressor, and in a speech in the House of Commons, on June 1, 1829, he put the matter thus:—

She seized Russian ships and cargoes, expelled Russian subjects from Turkey, shut the Bosphorus against Russian commerce, and declared her intention not to fulfil the treaty of Akermann; and all this upon no other pretence than certain things which Russia had done in conjunction with her allies England and France to prevail upon Turkey to accede to some arrangements about Greece.

By the treaty of London, to which he thus referred, it was stipulated that none of the three Powers should obtain any accession of territory; and though the Russian campaign against Turkey, which was outside the treaty of London, ended in the defeat of the Turk and the hard terms of the treaty of Adrianople, Russia considered herself virtually bound by her engagement with England and France, and beyond the small villages of Anapa and Poti on the Black Sea did not enlarge her borders.

But to return to the Cabinet at home, which we find rapidly sinking:—

War Office: Dec. 18, 1827.

My dear William,—Here we are again all aback. Goderich last Saturday se'nnight pressed on the King, in a personal inter-

view, the accession of Lords Holland and Wellesley to the Cabinet, which the King put aside. On Tuesday last, Goderich wrote the King a letter, again urging the matter, and stating that without such an addition of strength to the Government he felt himself unable to make himself responsible for carrying on the King's service; and unless his advice was adopted, he begged leave to retire. To this Lansdowne and Huskisson were parties; and they were also prepared to abide by the same alternative. But then Goderich added to this letter a postscript, which nobody saw, and in which he stated that he felt himself—from domestic circumstances, affecting the health of one most dear to him—totally incapable of continuing to perform the duties of his station. The King dexterously avoided any notice of the first alternative, and fastened upon the postscript, and expressed his regret that Lord Goderich should find himself unfit for his situation by circumstances over which the King had no control; and in a subsequent interview on Thursday, he said he would think of the means of relieving him. He has sent for Lord Harrowby, and yesterday saw Huskisson. I have not heard that any decision has been made, nor can any be expected for some days. Goderich is willing, on reconsideration, to remain, if any satisfactory arrangement could be made as to Holland and Wellesley; but the King, probably, will not let him. I do not expect any considerable change, and certainly not the return of the Tories; but some changes there probably will be—beyond the single office of First Lord of the Treasury. If the accounts from Constantinople are confirmed, and that an armistice has been agreed to, we may consider ourselves out of the main difficulty in that quarter.

Stanhope Street: Jan. 8, 1828.

I am glad you are satisfied with the steps I have taken in your name. Petersburg may not be an agreeable residence, but it was very important for you to secure the step; and depend upon it, *it never answers for a professional man to decline advancement when offered him, with the view of waiting for something more agreeable*; it creates an unfavourable impression; and, at all events, when that something more agreeable does offer, he is nearer its attainment by the preceding promotion. I am afraid it is very doubtful whether Goderich will continue; his resignation has caused a most unfavourable impression as to the stability of the Government, and compels even his best friends to doubt whether, with all his talents, he possesses that

firmness and energy necessary for his situation. I believe, from private information, that the King means to make some fresh arrangement before Parliament meets, and is only waiting for Miguel's departure to take the matter up. A general change I do not expect, but I think it likely that a new chief may be appointed.

The cause of Lord Goderich's resignation was a quarrel between Huskisson and Herries, 'whom the King,' said Lord Palmerston, 'had thrown like a live shell into the Cabinet, to explode and blow us all up.'

'Instead of going to the King,' continues the autobiographer, 'and saying, "Sire, Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Herries have differed, and cannot serve together, and therefore I propose to you to appoint A. B. instead of one or the other," Goderich stated the quarrel, the impossibility of the two going on as colleagues, and gave the King to understand that he had no advice to give, and did not know what to do. But the King knew very well what he had to do: he bid Goderich go home, *and take care of himself*, and keep himself quiet; and he immediately sent for the Duke of Wellington to form a Government.

'One of the first acts of Goderich's administration had been to ask the Duke of Wellington to be Commander-in-Chief; Lord Anglesey had been sent to make the offer. He travelled without stopping, arrived at some country house in the west, where the Duke was staying, about three in the morning, found the Duke in full uniform, just come home from a fancy ball, obtained his immediate acceptance, and arrived with it at Windsor while we were sitting in Council on the memorable day in August at which Lord William Bentinck also was present to be sworn in Governor-General of India.

'Lord Anglesey said to us, "Well, gentlemen, I have done what you sent me to do. I have brought you the Duke of Wellington's acceptance as Commander-in-Chief; and by God, mark my words, as sure as you are alive, he will trip up all your heels before six months are over your heads."

'Before the six months were well over the Duke was in, and our heels were up; but the King was the great plotter, and Holmes and Planta worked upon Goderich, and persuaded him he could never overcome the difficulties he would have to encounter.'

The projected arrangements ended, as we know, by

the Duke of Wellington being named Premier instead of Lord Goderich, though the post of Premier was one for which he had declared himself a short time previous wholly unfit.

Lord Wellesley, it was believed, expected this appointment, and had been encouraged by his brother to do so. It is said that when the Duke was summoned by the King, it was understood that he should recommend the Marquess as more fit to take the lead in civil affairs than himself; that the Marquess expected the Duke's return with much anxiety, anticipating his own elevation, and that the disappointment that ensued occasioned a coolness between these two eminent men. Whatever may be the precise truth of this story—and such stories are rarely told with perfect accuracy—it would perhaps have been, upon the whole, fortunate for the Duke's reputation, great as that reputation is, if he had followed the course which it is supposed that he at one time intended to pursue.

Many of Lord Wellesley's contemporaries have asserted that no man of his time was endowed with so many of the highest attributes of a statesman as he was. With great eloquence, large and liberal views, free from impracticable theories, unbiassed by obsolete prejudices, he was the man peculiarly fitted to bridge the abyss over which the past had to run into the future, and could have done with credit and consistency what the Duke could not do without making concessions which, not being the result of conviction, would assuredly appear the result of fear and necessity; thus commencing a policy which has had too many imitators—a policy carrying bitterness into the hearts of those who have been vanquished, and contempt into the hearts of those who have triumphed; for to give what you dare not deny is a humiliation to one party, and no satisfaction to the other.

CHAPTER V.

FORMATION OF THE WELLINGTON ADMINISTRATION—PRIVATE LETTERS TO MR. TEMPLE ON FOREIGN AND HOME POLITICS—EXTRACTS FROM JOURNAL BEGINNING MARCH 9, 1828—WITHDRAWAL OF MR. HUSKISSON FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

ALL the Canningites remained in the new Cabinet. In a speech in the House of Commons on January 31, 1828, Lord Palmerston vindicated himself for so doing by expressing the confidence he had when joining the Government that all the public principles on which he would propose to act would be embodied in their measures; and his conviction that on the Catholic Question, although several of his colleagues differed from him, public opinion had not yet become ripe for legislation.

He thus relates in his journal what occurred to himself at the formation of the new administration:—

When the Duke came in he sent for Huskisson to Apsley House, as head of the Canningite party, and asked him to join his Government. The inducements held out were these—

The Catholic Question to be, as before, an open question; and to have, therefore, the benefit of the influence belonging to a portion of the Cabinet being in its favour. The Greek treaty to be faithfully executed; and Dudley to be left, as Foreign Secretary, to watch over its execution. Huskisson's principles of trade to be acted upon, and Charles Grant to be left at the Board of Trade, as a pledge and security on that point. Huskisson, Grant, Dudley, and myself to have seats in the Cabinet; Lamb to remain as Irish Secretary, as a guarantee that an impartial system would be pursued towards the Catholics. Eldon and Westmoreland to be excluded from the Cabinet, they being the representatives of the most liberal opinions. Dudley, Lamb, Binning, Grant, and myself met at Huskisson's house in Somerset Place, which he still occupied—being very unwell—

in order to take these proposals into consideration. We discussed the matter fully, with reference both to the personal question between Herries and Huskisson, and to the public interests and political questions involved; and our determination was that the offer ought to be accepted. We did accept it, therefore, not as individuals, but as a party representing the principles and consisting of the friends of Mr. Canning.

We joined the new Government in January. We left it in May. We joined as a party; as a party we retired. The only one who hesitated was Dudley; and he would willingly have given six thousand a year out of his own pocket, instead of receiving that sum from the public, for the pleasure of continuing to be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The feebleness of the Wellington Cabinet is sufficiently explained by the fact here stated, viz., that the Canningites joined it as a party mistrusting its chief.

The following letter—going back to the formation of that Cabinet—states the feelings with which Lord Palmerston saw himself now transferred from a union with the moderate Whigs to a union with the liberal Tories, whom he distinguishes from the Tories of a more antiquated caste, or, as he styles them, ‘the pig-tails’ :—

Stanhope Street : Jan. 18, 1828.

My dear William,—The Duke of Wellington has been employed since Wednesday, the 9th, in taking steps to reorganize the Government; but he found it so much longer an operation than he expected, that he has been obliged to prorogue Parliament for another week, and put it off to the 29th. He has made propositions to Huskisson, Dudley, Grant, and myself. He first proposed to Huskisson, who said that he could not at all events come in without us three and William Lamb; and we three determined not to come in without Huskisson, considering him as representing in Parliament certain political principles which we profess, and for which his presence in office would be a security and guarantee.

This result was yesterday communicated to the Duke, and he was then enabled to go on with his communications with other persons. He wishes to form a strong Government, and a liberal one. Eldon and Westmoreland will not be in it, though I fear Bathurst is inevitable, but he will be President of the

Council, or hold some other office which gives no departmental influence. But Canning's principles of policy will be preserved, which is a great tribute of homage to his memory; Dudley will carry them on in our foreign relations; Huskisson and Grant in our colonial and commercial. Peel will probably return to his Home Office, where he will prosecute his system of reform. All this, instead of a pig-tail Tory Government, shows the great strides which public opinion has made in the last few years. Such a Government as Liverpool's even cannot now be established; and such a one as Perceval's could not be for a moment thought of. The Cabinet list gives a majority of Catholics; and the Duke agrees that the Lord-Lieutenant shall not be an anti-Catholic.

The Duke has read the detailed explanations about Navarino, sent by Codrington through Sir John Gore, and is satisfied, and also declares that '*The King's treaties must be observed.*' So that there will be no change of policy about Greece; indeed, Dudley's continuance would be a security on this point. However, difficulties of detail may still arise to change the whole of this arrangement, though it is not probable; and I think that Huskisson is so necessary in the Commons, that any reasonable sacrifice will be made to retain him.

The Whigs of course will be furious and violent, and lay about them to the right and left. *I very sincerely regret their loss, as I like them much better than the Tories, and agree with them much more; but still we, the Canningites, if we may be so termed, did not join their Government, but they came and joined ours; and whatever regard we may feel for them, we have not enlisted with them, so as to be bound to follow their fate and fortunes, or to make their retention a condition of our remaining; and, indeed, if we had all gone out I should certainly not have sat with them in the House of Commons, but should have taken an independent and separate position.*

We see from this letter that a Canningite at that time was not a Whig—was not a Tory. What was a Canningite?

It may not be the fashion at this moment to defend the Canningite party. They may be condemned as a party who—while opposed to Toryism—were yet not favourable to making democracy the basis of political institutions. But, in judging them, we must not merely take such a confined view as this.

There are doubtless great and powerful virtues that expand in democratic institutions; and perhaps no Government is so capable of doing great things as a well-educated democracy with noble-minded leaders, as there is no Government so capable of committing great errors and great crimes as an ill-educated democracy with low-minded, vicious, or fanatical chiefs.

The form of every Government is a means to an end, according to times and circumstances. So also the character of a party has to be judged according to times and circumstances. It should be adapted to the state of existing society; it should aim at carrying on society to further improvement; it should nourish in a nation noble and generous aspirations; it should encourage a spirit of general humanity and national independence, and has a right to our praise if it is the object of imitation, of admiration, and affection amongst the intelligent and patriotic men of its epoch.

The party of Mr. Canning was in a great degree a party of this kind, and will live in our history, and the history of the world, as the party of the generous, brave, and intellectual Englishmen of the early part of the nineteenth century. It was not in favour of an extensive suffrage. It favoured the existence of a powerful and wealthy landed aristocracy; it was not opposed to that system of so-called rotten boroughs, which was certainly an absurd anomaly in the theory of popular representation; still it tolerated universal suffrage as an exhibition of popular feeling in certain localities; it opposed the pretensions of aristocratic pride to exclusive power; and it defended its adherence to the existing parliamentary constitution on the plea that that constitution brought practically the best men, poor and rich, and of almost every station, into the House of Commons. It had, moreover, for its characteristics, principles which elevated it high above the political adventurers who consider politics as nothing more than a struggle for place. Those principles were in part manifested in the patronage of constitutional

opinions abroad, and in the adoption, though not without reservations, of the doctrines of free trade at home; and in the withdrawal of religious qualifications for political functions both at home and abroad. Such, on the one hand, was the Canningite party; on the other hand, that section of Lord Liverpool's Cabinet which had quitted Mr. Canning, had a leaning towards the absolute Governments on the Continent, was disposed to a protective policy in regard to trade, and was for maintaining unimpaired the maxim of Protestant ascendancy throughout the United Kingdom.

At first the differences that thus naturally and incessantly occurred were got over without any painful jar between the two parties in the Cabinet, but by degrees these differences became painful and irritating to both. Some letters and some extracts from Lord Palmerston's journal at this time will show the subacute state of an impending quarrel, which was certain ere long to assume an inflammatory character.

Sunday, March 9, 1828.

Cabinet at four on Greek affairs. Huskisson proposed that Austria should be formally requested to prohibit all commercial intercourse between her subjects and the Turks in the Morea, in order to give effect to our blockade of Ibrahim Pacha; and that they should be told that they must be answerable for any consequences which her refusal may lead to, by its rendering our blockade abortive, and inducing Russia therefore to invade Turkey. This seemed to be agreed to.

The Duke of Wellington brought his memorandum of the arrangements which he proposed, in order to define the details of the treaty:

1. That the Greeks should pay Turkey an annual tribute of 200,000*l*.
2. That they should pay 1,500,000*l*. as compensation for Turkish property in the Morea.
3. That their territory should be confined to the Morea and certain islands to be named.
4. That they should be governed by persons to be appointed in one of three ways: either that a list should be sent to the Porte, out of which the Porte should select; or several lists,

which the Porte might reject in succession till an agreeable one was presented; or else that the Porte should actually name, provided they named Greeks.

5. That the Greek state should be bound to follow Turkey in peace and war.

To this arrangement many objections were urged. Everybody thought the tribute much too high, and the Duke admitted it; and Aberdeen said he knew the whole tribute of the Morea was carried on about twelve mules.

Peel strongly objected to placing the new Government in such dependence on Turkey. If he had been to frame the treaty, he should have preferred independence to suzerainty. He thought the relations between Greece and Turkey must in future be unpleasant, and no good could come of a right of interference on the part of Turkey. Ought we, too, not to pause before we admitted that war between us and Turkey must necessarily be followed by war between the Ionian Islands and Greece? He thought, too, we had no data upon which to fix tribute and compensation.

I expressed a strong objection to the proposed limit¹ of the Morea, as at variance with the spirit and principles both of protocol and treaty, because permanent pacification could not be looked for when large districts, long in revolt, were excluded from the settlement. Dudley stated strongly his full concurrence in this view. Grant had already read a memorandum on a former day to the same effect. Ellenborough and Bathurst, as usual, were for cutting down the Greeks in every way.

It was settled that, instead of making any specific proposal on these points, Dudley should, in a conference he is to have to-morrow with Lieven and Polignac, sound them as to the views of their courts on these topics.

It was proposed to recall Codrington, or at least to send out a superior officer to supersede him, on pretence of some negotiations with Egypt. It was, however, determined first to call upon Codrington to account for his having allowed forty-five sail of ships, with 20,000 people on board, including 5,500 captive Greek women and children, to sail quietly in December from Navarino to Alexandria, without his knowing anything about it till he heard of their arrival at the latter place.

Monday, March 10.

Examined by Finance Committee upon Army Estimates. Cabinet at half-past three on proposed Corn Bill. Duke of

¹ Afterwards, as it will be seen, enlarged.

Wellington wanted to have the 20*s.* duty begin when the average price was 65*s.*, instead of when it was 60*s.*, and to bring in his last year's clause about warehousing. Huskisson declared he could not face the House of Commons to support such a bill, but proposed, as a modification of Liverpool's bill, that when in any consecutive twelve weeks more than 200,000 quarters should have been imported, the duty should be increased one-fourth, and that increase should continue till the average taken upon six successive weeks should have amounted to 66*s.* Grant objected to this, but the agricultural part of the Cabinet seemed to like it. Peel and Melville were for Lord Liverpool's Bill, with such changes only as might be necessary to make it palatable to the House of Lords.

Tuesday, March 11.

Cabinet on the proposed Corn Bill. The Duke strongly pressed his duty on warehoused corn according to his amendment of last year, or a higher scale of duty. Huskisson could not agree to either. Peel took much the same view as Huskisson, and so did Melville. After a great deal of discussion, the Cabinet separated without any formal decision, but with an apparent understanding that the bill of last year should be again brought in, only with the addition suggested yesterday by Huskisson. The Duke was evidently ill-pleased to find so large a majority of his Cabinet against him on a point on which individually he committed himself last year, and he left the room without saying whether he agreed or not to Huskisson's proposal.

Wednesday, March 12.

Cabinet again on the Corn Bill, the Duke clinging to his clause of last year, imposing an additional duty of 2*s.* 6*d.* a quarter on all corn taken out of warehouse.

Huskisson showed very ably that the Act of 1791, from which the Duke took his idea, never was in operation as to warehousing, and that no corn ever was warehoused under its provisions. Peel stated his decided preference for Huskisson's plan, and urged that if the Government were to break up at this moment, just on the eve of a war between Russia and Turkey, no man would believe that it was upon a clause in a Corn Bill, but that general opinion would impute deeper differences, more important to the general policy of the country. Bathurst and Ellenborough, not at all wishing to go out again, after having so recently come in, professed themselves entirely satisfied with Huskisson's clause, which they had not fully understood in all

its bearings yesterday. Melville was entirely for it. Aberdeen was satisfied; and the only unyielding party was the Duke, who feels that he shall be in an awkward situation in the House of Lords if he does not propose something about warehouses. He wants to make a difference between corn imported direct and corn taken out of warehouse. Huskisson's principle is, that both must stand on the same grounds. The Cabinet separated at five, without having come to any decision.

Last night Lieven communicated to Dudley a note from Nesselrode of February 26, announcing that the Emperor of Russia meant to declare war against Turkey, upon Russian grounds: the violation of the Treaty of Akermann, the interruption of Russian commerce, and the interference of Turkey to prevent the conclusion of peace between Russia and Persia.

The Cabinet dined at Ellenborough's. After dinner we discussed what should be done about the proposed disfranchisement of Penryn—to be transferred to Manchester, and Retford to Birmingham.

Peel proposed to transfer Penryn, and throw Retford into the hundreds; Huskisson the reverse. Both wished to prevent establishing the rule that in all such cases the right should be transferred. *Dudley was strongly for seizing the golden opportunity of giving members to great towns, and thus getting rid of the great scandal of the present state of our representation.* I was clearly of opinion that we should be beat if we proposed to throw Penryn into the hundreds. The House of Commons had twice beat the Government upon a similar proposal as to Cornish boroughs, Grampound and Penryn; would it be wise to risk a third defeat as to Retford? The difficulty would be that it was a worse case than Penryn, and therefore seemed to call for a course at least as severe; and there was also a general impression that to throw it into the hundreds would give it to the Duke of Newcastle. The result seemed to be, that we should transfer Penryn, and try to throw Retford into the hundreds, taking away altogether the burgesses, and making the right entirely in freeholders; or at least that Retford should be given to the agricultural interest in some way or other.

Sunday, March 16.

Cabinet at four on Nesselrode's note to Liverpool of 26th, announcing that Nicholas meant to declare war against Turkey upon his own grievances, namely, the interruption of his commerce by the closing of the Bosphorus, the expulsion of some

Russian subjects, and compulsion upon others to register themselves under Turkish authorities, and the interference in the Russian dispute with Persia, to make the Persians refuse to conclude peace. That he should still persevere in executing the Treaty of London, and look for no conquests. That if England and France would agree to his last proposal of December, 1827,¹ he would finish the great question in conjunction with them. But that if they refused to co-operate with him on that arrangement he should nevertheless execute the treaty, but in the mode of execution consult *only his own 'intérêts et convenances.'* It seemed the general sense of the Cabinet that this latter declaration was announcing an intention to depart from the treaty, because the treaty binds the allies to concert measures, and this amounts to prescribing them. The mere fact of his being at war with Turkey does not dissolve the treaty, because the protocol contemplated the case of a separate war between Russia and Turkey.

Tuesday, March 18.

Cabinet at ten at night on Portuguese affairs. Letters from Sir F. Lamb,² of the 12th, received to-day by steamboat. The greatest alarm in Lisbon; everybody expecting a convulsion the moment our troops should embark; the Queen Mother had got entire possession of Don Miguel; had persuaded him that the Freemasons threatened his life. He never goes out, walks from room to room with two guards, lest he should be assassinated, and eats nothing but what has been prepared by a particular person (an old nurse), for fear of being poisoned. Every symptom of an approaching convulsion. Miguel pretends he did not swear to the Constitution, though he pretended to do so; Constitutional officers had been removed from four out of six Portuguese regiments in Lisbon; the other two would not part with their officers. The mob had been encouraged to insult everybody supposed friendly to the Charter; all the Liberals feared immediate proscription, and the English were preparing to escape. Two thousand English troops had gone off to the Mediterranean; Lamb had taken upon himself to detain the other 3,000 till he could hear from us by return of the steamboat, to give the Government an option as to the course they would pursue. Some means of protection for English persons and property had become absolutely necessary, in case of a convulsion both at Lisbon and Oporto.

¹ To occupy the Principalities.

² Our minister at Lisbon.

Wednesday, March 19.

Cabinet at three at St. James's. Settled despatches to Lamb and Clinton according to determination taken at Cabinet at ten last night. We approved Lamb having detained the troops, but stated that it had never been our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal. That we had sent our troops to protect her against external attack, when requested by her Government to do so; and that danger being over we had determined to withdraw our troops. The recent aspect of affairs did not alter our view, and the troops should come away as before settled; but to afford security and refuge to British subjects or persecuted Constitutionalists, one line-of-battle ship and a frigate or brig should remain in Tagus, and marines should continue to occupy Fort St. Julian till further orders from hence, and a second frigate, the *Briton*, would be sent there from hence, and two brigs to Oporto, to protect the English there. Lamb was directed to ask for an interview with Miguel, and expostulate with him in the strongest terms upon the conduct he is pursuing, and to declare that we never can sanction or recognise an usurpation which would be founded upon hypocrisy, injustice, and perjury. If Miguel should have already declared himself King, Lamb's credentials being to the Regent, he should consider his functions suspended. If the thing is not yet done, he is to remind Miguel of his oath at Vienna, and the engagement there made to proclaim amnesty and the Charter, of his renewed assurances in England, and his oath at Lisbon, and to say that we cannot advise Pedro to complete his abdication while Miguel pursues such a course as his present one. He is also to remonstrate against the choice of the present ministers.

Monday, March 24.

Cabinet at three; Duke of Wellington read letter from Charles Grant, resigning, as no arrangement satisfactory to him could be made about the Corn Bill. Letter from Granville, stating that La Ferronaye had said that, as we object so decidedly to being parties to the Russian plan of invading Northern Turkey, France will not further press that measure; but that she thinks it of the utmost importance to drive the Turks quickly out of Greece, and seems determined to send troops there, whether we consent or no. Accounts from Portugal that Miguel had dissolved the Chambers and appointed an apostolical commission to arrange fresh elections; but in all probability he does not mean to call the Chambers again. Lamb says that both parties are running away from each other, but the Consti-

tutionalists seem the most persevering in this intention. A strong letter prepared by Dudley for Lamb to remonstrate with Miguel.

March 28, 1828.

My dear William,—Affairs are becoming embroiled at home and abroad. Our Government consists of some discordant elements; but still I think it will go on. *Peel is so right-headed and liberal, and so up to the opinions and feelings of the times, that he smoothes difficulties which might otherwise be insurmountable.* The announcement which we have received of the intention of Russia to declare war against Turkey creates great embarrassments in the execution of the Treaty of London. We do not mean to go to war with Turkey; and how, therefore, can we co-operate with Russia if she does go to war? We are, however, determined not to throw the treaty overboard on account of this difficulty, but to persevere with France to execute it in our own way.

France seems equally disposed to maintain her engagements, and anxious for a speedy settlement of the question. We must do our best to get the Turks and Egyptians out of the country, and that accomplished, the rest will be comparatively easy. Russia has bound herself by so many obligations and declarations not to look to territorial aggrandizement, that one must believe her sincere; but successful war offers great temptations to depart from the moderation which may have been felt at its commencement; and the sooner the cause of contest is over, the less likely is it that that temptation will be presented. Europe has a clear right, however, upon general principles, and independently of any engagements by Russia, to see that the war between her and Turkey shall not derange the balance of power, and alter the state of possession as fixed by the last general peace.

Portugal is in a state approaching to revolution. The actual overt acts of Miguel are few. He has dissolved the Chambers, which he had a right to do, but has made a commission to arrange resolutions, which he had no right to do, and all the members of which are creatures of the Queen; and he has been changing the officers of regiments. This, to be sure, is as much as he could perhaps have done in so short a time since his landing. But the panic in Lisbon is universal. Lamb detained three thousand of our troops till he could hear again from hence. We have, however, told him, that though we entirely approve his having done so, yet that we went to repel foreign invasion,

not to interfere by force in domestic affairs, and that we cannot stay to do that which was no ingredient in the cause of our going. But we shall keep a line-of-battle ship in the Tagus, and seven hundred marines in Fort St. Julian, for the protection of English subjects and property, and to give means of escape to any persecuted Portuguese; we have also sent three sloops to Oporto for similar purposes, there not being depth of water for larger ships to get in there.

Friday, March 28.

Grant not having made up his mind this morning to move the Corn Resolutions, Dudley, Lamb, and I met at Huskisson's, to consider what was to be done if Grant should resign upon this question. We had all used every persuasion in our power during the last week to induce him to overcome his objections, and I had spent two hours with him yesterday morning before the levée; but though he seemed shaken, he had written to Huskisson last night late, to say that he could not bring himself to agree.

He objects to the scale of duty proposed, as being too high and too great a departure from sound principles. I urged that we were not considering what was abstractly right, or what we should ourselves prefer, but what in the divided state of opinion on this question would be most likely to be acquiesced in by the two contending parties; that the whole arrangement was in its nature a compromise, and therefore it was wisest to make such a compromise as would be successful; that the prejudices in the Lords were strong, and must be met by some concessions, or the Bill would not pass their House. The Duke of Wellington had conceded a principle by giving up his warehousing clause, and this was a great sacrifice, and was deeply felt by him. If we were prepared to contend that the particular scale of last year involved a principle, we might consistently refuse to depart from it. But that scale was by necessity fixed arbitrarily and by guess as an approximation, and not as a scale which could be demonstrated to be right. There was, then, no broad public ground of principle upon which he could put his resignation; and in point of etiquette the Duke had conceded infinitely more than Grant was called upon to concede.¹

¹ The Corn Law of 1815 was based on the two extremes of complete prohibition up to a certain price of corn in the home market (eighty shillings), and complete freedom as to the introduction of corn above that price. The Bill brought in by Mr. Canning (March 1, 1827) towards the end of Lord Liverpool's administration, and to which Lord

The Duke was the head of the Government, and could not be discredited without some portion of his discredit reflecting on the Government. He could not, however abandon his warehousing clause with any credit unless he was able to say that the measure afforded in another and better way that protection to agriculture which the warehouse clause was intended to give; and unless there was some increase of duty that could not be pretended. We ought to make him a decent bridge to retreat over. If the Lords threw out the Bill we should remain under the law of 1815. The great object was to get established the principle of protection by duty, instead of prohibition, and that once done the particular scale might afterwards be varied according to experience of circumstances and fluctuations in the value of currency. If he went out Huskisson must go too, although prepared to support the measure either in or out of office. His character and reputation were staked upon the principles of free trade, and especially on the Corn Law. He had been accused of coming into office with the enemies of Canning's person and principles, and of sacrificing his principles to place. He had at Liverpool denied the charge, had alleged that Grant and Dudley and Lamb were his guarantees that sound measures would be pursued in the departments in which they were continued. But if upon the first measure that was to be brought forward in Grant's department, Grant were to resign a good office and a seat in the Cabinet rather than propose the intended measure to Parliament, and if Huskisson remained in, it would be said that he, an older man, hackneyed in office, corrupted by place, cling-

Palmerston alludes, was conceived on the directly opposite principle, viz., that of avoiding extremes. Taking an average of twelve years, sixty shillings a quarter was fixed as the fair price of wheat—neither ruinous to the farmer, nor hard on the consumer. At this price, according to weekly averages, corn was to be introduced. This Bill, carried in the Commons (April 12), was lost in the Lords, the Duke of Wellington proposing in Committee, and carrying an amendment—‘that no foreign corn in bond should be taken out of bond until the average price of corn should have reached sixty-six shillings.’ The difficulty now was how to satisfy the Duke, whose amendment had thrown out the former Bill, and the Canningites, who had rejected his amendment. Mr. Grant, who, as Vice-President of the Board of Trade, had particularly distinguished himself by supporting the preceding Bill in the House of Commons, and advocating the general principles of free trade, was the most compromised. The various modifications proposed were for bringing about some arrangement to which two parties, who a few months before had essentially differed, could now agree. Lord Palmerston treated the difference as one of detail, on which each party might give way in a certain degree to the other.

ing to power, and sacrificing principles, had consented to that which Grant, a younger man, independent and high-minded and respecting principles, had rejected with disdain, and no explanation that could be given could ever remove the impression which this would create. If Huskisson went out I must do so too, for similar reasons, and because if his influence were withdrawn from the Cabinet, the arbitrary party would soon predominate, and I could no longer co-operate with my colleagues. We should then all of us make ourselves highly ridiculous; we had said when the Government was first formed, that before we joined it we had explanations and understandings with the Duke on all important points of policy; and now it would appear that on one most important point, which we must have felt from the beginning, could not fail to come under consideration the moment Grant was re-elected, we had had no understanding at all. I also represented to him, that if we all went out there must be formed a purely Tory Government, that would speedily throw over all those measures on which Canning had founded his fame. We should break immediately with Russia, probably also with France, back out of the Greek treaty, and unite ourselves again with Metternich, and adopt the apostolical party in Spain and Portugal. For even if the King were to send for Lansdowne, Huskisson and we could not join him without exposing ourselves to the imputation of treachery to our present colleagues, by having broken up the Government upon a mere pretence, for the secret purpose of getting rid of the Tories and joining again with the Whigs. But a purely Whig Government could not be formed, and therefore the King would have no choice but the Tories.

Huskisson to-day read us some letters which had passed between him and Grant last night, by which it appeared that up to that time no change had taken place in Grant's intentions, and he had heard nothing from him this morning. He was going at three to the King to state to him the whole affair, of which the King had heard for the first time the day before yesterday. Huskisson strongly urged Dudley and Lamb and myself to remain in. I said at once that I had very fully made up my mind on this matter, and that viewing the composition of the Cabinet, and my own situation in the House of Commons, I could not remain in if he retired, and thinking as I did that his retirement was inevitable, I should go with him. Dudley, who had at first put as a question—whether it was absolutely necessary for Huskisson to retire, acquiesced in the reason which

Huskisson gave in detail for doing so, and said that if I deemed it necessary to go, it was still more impossible for him to remain. I had certainly joined Canning's Cabinet; but had not been, like him, personally connected with Canning by long habits of private intimacy and political co-operation—he must therefore go also.

Lamb did not say what he should do. Huskisson went at three to the King to tender his resignation, and explained to the King the course of the transaction, and his reasons for retiring. The King urged him to stay by all the arguments he might have been expected to use, complaining that he was abandoning his King; and Huskisson said that the King was a man of the world, and would therefore understand his feelings by an illustration. It might often happen to a man in society to be obliged to fight a duel when he knew he was in the wrong, but could not avoid being shot to prove that he was not a coward.¹ He was now obliged to go out without wishing to do so, and without any public reason, merely that he might not be accused of corruptly clinging to office. The King admitted the force of the illustration, but asked if he could not go out provisionally, and return again. This Huskisson said would only be a juggle, which would at once be detected, and only be worse than staying in.

While they (the King and Huskisson) were talking, Huskisson received a box from Peel, with a note, dated four o'clock, to say that Goulburn had called on Grant at Somerset Place at a quarter before four, to tell him that the notice for his motion stood for to-day, and that he must decide whether he would make it or not; and that Grant had at last said he would make it,² but begged it might be put off till Monday. The King was delighted, told Huskisson to kiss his hand, as a token that he was to remain in, and they parted.

Wednesday, April 2.

Esterhazy communicated a despatch from Metternich, enclosing one from Ottenfels, at Constantinople, dated February 23, by which it appeared that the Porte had granted to the Greeks an armistice for three months. The Russian preparations on the Pruth have probably begun to alarm them. It is always said that the Turks are obstinate in November, and tractable in March.

Cabinet this evening after dinner at Apsley House, to settle draft of a dispatch to France, stating our proposals for defining more clearly the objects of the Treaty of London. *As usual,*

¹ This argument, urged in such a quarter, shows the great changes in social feelings that have taken place since it was used.

² It is amusing to see how this instance of firmness in the amiable, clever, and irresolute Charles Grant terminated.

much discussion and entire difference of opinion; the Duke, Ellenborough, and Aberdeen being for cutting down the Greeks as much as possible; Huskisson, Dudley, and myself for executing the treaty in the fair spirit of those who made it. The Duke, while he professes to maintain it, would execute it in the spirit of one who condemns it. The limits were proposed to be the Morea and islands. I again urged that Livadia, or at least Attica, should be added; but nobody else supported this opinion. The tribute was to be fixed upon a reference to what had been actually paid to the Porte during the seven years subsequent to 1814. Commissioners to be appointed by both sides to value the private Turkish property to be surrendered to the Greeks. The Greeks to conduct their own internal government and commercial concerns. The Porte to have a negative upon the nomination of their chief; but this negative not to go beyond a second choice. The Greeks to be allowed to have commercial relations with other countries. Much discussion upon a proposal by the Duke, that the Porte should have some officer in Greece to inform it as to what was going on, but rejected as at variance with the treaty. Still more debate and difference of opinion as to the nature of the relations which Greece should be permitted to have with other states, and in what degree she should follow Turkey in peace and war. Peel again repeated his opinion that it would have been best to make Greece wholly independent of Turkey. The Duke, on the contrary, wishes to make her as dependent as possible. It was proposed that, according to the nature of suzerainty, the Porte should have a claim for a fixed contingent in men and ships from Greece in the event of war, but that Greece itself should not follow Turkey in her external relations; after much altercation this was left unsettled. Huskisson then proposed that so much of the Foreign Enlistment Act as prevents our ship-builders from constructing vessels for foreign states should be repealed; the low price of timber, want of employment among shipwrights, and the fact of 500,000*l.* being ready in London to be so laid out, or to be sent for the same purpose to other countries if it could not be employed here, were the reasons on which he founded his proposition. Ellenborough was against the Bill, and the Duke would not listen to it; and so we parted at half-past one, Huskisson very angry, and the Duke ill-pleased.

Good Friday, April 4.

Cabinet at three, to settle draft of Dudley's letter to Lord Granville about Greek affairs, containing our project for defining

those points which were left vague in the Treaty of London; renewed discussion whether Greece should follow the Porte in peace and war, in consequence of the suzerainty of the Porte. The Duke strongly for this; Huskisson, Peel, Dudley, myself against it. The treaty of 1800, between Russia and Turkey about the Ionian Islands and the condition of Ragusa, were quoted and adverted to; at last, finding the sense of the Cabinet to be that Greece should *not* follow Turkey in war, the Duke proposed that nothing should be said on this point, though it is obviously one that must be determined. His wish, however, was agreed to. It was also agreed that the annual tribute should be in lieu of any contingent of men and ships. The Duke ill-pleased to find Peel for Greek independence.

Much discussion whether Russia, having announced her intention of going to war with Turkey upon her own grounds on the Pruth, can co-operate with us in the Mediterranean, we being neutrals, and she belligerent. It seemed to me that if she consents to place her admiral under the same instructions which we are prepared to give to ours, there can be no difficulty. The Duke thought it impossible. He is evidently anxious to break with Russia. He has a strong personal feeling of dislike to Russia. He has had violent quarrels with the Lievens, and thought himself not civilly received at Petersburg. A great many little things have contributed to set him against the Lievens. Mrs. Arbuthnot and Lady Jersey, who have both influence over him, both hate Madame de Lieven. Madame de Lieven was foolish last year when Canning came in, and too openly expressed her joy at the Duke's retirement, and was to a certain degree personally uncivil to him.

Peel again started the proposal which I had made some weeks ago, that we should make some effort to get back from captivity the Greek women and children carried off as slaves from the Morea by Ibrahim Pasha and sent to Egypt.

Cabinet adjourned to Sunday se'nnight. The Duke said that Polignac, with whom he had conversed, thought we might hold that there were two Russias—one at war on the Pruth and Danube, and the other acting with us as a neutral in Greece. Accounts from Lamb from Lisbon, of 22nd, that the attempt to have Miguel proclaimed King had totally failed, but that severe proscriptions were expected the moment our troops depart; that no class cares anything for the Charter, but the general wish seems to be for tranquillity, and to avoid convulsions; that Miguel has irretrievably lost the confidence of the

nation ; and that the most constitutional party look now to Pedro as their only hope.

This journal, apart from its inherent interest as an authentic narrative of discussions within the Cabinet, is also worthy of attention as proving the steady support which Lord Palmerston, the 'great champion of Turkey,' gave to the Greek cause, and to any proposal for the largest extension of the Greek kingdom. He wished for her complete independence. He would have given her wider boundaries than she obtained, including Crete and Samos, whose inhabitants had for ten years valiantly and at a terrible cost kept the Turkish forces at bay. It was British influence alone which drove them back under the Mussulman yoke. In a debate on February 5, 1830, after Lord Palmerston had left the administration, he asserted, in reply to a speech from Peel, that the accession of Crete was essential to the well-being and independence of Greece, and that it was entirely owing to the interference of a non-interfering Government, as ours professed to be, that the 'Turks had wrongfully preserved possession of that island.' The same blindness to inexorable facts, and the same indifference to nationalities struggling for freedom, which have so often led governments and parties in this country astray, had prevailed with the less liberal portion of the Cabinet, and caused the loss of a great opportunity for consulting the best interests both of England and of the East.

The remarks which the next letter contains about the 'relative' price of commodities may well be recommended to those politicians—if there are such—who, in times of agricultural distress, still turn lingering eyes towards the City of Protection which thirty years ago they were forced to abandon.

Stanhope Street : April 25, 1828.

My dear William,—I am well aware that all letters that do not go by a courier of our own must be considered as addressed to many other people besides one's own particular correspondent, and I shall always write to you with that recollection,

and say nothing which I should care being put even in the 'Allgemeine Zeitung.' I can, nevertheless, give you some general accounts of the state of things here which may fill up the gaps in the newspapers. Our session has hitherto been one of the most inactive I ever remember, instead of being busy, as was expected. Every matter of importance connected with Income and Expenditure, which embraces a wide field of subjects, is now impounded in the Finance Committee, and nobody thinks of discussing such things in the House; the Committee have not yet reported upon anything. As to the army, it is obvious that in the present state of affairs in Europe no reduction can be proposed, beyond that which we had ourselves determined to effect, by checking the recruiting so as to keep the effectives 5,000 below the establishment. In the navy, some little saving may be made in building ships and in the dockyards. In the Ordnance there is not much to be economised, and, on the contrary, there are some very expensive fortifications which must be completed in Canada, but which, when finished, will place the two Canadas completely out of danger from any attack from the United States, by giving an internal communication by means of a canal between the Lakes and Quebec. Our new Corn Bill will pass without any serious difficulty, though there will be many alterations suggested from both sides. It is not what I should have liked, being still further removed from the principle of Free Trade than the measure of last year. But a compromise was unavoidable. Last year's Bill would not have passed the House of Lords. The agricultural gentlemen, and especially those in the Upper House, are not yet sufficiently advanced in the 'march of intellect' to understand how little their own real interests are promoted by the restrictions and prohibitions for which they are struggling. They still delude themselves by the supposition that by a law imposing duties or prohibitions they can determine what shall be the price of corn in England as compared with *other commodities*, which is the only point that concerns them; not seeing that no human ingenuity can in any country give to capital employed in producing one commodity a higher rate of profit than to capital employed in producing other commodities; that capital will necessarily flow from the less profitable to the more profitable employment, till all come to one and the same level, and that thus the only consequence of restrictive laws is to make the price of all commodities settle down to a level somewhat higher than natural, because of the artificial dearness which is created

in one, and thus to retard the progressive accumulation of national capital, and to check the advance of national prosperity. But these wisecracks look only to the price in the 'Gazette,' and think every man who has half an idea more than they have, a wild theorist. This party, however, is going down fast, and the reign of Toryism is drawing to a close. Peel is perfectly liberal in everything, and the old hens who see this duckling taking so stoutly to the water are in perfect dismay. The line which Peel and the Duke have taken about the Test and Corporation Acts has made a considerable impression, but especially in Ireland. The Orangemen there say that it is a virtual abandonment of the Catholic Question, and to be sure the Duke's language in the House was such as to lay the ground for his taking any course he likes upon the Catholic Question. He supported the Test repeal, for the sake of obtaining *religious peace* in the country, and because the House of Commons had passed it. Whenever, therefore, we send up to the Peers a Catholic Bill, the same arguments will serve for it. The Bishops, too, are beginning to take their cue, and facing outwards to prepare to wheel quite about. In short, I begin to think this great measure fully as near as it was last year under Canning.

The King went through the drawing-room prosperously. He sat on an elevated arm-chair, and looked like a king in a play, or in a wooden cut in the 'History of England,' and what can be more truly royal and dignified? In good truth, I think it a much more dignified way of receiving his company, and then there can be no mistake as to which is the king; whereas some three years ago, some young damsel who was shot through the door at Buckingham House in a hurry saluted Graves instead of George, being told to do so to the fat gentleman she would see before her.

We have no very late accounts from Portugal, but Miguel seems going to the devil as fast as he can. Even the Princess of Beira writes to him to say he is going on too fast, and that nothing can be well done that is done quickly (a good Spanish maxim by-the-bye). It is provoking, but we cannot help it. Our troops did not go to interfere in the affairs of Portugal, or to dictate a Government to the nation. We went to defend them from Spanish aggression in compliance with the obligation of a treaty, and that duty being performed it would have been a departure from all the principles we have ever maintained to have kept our troops there in order to impose upon

the people any form of government, or, indeed, to meddle at all in their domestic concerns. If they like an absolute king and an usurper it is their own affair, and if they don't, they ought to say so, and to resist.

Stanhope Street : May 8, 1828.

My dear William,—I take the opportunity of a Captain Campbell, to write a few lines that will not be opened by the Russian and other post offices. We are not going on as I like; but it will depend upon Russia and France whether we break with them or not: if they wish to break with us they may easily find an excuse; if they wish to keep with us they will not give us a pretence for breaking. The Duke has the strongest dislike to Russia—more, I think, from personal feeling than from political. Ellenborough is even more adverse than the Duke: Aberdeen is Austrian, and Bathurst anti-Russian and Austrian; all these would give anything to get out of the Greek treaty, which they hate, and they set about it dexterously. The Duke I believe to be in correspondence with Metternich, and tries to play his game of delay and procrastination—a system so unlike his natural temper about anything which he wishes really to accomplish. Advantage was taken of an objectionable expression in a note from Nesselrode to Lieven, 26th February, in which he said that if the allies did not adopt the Russian proposition of invading, or rather of occupying, the principalities, '*La Russie abandonnée par ses alliés n'exécuterait pas moins le traité de Londres; mais dans la mode d'exécution elle ne consulterait que ses intérêts et ses convenances.*' This was announcing that she meant to violate the conditions to which she had bound herself by treaty, and required remonstrance and a demand of explanation from us. We, however, took advantage of this to leave off the conferences and rest upon our oars, and do nothing but propose to France a long string of propositions for defining those ultimate arrangements left indefinite in the treaty. The Russian answer to our remonstrance must, however, soon arrive; and if, as I expect, it shall state that Russia does not mean to depart from the treaty, and if it confirms the explanation given to France that the *indemnities* announced as wanted from Turkey are indemnities to individuals, and not to the State, I think we shall be forced to renew the conferences, and shall not have a pretence for declining to do so. The Chambers in France are becoming all-powerful, and are impelling the Government to more active measures about Greece. The French Government say they

must send money, and wish to send troops, and propose that six thousand English and an equal number of French should go; that was always my plan, and I proposed it to Goderich in November, when it was determined to evacuate Portugal; but nobody else approved it, and it is not more in favour now, and will not be done. Money we cannot give without a vote of Parliament; and I doubt whether that could at present be obtained for such an object. Huskisson, Dudley, Grant, and I try to keep things together, and have done so; and if Russia and France are *civil* to us, we shall manage it still; but if they send us uncivil papers, we shall not be able to prevent a separation of the alliance. I shall be sorry for this; not that it will prevent the liberation of Greece, for Russia and France will then do that work without us; but it would be unfitting for England to back out of such a treaty, and abandon the position she has taken in Europe. In the mean time France is urging us to resume the conferences, as a means of keeping a hold upon Russia; and there is much good sense in this. The Government is very strong, and there is in fact no opposition. The Corn Bill will satisfy all parties tolerably well. The Finance Committee will not do much harm, and if so, it will do much good. There is a general disposition to give us rope, and see what we shall do with it. You will probably hear it alleged that our Government wishes to break with Russia and abandon the Greek cause; you may with truth say that this is not the feeling of some of the most influential members of the Cabinet; and that if Russia shows a disposition to abide by the treaty we shall not depart from it.

Stanhope Street: May 19, 1828.

We have received all the Russian papers, manifestoes, declarations, &c., and their answer to our long letter about Greek affairs. It could not fail to strike us all that their declaration of war and other public documents differ essentially in one material point from the report of the French *chargé d'affaires* to his court communicated to us by Polignac. The Frenchman was ordered to ask what Russia meant by the indemnities which she announced her intention of requiring from Turkey, and Nesselrode, according to the Frenchman's statement, distinctly assured him that they did not mean indemnities from Turkey as a state, to Russia as a state, but only indemnities to Russian merchants for the losses sustained by the shutting of the Bosphorus and the seizure of Russian cargoes

either for inadequate payment or for no payment at all. Now the declaration distinctly announces that Russia is to be paid as a state for the expenses incurred in making war upon Turkey. This is surely a new principle of European warfare and one that is objectionable. It is true that France paid a certain sum to the allies for the expense of the last campaign of 1815, and for the construction of fortresses to curb her, but that was a peculiar case. If we had required payment for the expense of our twenty years' war we should have had a largish demand to be settled.

There is another part of the question as stated in Nesselrode's letter to the Vizier which is ambiguous. He says that having taken up arms Russia will require redress of her private wrongs and adherence to the Treaty of London, but that she will not stop during the negotiations which may follow upon the consent of Turkey to these terms. Now as far as regards her own quarrel, which is simple, and of which she is sole arbitress, it may be well and right to say that she will not stop her troops till full satisfaction has been agreed to in all the details she may require. But if she means that she will go on fighting till Turkey has consented to all the details of the Greek arrangement, when it is impossible to settle what the details are to be which are to be proposed to Turkey for acceptance, without long communications between London and Turkey and Greece, that would be to declare that she would exterminate the Turks and drive them out of Europe. This may be accidentally obscure, or it may be meant to bully the Turk, but taken literally it is like the renewal of her pretension to settle the Greek question herself, '*selon ses intérêts et convenances*.' This, however, I daresay, will be explained satisfactorily. Her offer to receive Heytesbury at the head-quarters ought to be deemed a proof of her desire to be friends with us, and her proposal to make her fleet perfectly neutral in the Mediterranean, so as to act precisely under the same orders as ours, is also going as far as possible to meet our wishes. Nevertheless, there are those in the Cabinet who are earnestly desiring to pick a quarrel with Russia, partly from a rooted dislike to her, and partly as the means of getting rid of a treaty of which they detest the spirit and object—and these are first, foremost, and most bitterly the Duke, then Ellenborough, then Bathurst, and then Aberdeen. We had a Cabinet yesterday to talk these matters over. The Duke is determined not to accept the offered co-operation of Heyden's¹ squadron, and we shall probably not be able to over-

¹ The Russian admiral.

come his obstinacy on that point. He is resolved to throw every obstacle in the way of the resumption of the conferences, but upon that we shall I think carry our point, and I expect in a few days to have them resumed. We shall also I think get Stratford Canning sent out to Corfu, but there seems to be little chance of our getting Heytesbury off to the head-quarters, though I confess it seems to me the greatest absurdity to decline knowing anything of what is going on there, and purposely to divest ourselves of all opportunity of interfering to bring about peace. Money we have refused to lend, we could not do it without a vote of Parliament, and under present circumstances that would be inconvenient to ask for. It would necessarily open the whole discussion of the question which pending negotiations would be embarrassing, and there is no zeal for the Greeks in the House of Commons. Troops we have objected to send; and, indeed, Capo D'Istra, having publicly declared that if a foreign soldier sets foot in Greece he would for ever abandon the soil of his forefathers, that measure becomes on that account less easy. France has acquiesced on both these points, has assured us that what money she lends will go as private bounty from her king, and that she will immediately disperse the troops assembled near Marseilles, she having previously said she should send them neither to Algiers nor Egypt.

We have received Codrington's answer to our inquiries as to the reason of his perfect inactivity ever since Navarino, of his letting the Turkish fleet sail from Navarino to Alexandria, and again from Alexandria to Navarino, of his having permitted supplies of all sorts to reach Ibrahim, and cargoes of slaves to be sent to Egypt; of his having, in short, made '*mare liberum*' that which his instructions of October 16, 1827, ordered him to make '*mare clausum*.' His answers are perfectly unsatisfactory, and, worse than that, are an attempt to throw upon the Government the blame which belongs to him. We have written him an answer demonstrating, by reference to his instructions and his own acknowledgments, that he has totally neglected his orders, and we have desired that he may be forthwith recalled. I believe Sir Pulteney Malcolm will go out in a line-of-battle ship now ready to sail and succeed him. It is obviously our policy to keep up the treaty and hold Russia to it, and this can only be done by pursuing its objects in earnest, but as I have said there is in those I have mentioned the strongest determination to take advantage of any and every pretence for getting out of the whole thing. This, however, is no longer possible, events

are uncontrollable, and the Canning part of the Government are beyond escape to fulfil the treaty, even if they were as much disinclined to it as they are anxious and desirous to execute it. Peel, too, feels strongly the absolute necessity of putting an end to the state of things in the East, even if no treaty existed. It is, however, heavy work dragging on in a Government that differ upon almost every point that comes under discussion and that involves any general principle, and our meetings are always debates instead of deliberations. There are a set of violent Tories who beset the Duke in private and sway him powerfully. Still, however, we have public opinion and the House of Commons to fight with, and these are powerful weapons.

The result has not as yet been to lead us to *do* anything we disapproved of, but only to make us leave *undone* things we should have wished to have done, and this conflict of opinion leaves the Government in a state of inaction at a moment when it ought to be taking a lead in the affairs of Europe.

The abdication of Pedro is confirmed. If you hear us abused for having led the Portuguese to declare for the constitution, and then abandoned them to Miguel, the answer is that the constitution was none of our making though we were glad it was made—that it was Pedro's own, absolutely and in strict truth. That we several times refused to send troops to support it because we distinctly said we never would interfere in the internal affairs of foreign nations; that the King's message to Parliament specifically alleged foreign aggression to be the object and limit of our interference, and the motive of it not our own choice but the claimed obligation of a treaty; and as we did not *go* to interfere so we could not *stay* to do so.

Don Miguel, after taking an oath to preserve the constitution, as the protector of his niece, had made a *coup d'état*, and all the Liberals had fled from the capital. There is an evident intention in this letter to excuse the withdrawal of our troops from Portugal, and to explain the acquiescence of Mr. Canning's followers in that measure. Though, no doubt, we could have found pretexts for retaining them, if so inclined, the reason for removing them was a specious, if not a solid one, and could have been justified by Mr. Canning's own language when our troops were sent to Lisbon to protect Portugal from the aggressive intervention of Spain.

Thus, though the step we now took caused great calamities and encouraged a domestic and treacherous usurper in his further proceedings, it was impossible to resist the arguments with which the Prime Minister could have enforced it. However, the condition of Ministerial councils at home was described by Lord Palmerston as follows :—

May 22.

The Cabinet has gone on for some time past as it had done before, differing upon almost every question of any importance that has been brought under consideration :—meeting to debate and dispute, and separating without deciding.

This sentence is found after notices of many other differences—one on the Corn Laws, for instance, which was nearly bringing about Mr. Huskisson's and Mr. Charles Grant's resignation—and also on matters of foreign policy. The father of the late Lord Holland, who had lived all his life in intimate acquaintance with Cabinet ministers, used to say that he had never known a Cabinet in which its members did not dispute more amongst themselves during their councils than they disputed with their antagonists in the House of Commons. It is possible that Mr. Pitt's Cabinet and Lord Derby's were exceptions to this rule; but probably a peep behind the scenes would pretty generally demonstrate that a Cabinet is more often held together by the same interests than by the same opinions. At all events, the many squabbles which Lord Palmerston's journal alludes to were a natural prelude to the great quarrel which finally took place; a quarrel of which history may well desire to learn the particulars from biography—inasmuch as it is the starting-point of modern events.

This quarrel is that between the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Huskisson, which led to Mr. Grant being succeeded by Mr. Fitzgerald at the Board of Trade—which led to O'Connell's election for Clare¹—which led to

¹ O'Connell, being a Roman Catholic, was incapable of sitting in Parliament, but was, in spite of that, elected by the constituency.

Catholic Emancipation—which led, by a new defection in the Tory party, to the Reform Bill, which led to a complete social and political revolution in our country.

Mr. Huskisson had come into the mixed Cabinet recently formed very much in the character of Mr. Canning's representative, which made him in some degree the Duke's rival. But Mr. Huskisson was not Mr. Canning. He had not the claims to distinction of a great orator; he had not trodden the public stage as one of the principal actors on it for many years of his life. He had never until lately (though considered for his knowledge of finance and trade) played more than a subaltern's part. He expressed himself with difficulty, and in a style that neither inspired fear nor pleasure. He did not belong to any great aristocratic family. He had little of dignity in his bearing or disposition; and was thought to be at once too anxious for place and too boastful of independence. This was not the sort of man to be accepted as an equal by the conqueror of Waterloo, who had been listened to with respectful attention by the great sovereigns of the earth.

Already, and at the very commencement of their connection, the difficulty of keeping them united had become apparent, for Mr. Huskisson had declared on the hustings at Liverpool that he had only consented to accept office on receiving pledges that Mr. Canning's views would be followed out; a declaration which the Duke took the first opportunity in the Lords of indignantly denying, and from which Mr. Huskisson was obliged, with some discredit, to shuffle out.

The subsequent disputes—each day, as it will have been observed, more or less renewed—had completely irritated the nerves of one party and worn out the patience of the other; and it was certain that the first occasion for getting rid of a disagreeable colleague would be seized by a Prime Minister accustomed to keep his temper under control, but not accustomed to

have his will disobeyed. That occasion came; and the facts relating to it are given, minutely and vividly, in the journal, to which we now return.

A subject on which we had differed from the beginning of the session was the mode of dealing with the franchise of Penryn and East Retford, both of which the House of Commons had pronounced corrupt and deserving disfranchisement. The Duke, Bathurst, &c., were for throwing them both into the hundreds; Huskisson, Dudley, and I for transferring the right to some large towns. Peel rather favoured the latter opinion, but proposed to take one and one, so as to give one to the manufacturing and the other to the agricultural interest. This course it was determined to pursue; Huskisson wanted Penryn to go to the hundred and Retford to a town. Peel would send Penryn to a town and Retford to the hundred. Huskisson maintained that Retford was the worst case, and should therefore have the strongest measure. Peel, on the other hand, thought that taking the two previous delinquencies of Penryn, that case became accumulatively strong, and that Cornwall was so thickly studded with boroughs that the House of Commons would be unwilling to throw any corrupt place there into the hundreds; while on the other hand Retford, though more extensively corrupt on this occasion, had never been proved so before, and was in the hundred of Bassetlaw, which contains 2,000 freeholders. I inclined to Peel's opinion, especially as I thought it hopeless to expect to get the House to put Penryn into the hundreds after Canning had been beat upon it on May 28, 1827. Peel accordingly proposed his arrangement to the House, saying he had waited to see whether we had two places or one to dispose of, and finding we had two, he would give one to manufactures, one to agriculture. Huskisson went further, and on March 21 said, that if there were but one place he would give it to a great town. On the faith of this arrangement we carried an instruction to the Committee on the Retford Bill to alter it by substituting the hundred of Bassetlaw for Birmingham, and Penryn was sent to the Lords, and Retford lay to, to wait the result of Penryn. The Cornish men, however, regained courage, and swore so stoutly at the bar of the Lords that even Lord Carnarvon, who had charge of the Disfranchisement Bill, gave up the case as far as sending the right to a town, and said he should propose the hundred instead.

On Monday, May 19, at three o'clock, we had a Cabinet to consider a variety of things, and among others what should be done about East Retford. Peel said he considered himself free to vote as he liked on the motion which Nicholson Calvert was to make in the Committee to strike out Birmingham, to which, as the Bill was originally drawn, the franchise was to go, and to insert the hundred of Bassetlaw. Huskisson stated, and his statement was admitted, that on March 21 he had pledged himself that if there were but one place to be disfranchised he would vote for sending that place to a town; and it seemed that the case had occurred, inasmuch as it was known that Penryn would go to the hundred or remain as it is. I reminded Peel that if Penryn went to the hundred he would be bound by his own pledge to send Retford to Birmingham. Bathurst objected to voting in any case for a town, and proposed that it should be an open question, like the Catholic Question. This proposition seemed to be agreed to, and Melville showed, by reference to the parliamentary debates, that in the case of Grampound all the Cabinet ministers in the House of Lords had taken their own view and voted different ways.¹ Neither the Duke nor Peel expressed any dissent, nor did they say that any inconvenience would arise to the Government from the Cabinet ministers voting different ways upon this question. It was thought, however, that for the purpose of that night's debate it might be maintained that the Lords had not yet actually decided against sending Penryn to Manchester, and that consequently in the present stage we might adhere to the original arrangement. I said I thought this ground scarcely tenable, but it was agreed to try it. In the course of debate, however, Peel was charged with inconsistency in not sending Retford to a town, now that it was known to every man that Penryn would not go to one. He vindicated himself by asserting, what was true, that he had never pledged himself as to what he should do if there were but one place; but it was admitted on all hands that Huskisson had, and this pledge was claimed from him in the most direct terms by Lord Sandon, and the claim was received with the most taunting cheers from the Opposition. The plea that Penryn was not formally decided was quite knocked over, and indeed was abandoned by Peel himself, who begged the House to take warning from the fate of the Penryn Bill in the House of Lords, to be more cautious

¹ Lord Eldon and Lord Bathurst had opposed the Bill for the disfranchisement of Grampound: Lord Liverpool had supported it.

as to the evidence upon which they dealt with the franchise of towns. Huskisson was in great perplexity what to do, repeatedly said to me he could not possibly vote for Calvert's motion. I told him I thought he could not, and that I would vote against it if he did, because his vote would make it no longer a Government question, and then my vote would become an expression of my own personal opinion, which was directly at variance with Calvert's. Huskisson suggested to the House an adjournment of the question, to give time to ascertain the formal decision of the Lords on Penryn; and he pressed this the more because Nicholson Calvert's proposition was altogether a new measure, and not in conformity with the instruction to the Committee which had been previously agreed to. That instruction directed the Committee of the whole House upon the bill to make provision to extend the right of voting to the hundred of Bassettlaw; but Calvert's proposition went to extinguish the present right of voting as it stands in Retford, and to create an entirely new right, to be vested in freeholders of Bassettlaw, and thus not to throw Retford into the hundred, but to annihilate Retford and create a separate little county of Bassettlaw. Peel, however, would not support Huskisson's proposal, though when Huskisson got up to speak he had desired him not to forget to point out the difference between what he had said on the former night and what Huskisson had said. Huskisson was in a state of great hesitation and uneasiness during the latter part of the debate; and he was in that state of anxious doubt that any strong advice would have led him either way. I then pressed him to sit still on the Treasury bench, on which side those who voted like us, 'that the words proposed by Calvert to be left out should stand part of the question,' were to be counted, and we accordingly voted against Peel. I observed during the division that Peel looked much discomposed, and that he turned his face aside and seemed to avoid looking at us across the table. He had been a good deal nettled by Stanley's attack in the debate, and in fact must have felt that he was sailing as near the wind as possible, since, though he was free as to any pledge, yet the course of his argument certainly led to a conclusion different from his vote. For my part, after the manner in which, at the Cabinet in the morning, it had been proposed to leave the question open, it did not strike me that we were doing anything that was a material breach of official allegiance. I walked home by myself, and heard nothing from anyone on the subject.

At four next day I received a note from Huskisson, saying he wished to see me as soon as I could go over to him. I went over immediately, and found Dudley with him, to whom Huskisson said that I knew nothing of what had been passing that morning, and that he would tell me all, and then I would go over to Dudley and talk the matter over with him. Huskisson then showed me a copy of the letter which he had written the night before to the Duke of Wellington on his return to the House of Commons, tendering his resignation, and the Duke's answer, informing him that he had laid that letter before the King. I immediately said that it was a pity he had not put into his first letter an explanatory sentence stating that he tendered his resignation, if the Duke thought that his continuance in office would be inconvenient to the public service; that there was evidently a misunderstanding, but something must be done without loss of time to clear it up; as the Duke's letter was a dry announcement that he had laid Huskisson's before the King, it gave him no opening for any further explanation nor for a personal interview. But as I had been a party to the vote, and as this matter arose out of the vote, it became proper for me to go to the Duke and explain my conduct to him, and in so doing I could also explain to him the sense in which Huskisson's letter had been written. Huskisson acquiesced in this proceeding. I went then over to Dudley at the Foreign Office, and he told me, that having seen Huskisson in the morning on some of the Russian questions, he had incidentally mentioned what had happened the night before, not as a matter of importance, but as one of those little rubs which created difficulties at the moment, but which we should ultimately get over. Dudley had afterwards seen the Duke, with whom he had a conversation of some length, but who did not mention the subject till Dudley spoke of it, which Dudley said was somewhat strange, as the Duke could not but feel that if Huskisson really had resigned, his resignation must be a matter of some interest and importance to Dudley. Dudley had assured the Duke that Huskisson did not mean what he, the Duke, supposed; but the Duke did not conceive that there could be any mistake in the matter. Upon leaving Dudley I called at the Duke's door in Downing Street; but he was gone to the House of Lords, it being then about five, and in turning to follow him there I met Peel, and took him in the Cabinet room to talk with him on the subject. I explained to him the circumstances which had led to Huskisson's vote and mine, and reminded him of Bathurst having proposed that the question should be an open-

one, of Melville having seconded that proposal, and that neither he nor the Duke had objected to it.¹ He admitted this, but said that he considered that arrangement as applying to a subsequent stage of the bill, and was firmly impressed with the expectation that everybody was that night to have voted the same way; that Huskisson, going out of the room, had said, 'Well, to-night, at all events, we may stand upon the ground that the Lords have not disposed of Penryn;' and that the vote which was given seemed to imply a charge of breach of faith on his part towards the House. He seemed evidently hurt and angry, though his manner to me was perfectly kind and conciliatory. I told him that I was going to the Duke, that I felt I ought to apologise to both for not having come to them the first thing in the morning to explain my conduct; but though I saw now that I had not attached sufficient importance to the matter, it really did not occur to me, under all the circumstances, that it was an affair of such moment as Huskisson had considered it to be.

I then went down to the House of Lords, and sent a note in to the Duke, requesting a few minutes' conversation with him. He came out to me, and finding no committee-room vacant, we went to the long gallery made for the King's entrance, and walked up and down there for half-an-hour. I stated to him very much what I had said to Peel, that, speaking as a man of honour, I must honestly say that I thought Huskisson had no option as to his vote after the course which the debate had taken; that he would have been discredited had he not given it; and that, however inconvenient to a Government an appearance of disunion might be, it would be still less for its advantage that one of its leading members should be discredited in the face of Par-

¹ *Note by Lord Palmerston.*—In the following year, 1829, when the Catholic Relief Bill was pending, Lord Lowther, then Chief Commissioner of Woods and Forests, Sir John Beckett, Judge Advocate-General, Mr. George Banks, Secretary to the Board of Control, Mr. Holmes, Treasurer to the Ordnance, all sent in to the Duke their resignations; that is to say, wrote word that they could not support the Bill upon the fate of which the existence of the Government was staked; and that if their voting against it would be inconvenient to the Government, they were ready to resign their offices. Of these letters no notice was taken, and to them no reply was sent. The individuals in question voted against the Government in every stage of the proceeding, and remained undisturbed in their offices; a pretty good commentary upon the eagerness with which Huskisson's resignation was acted upon in a case where the Bill out of which it arose was not a Government measure, nor a proceeding upon the issue of which the existence of the Government in any degree depended.

liament; and I then explained that he seemed to have mistaken the meaning of Huskisson's letter; that all he intended to say was, that if the Duke objected to his remaining in office after giving that vote, he declared beforehand that he should have no just cause of complaint if the Duke chose to remove him; but that he had no wish or desire to quit the Government. The Duke said that he had received Huskisson's letter with the greatest surprise; that as it alluded to circumstances which had taken place in the debate, he had concluded that some personal discussions must have occurred between him and Peel; that he looked to the newspapers, but could see nothing of the sort or which accounted for the letter; that he could only understand the letter as a positive resignation; that he had shown it immediately to Peel, who had also so understood it (he did not tell me that which was much more important, namely, that he had shown it also to Lord Bathurst, who had strongly exhorted him so, and in no other way, to understand it); that such an event having taken place as a division among the Cabinet ministers in the House of Commons, and the King being in town, it was his duty to lose no time in stating the matter to the King, and having received such a letter from Huskisson, he could not avoid, at the same time, laying that letter before the King. That he had heard nothing from all quarters but the shocking scene of the night before; that the Chancellor told him people were talking of nothing else; that we had been coming to this for some time; that no Government could go on without a party; that our friends were leaving us, and the Government would very soon fall into as much weakness and contempt as Goderich's.¹ I said to this that I did not think that we had experienced any difficulties in Parliament. He said, No, because we have had no questions; but we must not expect that this would last; questions would soon come on, and then our difficulties would begin. He said that if he had had any doubt what Huskisson's letter meant, he should have applied to Huskisson for explanation; but neither he nor Peel,

¹ *Note by Lord Palmerston.*—Here came out the Duke of Cumberland's cloven foot. He had been telling the King that the Duke of Wellington had no energy or decision, and was as weak as Goderich. The King repeated this to those about him as his own opinion; and from them it got round to the Duke, and nettled and goaded him on to acts of violence. The King had more than once said to Huskisson that he was much disappointed in the Duke; that he was no doubt a man of energy and decision in the field, but that in the Cabinet he was as weak and undecided as Goderich.

to whom he had shown it, had any doubt upon the subject; and the King, to whom he had shown it, had no doubt either, but had expressed great regret at receiving it, but had said, Well, we must do the best we can; that he, the Duke, would stand by the King to the last, I might depend upon it; that having no doubt whatever that Huskisson's was a positive resignation, he could not go upon all fours to Mr. Huskisson to ask him to withdraw it, and lay the Government at his feet by requesting him to stay in. I said no man could wish him, the Duke, to take any step inconsistent with his personal or official character, or to make submission to any man; but it did not appear to me that there was any submission or anything derogatory in receiving an explanation of that which had been misconceived; that so far from Huskisson's letter being a demand for submission on his part, it was an act of submission to him, that it was like a soldier who has been guilty of indiscipline and insubordination, and who, instead of waiting to be apprehended, comes of his own accord to his general to say that he is conscious he has done that which may be objected to, and that he is ready to submit himself to the discretion and judgment of his chief. I said that I felt in this matter as much personally involved as Huskisson; that, in fact, whatever blame might attach to Huskisson, more blame must attach to me; he was bound by a pledge given in a former debate, and which left him no choice; I was bound by no such pledge, but had voted because Huskisson's vote, which I had myself told him I thought him bound to give, would have divested the division of the character of a Government question, and then my vote would have been an expression of individual opinion; and as my opinion was, as he well knew, for the town, I could not vote for the hundred; but that as I had been mixed up in the vote out of which this discussion arose, if the end of the matter should be that if he were to find himself under the necessity of recommending to the King a successor to Huskisson, I should be obliged to ask him to do the same for me; that I should feel the greatest regret at separating myself from the Government, and that nobody who knew me would for a moment doubt my strong personal feelings of respect and regard for him; but that under all the circumstances of the case, and mixed up as I had been with the vote, I could have no choice in this matter. I remarked that while I said this he raised his eyes which had been fixed on the ground as we were walking up and down, and looked sharp and earnestly at me, as if to see whether this was meant as a sort of menace

or a party measure ; but he could not fail to see by my manner that I was merely stating to him my own feelings beforehand, that I might stand acquitted afterwards of having used towards him any concealment or reserve. He said that as to the vote, it was certainly an unfortunate vote, but that did not signify so much, and might be remedied ; it was the letter he objected to, and upon that he laid the main stress. At last I said I wished to know how he considered the matter to stand, and whether he looked upon it as a complete transaction, or still as an incomplete transaction. He said the state of the matter was this, that he had received from Huskisson a letter which he understood as being a positive resignation ; that he had laid it as such before the King, who as such had received it ; that he had informed Huskisson he had done so, and had heard nothing from him since. I said, When you say that you have heard nothing since, do you mean from Huskisson, or from the King ? He said, From Huskisson. Upon this we parted, and I returned to Huskisson, and told him that though I thought he could not ask a personal interview with the Duke, yet it seemed to me that he had a fair opening for a written communication without compromising in any degree his own character. Dudley and I had both had personal communications with the Duke, we had both of us informed him what was the Duke's understanding of his letter ; and he might fairly make that the groundwork upon which to rest a voluntary explanation in writing of what his meaning really was. He said, Well, let us try, took up his pen, and between us we wrote the letter which he read afterwards as his second letter in the House of Commons. I confess I thought that this letter would set everything right, that the Duke was merely standing upon a point of etiquette, and that when that was conceded to him, as it would be by this letter, he would be satisfied, and the affair would end. Huskisson sent the letter to the Duke at a little after seven, and the Duke received it in Downing Street while he was dressing for dinner. Huskisson told me that he had, immediately on receiving the Duke's first letter, written to the King to beg an audience, but supposed he should not have an answer till next day. We debated whether we should go down to the House, but in the end we did so, and he spoke on a matter concerning the Civil List which was before the House that night, by way of showing that he did not consider himself as having resigned. The next day, Wednesday the 21st, he received the Duke's second letter, and wrote in answer a very

long explanation, and one so clear and explicit that it seemed to me impossible that anybody could mistake the matter after receiving it. The Duke's reply to his letter of Tuesday evening appeared, however, to throw a new light upon the matter, and evinced a disposition by no means easily to accommodate the affair, and led us to think that deeper motives were at work than a mere understanding of the first letter, or a simple feeling of etiquette.

On Wednesday evening I went to Almack's, and there found everybody full of the report that Huskisson and I had resigned. I of course contradicted that report as far as I was concerned, for obvious reasons.

On Thursday, the 22nd, I went to Huskisson as soon as I got down to the Horse Guards, and he said, 'It is now quite clear this was a settled thing from the first—here is a letter I have this morning received from the Duke.' When I read that letter I found that the Duke passed by entirely all the explanations, verbal and written, which Huskisson had given, and pinned him down to the meaning which the Duke himself had put upon the first letter when first he read it, and before he had received any explanations, and then arguing upon that meaning concluded by saying, 'Your resignation, therefore, is your own act, and not mine' (as if a *resignation* could be the act of anybody but the resigner). I saw plainly that the matter was at an end; that letter closed the door upon any further explanation from Huskisson, because it left wholly unnoticed all he had previously given, and did not leave him a peg on which to hang any further communication. If it had argued his explanation and pointed out deficiencies in it, he might have answered the arguments or supplied the deficiencies; but when all he had said was treated as if it had not existed, there was nothing further left to be done but to wait to hear who was to succeed him.

I returned to the War Office and wrote to Peel to say I wished to see him before he went to the House, and he appointed me at his own house at Whitehall at three. I went and told him that I called in consequence of having seen the Duke's letter of that morning; that that letter appeared to me to close the door to all possibility of accommodation, as it left Huskisson nothing upon which to found any further step. That under these circumstances I could have, as I had told him on Tuesday, no choice as to what I must myself do; and therefore, as I could not in this state of things go down to the House as a minister, I wished he would put off till after the holidays the

notice for the Army Estimates, which stood in my name for the next day, Friday the 23rd. I said that we could not question, and did not mean to question, the full and perfect right of the Duke to remove us if he chose in consequence of our Retford vote; but I did not think it fair by Huskisson to put his removal, not upon the vote, but upon a letter which he had repeatedly and fully explained was not written in the meaning which had been put upon it, and was intended as an act of courtesy, not as an offence. Peel said that resignations given and not acted upon gave the minister making them a great advantage afterwards over his colleagues. I said, 'Yes, if the resignation is founded upon a difference of opinion upon prospective measures, because then when the resigner is asked to withdraw it, there must be implied at least an acquiescence in the measures upon which the difference of opinion arose; but here the case is totally different; the resignation, if such it is to be called, was not given with reference to any measure to come, but as an *amende* for an act done and performed; and instead of requiring future acquiescence, it simply meant to say that Huskisson forewent any pretence of complaint if the Duke chose to remove him, but had no desire to leave the Government unless the Duke wished him to do so.' I admitted that it would have been better if the letter had been more explanatory, and had not been written at all; but it seemed to me that its original defects, whatever they might be, must be considered as cured by the subsequent explanations. I then shook him by the hand, and we mutually expressed our regret at parting with each other.

From this time Dudley took the matter in hand, and endeavoured to negotiate between the Duke and Huskisson; and if there had been the slightest desire whatever on the part of the former to retain the latter, that negotiation must have been successful.

He proposed, what certainly did not seem unreasonable, that the letters should all be withdrawn on both sides, and considered as *non avenues*, stating that he was not indeed authorised by Huskisson to make this proposition, but had no doubt that it would be acceded to. The Duke said he did not feel himself called upon to give an opinion upon a hypothetical case, but, said he, Huskisson is a sensible man, and a man of the world, and he must know what it is right for him to do under any given circumstances. When Dudley reported this conversation to Huskisson and to me, I observed that it was very oracular, but did not advance us much; but I wished to know how Dudley understood it, and what he supposed the Duke to mean. He was not very

clear on this point, but seemed to think the Duke wished Huskisson to say that he withdrew his *resignation*, and that he had not suggested this step in order not to appear to dictate it. It was manifestly impossible that Huskisson could say he withdrew his resignation,¹ because he had all along contended that his first letter was not meant as a resignation; he could not therefore falsify his own deliberate statements, and those he had made through Dudley and me. Dudley said that he had opened his communication by laying down two propositions as a basis on which it could not be difficult to come to an understanding; the first, that Huskisson had no wish to go; the second, that the Duke had no wish that he *should* go. The second proposition, however, seemed to me much more doubtful than the first.

On Saturday morning Huskisson made his mind up to stand upon his right as Secretary of State to demand an audience of the King, and to say that having ineffectually endeavoured to explain himself to the Duke, and having been informed that his first letter had been laid before the King, but not having been told whether his subsequent letters had also been shown, and having asked for an audience on Tuesday, but having as yet had no answer, he could not go into any further explanations with anybody else till he had seen the King, but then he should be ready and willing to give to the Duke any explanation he wished. Dudley was to dine with the King that day, Saturday, to meet the Duke and some of the foreign ministers, and was to say this to the Duke, and ask the King again for an audience. Dudley, however, next day informed Huskisson that the King wished not to see him till he had settled the matter with the Duke, but that the Duke still declined pointing out what was to be done, and that Peel also declined making any suggestion, saying that if he suggested anything as a step which ought to be satisfactory, and the Duke should think it not so, he should thereby be unpleasantly committed as against the Duke.

I was going across the parade towards Downing Street at about two, when Dudley and Lamb called to me from the balcony of Melbourne House. I went up, and Dudley said he imagined the matter at an end, and that the Duke, conceiving that sufficient time had now elapsed without any arrangement effected, was gone, as he, Dudley, believed, to the King, to recommend a successor to Huskisson. He said it was now necessary for us to consider what we should do. I said that, as far as I was con-

¹ He might have withdrawn the letter without saying whether it was a resignation or not.

cerned, there was no further consideration necessary; that I had, as early as Tuesday, informed both the Duke and Peel what I must do in a certain contingency, and that case having now arisen my course was perfectly plain. Lamb also said that he thought we had no choice as to what we were to do. The whole thing evinced such a thorough determination to get rid of Huskisson that it was quite time for all of us to retire also. Dudley stroked his chin, counted the squares of the carpet three times up and three times down, and then went off in the agony of doubt and hesitation. I went over to Huskisson, and found him finishing a long letter to the Duke, which he requested the Duke to lay before the King, as the only mode left to him, now that he was debarred from access to the King, to make known to his Majesty the statements and explanations which he wished to have submitted to him in an audience if he had had one. This letter he sent about five o'clock.

I dined at Sir Thomas Farquhar's in St. James's Street, and met Dudley there. After dinner, when the ladies were gone, Dudley came round to me, and told me he was doubtful whether he had done right or not. The Duke had told him that morning, that unless he heard something satisfactory from Huskisson by half-past two, he was to go at that time to the King to submit the name of a successor; that he had not told this to Huskisson for fear of doing mischief; that Huskisson's letter had arrived after that time, and had been returned by the Duke to him (Dudley) unopened, with a request that it might be so sent to Huskisson, as the Duke did not think it fair to him to open it after he had named his successor. Dudley said he was going to Huskisson at eleven o'clock that evening; and I said I would meet him there. On arriving I found Dudley and Lamb. Huskisson said he had sent his letter back again to the Duke, with a note to say that it had no reference to the appointment of his successor, and that he begged the Duke to open it, therefore, and lay it before the King. We all left Huskisson together,¹ and Dudley proposed we should walk up a little way, our cabriolets following. He was in the middle, and said, 'Well, now we are by ourselves in the street, and nobody but the sentry to hear us, let me know, right and left, what is meant to be done—"in" or "out."' I said 'out,' and Lamb echoed 'out.' 'Well,' said Dudley, 'I am under some embarrassment as to what I shall do. The King has been pleased to

¹ Huskisson was living in the house belonging to the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

take a great fancy to me, and will, I am sure, be much offended if I go out. He and the Duke have both taken for granted that I mean to stay at all events, and told me so, and I have neither affirmed nor denied their assumption, and they certainly are under an impression that I mean to stay. On the other hand, if you, Palmerston, who have all your life been in office with the Tories, feel it impossible to stay, how much more difficult must it be for me who never belonged to that party, and who came in as the personal friend of Canning?' He asked our opinion, and I said that I thought he would do best for his own credit and comfort by going out. That it would be felt that he, having come in as the personal friend of Canning, was staying in when all the other personal friends of Canning were going out, and that nobody would think that he, singly, could have power and influence enough to secure the maintenance of those principles and that course of policy to which he was pledged. He said that as to that there was great vagueness in talking of the policy of particular men. I said there might be, but still people fancied they knew what the expression meant. He said the Colonial Office would be filled by a moderate Tory, a man of promise, a member of a noble Tory family. Lamb then said that for his part he did not happen to know any young member of a Tory family who was a man of promise: but that upon Dudley's own showing the character and complexion of the Government were to be altered first by withdrawing Huskisson, and then by putting in his place a decided Tory. That this would decide him at all events; and not being in the Cabinet, and having no deliberative voice, his confidence in the Government must depend upon those who composed the Cabinet, and so great a change as was about to take place must make him withdraw from his office. Dudley said that there was something in attaching one self to so great a man as the Duke. 'For my part,' said Lamb, 'I do not happen to think that he is so very great a man; but that's a matter of opinion.' I left them, and on my return home wrote to the Duke a letter of resignation, which was to be sent to him early the next morning.

Thursday, the 29th, there was a council to receive the seals from Huskisson and from Dudley, who on the Tuesday had made up his mind to resign, everybody having told him he ought to do so, and even Baron Bulow, the Prussian minister, having said that if he did not do so he would be in a month's time entirely '*perdu de réputation*.'

On Wednesday, the 28th, the Pitt dinner was held, at which

Lord Eldon begged for 'one cheer more' for the toast of Protestant ascendancy.

The King had a long interview with Huskisson upon receiving the seals; and when Huskisson was beginning to express his regret at quitting his service, he said, 'I cannot bear to enter upon that subject; my heart is too full—pray spare me. I am going to-morrow to the country to get out of the way of all these horrid discussions.' He affected to regret that he had not seen Huskisson's last letter before the arrangements had been submitted to him, stating that if he had, he never would have agreed to them, and intimated that it was by his desire that no step had been taken between the Tuesday and the Sunday.

Saturday, June 7.

There has been great violence among all the Tories, and after abusing Huskisson for resigning, they now abuse him for proving too clearly by his speech on Monday that he was deliberately turned out. They do not find fault with my speech, but, on the contrary, affect to praise it, in some sort as contrasting it with Huskisson's. At all events, my statement succeeded, because on the one hand it gave the most perfect satisfaction to Huskisson and his friends, who thanked me very sincerely for what I had said, and on the other hand, all the friends of the Government praised it for being temperate, though, as they said, manly and gentlemanlike.

The King had a large party at the Lodge during Ascot Races last week, and was much puzzled to know upon what footing to place the recent changes. He did not like to admit that the Duke had ill-used Huskisson, because all had of course been done in his name and by his authority. He therefore tried to maintain that Huskisson had determined to go, and the Duke had tried all he could to keep him. Some persons, however, who had his ear, and ventured to speak out to him, denied this to him in a manner which left him nothing to say, except, 'Well, I hate politics, and do not wish to quarrel with you about them, so let us leave this topic.' The Duke of Cumberland abused me for a democrat, saying it was all my fault, and that I had urged Huskisson to go out. To be well abused by H.R.H. is no mean praise to any man. It is quite clear that the King is very much dissatisfied with the turn which affairs have taken. He says he wanted the Duke to have recourse to Lord Lansdowne, but he would not. Cumberland says also that the Duke must have lost his head not to have taken in Eldon.

Our party, though small, is very respectable. Goderich has been very anxious to organise some immediate arrangements, and that we should meet at Pembroke House, where he now lives, but this has not been relished. Besides other objections it would have the appearance of putting ourselves under his lead, which, considering what an unfortunate display he made last December as head of a party, it would by no means be expedient for us to do.

Stanhope Street, June 8, 1828.

My dear William,—The new Government is somewhat too military to be very pleasing to the country ; but it will do and go on till something *untoward* happens to discompose it. It is so many years since I have been entirely my own master that I feel it quite comical to have no tie, and to be able to dispose of my day as I like. I have ceased for a week to attend at W.O., though Hardinge has not yet begun.

The other day, at Woolwich, Prince George said to the Duke of Clarence, 'They say you are in favour of the Catholics, I hope that is not true.' 'Yes, my little fellow,' said Clarence, 'I am, and, as far as I know myself, shall always be, and *so you may tell your father*.' I was much struck and amused with the contrast between these royal Dukes on two occasions. At the child's Ball at St. James's, which was given before Retford came on, Clarence was civil to me as usual, but nothing particular; Cumberland was very gracious, asked me much about you, begged to be remembered to you, said you were a very good fellow, and they were sorry to lose you, and, in short, was as civil as possible. At the full-grown ball the Monday after the change had taken place, Cumberland barely recognised me, and passed with a slight acknowledgment and a simple 'It's very hot to-night;' Clarence, on the contrary, reached out his hand to me across three people, shook me with the greatest cordiality, and said, 'I am *very glad* to see you,' with great emphasis.

It is said that *Capo d'Istria* is getting too openly in the interests of Russia, as contradistinguished from those of the other allies. I should be very sorry for this, because it would only tend to excite jealousies and create obstacles to a satisfactory settlement of Greece; but the impression that this is so, exists in Greece itself. The policy of the Austrian Government in declaring for absolute independence for Greece is curious. I should, however, be for taking her at her word, for I am sure it would be the best arrangement.

Though we have all parted, yet we have parted perfectly good friends, and especially Peel and I.

There was now, apparently, a Cabinet such as the King and the Extreme Tory party desired—a Cabinet in which the affairs of the country would be managed as in old days. But the men could not insure the measures, and it was soon evident that they would have to trim their sails to the popular gale.

Stanhope Street, June 27, 1828.

My dear William,—We are going on here quietly, everybody and all parties seem determined to wait and watch and see the result, and whether the declarations which have been made will be kept to. In the meantime there is no opposition, and it is well for the Government there is not, for Peel is the only man in the House of Commons on the Treasury Bench who can make a speech as a minister should do. However, the ship will sail well enough in fair weather, and the business of the crew must be to keep her out of storms. This seems their intention.

Cumberland says he loves us so much, he means to settle here and send for his Duchess. Sussex was talking of him to me the other day, and said how abominable it was of *that man* to come over here to do so much mischief, treating him as if he was Ghibeline instead of a Guelph. He and Eldon and the rest must, however, be little satisfied with the result of their intrigue, for though they have satiated personal feelings, they have been utterly disappointed in their political expectations, and are even worse off in politics than they were. The tone of public opinion has fairly overpowered them, and, at the moment when they thought everything within their reach, has wrested everything from their grasp. The declaration of the Duke in the Lords as to the Catholic Question—let him mean what he may, and there are great differences of opinion as to what he *does* mean—has advanced that question immensely because it throws overboard all objections on *principle*, and places the matter simply on the ground of comparative arrangement. As long as the Prime Minister declared that on no terms and no conditions would he ever consent to admit Catholics into Parliament, so long the Anti-Catholics throughout the country had a clear course, and knew what to do, and what language to hold. But the moment the minister says that there is no invincible objection to their admission, and that he *can* imagine arrange-

ments which would render such a measure harmless, the column is broken, and every man looks to himself and his own feelings and opinions, and finding his general meditating a retreat, determines not to be the last to stay. I expect therefore that our majority in the Commons next year will be very considerably increased. *This* cannot be very palatable to Cumberland and Co. The exclusion of Eldon, the taking in of Calcraft and Francis Gower, and of Spencer Perceval, the overtures made to Lord Grey, all these things must be exceedingly distasteful to those persons who objected to the ejected as being too anti-Tory.

Our Session is now drawing nearly to a close and little more will be done this year. The Finance Committee have been so absolutely overwhelmed with all the mass of details that Hume has brought on their heads that they have only just been able to get their noses out of water. They have reported on the ordinance and will not do more this year, but that report embraces several principles applicable to other branches of the service.

The feeling of the Committee seems to have been, that we are weighed down by that part of our annual expenditure which belongs to retired charges and is not belonging to active establishment, and that the sources of future expense of this kind ought as much as possible to be checked. This is all very well if they do not go too far, but the result of most former experiments of this kind has been that they have been carried too far, and that then the feeling of the public has after a time recoiled, and in the first moment of returning ease the checks have been removed and all the former liberality, or, as some would call it, extravagance, has returned. We may, however, now hope to be in a settled state, as the Government have positively determined to adhere to the abolition of the one-pound notes as fixed by the present law which forbids any such note being *issued* after April 1829, and this paper currency was the great element of all our convulsions and revulsions. While such notes pass current gold *cannot* remain in the country, and when there is no gold or at least only a small quantity the law may require that notes should be convertible, but what is there to convert them into? And as to the bankers giving security, Exchequer Bills, estates and 3 per cents. cannot be coined into sovereigns when panic happens, and therefore do not guard against the evil. Panic will always be liable to happen as long as we have paper money, because there is a tendency in paper to become every now and then excessive, and when the issuers think they have too much in circulation, and begin to withdraw it, prices fall. The

moment prices fall, there are more sellers than buyers, because all expect a greater fall and the sellers hasten to get what they can, and the buyers wait for the lower price. Then comes bankruptcy by persons selling for less than they bought at instead of more; then alarm, then run on banks, and if the banks have 1*l*. notes in the hands of poor people who cannot afford to trust and wait, and if there is not a gold circulation for which to change the notes, stoppages follow, and extensive ruin and misery. Upon this point the Government means to stand or fall, and public opinion is with them.

The secession of Lord Palmerston from the Duke of Wellington's Cabinet marks his final separation from the Tory party. His next appearance in office was in connection with the Whigs, and the whole of his subsequent career was spent in sympathy and harmony with their views.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DUKE FORCED TO BECOME MORE LIBERAL, AND TO QUARREL WITH EXTREME TORIES AS WELL AS CANNINGITES—QUOTATIONS FROM JOURNAL AS TO AFFAIRS UNDER HIS ADMINISTRATION DURING 1829—LETTERS IN THE SAME YEAR FROM PARIS AND LONDON—SPEECHES ON PORTUGAL AND GREECE—GOES TO PARIS AT THE END OF THE YEAR—EVENTS IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE—OFFERS FROM THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON—LORD GREY'S ADMINISTRATION—LORD PALMERSTON'S APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE Canningites, whether right or wrong in their differences with the head of the Cabinet they had seceded from, were not sympathised with. It was thought that they had too hastily coalesced with the enemies of their old leader. The reproaches which it was said that Lady Canning addressed to Mr. Huskisson found a pretty general echo. The Whigs, moreover, whom the Canningites had quitted when enlisting with Peel and the Duke of Wellington, chuckled over the treatment their late confederates had received. The vote also which both Mr. Huskisson and Lord Palmerston gave, on Feb. 26, 1828, against Lord John Russell's bill for removing the Dissenters' disabilities—though that vote was not intended to be hostile to religious equality, but rather to the religious inequality that would be established by removing Protestant and not Catholic disabilities—was highly unpopular; whilst Mr. Huskisson's conduct in letting a resignation slip out of his hands, and then trying to pick it up again, was considered shuffling and undignified. Thus the great public, which always likes character, clapped its hands at the stern soldier's determined phrase—'It is no mistake, it can be no

mistake, and shall be no mistake.' But the Duke himself make a mistake when he would not acknowledge that Mr. Huskisson had made one. He not only gave powerful auxiliaries to the Whigs, but led to a state of things which dissatisfied and finally alienated a large portion of the Tories. For the loss of liberal coadjutors made it necessary to adopt liberal measures, and liberal measures disgusted his illiberal supporters.

There is an entry in Lord Palmerston's Journal which applies to these remarks, and they are sustained by those that follow:—

Huskisson says the Government are becoming much more liberal than they were when we were among them. This is not unnatural, and I always expected it might happen. They may be disposed to do things, when they have the credit of doing them spontaneously, which they refused to do when it would have been supposed that we were urging them to do them. Thus, they are going to send Lord Heytesbury to the headquarters of the Russian army, and Stratford Canning to Corfu, and mean to resume the conferences with Lieven and Polignac; though when I proposed these things in one of the last Cabinets I attended, they scouted them as inadmissible propositions. The fact is, that Metternich is changing entirely his line; and having found that he could not prevent the Russian war and the liberation of Greece by virtue of the Treaty of London, he is now turning round, and by endeavouring to outstrip the allies in the career of liberality, to appear in this way to lead Europe, which is his great ambition. Thus he now maintains that Greece ought to be made quite independent of Turkey. It remains to be seen whether the Duke will agree to this—which, at a Cabinet dinner at his house, he declared he never would consent to.

Sunday, June 8.

Aberdeen called to-day on Madame de Lieven. She said, 'I am always glad to see you, but I am very sorry to see you Minister for Foreign Affairs, because I consider you Austrian, and an enemy to Russia.'¹ Aberdeen said he had called on

¹ When the Crimean war was under consideration, Lord Aberdeen was accused of being over-Russian. The fact is, that he was, as he said, neither Austrian nor Russian, and only leant to Austria because she was, like himself, inclined to moderate courses. No man was a

purpose to explain himself, as he had heard that she had expressed strong opinions about him, which were entirely mistaken. He assured her he was not at all in the interests of Metternich or of Austria; that, as an English minister, he was English, and in no foreign interest; that he could not be Austrian, as he had not been at Vienna for many years, &c. She said that as he gave her his word of honour that he was not adverse to Russian interests, she could not say she did not believe him; but she knew well the Duke's sentiments about Russia, and she would tell him what she had heard about himself only two days ago: a countryman of hers had met Esterhazy in the street, and Esterhazy, slapping him on the back, exclaimed, 'Eh bien, mon cher, chacun à son tour, vous avez eu votre ministre, à présent j'ai le mien.' Aberdeen was very angry at this, and defended himself, but said nothing in defence of the Duke.

December 1828.

In the Commons we made a battle upon the further stage of the East Retford Bill. The Government made a great whip, and gave out that upon the result would depend its character for strength; and we were certainly beat by a very large majority. The bill was then put off till next session by Peel. There was also a little splash about a Silk Importation Bill, in the course of which Courtenay, the new Vice-President of the Board of Trade, in the absence of Vesey Fitzgerald at his Clare contest, made an unguarded promise to the English silk manufacturers that he would continue the existing duties of importation for a year longer, although there had been a pledge by the Government that they should cease sooner. In the course of this debate Grant made a good speech, and Courtenay declared that his mind and that of Fitzgerald were, upon all questions of trade and commerce, like sheets of blank paper, free from all preconceived opinions. Somebody said that, considering the military character of the present Government, Courtenay should have likened their minds to *cartridge paper*.

The only important matter in the King's Speech was the announcement that Russia had declared war against Turkey upon grounds of her own, and that the Emperor had nevertheless *consented* that his fleet in the Mediterranean should act under the same instructions as the French and English squadrons, and that he had, therefore, in that sea consented to waive his safer steersman on a calm sea; but neither nature nor habit fitted him for the daring pilot in extremities.

belligerent rights.¹ The natural impression from this would be, that we had asked him to do all this, and that *he had* (reluctantly perhaps) *consented*; the truth being that *he had offered all this long ago*, and that the Duke and his party in the Cabinet never could be prevailed upon, as long as we were there, to give their consent.

A great and decided change took place about this time in the measures of the Government as to the Greek question; and many of the things which we had in vain been urging day after day, and which had been pronounced either improper or impossible, were now found possible and right.

1. The co-operation of the Russian fleet with ours in the Mediterranean was accepted.

2. Lord Heytesbury was sent to the Russian head-quarters.

3. Stratford Canning was sent back to Corfu.

4. The conferences were resumed.

5. A land force expedition to the Morea was determined upon.

I had always thought that this was the true and only way of accomplishing the Treaty of London; all the other methods of coercion which were proposed were sure to prove ineffectual. The occupation of the provinces could not produce a settlement of the Greek question except through the prostration of Turkey. The blockade of the Dardanelles must be ineffectual unless we became actually at war with Turkey; since, till we obtained belligerent rights, we should not be able to stop the only material supplies, namely, corn and other provisions, which would be brought by neutrals. But to land a sufficient army, and sweep the Turks from Greece, would execute the treaty practically; and then the formal acquiescence of Turkey became less important.

I proposed this in December, 1827, to Goderich; but neither

¹ 'His Imperial Majesty has found himself under the necessity of declaring war against the Ottoman Porte upon grounds concerning exclusively the interests of his own dominions, and unconnected with the stipulations of the treaty of July 6, 1827. . . . His Imperial Majesty has consented to waive the exercise in the Mediterranean Sea of any rights appertaining to his Imperial Majesty in the character of a belligerent power, and to recall the separate instructions which had been given to the commander of his naval forces in that sea, directing hostile operations against the Ottoman Porte. His Majesty will therefore continue to combine his efforts with those of the King of France and his Imperial Majesty for the purpose of carrying into complete execution the stipulations of the Treaty of London.'—*Extract from King's Speech.*

he, nor Huskisson, nor Lansdowne, nor Tierney relished the plan, still less did the Duke give in to it when I proposed it afterwards to his Cabinet. His objections, as he stated them, were these : less than fifteen thousand men would be too little ; we could not send so many without inconvenience. To let the French go alone would be objectionable ; to let the Russians, or Russians and French, go alone, equally so ; and a combined force would not do by land, however it might answer by sea.

It is worth while to interrupt the journal in order to give an abstract of this proposal made to Lord Goderich when head of the Government. It has not only an historical but also a present interest—illustrating, as it does, the question of how to deal with Eastern difficulties which have recently repeated themselves and will probably do so again. Lord Palmerston, in his memorandum, pointed out that as Turkey obstinately refused compliance with the demands of the Allies with respect to Greece, it became necessary for them to concert such further measures as might be requisite, unless they wished, by abandoning the objects for which, as being of vast importance to the peace and welfare of Europe, they had coalesced, to expose themselves to the derision of the world. Actual coercion must clearly be resorted to. The only question was what form of measure coercive in its character and compatible with efficacy would be the least dangerous and irritating. He proceeded then to point out his objections to the Russian and French proposals, his own being as follows : that 5,000 English troops about to be removed from Portugal should, in conjunction with 3,000 more to be taken from Malta and the Ionian Islands, concentrate at Corfu ; that from thence a summons should be sent to Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate the Morea, with an intimation that if he refused he would be compelled by force—the French also joining, if necessary, with a contingent in addition to the Greek forces already on the ground. ‘The object of the Allies,’ said Lord Palmerston, ‘would thus be accomplished without the political inconvenience of a war

with Turkey—without disturbing the general peace of Europe—with England keeping a prominent and advanced position in the confederacy, and without our having to wade through the delays and subterfuges of Turkish diplomacy.’¹

From the narrative, which we now resume, we shall find this proposal of Lord Palmerston, though rejected at the time, virtually adopted eight months later, after he had left the Cabinet. But though this tardy action on the part of our Government modified some of the evils which had been provoked by its delay, it had come too late to prevent the principal evil, namely, the outbreak of a war between Russia and Turkey.

The French, in the spring, became very urgent, and said their Chambers pressed them so much that they must send ten thousand men; and they actually collected troops near Toulon for the purpose. But at the Duke’s urgent remonstrance they abandoned the plan, and dispersed their troops again. In July, however, the Duke all of a sudden changed his views, and urged the French to go, and to send eighteen thousand men. They did so: our ships escorted and helped to transport their troops; and the result was the prompt clearance of the Morea. The change came from Metternich, who, frightened at the commencement of hostilities between Russia and Turkey, and feeling that till the Treaty of London was out of the way it was impossible for France and England to interpose in favour of Turkey, became as anxious, on a sudden, for the speedy fulfilment of the treaty as he had before been desirous and industrious to defeat it. To Metternich is ascribable the sending of Lord Heytesbury to Nicholas’ head-quarters. He wrote, in the name of the Emperor of Austria, to Nesselrode, to say that Austria, having tried every means to bring Turkey to reason, and having failed, now determined to throw her moral weight on the side of Russia; and as a manifest proof to the world of his good understanding with Russia, the Emperor begged that Nicholas would allow him to send an ambassador specially to his head-quarters. The answer was that Nicholas “*le permet*.” After this, of course, there could be no doubt about sending Lord Heytesbury.

¹ The full text of this memorandum will be found published in the *Times* of Jan. 17, 1877.

Lord Cowley¹ wrote in the spring, 1828, that the Austrian army was in the most deplorable state of inefficiency; the whole amount everywhere (Italy included) was not more than 150,000 men, and even upon their then establishment they wanted 60,000 horses to make them effective. They wished much to have put into the field 50,000 men, to observe Witzenstein's corps, but could not muster so many. Metternich, therefore, finding his maxim of trying to '*gagner du temps*' fail, now became suddenly anxious to precipitate everything, and ran—as men without principle do—from one extreme to the other. The Duke, too, now became an advocate for making Greece independent; which, with great emphasis, in March, he protested he *never* would consent to.

Sir Pulteney Malcolm was sent out to supersede Codrington; but before he could get out, Codrington had made a treaty² with the Pacha of Egypt for the evacuation of the Morea by the Egyptians, and Ibrahim, his son, with an article about the slaves, viz., that those who were still unsold should be returned; and as to those who had been sold, the Pacha should, in conjunction with the consuls of the allies, use *his influence* to restore them to liberty. I had given Peel notice, on the morning of the last day of the session, that I should ask him in the House a question about what had been done respecting these slaves. When first the account came that the fleet of forty sail, which left Navarino in December, after Codrington's boasted annihilation of the Turkish fleet³ and which consisted of seventeen sail that had actually got into Navarino after the battle,

¹ The ambassador at Vienna.

² Dated August 6, 1827, at Alexandria.—Article 1: 'His Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha engages to give up all persons under his control made slaves after the battle of Navarino who have been sent to Egypt, and will immediately place them at the disposal of Admiral Codrington. His Highness likewise promises that he will, in conjunction with the consuls of different nations, use his utmost endeavours to induce such persons as have purchased any of the slaves to deliver them up. And Admiral Codrington on his part engages to set at liberty all Egyptian soldiers taken prisoners, and to give up the corvettes captured in the waters of Modou by the *Hussar*.'

³ 'The whole Turkish and Egyptian fleets have paid the penalty of their treacherous breach of faith. The boasted Ibrahim Pacha promised not to quit Navarino or oppose the allied fleet, and basely broke his word. . . . Out of a fleet composed of eighty-one men-of-war, there remain only one frigate and fifteen smaller vessels in a state ever to be again put to sea.'—*Extract from General Order issued by Vice-Admiral Codrington after the battle.*

although Codrington was ordered to prevent any sea movement—when accounts came that this fleet had carried away five or six thousand Greek slaves, I called the attention of the Cabinet to this circumstance, and urged that it would be a stain on our national character if we did not make an effort to recover these wretches. The Duke received the proposition coldly; Aberdeen treated the matter as a thing we had no right to interfere with; Bathurst, as the exercise of a legitimate right on the part of the Turks; and Ellenborough, as rather a laudable action. I reminded the Cabinet that, two years before, we were informed by Lieven that Ibrahim meant to carry off into slavery the whole Greek people, and to colonise Greece with Arabians and Egyptians. Canning had then taken up the matter warmly; a despatch had been written—probably by Canning—and signed by Bathurst, desiring Adam¹ to send to Ibrahim, to require him to disavow such an intention, and to warn him that we should oppose it by force; and a strong remonstrance was also sent to the Porte. Bathurst said that was a different case; what we then objected to was the carrying off the Greek people, and replacing them by an Egyptian colony. In the present case there seemed to be no intention of replacing those who were carried off, and the captives seemed to be all women and children! Such was literally and gravely his argument. I met it by reading to him a passage in his own despatch, stating that the King objected '*particularly to the carrying off of women and children.*' I got a laugh against him, especially from Ellenborough and Aberdeen, but only a laugh. I reminded the Cabinet that the fact of these persons being sold to individuals could be no reason why the Pacha should not give them back, because it was stated in Lord Exmouth's despatch, giving an account of his attack on Algiers, that when he came away there was not a Christian slave of any sort left in Algiers;² and this proved that sovereigns of that stamp have ways of settling these things with their subjects when they choose to do so. They said, 'What! do you propose we should do as at

¹ Sir Frederick Adam, G.C.M.G., Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands.

² 'To have been one of the humble instruments in the hands of Divine Providence for bringing to reason a ferocious Government, and destroying for ever the insufferable and horrid system of Christian slavery, can never cease to be a source of delight and heartfelt comfort to every individual happy enough to be employed in it.'—*Despatch of Admiral Lord Exmouth to Secretary of Admiralty*, dated 'Queen Charlotte, Algiers Bay, August 28, 1816.'

Algiers, and go to war for these slaves?' I said, 'No; but we have some hold over the Pacha by the presence of Ibrahim and his army in the Morea; you are going to starve him, and thus compel him to evacuate. The same means that will make him evacuate will also make him give up the slaves; extend the pressure to this point also, and let him and the Pacha know that till the whole of the slaves are given up that army will be starved in pawn.' The result was that a despatch was sent to Adam and Codrington, desiring them to send off Cradock¹ to ask the Pacha to have the kindness to give up these slaves, and to ascertain how many they were. It was so managed on the last day of the session that there was no possibility of asking any question. The Speaker did not take the chair till after the Black Rod was in the lobby; and as soon as a few writs had been moved—Grant having got up to move for some shipping returns—the well-known tap was heard at the door of the House, and there was an end of speaking. Peel, however, who had not come into the House before the Usher tapped, showed me on our return from the House of Lords a despatch recently received in answer to the inquiries above mentioned. By this it appeared that the practice of the Egyptians had been, from the time they first entered the Morea, to consider the Greek population as a preserve of slaves; in every action or siege every soldier took as his own property all the men, women, and children he could lay hands upon. Sometimes these captives were sent to Alexandria, to be there sold; but latterly slave merchants used to come over to the Morea to buy them up there, as horse-dealers go down to Horncastle Fair. The total number thus seized, first and last, was from fifteen to twenty thousand; the women were put into harems, the men applied to the most laborious menial employments, and those children who were not kept for the worst uses were sent to a great school at Cairo to be brought up as Mahometans.

As it did not seem to me probable that any effectual steps would be taken on this matter—though I again pressed on Peel my suggestion that Ibrahim and his army should be made hostages for the slaves—I pressed this point strongly on Lieven, whom I met at dinner that day at Falck's;² and I called the

¹ Lord Howden, then Lieut.-Colonel Cradock, who afterwards took the name of Caradoc. He distinguished himself at this time, both as an officer serving as aide-de-camp to Admiral Codrington at Navarino, and as a diplomatist in different matters on which he was employed.

² Then Austrian ambassador in London.

next day on Polignac to do the same thing. Polignac said he had just had orders from his Court to make inquiries as to the number and treatment of these slaves, and to state that, as far as a moderate sum would go, the King of France would willingly buy them up. He was astonished when I told him how many they were. I believe, however, that in the end nothing was done beyond liberating some 180 men who were still unsold at Alexandria.¹

In August the Duke of Clarence resigned, or rather was turned out of the Admiralty. He had managed to put himself quite in the wrong, and, in fact, was half mad. He did all sorts of strange things, and incurred all kinds of foolish expenses. He insisted upon going aboard every ship that went to sea before she sailed; he was perpetually going down to Portsmouth and Plymouth to give colours to regiments and depôts in garrison who wanted none. On these occasions he ordered the general officers commanding to give entertainments which put them to ruinous expenses. Poor Sir James Lyon, at Portsmouth, spent nearly his whole year's staff pay in this manner. The Duke also on these occasions reviewed the troops, and on one occasion found great fault with the —th Infantry, and told the commanding officer it was the worst regiment he had ever seen. After dinner he renewed the attack, and asked Sir Colin Campbell, who was then Major-General commanding, if it was not so. Campbell fired up, and said, 'I do not know what your Royal Highness may think of this regiment, but *we soldiers* consider it as a very fine one.' Whenever he went about the yards he was saluted with discharges of artillery; and there was a curious calculation made of how much he cost the country in powder every half-hour during these expeditions. He at last became impatient of the control of his Council, who used naturally to remonstrate against his proceedings, and he took it into his head that when he was at sea he was exempted from their control. Anxious to try the experiment, even before he could get down to Portsmouth, he wrote at Bushy Park an order to his Council, dated on board some ship, I forget the name, '*at sea*,' and sent it off to the Admiralty by a groom; he then posted off, sailed down the Channel, and sent orders to the Admiral at Cork to leave his station and come and join him in the chops of the Channel. The Board were astounded to hear that their Cork Admiral was gone without their knowledge or

¹ The interest which Lord Palmerston exhibited unostentatiously in this matter shows the genuine humanity of his character.

concurrence. Remonstrances ensued; the Duke took offence,—protested that if Sir C. Cockburn was not turned out he would resign. The other Lords all made common cause with Cockburn; and at last the King wrote him a letter in his own hand, to say that he must either conform to the provisions of his patent or resign; and his answer was a resignation. This was followed by an immediate fit of jaundice, and afterwards by a severe illness in the autumn, during which he was almost childish, in desponding spirits, and often in tears. When they announced to him the death of the Queen of Wurtemberg (the Princess Royal of England), he exclaimed, ‘Ay, she is dead, and I am going to die. We are all of us going to die.’ He had a bad rupture in the spring, which about this time became worse.

The French expedition of about 18,000 men completely effected, in a short time and with little trouble, the expulsion of the Egyptians and Turks from the Morea. Ibrahim and his army evacuated under the treaty made by Codrington, leaving small Turkish garrisons in some of the fortresses, Coron, Modon, Patras, and the castle at the mouth of the Gulf of Lepanto; these garrisons, however, surrendered speedily, some of them without resistance, others with little. The French General Maison was then going to march into Attica to complete the expulsion of the Turks; but our Government made a strong remonstrance against any operation beyond the Morea till the limits of Greece should be finally settled, and the French Government acquiesced and ordered him to stop. The French for some time during the autumn suffered from the fever of the country.¹

Portuguese affairs went ill. After Miguel had completed his usurpation all the European sovereigns except Ferdinand² withdrew their ministers and broke off diplomatic intercourse with him. Imprisonments multiplied in Portugal, and the prisons were crammed with victims.³ An insurrection broke

¹ ‘Our policy about Greece seems the same as ever; to do as little as possible and to circumscribe freedom within the very narrowest possible limits. The French were much mortified at our objecting to their going to Athens and Eubœa; and they ought to have gone there and swept away the Turks as far as the Gulf of Arta on one side and Volo on the other, and then we might make a Greek state respectable and capable of defending itself and paying its own expenses.’—*Lord Palmerston to Sir W. Temple*, Dec. 1828.

² Lord Palmerston might have added ‘and the Pope.’

³ ‘In the beginning of October the prison of the Limoeiro alone, in

out at Oporto in favour of Donna Maria da Gloria, and a force of 8,000 or 9,000 men was got together. Miguel's army was inferior in numbers, and if the Oporto people had had any leader of enterprise who could have led them on to Lisbon, the thing would have been done. Each party, however, feared the other—neither dared to move; the Constitutionalists waited for Palmella, Saldanha, and Stubbs, and Taipa, who were to join them from England; but these had a long passage. In the mean time the Miguelites took courage and advanced; the others of course retreated. By the time the party arrived from England the Oporto army was in full retreat, and the cause was given up as hopeless. Palmella and his friends re-embarked instantly, leaving the army to shift for itself: 5,000 men kept together, and the greater part of them made good their retreat into Spain; there they were required to give up their arms, were exposed to the worst usage, the officers separated from the men, and both tempted in every way to go over to Miguel. At last, by the intercession of the French Government, the Spanish Government allowed these people to go to England, and about 3,000 came to Plymouth—not at our expense, but at their own, in vessels which they hired at Corunna. After a time, and about Christmas, Miguel's Government began to grow uneasy at the presence of these 3,000 men in one of our seaports, and feared they would return and make a descent on Portugal; indeed, it was known that Palmella had been making arrangements to get a corps of Germans to join them in order to renew hostilities in Portugal. D'Asseca, the unaccredited minister of Miguel in London, made remonstrances; and the Duke told Palmella that these people must be separated and scattered about the interior of England, as the prisoners of war formerly were. Palmella protested against this, and denied the Duke's right to insist upon it. He consulted Brougham and Denman. Their opinions seemed to be, that as these people were organized, regimented, and equipped as a military body, though not actually armed, they must be considered as foreign troops, and

Lisbon, contained 2,400 prisoners, of whom 1,600 were confined for political delinquencies. The total number of individuals throughout the kingdom incarcerated on similar charges, or who had avoided the scaffold and the dungeon by flying into exile, amounted to upwards of 15,000 men, among whom were forty-two members of the Chamber of Peers, including some of the highest nobility, and seven members of the Chamber of Deputies.'—*Annual Register*, vol. lxx. p. 202.

not as a number of individual aliens ; that, consequently, the Government would have a constitutional right to deal with them differently from what it would with simple strangers. Palmella then said he would send them to Brazil. The Duke said he would escort them, to prevent their landing in Portugal or elsewhere on their way. Palmella protested against this. In the mean time arrived an application from the island of Terceira¹ for 1,000 men to help them to keep out the Miguelite expedition. Miguel had been permitted by our Government to send an expedition to conquer Madeira—a strange straining of the system of neutrality, and a decided indication on our part of partiality for Miguel. It was right enough not to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal, in order to force any particular form of government upon the majority of the people ; but why should we allow the Portuguese to force a particular government on the people of Madeira ? We ought to have said to Miguel, If the Portuguese choose to have for their sovereign a man whom we have to his face taxed with treachery, bad faith, perjury, usurpation, well and good. Much happiness may it confer upon them. But we will not permit you to go and conquer Madeira, the territory of Donna Maria, in which she is queen *de facto* as well as *de jure*. Miguel's success at Madeira encouraged him to attempt the same at Terceira ; but bad weather drove off his ships and postponed the attempt.² Palmella, on receiving the application from Terceira, told the Duke he should comply with it. The Duke said he would prevent him by force, and wrote him a violent letter, of three sheets of paper, in which he said—' Monsieur le Marquis, *I have conveyed to you the commands of his Majesty, and I expect you will obey them.*' Somewhat imperative language to be used towards the ambassador of an independent and allied sovereign, but which would have sounded better had it been used towards a stronger power. However, Palmella was stout, and the expedition sailed in the beginning of January for Terceira, the Duke at the same time despatching two frigates with sealed orders, probably destined for Terceira, to prevent a landing.³ If this is done, surely it will rouse the indigna-

¹ One of the 'Azores.'

² In August an attempt was made by the Miguelites to reduce Terceira ; but it was defeated by Count Villa Flor, commanding for the Queen, with a loss to the Miguelites of the commander-in-chief, the second in command, and between 900 and 1,000 men of the expedition.

³ This was the case. Captain Walpole, of the 'Ranger,' who was in command, warned the expedition under Count Saldanha from attempt-

tion of the public and of Parliament ! How well satisfied I am, and have been every day since I went out of office, that I have escaped from the embarrassment of choosing the precise points of difference with the Duke at which it would have become absolutely necessary for me to quit his Government !

In the meantime the King, towards the end of December, received the little Donna Maria da Gloria at Windsor Castle with all the honours of sovereignty, the Duke, Aberdeen, and the other ministers being present. He was charmed with her ; thought her like Princess Charlotte, well-mannered, and, above all, beautifully dressed in lace and diamonds. When he handed her to her carriage, he stopped to make her a farewell speech, in which he expressed his hearty wish to see her restored to her throne. The child was so overcome with his kindness and her own difficulty at expressing herself in French, that, as the readiest reply, she instinctively threw her arms round his neck and kissed him, to thank him. This completely captivated him. He is particularly fond of children, and he said that everything else might have been taught her, but this *must* have been her own. We shall see how this reception is to be reconciled with the line about Terceira and the general moral support given to Miguel.

With Russia our relations have continued cold, but uninterrupted. The Duke is anxious to bring about a peace between her and Turkey, but does not set about it in the right way. The campaign has been unfortunate for such a result ; the Russians, having partially failed, and lost about sixty thousand men by *feu et fer* and disease, want a second campaign to redeem their honour. The Turks, elated by their unexpected success in resistance, undervalue the dangers of another campaign, and are more than ever obstinate. But yet the Russians *know* what they have lost, understand better than they did the difficulties they have to contend with ; and the losses of the Guards, twenty-seven officers of which, all belonging to the first families, fell at Varna, have tended—though they may not acknowledge it—to sicken them of the war. Woronzow is for peace, and so probably are many others. The

ing to land, and fired into the leading ship, killing one man and wounding another. Count Saldanha in consequence proceeded with his squadron to Brest. This affair created a good deal of excitement both at home and abroad. But the severest criticism on the Wellington policy was in the *Lisbon Gazette*, wherein Miguel announced ‘ that the conduct of England towards Portugal, in such circumstances, had been above all praise.’

Russians begin to discover that they have *land* enough, if they were only to cultivate and improve to its utmost what they have; that the possession of Constantinople, even if Europe would permit it—which they know could not be—would indeed create a new empire, but would not strengthen existing Russia. What they indispensably want, is a certainty of a free passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for their commerce, and that they might have secured to them by treaty. I had on the 14th January 1829, a long conversation with Pozzo di Borgo, at his house in Paris, and this seemed to be the general result of it: that the Emperor's honour required some concessions in any treaty of peace; that Russia could not accept a formal mediation, though she could not object to the good offices of her allies if used to promote peace. On the other hand, there is a large party in Turkey who are inclined to peace. In spite of the obstinacy of the Sultan, it is not impossible, therefore, that an accommodation may take place before spring.

Irish affairs have gone on from bad to worse ever since the summer. *The Clare election began a new era, and was an epoch in the history of Ireland.* O'Connell did not at first mean to stand himself, but no eligible Protestant candidate could be found; and as all the landholders, with scarcely an exception, were for Fitzgerald, nothing perhaps but the influence of O'Connell as a candidate could have carried the point. The event was dramatic and somewhat sublime. The Prime Minister of England tells the Catholics, in his speech in the House of Lords, that if they will only be perfectly quiet for a few years, cease to urge their claims, and let people forget the question entirely, then, after a few years perhaps *something may be done for them*. They reply to this advice, within a few weeks after it is given, by raising the population of a whole province like one man, keeping them within the strictest obedience to the law, and, by strictly legal and constitutional means, hurling from his seat in the representation one of the Cabinet Ministers of the King. There were thirty thousand Irish peasants in and about Ennis in sultry July, and not a drunken man among them, or only *one*, and he an Englishman and a Protestant, and O'Connell's own coachman, whom O'Connell had committed upon his own deposition, for a breach of the peace. No Irishman ever stirs a mile from his house without a stick; not a stick was to be seen at the election. One hundred and forty priests were brought from other places to harangue the people from morning to night, and to go round to the several parishes to exhort and bring up voters. The Govern-

ment were not idle or unprepared. Lord Anglesey told me he had seven thousand regulars, all out of sight, but within a short distance of Ennis, and capable of being brought to bear upon it, in case of disturbance, in a few hours. All passed off quietly; but the population of the adjoining counties was on the move, and large bodies had actually advanced in echelon as it were, closing in upon Ennis, the people of one village going on to the next, and those of that next advancing to a nearer station, and so on; and thus, had anything produced a collision, the bloodshed would have been great and the consequences extensive. The Association had ordered peace to be made between all the local factions; and after the election the people assembled in large bodies in various parts of the south, without arms, but regimented, and with some outward badges like uniforms, mostly on foot, but sometimes on horseback. Anxious and eager inquiries were made of O'Connell and Sheil to know *when the people were to begin*. They had made peace among each other, as ordered, but surely that could only be to enable them all to join in making war upon somebody else! If they were not to fight each other, whom were they to fight? Of course the Orangemen and the Government—and when were they to begin! These inquiries embarrassed and frightened the Association, and they were delighted by a hint which they received from Lord Anglesey, through Parnell and Spring Rice, that these meetings could not be permitted, and that he *must* put a stop to them, and only wished that the Association would themselves anticipate him; and they accordingly issued their proclamation a few days before his came out. The effect of the *two*—and *one* would have been sufficient—was magical; and all popular demonstrations from that time ceased on the part of the Catholics, though not entirely on that of the Orangemen.

I was in Ireland in October and November, and saw Lord Anglesey several times—once on my way to Sligo, and two or three times on my return. He said that neither the Duke nor Peel ever wrote to him anything but official letters; that he had no confidential communications from either, and was utterly ignorant what the Duke intended to do about the Catholic question; that he wrote to them incessantly to press upon them the indispensable necessity of settling it; that at that moment there would be no great difficulty in the way from the Catholics, *who would agree to any reasonable arrangement with regard to securities, such as the payment of the clergy, an arrangement for the nomination of bishops, and even, he said, a regulation of the*

forty-shilling freehold. He had also seen a letter from Huskisson, from Rome, stating that no difficulties would be made by the Pope.

This last was afterwards confirmed to me by Huskisson, whom I saw on my return to London. He had had a conversation with the Pope and with Cardinal Bernetti, his Secretary of State, a man about forty, who has seen the world, and has been employed in Russia and Germany. The Pope expressed a great desire to have the matter well settled; and Bernetti said, 'We know that we are not what our predecessors were some centuries ago; we are a feeble and decaying power; it is for our interest to be friends with the great powers of Europe, and with none more than with England' (probably alluding to our means of protecting the Pope against the hostile designs of Austria, who wants some of the northern districts of the papal territory). 'Do not, however,' said he, 'ask us to rescind the edicts of ancient councils, nor to change the principles and doctrine of our Church: this we cannot do: look forward, and not backward. *Dites nous ce qui vous convient*, and we will do it if it is possible.'

Lord Anglesey begged that when I got back to London, if I was able by any means whatever to pick up what were the intentions of the Government, I would write him word. The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland begging a private gentleman to let him know, if he could find out, what the Prime Minister meant upon a question deeply affecting the peace and welfare of the country which that Lord-Lieutenant was appointed to govern, and upon which question he was every week stating to the Government the opinions he himself entertained—a strange instance of the withholding of that confidence which, for both their sakes, ought to have existed. He said he had had a good deal of communication with the Catholics, and could answer for keeping them quiet for the present. They were contented with impartiality and justice. The Protestants, on the contrary, required partiality to themselves, and injustice to the Catholics. Still some of those leading Protestants would be very glad to have the question settled for them by an overruling authority; as long as it remained unsettled they are compelled—or, rather, think themselves compelled—to keep their places in their party by heading meetings, &c.

He said the King was very angry with him because he would not do a great many violent things which the Government at home required of him, and proceed against this man and that man who gave them offence. He was determined, however, not to do so, as such measures could only irritate without deterring.

He had seen O'Connell, who asked to see him on business, and of course he never refused admittance to anybody. He had availed himself of the opportunity to impress upon O'Connell the inexpediency of personal attacks upon the Duke and Peel, and the wisdom of trying to conciliate the Duke. With him it rested to determine whether any measure of relief should be proposed, and no good could come of making him their enemy. Lord A. asked me if I had not observed of late a more moderate tone on this point in the Association—which I had, and he attributed it to this communication. I said I did not see how it was possible to go on governing Ireland upon the present system even for another year. He said, Yes, he could engage to keep them quiet for another year, but that every year's delay would bring us worse terms of settlement. He dwelt much upon the difficulties under which he laboured from being left in entire ignorance of the Duke's intentions, and being obliged to govern according to his own notions, without knowing whether he was thwarting or forwarding the views of the Duke. Doherty, the Solicitor-General, said that they could just keep the country together till Parliament met, and hand it over to the table of the House, but could not be answerable for more. He was very shy, however, of entering deeply into the subject with me; but I understood that he was the guiding adviser of Lord Anglesey. Sir John Byng, the Lieut.-General commanding, told me that, being asked by Lord Anglesey where he would place two regiments which were coming over from England, he said at once that he would send them among the Protestants of the north, who were much more violent and likely to disturb the public peace than the Catholics of the south; and they went accordingly to Belfast. He mentioned that the High Sheriff of Clare had lately called out the military upon his own authority, to preserve the public peace from being endangered by a meeting called to form a Brunswick Club, of which meeting the said Sheriff was to be Chairman—a good specimen of Ireland.

It is certain that the Duke did not wish to increase the difficulties, because all the friends of the Government studiously discountenanced the formation of Brunswick Clubs. Peel too told me, the day after the Repeal of the Test had been carried in the House of Commons, and after a long interview he had with the King at the Lodge at Windsor, where we went to hold a Council, that the King having adverted to the Catholic Question, and expressed his hope that this vote would not lead to giving way on that question, and alluding also to his scruples of con-

science arising out of the Coronation Oath, he, Peel, entreated the King well to consider before he rested his objections upon a point of conscience: circumstances of necessity might arise to compel him to agree. From objections of State policy he might recede, but from objections of conscience he could not with honour recede, and yet he might be obliged to waive them.

About the end of December came out the Duke's letter to Dr. Curtis, Titular Primate of Ireland, a Catholic, and a little while after came out Lord Anglesey's letter to the same person, in answer to one by which Dr. Curtis had communicated to Lord A. the Duke's letter to him; and at the same time was announced the recall of Lord Anglesey. It seems that on the 31st December, 1828, he informed his household that they were to prepare for his departure from Dublin in a fortnight from that time. The recall had certainly nothing to do with Lord A.'s letter to Curtis, but grew out of differences long existing and a correspondence that had long been going on between the Duke and Lord A.¹ In fact, nobody who is not, like Peel, indispensably necessary to the Duke can go on long serving under him, without an entire abandonment of all his own opinions.

Lord Palmerston being out of office, and anxious to utilize his time, now went to Paris, where he associated with the principal statesmen there, and he records in his journal some of their views and opinions, very suggestive of the events which subsequently occurred:

Jan. 10, 1829.

I came to Paris on the 10th, and saw Madame de Flahault, Pozzo di Borgo, and others. Constitutional principles have made great advances in France, and public opinion is acquiring considerable force. There remain very many abuses of detail which require correction; and if the Government does not of its own accord give the tone upon these points, it will be compelled to do so. The King is quite satisfied with the present state of things, but would wish any change to be towards Toryism. He was uneasy last summer about his disputes with the bishops on the subject of the schools, but was satisfied by the report made by Chateaubriand of his conversation with the

¹ When M. de Talleyrand heard that Lord Anglesey was recalled, he saw at once that the Duke had determined on conceding the Irish Catholic claims, and that he did not mean anyone else to have the credit of the concession.

Pope, who said, 'What a troublesome set of bishops you have in France! they are the most so of any in Christendom. What do they want? They have the most pious and Christian King that ever reigned—indeed, I may say, a very saint; why cannot they be satisfied?' The present administration is very Russian; but there is growing up among public men a *French* feeling, and this is directed for its first object to the recovery of the provinces between the northern frontier and the Rhine—Belgium, in short, and part of the Prussian territory. The ultra-Liberals say they would support any minister who would recover this territory for France; and I am told that Pozzo di Borgo secretly assures France that if in the event of a general war in Europe they will side with Russia, Russia will assist them in obtaining this object. The '*Journal des Débats*,' the other day, denied any intention to send troops to Algiers or Egypt. 'France,' it said, 'has objects nearer home of deeper interest, for which it should reserve its resources.' If Chateaubriand and his party come in, the Government will probably be looking to the possibility of extension to the north and also to the south. Pozzo di Borgo, with whom I had a long talk, said that the happiest thing for France would be a Government that would act upon the system of the late Duc de Richelieu (that is, I presume, which would lean on Russian connection); but the difficulties are great, from the dearth of eminent public men. Buonaparte crushed everybody else, both in politics and war; he allowed no one to think and act but himself, and has left, therefore, nothing but generals of division and heads of departments, but no man fit to command an army or govern a country. France, however, is prospering, and wants only peace to become powerful. The interest of her debt is only seven millions sterling, and her sinking fund for redemption of debt is three millions sterling; her taxes are light, and her people happy.

With respect to the Russian war, he said peace was difficult; the Emperor must yield to public opinion. The nation was mortified at their want of success, and desirous of redeeming their honour,¹ and on the other hand, the Turk is proportion-

¹ *Note by Lord Palmerston.*—Madame de Flahault and Olivier Verac told me that the Duc de Mortemart says that much of the failure of the Russians is owing to the disinclination of Nicholas to sacrifice lives; that after every affair he dwelt more on the loss of men than on the success obtained, and forbade several enterprising attacks at Varna and elsewhere, which perhaps might have been successful, but at the hazard of severe loss. The spirit which led to the conspiracy against Alexander is not extinct; the snake is scotched, but not killed; and

ably more obstinate from his unexpected success. He said the best-informed Russians no longer wished for extension of territory in Europe; they might, indeed, require '*quelques bicoques en Asie*' (alluding to Anapa and Poti on the Black Sea), and the security for free passage for their commerce through the Bosphorus—which they would require to have assured, not by territorial possession, but by guaranteed treaties.

I threw out to him that the other Powers of Europe might easily put an end to the war, since, without a formal mediation, which Russia might object to, they might say to Turkey, You were the aggressor—as she certainly was: such and such terms, including compensation for mercantile losses, but excluding territorial cession, would be just between you. If you will agree to these, we are persuaded the fairness of the Emperor will lead him to accept them; but they must be compatible with his honour. If you refuse these terms, take care of yourself; and, mind, you must look nowhere for help. I did not add to Pozzo what, however, would in that case be indispensable, namely, that we should say to Russia, We will leave Turkey to you, or even help you against her; but then, mark you, you must make peace when you have beat her, without taking any of her territory in Europe. Pozzo did not seem to disrelish this notion. I remarked that whatever advantage Russia may have gained by getting Varna, the Turks, if they were not egregiously stupid, would have time, between this and the summer, to fortify Constantinople in a way that would make it no easy capture, especially as it is behind entrenchments the Turks fight so desperately. Touching on the possible extension of the war through Europe, he said that as to Austria, they did not fear her; Hungary might, perhaps, be invulnerable, because they were almost independent, and would hate Russian connection; but Galicia would fall at the first blow, being open to Russia, and having the Carpathian Mountains on the wrong side, namely, to the rear; Austrian Poland would be more likely to be excited by Russia than Russian Poland by Austria.

the punishment which has been inflicted upon some of the offenders, though meant as a more merciful one than that of death—to which legally they were subject—tends, perhaps more than death would have done, to keep up the irritation. Six or seven nobles, whose wives were among the most fashionable women of Petersburg, have been exiled to Siberia, and work in the mines. The wives went with them. The husbands are underground six days in the week; the wives are forced to wash and perform all menial offices. Of course they write to their friends, and their letters of course cause great sympathy.

The Austrian army is *mon*; not but that if one hundred thousand Russians and one hundred thousand Austrians were to meet in pitched battle the chances would be even; but war is carried on differently; and in all the difficulties and enterprises of war he thought the Russians would make an example of the Austrians; and so they probably would. And he added that Russia would probably be too happy to get out of the hard bargain she has got of Turkey, and would fall entirely on Austria, and revenge upon her the hard blows she has received from the Turks. If England and Austria took the field against Russia with Turkey, France would not long remain quiet; she *could* not do so; and her first attempt (as *Pozzo* said) would be upon Savoy and the Milanese. Austria has certainly been preparing for events. Lieven told me, a fortnight ago, that her army had been augmented from 150,000 to 300,000, Italy included, but still was deficient in horses. I remarked to Pozzo, that if England took part with Turkey it would probably be by sending a fleet to the Black Sea, which of course, by cutting off the sea line of communication, would cripple the Russian operations, and that Austria in that case need not stir. This, he said, was exactly the plan of Metternich, who always boasted that he would throw England at the head of Russia. We, however, both hoped that no such rupture would take place. I then touched upon Greece, and he said that he had sent on to London, a fortnight ago, a very long and laboured report by the three ambassadors, upon the state of Greece, its probable resources, its proper limits, and the amount of tribute it could pay to Turkey. As to limits, they unanimously recommended that it should extend to the line drawn from Volo to Arta; the tribute they proposed at 60,000*l.* a year—a large sum as it seems to me, and for the payment of which I should be sorry to be a guarantee. They recommended that the president should be hereditary; but Capo d'Istria had positively refused to be president, and a notion had been broached of getting some little German prince unconnected with any of the Great Powers. In the mean time, though the French have been stopped at the Isthmus of Corinth, the Greeks are still carrying on operations on the continent, and it is to be hoped with success. Pozzo said that 640 Greek slaves had been redeemed by the French Government, and he believed (though I do not) that the English Government had contributed something towards the expense of this redemption.

Saturday, Jan. 17, 1829.

I dined at Flahault's yesterday, and met Sebastiani and Talleyrand; the latter seems sunk and broken, and said but little; the former is a self-sufficient, consequential coxcomb. He maintained, in a loud voice and a declamatory style, that it is of great importance to a country to have a large capital town, as it tends to create a public opinion, and to advance the political freedom of the State; that Paris is not large enough, and ought to be *forced*; that the best mode of doing this would be to exempt from taxation for fifteen or twenty years all houses that should be built from this time for a certain period to come;—he not perceiving that a large capital town may be a good political establishment when it results from the activity of commerce, and arises spontaneously, but that an aggregation of stone and mortar is different from an aggregation of thinking beings. After dinner he did me the honour to tell me, *avec franchise*, that it is a thousand pities that all parties and Governments in England take so mistaken a view of the principle on which we ought to deal with France. It is essential and indispensable to France to get back to the Rhine as a frontier; Landau and Sarre-Louis are particularly necessary to her. So long as the policy of England is opposed to these resumptions, so long will it be impossible for cordial alliance to exist between England and France; and France, whose real interests lie in a connection with England, will be led rather to seek to unite herself with Russia and Prussia, or any Power that will aid her to accomplish these objects. Prussia—though at first sight interested to prevent these resumptions by France—might be bribed to acquiescence by slices from Austria or Saxony, or by Hanover. I expressed great doubts whether any party would be found in England sufficiently enlightened to see this matter in this point of view, and thought it would be very difficult to persuade the people to such an arrangement.

Paris: Jan. 13, 1829.

My dear Sullivan,—This country is making rapid strides in improvements of all kinds; and, as Miss Berry said last night, 'It is a joke to talk of danger to Europe from Prussia; if any exists, it is from France it is to be feared. However, this is a chapter far on in the volume, and we have a long way to go before we come to it. I dined at Pozzo's yesterday, a small and select party of *fifty*, and the whole thing as well managed and arranged as it could have been for *five*. The frost still continues,

and the cold is considerable, for among the improvements that of making doors and windows to shut has not happened; and then such a *country* as the streets of Paris to go across—over hills and down dales, and across brooks you go; they are like a model of Switzerland almost, or, rather, like a model of a sea after a storm, and before the swell has gone down. All the sewers are still above ground, so that beside the central river, each house supplies its feeding channels: and bump, bump, bump, you go all the way. Then, in this weather, the snow is all swept into mid-channel, and left there to await the day of thaw; and the streets being as slippery as ice can make them, *ergo* all the carriages you meet are illustrating the resolution of forces: the horses trotting straight along half-way up the street, between the gutter and the houses, the tire wheels of the carriage a few feet nearer the gutter, and the hind wheels sliding diagonally along said gutter; so that when two meet there must be a stop, and a heavy tug on each side towards the opposite house doors to get the wheels out of each other's way.

On his return to England he resumes the broken thread of home affairs and the fight between the progressive and the resisting party, the counterpart of which he had been studying in France with no less discrimination:

Stanhope Street: March 30, 1829.

My dear William,—I am quite ashamed to think how long it is since I last wrote to you. I really believe it is not since I set off for Paris; and we have been so occupied with Catholic affairs since my return, that one has really hardly had time to think of anything else. I send you two copies of a speech which I made the other day;¹ one for yourself, and the other, with my compliments, for Lord Heytesbury. It had great success, and I have had so many civil things said to me about it by persons whose judgment on these matters is valuable, and who could have no motive for saying much more than they thought, that I have been very much gratified. The Bill will scarcely go up to the Lords till Wednesday. In that case they will probably read it a second time on this day week, and it will scarcely get through before Easter. But the Duke says there shall be no Easter till the Bill is through; and there he is right. They will have a decided majority for the Bill in the Lords; the Protestants say about thirty, the Catholics hope for sixty or seventy; if they

¹ On March 18.

carry it by fifty, that will do perfectly well. Ten bishops, including two Irish ones, will vote for the Bill, and that will be sanction enough ; it is better, perhaps, for effect, that some of them should remain opposed to it.

Orders have been given to all the Government people to redouble their attention to the Tory opposers of the Bill, and to be, if possible, more civil to them than to those Tories who have come round ; and the Duke gave them all a grand dinner the other day, and talked to Knatchbull, and Gooch, and others, of what was to be done after Easter, just as if he were reckoning upon their certain support. What he will do I can hardly guess ; some think he will try to strengthen his Government ; I doubt it ; he may, perhaps, take in two or three young men, if they will come, and he will try to get Rosslyn as a hold upon Grey ; but Grey himself he will not wish for : in fact, he feels his Government sufficiently strong in the Lords, where he himself is ; and he does not attach quite importance enough to the Commons, where he is not. But if any question were to arise upon which a strong attack could be made upon the Government in the Commons, I think they would be found very weak. Peel is the only man among them who can speak effectively to the House. Fitzgerald is a good speaker, but not an agreeable one, and he has an inbred vulgarity about him which the House does not like. On the other side of the table are a number of men, with Brougham at their head, who can make good fight ; and Huskisson, both of the Grants, and myself would make a troublesome squadron on their flank. We must have a turn out upon foreign politics before the session is over. Portuguese matters cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed ; the conduct of the Government has been too bad upon that subject. I fear, too, about Greece, that they have been sticking to their text of last year, and wanting to confine the new State in all respects as much as it is possible to do. As to Russia and Turkey, that war has lost much of its interest ; it seems pretty certain that the two parties are a tolerable match for each other : and although the advantage will most likely be on the side of Russia in this next campaign, yet one's notion that she could eat up Turkey at a mouthful has been utterly dissipated ; and for my part, I heartily wish her success, as the only chance of making a good settlement of the Greek State. The French I found much more liberal on that point than ourselves ; but they have, like us, been so engrossed with domestic affairs since the beginning of their session that they have not much noticed foreign

relations. I was at Paris at an interesting movement, when La Ferronaye¹ was taken ill, and intrigues were going on about his successor. Pasquier seemed most wished for by the Ultras, Chateaubriand by the Liberals, and Polignac by the Duke of Wellington. The Duke wrote a letter to the King of France in December, when Polignac went over for a fortnight, to say that he availed himself of the return to Paris of one of his Majesty's most faithful and devoted subjects to bring himself under his Majesty's notice at the beginning of the new year; and he thought he could not give a stronger proof of the great interest he took in his Majesty's welfare than by entreating him to allow Polignac to lay before him the true nature of his Majesty's situation and the dangers by which he was surrounded. On this hint Polignac spoke, and preached about revolution, and all the nonsense which the spirit of Toryism and Ultraism could suggest. The thing failed, and Polignac returned; but upon La Ferronaye's illness a fortnight after, he went back to Paris on a summons from Portalis; but, before his arrival, an explanation took place between Portalis and his colleagues, and they all, Portalis included, went to the King, and declared that if Polignac was appointed they would unanimously resign. I see there is again mention of filling up the situation; the Liberals all want to have Chateaubriand. If he comes in he will make a rumpus; he is violent about the old story of frontiers, and will throw France into any hands that will help her on towards the Rhine.

You are, of course, aware of the understanding between Russia and Prussia, entered into about this time last year, to agree, under certain contingencies, that France should move on to the Rhine, at the expense of Prussia and the Netherlands; that Prussia should be indemnified by taking Saxony, and the King of Saxony be transferred to the Milanese; and that Holland should get some equivalent on her northern frontier. I heard this the other day at Paris, and from a quarter which makes me pretty confident that there is some foundation for the statement. France was cognizant of the undertaking, but declined making herself, specifically or formally, a party to the agreement, wishing to leave her hands free to act according to circumstances.

Sebastiani lectured me one day upon the unfortunate jealousy which all English Governments feel about the aggrandisement of France: he said that an accession of territory towards the Rhine was indispensably necessary to her; that her general

¹ Foreign Minister.

interests led her to cultivate an alliance with England; and what a pity it was for both that this confounded jealousy of ours should oppose obstacles to a good understanding, or tend to drive France into the arms of Russia, whom it was so much to the real interest of France to watch and control.

The Duke of Cumberland has been doing all he possibly could to thwart the Government and prevent emancipation; and nothing could have foiled him but the absolute impossibility of making any Government that would stand one day upon the principle of resistance. In the Lords they might indeed do with Eldon, Colchester, Mansfield, Sidmouth, and some others; but in the Commons it would be perfectly impossible. The Speaker is the only man in the whole House fit for a Cabinet office who is not pledged the other way.

Notwithstanding this, however, on Sunday, the 1st of March, next before the Thursday on which Peel proposed his measure, I went down to Strathfieldsaye to meet the judges; and at *three* on Monday morning the Chancellor arrived from Windsor to tell the Duke that the King had changed his mind, and would not consent to the measure being brought forward. He remained with the Duke till six in the morning, when he set off for London, where he was to be in the Court of Chancery at ten. The Duke went off at eight for Windsor, and gave in his resignation. The King did not refuse it, but took time to consider of it: the Duke, Peel, and Lyndhurst went down to the King again on the Wednesday, and returned to town to dine at Bathurst's, without having been able to bring the King to reason; and they summoned a Cabinet for ten the next morning—that is, for Thursday, the day the measure was to be brought forward—in order to consider how they were to announce to Parliament that they were out, and the whole thing up; but at seven that evening the Duke received the King's surrender, which he wrote on Wednesday night before he went to bed. It is quite clear that neither Canning nor any other minister could, *this year*, have done the thing, because nothing has brought the King to agree to it but his being checkmated by having no other move left upon the board. If Canning had now been alive, and the Duke and Peel available, the King would have taken them; and in that case they would perhaps have supported him in making a government upon the principles of delay and postponement.

Stanhope Street ; Sunday, June 14, 1829.

My dear William,—You have been an excellent correspondent of late, and in return I send you a copy of my speech on foreign affairs,¹ and one which I wish you to present from me to Lord Heytesbury. I have had many civil things said to me about it; and even the friends of the Government, who think it too strong an attack, have spoken well of the speech itself. I thought it would be very unfortunate if the session was allowed to pass away without anybody making any comments upon the course of policy pursued by the Government in our foreign relations; and as the Whigs were too coquetting with the Treasury Bench to do so, it fell to my lot to make the move. My objects were, first, to put on record my own opinions, both now and when I was in the Cabinet; secondly, to excite public attention to these matters a little; and, thirdly, to let the Government see that they were not to suppose that they could have their own way entirely in foreign affairs; and that, however incompetent the individual might be who broached the subject, yet when once the stone was set a-rolling, it would acquire a force which did not belong to the first mover. I had taken measures to insure these matters being touched upon also in the French Chambers, because that was the way to stir up the French Government to more active feelings about them; and I trust that some good may be the result: at all events, there can be no harm done.

What will happen here at home as to ministerial arrangements nobody can guess; some changes seem inevitable. The Government is wretchedly weak in the House of Commons, and would be out-debated in a moment if questions were to arise in which the Whigs chose vigorously to attack them. Peel is the only good speaker they have, and he has lost much of his weight in the House from the ill-will which the Anti-Catholics still bear him for changing on the Catholic Question. Fitzgerald is a clever ready-fighting speaker, but not a favourite with the House; Goulburn is very indifferent. Murray can hardly speak at all in debate, and Herries is entirely mute. The friends of the Government feel the necessity of additional strength to it in the Commons, but the difficulty will be to know how to get it. I do not think the Duke would like to take us back again as a party; and individually I doubt any of us joining him, because we would then

¹ Made on June 1.

have no security against being obliged to concur in measures which we disapprove. What he would best like himself would be to get in some of the rising Whigs, who would fight for him in debate, and, from their youth, give way to him in Council. But that, again, is not so easy, and every step in advance towards the Whigs widens the breach between him and his old Tories. In the meantime the King has not forgiven his ministers, and would be glad to throw them over if he could see how to do so. Cumberland does not know what to be at; he wishes for revenge on the Duke, but not the accession of the Whigs to power. I believe he would like to see a Government consisting of our party and the old Tories—a thing impossible for many reasons. The best Government that could be made would be one composed by a union of Huskisson and Lansdowne; in short, the Government of Goderich, with a better head and some changes, omitting Herries and some subordinates.

All this, however, is mere moonshine; the Duke is fully resolved to remain minister as long as his health will allow him to do so; and, if he only follows the same principles in his foreign policy which he has in his domestic, there is nothing to prevent him from holding on. In home matters he has yielded up his own opinions and wishes to necessity and public opinion; he found that he could not carry on the Government of the country without yielding the Catholic Question, and he immediately surrendered that point. Public opinion has not touched foreign affairs, but these have hitherto been left as *carte blanche* to the unscrutinized discretion of the Government. Whenever public opinion applies itself to foreign affairs—which it will certainly do next session—the Duke will give way upon that point also, and by so doing will retain his power.

I am sorry there has been so much abstinence and apathy on these topics this session, because if the screw had been strongly applied this spring, it would have had its effect upon the policy of our Government about Russia, Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, in the course of this summer; and might have prevented them doing things which when done become irrevocable, and have impelled them to do others which, when the opportunity is gone by, can never afterwards be done. I heard by accident the other day a strong proof how entirely the Duke's acquiescence in Catholic relief was a bending to necessity, and not a change of opinion. A Catholic gentleman applied to him lately to be placed in the Commission of the Peace, but though the man was perfectly respectable and eligible, and a

landed proprietor, the Duke refused him because he was a Catholic; not indeed assigning that reason to him—to whom he merely said that no appointments could be made—but having stated that reason to another person whom he consulted as to the character and circumstances of the applicant.

There have been strange stories current within the last few days of malpractices of the Chancellor that are said to have come to light—the receipt of money from suitors. I do not believe them.¹

I shall go to Ireland for a month some time in the autumn, and may perhaps run over to Paris for three weeks before Parliament meets. I shall probably stay here in town till the latter end of August. London is by far the best place to read in; in the country one is tempted to be out all day, and especially so at one's own home.

Stanhope Street : July 15, 1829.

I am glad to find that the advantage gained by Diebitch over the Vizier was even more considerable than was at first supposed. The sooner the Turks get well thrashed in pitched battle, the sooner they will agree to reasonable terms of peace, and it is only by making peace quickly that they can save their Danube fortresses, and if those are once taken it may not be so easy for them to get them back again, and it is quite certain that England never will spend a single shilling for this purpose.

The Duke of Cumberland stays here and has sent for his Duchess and son. This will annoy the Duke of Wellington, because Cumberland is determined to get him out if he can, and by being on the spot and with the King constantly he has it in his power to blow into a flame every little difference between the King and the Government.

The Monday before Parliament was prorogued Cumberland went over to the King and advised him to object to any paragraph in the proposed speech which might convey an opinion that the settlement of the Catholic Question had been a good thing, and accordingly when the Council met that day, and the Duke showed the King the draft of the speech, the King struck out a whole paragraph about the Catholic Question, and obliged the Duke of Wellington to go back and frame a new paragraph such as you saw, only expressing a hope and no opinion. The

¹ Lord Lyndhurst met these charges in open court, and they were proved to be an injustice done to his character by those who could not dispute his abilities.

King and Cumberland consider this as a victory over the Government, and as giving the King the upper hand with them, and proving that if he only resists them they will give way. They will not, however, do so upon all things.

In the meantime, however, matters at home are in a state in which they can hardly remain; but probably the Duke will wait till affairs take a decided turn in the East, in Portugal, and in France, before he thinks of any fresh arrangements for his Government. Polignac expects to be taken into the Government, and says that he is not afraid of the responsibility, and that the only way is to be stout and determined and to *terrasser* one's opponents. If he acts upon this system he will *terrasser* himself in a very short time. That system will not do in France unless he could abolish the Constitution, and it is now happily too late for such a man as Polignac to think of accomplishing a change like that. Madame d'Escars is come over, probably in the hope of helping Polignac and his party with our King, but she has failed as yet in getting more than an hour's audience in London, instead of being invited down to the Lodge at Windsor. She says, 'Que le bon Dieu me le pardonne, mais pour vous avouer la vérité, j'adore le Duc de Wellington.' This got abroad to the King, and as he by no means partakes in that worship, did not much please him.

The two or three letters just given, from January till July, 1829, go naturally over some of the ground which had been previously traversed in the 'Journal.' But they are not the less interesting. We see from that of January 7, how little even so close an observer of events as Lord Palmerston foresaw the Duke of Wellington's real intentions as to the Catholic claims within a few weeks of the meeting of Parliament. It is curious also to read an account of the city of Paris forty years ago—with its streets like the model of a sea after a storm; and the Duke of Wellington's letter to Charles X., recommending Prince Polignac, if the story as related is correct, is no unimportant fact in the Duke's biography. The allusions in March and June to the two speeches—one on Catholic Emancipation and the other on Portuguese affairs—convey a right impression of the effect they produced.

Alas! the brilliant prophecies then made as to Ireland have not been verified; for although the Catholic disabilities were removed, the spirit which had established them on the one side and resisted them on the other still remained; and up to this day there seems a difficulty in persuading those most interested in its welfare, that if you wish to govern Ireland as a statesman, you must not govern it as a sectarian, nor debate every political question with the predominant idea that you are dealing with the Protestant, the Catholic, or the Dissenter. It is this controversial feeling which poisons the Irish atmosphere; and until laws shall have changed manners, we must not expect to see any practical benefit from laws. But the glowing words of the orator were not chilled by any vision of distrust.

I cannot sit down [said Lord Palmerston] without expressing the satisfaction I feel, in common with the nation at large, at the determination which the Government has at last adopted to give peace to Ireland. The measure now before us will open a career of happiness to that country which for centuries it has been forbidden to taste, and to England a prospect of commercial prosperity and national strength which has never yet been recorded in our annals. The labours of the present session will link together two classes of the community which have long been dissevered; they will form in history the true mark which is to divide the shadow of morning twilight from the brilliant effulgence of the risen sun; they will form a monument, not of the crime or ambition of man, not of the misfortunes or convulsions of society, but of the calm and deliberate operation of benevolent wisdom watching the good of the human race; and we ought to be proud to be employed on an act which will pass down to the latest posterity as an object of their respect, gratitude, and admiration.

A smile may play over the lips of the incredulous critic who reads these romantic sentences. But it is only through the alternate process of enthusiasm and disappointment that the visions of hope ripen into realities, and the day may yet come when, as the states-

man of another generation foretold, the names of those who wrote the first pages in the history of reform in Ireland may be placed high amongst the far-seeing patriots of their country and the enlightened benefactors of mankind. At all events, at the time Lord Palmerston spoke he expressed in glowing words the sentiments on Catholic Emancipation common among the cultivated classes of his day, and this made him popular with those classes.

His speech in June on Portuguese affairs—which also touched towards the conclusion on foreign affairs generally—was not only composed with great care, both as to style and argument, but was singularly well delivered and in a tone which happily combined conversation with declamation. Lord Palmerston, in fact, never stood so high as an orator, until his famous Pacifico speech, as he stood at that moment. He was spoken of as the rival of Peel, and the preference was generally given to his style of eloquence.

His language respecting Don Miguel was universally echoed by the public mind; for all classes—cultivated and uncultivated—feel a spontaneous horror for the despoiler of the child and the traitor to his word. Don Miguel was both. He had with unexampled treachery installed himself on the throne which he had acknowledged to belong to his niece, and suppressed the liberties that he had solemnly pledged himself to consolidate and protect. Common belief at that time accredited the accusation that the British ministry favoured the usurper, although the young Queen whose sceptre he had seized was still treated and received at our Court as the sovereign of Portugal.

It is but justice to observe, that no man was so little likely to patronize disloyalty as the soldier-statesman who made honour and duty the guides of his life. Our great captain, however, was a man, and not without some of the small feelings of men in general. He had never pardoned Mr. Canning for the exclusive credit which he had obtained by his eloquence for the famous

expedition of 1826. He had already, when the Caningites were in his Cabinet, declared—on withdrawing our troops from Portugal—that they had been sent to Lisbon in consequence of international obligations, and not in manifestation of any particular opinion. But, in his zeal to prove this more conspicuously, he went beyond the line which a nice appreciation of English feeling would have prescribed; and by an ostentatious parade of neutrality created a suspicion as to his not being really neutral.

It must be confessed also that appearances justified this suspicion. Don Miguel had been allowed to take forcible possession of Madeira; Donna Maria was not allowed to strengthen her garrison at Terceira: true, in one case the troops were sent from Portugal, where Don Miguel was for the moment supreme; in the other, it was proposed to send reinforcements from England, where Donna Maria was a guest and a stranger; but the public mind did not go into these particulars, nor consider what might have been the consequences of an opposite line of conduct; it saw the Duke of Wellington acting against a constitutional sovereign and permitting a tyrant to extend his authority; and the nation's heart went with Lord Palmerston when he thus expressed himself:—

The civilised world rings with execrations upon Miguel, and yet this destroyer of constitutional freedom—this breaker of solemn oaths—this faithless usurper—this enslaver of his country—this trampler upon public law—this violator of private rights—this attempter of the life of helpless and defenceless women, is, in the opinion of Europe, mainly indebted for the success which has hitherto attended him to a belief industriously propagated by his partisans, and not sufficiently refuted by any acts of the British Government, that the Cabinet of England looks upon his usurpation with no unfriendly eye.

Their steady refusal to interfere in cases in which their interference would have been prejudicial to Don Miguel has been contrasted with their promptitude and vigour to interfere when their interference was subservient to his projects.

This attack upon Don Miguel, however severe, was in nowise an exaggeration of the general feeling respecting him; nor will it appear exaggerated or extraordinary now; but that which will appear extraordinary to many who knew Lord Palmerston in after years as the most staunch protector of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the most resolute opponent of Russian ambition, is the fervour with which at this time he advocated the interests of Greece, and the indifference with which he seemed to regard the advance of a Russian army towards Constantinople.

The Morea [he said] has indeed been cleared of the Turks. I wish that the arms of England had had a more direct and prominent share of that honourable exploit. France will hold the first, England only the second place.

Much, however, that the reader has been perusing sufficiently explains our complicated position at that time. We were parties to a treaty with Russia for establishing the practical independence of Greece, though for some time the form to be given to that independence was uncertain. We were undoubtedly not parties with Russia in her war against Turkey, and we were generally anxious, if we could not prevent, to limit the effects of that war. But it has been seen that from the commencement of the Duke's first administration there were two distinct parties in his Cabinet, the one more especially desirous to see the treaty respecting Greece fulfilled, the other more especially desirous to prevent Turkey from being seriously enfeebled by a dangerous invader.

Lord Palmerston was evidently at this time amongst the first;—a generous champion of the country which had inherited so great a name and undergone so many humiliations. At the same time he saw and pointed out how unfriendly a part England was playing for the Turks, if she in any way by her acts or language backed them up in their stubborn resistance to Russian demands.

If the British Government [he proceeded to say] balancing between a wish to assist Turkey, and an inability to find any pretence for doing so, have, by the ambiguity and mixed character of their language, allowed her to deceive herself, or to be deceived by others, as to what she is to expect from England; and if they have thereby been instrumental in encouraging her resistance to a wise accommodation: then, indeed, they will have incurred a responsibility which I should be sorry to share.

He did not, however, believe that any temporary success of the Russian arms would effect any great or permanent diminution of the Sultan's power. The Russian march, indeed, though victorious, had rather shown the weakness than the strength of that mysterious empire—invulnerable on the defensive, but crippled in an attack by an administration so corrupt and incapable that it can palsy the valour of a soldiery that rarely retreats, and the vigour of an ambition that never wearies. Russia, besides, had pledged herself at the commencement of her campaign not to make any extensive conquests; and an attempt to evade this pledge would have been resisted by a league too powerful to fear resistance.

On the other hand, the idea which Lord Palmerston denounced in the House of Commons,—viz., that 'of creating a Greece which should contain neither Athens, nor Thebes, nor Marathon, nor Salamis, nor Plateæ, nor Thermopylæ, nor Missolonghi, which should exclude from its boundaries all the most inspiring records of national achievements, whether in ancient or modern times'—was sufficiently illiberal and unnatural to induce all generous minds to rejoice at any event that might thwart its accomplishment. This Philhellenism, however, on the part of Lord Palmerston is worth noticing, because it shows his original propensity, and that the policy he subsequently pursued was not caused by preconceived prejudices founded on traditions or by indifference to the emancipation of the Christian races, but by the results of practical experience, and a conviction formed as to the possibilities of the moment and

the immediate interests of England. It may indeed be here observed, that Lord Palmerston—though generally desirous to keep England on the side of liberal opinions and very scrupulous as to fidelity to treaties—had not any general system of policy relative to foreign states. His notion was that every question should be treated on its own merits, without regard to the actual alliances it might dissolve, or the future dangers it might provoke.

The letter of June 14 spoke of returning to Paris towards the end of the year; and nothing, perhaps, in the correspondence so freely drawn from is more interesting than the three or four letters now introduced. The French king and his ministers, by their arbitrary counsels, were paving the way for the revolution which, in a few months, was to drive the elder branch of the Bourbons off the throne of France.

Paris, Hôtel de Rivoli, Rue Rivoli : Dec. 4, 1829.

My dear William,—I arrived here on Sunday morning at eight o'clock, not having stopped to sleep on the road; it is too much trouble to do so, and the roads were so heavy and ratty that one felt that if one did not keep moving one would never get to Paris. The weather has been mild, but the sky enveloped generally in a grey mist, very like London and its neighbourhood. I have got, however, what I think a very nice apartment; it is in the Hôtel de Rivoli, looking south, over the open part of the Tuileries Gardens, so that my opposite neighbours are the houses on the other side of the Seine; and as my room is not much higher than the top of the Monument, the labour of ascending to and descending from it is considerable; but then, in consequence of this elevation, the sun does not set for me till half an hour after he has taken leave of the inhabitants of the *rez-de-chaussée*; and as I have whatever is to be seen of him all day long, the rooms are warm and cheerful.

The public excitement continues unabated, but it seems pretty evident that the ministry must yield and go out, either when the Chambers meet, or before. Their only chance of staying in was by a *coup d'état*, that is, by exertions of prerogative to alter the laws without consent or concurrence of the Chambers, and by supporting these exertions by armed force. This

was what Labourdonnaye wanted, but Polignac and others demurred; Polignac was for management and waiting, by means of the priests, Labourdonnaye for using force. The latter sneeringly said, three of his *gens d'armes* were worth more than a dozen Jesuits: these bickerings led to their separation, but the final rupture turned upon Polignac's appointment as President of the Council, that is to say, Prime Minister.

When there is no President each minister is responsible for his own department, and the King or Dauphin acts as President. When a President exists, he takes the King's pleasure whenever he pleases, with or without his colleagues, upon all matters; in short, he is what our Duke chooses to be. Labourdonnaye, feeling himself an abler man than Polignac, and with more personal followers in the Chambers, thought that as long as there was no President he might gradually become the leading member of the Government; and, accordingly, when he came in, he stipulated that there should be no President. When, however, he and Polignac began to differ, the latter thought the best way of getting his troublesome colleague out, or of keeping him down while he stayed in, was to have himself invested with the authority of President. As soon as this was announced as about to be, Labourdonnaye declared it was a breach of compact, and he must resign. His party, consisting of about thirty members, will of course oppose the Government, like Knatchbull and the Eldonites in our Parliament.

As soon as Labourdonnaye was gone the rest began to consider whether a *coup d'état* was feasible; and they bethought themselves of an *ordonnance* that should alter the law of election by giving votes to Government *employés* and to military officers on half-pay of a certain standing, independently of any qualification of property, which would reduce the age of admissibility to the deputies from forty to thirty years, and should modify the law of equal inheritance. This plan was, however, resisted by Chabrol, by Haussey, Minister of Marine, and by a third, and abandoned; and, to make sure of its defeat, it is supposed that these Cabinet objectors let out the secret; for on one and the same day all the newspapers were full of the project, and of denunciations against it. Thus, then, by the retreat of Labourdonnaye, and the relinquishment of this *ordonnance*, it is decided that the Government do not dare to attempt violence; a majority in the Chambers, if ever possible, is out of the question with Labourdonnaye and the Ultra-Royalists against them; and therefore, though Polignac still swaggers, and the King knits his brows

and clenches his fist, and talks of what he will do on foot and on horseback, and how the first Revolution was the child of the weakness of Louis XVI., and a second shall never spring from the weakness of Charles X., yet still, nevertheless, it is as certain as the return of the last comet, that either before the meeting or soon after it away will go the present ministry, and a Liberal one will succeed. What that Liberal one will be nobody but Mr. Moore, the Almanacker, can positively predict; but it is generally thought here that it will consist of Martignac, Hyde de Neuville, Pasquier, perhaps Chateaubriand, and people of that sort; and it seems not impossible that Polignac may be kept in, in a less important situation, by way of giving the Government a hold upon the King. However, all this will be settled in an amiable manner, and there is no earthly possibility, or rather probability, of revolution or convulsion; *although if the King were, for the first time in his life, to carry his obstinacy up to the very hour of trial instead of dropping it, as he always has done hitherto, the night before; and if he was backed by a courageous and desperate ministry who were mad enough to bear the storm, not of public, but of national feeling, then and in that case the result would probably be a change of name in the inhabitant of the Tuileries, and the Duke of Orleans might be invited to step over the way from the Palais Royal; but as to any other change, it is out of the question. There are too many millions of proprietors of land and funds in France to let it be possible that anything should happen endangering the safety of either one property or the other.*

The army, however, would not support the Government in any violent proceedings; they themselves say they cannot reckon upon the army, and can only rely on the Garde Royal; the tribunals too, to whom in the first instance appeal would be made in any dispute between the Government and the people, though not actually inspired with the devotion of martyrdom, are still disposed to do their duty, as they proved by a judgment the other day upon the editors of some newspapers. These editors had been accused by the Government of publishing, with remarks, the 'Association Bretonne,' or resolutions not to pay taxes if the Government imposed them illegally. The charge was, that these observations tended to bring the Government into hatred and contempt, and to attack the just prerogative of the King; the verdict was, that the editors ought to be punished for even supposing that the Government could do so wicked an act as to attempt to levy taxes without the consent of the Chambers

according to the *Charter*; thus the sentence against the editors was a slap at the Government. In the meanwhile public attention is riveted to home politics, and people think no more of foreign affairs than we did last year while the Catholic question was pending; excepting always, that they still find time to talk about the Duke and the English Government for having brought upon France all this confusion and turmoil to serve foolish purposes of the English Cabinet, in which, after all, they have been disappointed. It seems, however, that Metternich was true to his double policy to the very last moment, and that up to the very signature of the Treaty of Adrianople he was writing to urge the Sultan to resist and hold out till winter, and promising then to make a coalition to support him before spring. The Turk, however, thought he had been bamboozled too long; and when he found what a scrape he had been brought into by listening to Metternich and waiting for his help, became furious.

There are quantities of English here, scattered about the town; and the hotels are so full that I wandered nearly two hours about the streets before I could locate myself to my satisfaction. There is not much alteration in the town since last year, excepting that *trottoirs* are gradually creeping on in most of the principal streets; but you meet with them, like the houses in Washington city, dotted about here and there in little patches widely separated by immense blank intervals.

Paris: Dec. 9, 1829.

The existence of the administration here is drawing rapidly to a close, and it seems highly probable that considerable changes will take place before another week has elapsed. In a Council a few days ago, upon some remark of the King as to some of the many difficulties they have to encounter, Courvoisier is said to have broken out, and to have declared that there was no use in attempting any longer to deceive themselves or his Majesty as to the state of affairs; that it was impossible the ministry could go on. Public opinion was against them, the press was against them, the Chambers were against them, all France was against them, and it was impossible they could stand. Polignac was amazed and furious, and was beginning to reply and explain, when the King cut the matter short and said, 'Since it seems, gentlemen, that you yourselves feel you cannot go on, or at least cannot agree together, I must take other measures, and send for somebody else.' It is said he then sent for Roy, who

was formerly Minister of Finance, and that Roy has for some days been in negotiation with different people endeavouring to make arrangements. The persons he communicated with were Martignac, Chateaubriand, Pasquier, &c. Martignac declared he would have nothing to do with the Government unless it was distinctly understood with the King, that those who are responsible for what is done should be allowed to do what they think best so long as the King may choose to keep them. Chateaubriand did not choose to take the post of upper school-master, or chief of the department of Public Instruction, which was proposed to him. Pasquier, I fancy, made no objections to any place that might be given him. The King demurred somewhat as to Martignac's theory of government, and moreover insisted upon keeping Polignac, to which arrangement, again, Martignac and Company vehemently objected, though it was said last night that they had been mollified on that point. The King hates Pasquier upon some personal grounds of offence, and abhors Chateaubriand as a renegade from Toryism; and wants Polignac as a *Herries* in the Cabinet, while the others object to him precisely in that capacity, not liking to have an avowed reporter at all their daily discussions. I dined at Polignac's the day before yesterday; there were forty people and more, and in the evening a large reception, fully attended. I thought Polignac was looking singularly beaten and cast down; but his *soirée* was attended by people of all colours. I sat between two charming Tory French country gentlemen, whose notions of things in general, and abhorrence of any change, reminded me greatly of some of my friends in England.

The illness of Nicholas has caused great sensation here, and alarm among the friends of peace and quiet in Europe. It is quite astonishing how every Frenchman you meet raves about '*nos frontières*,' and declares he would cut off his two hands to get back the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees as boundaries; all this, however, is mere froth and vanity; and while they have Chambers who must levy taxes to carry on a war, nothing but egregious folly on our part can bring on a war between the two countries. Wilmot Horton is here, indefatigably hammering at emigration, and writing his shorthand scribe down to a skeleton. Our weather is cold, but the frost is nothing to compare with that of last January. I saw a letter from Bologna, saying the Apennines were covered with snow; and *Soracte alia nive candidum*, and the post had been interrupted for some days between Bologna and Florence.

I wonder whether the word 'Private' will move the curiosity of the French Post Office to open and read this letter.

Paris: Dec. 15, 1829.

The change of ministry, which was expected ten days ago, went off in smoke, and the present people remain till the Chambers turn them out—which they are sure to do. The negotiations of Roy failed; none of the Liberals would serve with Polignac, and the King would not give Polignac up; so on the King's return from Compiègne it was announced that Polignac was to continue. Violent measures are therefore again talked of, and *Polignac is a man likely to try them*; he is bold, obstinate, and determined. A man who has passed ten years in prison becomes either broken or hardened; he is the latter—he makes it also a matter of conscience and religion. If the King is as firm as his minister there will be trouble in France; but there is every reason to hope he will not be, and will give in. The King is reported to have said at Compiègne, that the Government could never be without a majority as long as he supported them, '*car la majorité c'est le Roy.*' This maxim has been well attacked in the papers. The report of the day is, that the Government mean to issue proclamations changing the law of election, suspending the liberty of the press, and declaring the judges removeable at pleasure; and then to dissolve the Chambers. *But all this would not do; the public feeling is too strong, and the army is too decidedly Liberal to make it possible to carry through such a system; and if attempted it must end in the retirement of Charles X.* It is quite certain that Austria has promised to lead, in case of need, an army of observation into Piedmont and Sardinia, to back up this Government and repress any rising; but this is preposterous. The mere entrance of an Austrian regiment would raise a flame all through France, and kindle a war of revolution all over Europe; they never will set foot within the frontier.

Russia has, on the contrary, declared her anxious desire for the maintenance of those institutions which were established under the auspices of Alexander; and Prussia would probably side with Russia. It is to be hoped, however, that matters will not come to this, and that the legitimate means of resistance which the present Constitution gives will be sufficient to enable the French to upset their Government quietly and without convulsion; and I am quite sure that not one in a thousand wishes for anything more than a rationally Liberal Government.

Some of the royalists whom one meets in society talk like fools and madmen : *il nous faut de la force, d'abord de la force, et puis on peut être raisonnable à loisir* ; but when you ask them how their force is to be applied, and against what, they cannot tell you ; but they say a free press is not applicable to France, and that it must be put down ; that public opinion does not exist, except as far as it is created by the journals, and if these could be got rid of the Government might be sure of the tribunals, and the army, and the electors, and the House of Peers—all stuff.

I have been to hear some interesting lectures of Dupin, and Villemain, and Guizot ; the first, upon the State of Industry and Wealth in the nations of the earth ; the second, on the Progress of Modern Languages ; the third, on the Progress of Civilisation in Europe. These lectures are given twice or thrice a week, are open to the public, gratis, and are attended by many hundred persons, and must have a great effect in enlightening the public mind. The professors are paid by the Government, but are entirely Liberal in their doctrines.

There are certain epochs in which the atmosphere of Europe, so to speak, seems to change—in a manner similar to that in which by modern contrivances the atmosphere is refreshed and renewed in our apartments. The old air, long pent up within narrow limits, and which has lost its life and vivacity, passes out on one side, and is replaced from another by fresh air, which the lungs receive and breathe out more freely than that from which they are delivered.

The first visible sign of this change is generally in writers and orators—in men of genius who seem to catch by intuitive sympathy the impressions which are germinating around them.

From 1820 to 1830 there was manifestly one of these epochs. In 1827 neither Mr. Canning nor M. de Chateaubriand were the Canning or Chateaubriand of earlier years. They had not abjured their former doctrines. Mr. Canning was still an anti-reformer, and M. de Chateaubriand was still a royalist ; but they no longer represented the parties of which ‘opposition to parliamentary reform,’ and ‘fidelity to the crown’

had been the watchwords. The circumstances of the times had created new questions, on which they had taken the popular side; and, lit up by the brilliant influence of their talents, these new questions had become conspicuous, whilst the old had ceased to be so. It is singular that in France, as in England, the main conflict of the moment was on matters connected with religion, and that in both countries the Conservatives were overborne in those battles which they attempted to fight under a theological banner. With the cry of '*À bas les Jésuites!*' the King's faction, the King himself being popular, was overcome in France;—by the general impulse in favour of satisfying the Catholics the Tories were driven from power in England. The contest was apparently against the Catholics in one case, in favour of them in the other. But it was really and truly in both cases for religious liberty. Nor is it amiss to remark how the fortunes of the two nations were influenced by the characters of the two chiefs of the defeated parties—Wellington and Polignac; the one of whom knew how to yield, whilst the other did not know how to resist.

But it is curious to see the soldier employing all his credit to prevent a civil war, which would have called forth his talents; and to find the civilian exercising all his influence to provoke a conflict, which proved his incapacity.

We know the result; it was that which Lord Palmerston had so sagaciously foretold. But though the catastrophe which occurred at Paris was one calculated to heighten esteem for the prudence which had directed the counsels of St. James's, the Conservative party could not be so violently overthrown on the opposite side of the Channel without its being shaken very rudely on this side.

The Duke of Wellington perceived this, and resolved to make sacrifices to persons if he could maintain principles; for he was honestly attached to the ancient constitution of England, and saw in its alteration a

social as well as a political transformation, which he condemned with the mind of a man bred up in ideas altogether different from those then coming into fashion.

The following extract from Lord Palmerston's autobiography, and a letter to his brother, will relate the steps which were taken to obtain support :—

In July, 1830, an overture was made to Melbourne from the Duke to join the Government, and he was given to understand that no objection would be made to Grant and myself. His answer was, that he could not join without Huskisson and Lord Grey. The Duke's reply was, that he might perhaps consent to take back Huskisson, but that he could not act with Lord Grey, who had spoken of him in such unmeasured terms both in Parliament and private.

Huskisson died September, 1830. At the end of September I received a letter from Lord Clive, dated from Powis Castle, saying he had been requested by the Duke of Wellington to propose to me to return to the Cabinet, and that he (Lord Clive) was coming purposely to speak to me on the subject, and would come either to Broadlands or London, according to a letter which he begged me to write to him to Salisbury.

I was just starting for London when I received this letter, and appointed Clive to meet me in Stanhope Street, but said that in no case could I join the Duke's Government singly. Clive called at Apsley House with my letter before he came to me, and was desired by the Duke to ask who were my friends. I said the friends with whom I was politically acting were Melbourne and Grant; but that, to say the truth, I should be unwilling, and I believed they would be so too, to join the Duke unless Lansdowne and Grey were to form part of his Government. We knew that we differed on many points with those who were then in office, and we could have no security that our opinions would have due weight unless Grey and Lansdowne were in the Cabinet. Clive protested against this as an unreasonable demand, amounting to a surrender on the part of the Duke; but said that there would be no objection to Melbourne and Grant, and that Goderich was understood to be a friend of mine, and would be taken in also if we liked. I said I had not lately had any political communication with Goderich, and could not by any means consider him as an equivalent for Grey and Lansdowne.

To cut the matter short, and to avoid further communica-

tions, I set off immediately for Paris, to spend the fortnight previous to the meeting of Parliament.

Stanhope Street : Friday, October 9, 1830.

My dear William,—I have heard nothing more from the Duke, but from others I hear that there is an intention of proposing to me Melbourne, Grant, and Goderich. I do not think this would do ; Goderich would be of no more use to us than Dudley was. He would give way to the Duke, and his concession would make our scruples appear like obstinacy and cabal. The more I think of the state of parties in and out of the House of Commons, and the state of affairs in Europe, the more I feel it would be necessary to have some men in who, either by their personal weight or party connections, were of sufficient importance to deter the Duke from lightly risking the turning of them out again. With respect to us, he is playing over again the game of January, 1828. He wants us, to help him to go on ; and if by-and-by, when he has got on by our aid, he should be able to stand alone, he would get rid of us again with as little ceremony as before. In the meantime I think it would be very useful to me to spend a week at Paris and that I should pick up there in a few days much information important at the present moment.

The affairs of Belgium make an important crisis, and other things in prospect occupy the Cabinets of Europe. I believe the fact to be that Russia, Austria, and Prussia want England to join in a new alliance to put down revolutions and curb France. That France on the other hand wants England to come to a fair understanding with her upon terms mutually advantageous to both parties, or rather, consistent with a due regard to their mutual interests. Between these two the Duke has to choose, and he wants parliamentary strength to enable him to take the first-mentioned alternative. The consequence of which would soon be a second edition of the French war.

The Journal then continues :—

A few days after my return from Paris I got a note from the Duke, asking me to step to him at Apsley House. I went immediately. He said he wished to speak to me on the subject on which Lord Clive had seen me—that he had understood that I had talked about friends, and he wished to know who were my friends. I said as before, Melbourne and Grant, but that even with them I should be disinclined to enter unless his Cabinet was to be reconstructed. He said that he thought that for

Melbourne and Grant he could find room, but that it was not so easy to get people out of a Cabinet as to put them in; and as to a larger change of his Cabinet, that did not enter into his intentions, and would be attended with too many difficulties.

I said on leaving him—which I did at the end of the six minutes which our interview occupied—that what I had intended to say was, that I was flattered by his proposal, and was obliged to him for it, but that it would not suit me to join him unless he meant to reconstruct his administration, and that I purposely abstained from mentioning the names of any persons whom I might have in view in saying so.

Croker called on me a few days afterwards, to try to persuade me to reconsider the matter. After talking for some time, he said: 'Well, I will bring the question to a point. Are you resolved or are you not to vote for Parliamentary Reform?' I said, 'I am.' 'Well, then,' said he, 'there is no use in talking to you any more on this subject. You and I, I am grieved to see, will never sit again on the same bench together.'

Melbourne, the two Grants, Binning, Littleton, Graham, Warrender, Denison, and one or two others, had met at my house a few days before to consider what we should do on the motion that Brougham was to make in favour of Parliamentary Reform, and I and the Grants and Littleton had quite determined to vote for it.

As soon as Lord Grey was commissioned to form a Government he sent to me.

Thus the total failure of the negotiation with the Duke turned, as it would appear, on Lord Palmerston's declaration that he should vote for reform in Parliament. It was not of course known what reform, but the declaration was sufficient to show that the colours of the Canningites were changed with the times. They came into power with the Whigs, and were confounded with them ever after. Lord Palmerston was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. A short note written to his brother-in-law characteristically manifests the situation of a man plunging for the first time into that laborious department, the Foreign Office.

Stanhope Street: December 22, 1830.

I send you the note you wish for; I have been ever since my appointment like a man who has plumped into a mill-race,

scarcely able by all his kicking and plunging to keep his head above water.

In closing this period it may not be amiss to remark, that the main endeavour throughout it has been to bring before the reader the man with his individual characteristics. We shall now have before us the statesman who exercised for so many years an important influence on public events, and whose life becomes almost an European history. We shall thus be led into a fuller discussion of European affairs; and it so happens that the first of those affairs is the creation of that prosperous little kingdom, the independence and neutrality of which England has lately manifested its determination to defend.

CHAPTER VII.

CREATION OF THE BELGIAN MONARCHY.

LORD PALMERSTON received the seals of the Foreign Office at a moment when the policy of Europe was assuming a new aspect. The revolution which overturned the Bourbon throne in France affected naturally the course which its occupants had pursued. The Spanish War and the Holy Alliance were the results of a system which was to preserve sovereigns from the control of their people; the triumph of the citizens and the press against the soldiery of Charles X. was the signal of a reaction amongst the people against arbitrary and unpopular sovereigns. On all sides crowns were falling into the gutter. The insurrection by which we were most affected was the Belgian one. We had sufficiently learned the danger and the cost of having to watch, and defend ourselves against, an enemy possessing the long line of coast by which we had been hostilely confronted during the reign of Napoleon. We had desired at his fall to take all possible precautions against being again exposed to similar dangers; and our main object at the Congress of Vienna was to guard the Netherlands from future invasion. We had imagined that we had done so by uniting Holland with Belgium, hoping thus to have created a powerful kingdom, of which we had protected the frontier by fortresses raised under our inspection and in some degree at our expense. A variety of causes, however, had long made the Belgians discontented with a ruler who was one of those clever men who constantly

do foolish things, and one of those obstinate men who support one bad measure by another worse. It was not surprising, therefore, that the events of July at Paris had been echoed in August by a movement at Brussels.

Our Government was very anxious as to the turn which this movement might take. The independence of Belgium was hardly at that moment thought of. The two alternatives that seemed probable were either that it would fall again under the authority of Holland, or that it would be annexed to France. At one moment the Duke of Wellington meditated sending British troops to guard those strong places which we had a right to consider partly ours.

The native troops nowhere could be depended upon; for one of the clever devices of the King of the Netherlands had been to mix Belgians and Dutch in every regiment, so that the colonel never knew in a crisis whether his orders would be obeyed or controverted.

At one moment an arrangement was possible with the Prince of Orange (who had never approved of his father's policy) as Viceroy; but this opportunity being lost, a separation between the two countries became inevitable, and M. Van de Weyer, one of the Provisional Government then sitting in Brussels, started for London, in order to explain the feelings of the Belgian people to the English Government.

Russia offered to maintain the union of the two countries by force of arms in accordance with the treaty arrangements, and she was dissuaded from doing so principally at the request of Great Britain.

It would be impossible to understand the policy which Lord Palmerston pursued in overturning one of the main provisions of the Treaty of Vienna without a thorough knowledge of the circumstances in which that policy originated.

It is, moreover, to be repeated, that with the creation of Belgium commenced a new era in Europe. The first stone in the structure built up by the allies of 1815

was then displaced. From that time it has been year by year falling to pieces. Thus, the event which commenced the work of demolition, whatever its merits, was so serious in its consequences, that it is worth while to inquire whether wisdom or necessity justified it. The facts are as follows :—

In the conference between the ministers of the Allied Powers in 1814, it was agreed as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, but without any previous reference to the citizens of either country, that Holland and Belgium should be united. A protocol was accordingly drawn up, stating the terms of that union. These terms contained eight articles, forming a basis of the strictest impartiality; in conformity with which, Article I. declared that the constitution of Holland should be so modified by common accord as to suit the wants and wishes of the United Provinces.

The constitution thus adopted was not a bad one, and seemed designed to maintain that equality between the government of the northern and southern divisions of the Netherlands kingdom which was the fundamental principle of their union. Some guarantee, however, was necessary for its observance. The best that could be granted was the liberty of the press; and this was accordingly given by an article, which allowed all persons to express their opinions, under the responsibility of answering for such writings as might attack the rights of society, or of an individual. Still the author might ask what security he had that, in exposing any act of ministerial injustice, the meaning of this article should be strictly observed, or not in fact misapplied against him: he was given such a security in the immovability of the judges, as well as in the popular system of their appointment; since every judge was to be chosen from a list of three names presented to the King, either by the Lower Chamber, or by the Provincial States: thus the impartiality that was to administer the laws had two securities—one, the liberty of the press; the other, the independence of the judges.

But it so happened that shortly prior to the publication of this constitution Napoleon returned from Elba, and the King of the Netherlands, under the provisional state of things which then existed, published an *ordonnance* threatening with the severest punishments¹ any who should attempt to pervert the loyal disposition of his subjects. The terms of the *ordonnance* were purposely vague, inasmuch as it was meant to be comprehensive: its effects, therefore, were doubly severe. Still the crisis in the King's affairs was urgent, and if when the circumstances which called for this law had ceased, the law itself had been abolished, its enactment would simply have been one of those arbitrary acts of expediency which extraordinary circumstances may dictate. The vanquished hero, however, fled from Waterloo. He was an exile in the midst of the seas at St. Helena—he died; this law nevertheless remained in existence. It existed and was maintained in practice from 1815 to 1829; and, although enacted for an especial case, and expressly levelled against acts of rebellion and sedition, and such writings as, according to the text pointed out their author as the agent of a foreign Power, it was applied, in the most ordinary times, to every production of the press; so that it became impossible to attack the acts of a minister, or, in short, to express any political opinion whatsoever, without coming within the scope of its oppression.

But where were the judges presented to the King by the Lower Chamber or the Provincial States, and holding their offices during life?

For above thirteen years a provisional judicature was the only one which existed, nor had any other up to 1830 sat in Belgium—a provisional judicature, in which the judges were selected as well as named by the King, and entirely dependent upon his goodwill and pleasure.

Thus the article which conferred the liberty of the

¹ Branding, the galleys, death, &c.

press was rendered null, and the article which regulated the appointment and the existence of the judges was evaded. To pass to another subject.

The taxes of a country should necessarily be upon its means—in proportion to its wealth, not in proportion to its population. Holland was more wealthy than Belgium. If this required any proof, it was found in the fact that the inhabitants of towns, taken at a general estimate, are richer than those of the country, and that this class of population was more numerous in the northern than in the southern provinces of the Netherlands.¹ Besides, when it was asked why Holland should send the same number of deputies to the States-General as Belgium, it was said: 'True, the people of Belgium are the greater number, but the people of Holland are the more wealthy, and property is to be represented as well as population.' If, then, a country ought to be taxed according to its riches, Holland ought to have been more heavily taxed than Belgium; and this, in fact, was at first the case. In 1821, however, the budget (passed for ten years) changed the system of imposition; for taxes upon colonial luxuries (paid by the wealthy and commercial people) were substituted others which pressed upon the poorer and agricultural class. This change is the more remarkable for having introduced into Belgium the odious *Mouture* (or tax on flour), which was the immediate pretext for revolt. It is just, however, to say that the Belgians had already resisted it by every legal means. In the two Chambers out of 72 Belgians, four voted for this tax, 68 against it; while the Dutch were unanimous in its favour. By these and similar practices in 1827, when, since 1821, a general augmentation of four millions of taxes had taken place, Holland was augmented by one million, Belgium by three millions; and in the aggregate of impositions Belgium paid the greater proportion. In this manner

¹ Dutch population, 2,281,789: in towns, 770,691; in the country, 1,511,098. Belgian population, 3,777,735: in towns, 651,341; in the country, 3,126,394.

the poorer country was taxed more heavily than the richer;¹ and this injustice was the more striking, because from all the offices and establishments which Belgium was contributing the more largely to support, the Belgians were to a great extent excluded. Nor was this partiality confined to persons; it extended to localities: Ostend, Ghent, Antwerp—Antwerp, so favoured under the French Empire, and by the natural advantages of its position—received no mark of attention from the Dutch Government. Of various public establishments, the vast majority were in Holland. The military schools were in the north. The supreme council of the nobility was in the north. The chancery of the military order of William was in the north; and—who would think it possible?—the chancery of the order of the Lion of Belgium was in the north too. The administration of the mines also was in Holland, although there is not a single mine in that country. The only public establishment in Belgium, which was placed there after ten years of expectation, was the bank at Brussels. But here the director was a Dutchman, the Secretary was a Dutchman, the chiefs of the different bureaux were Dutchmen, and so on. A table of the different persons in public employment in the year 1829 gives 317 Dutch as against only 80 Belgians:—

One of the articles of the constitution declared ‘That public instruction should be an object of the constant care of the Government.’ So it ought to be of all governments. But who would ever think that this article, so simple in itself, and so natural in its meaning, should ever be construed into the gift of an arbitrary power over the whole education of the kingdom? Such, however, was actually the case. It was commanded that all existing seminaries for education

¹ Nor was this all: the interest of the debt during these six years had been also augmented by above 3,000,000 florins, the capital of which had been chiefly expended in the war in the Dutch colonies, and on the improvement of the dykes and canals of Holland.

should cease within a certain time unless they received the approbation of the King, without which none in future should be established. At least it might have been expected that certain qualifications would be stated for obtaining this approbation. No; it was entirely arbitrary in the King to grant or to withhold it. A distrust was everywhere shown for the Roman Catholic, and a preference for the Protestant religion. In North Brabant, almost entirely Roman Catholic, eight out of eleven inspectors of schools were Protestants; and this was the more remarkable, because under the old system, when these inspectors were chosen by the provincial administration, five out of six inspectors were Roman Catholics. In the other provinces of the north, among all the inspectors there was only one Roman Catholic. So that in the northern provinces, including North Brabant, there were altogether, out of seventy-nine inspectors, five Catholics; and yet these provinces, according to a census in 1815, formed about a third of the whole population. Protestant professors, moreover, German as well as Dutch, were appointed in the universities in the south and were even found in the *Collège Philosophique*, the ostensible object of which was the education of Catholics for the Romish Church. But stronger objections may be made to the assumption of this power than even to the use that was made of it. It was not a casual act of violence proceeding from a temporary cause, and likely to have a mere temporary effect; it was a well-aimed, a long-sweeping blow—the effect of which was to be felt by a future generation.

If other acts of injustice and oppression were not in violation of any express article of the constitution it was because the persons who framed that constitution could hardly have foreseen their possibility. They could hardly have thought it conceivable that the King would commit the most partial act of which he could be guilty—the actual imposition of the language of one part of his subjects on the other—when the system of government he had sworn to observe was that of the

most perfect impartiality. He did, however, positively declare, not only that Dutch should be used in all public documents, but that all persons speaking in the public courts should employ it. The language of society—the language of the bar—the language of a greater portion of the people of all ranks—was French; but this did not signify. It was in vain that a lawyer had consumed the best years of his life in the study of his profession. He was to teach himself a new tongue, or the capital of his labours, his education, was to be wrested from him. Some quitted the bar; others, induced by long habit, still continued at it, but prepared themselves to see the honours, the applause, and the practice they had been accustomed to receive transferred to others so fortunate as to have been born on the north side of the Mordyke. The loss to these persons was not merely that of an honourable livelihood; it is necessary to penetrate our minds with a sense of those higher feelings of pride and ambition which animate men who have reached the head of their profession, in order to appreciate the extent of that injustice which this foolish and tyrannical *ordonnance* inflicted. Still the measure was not full. The minister who urged his master thus headlong to his ruin did not, in the midst of his designs, feel easy respecting his accomplices. He desired to see those whom he employed completely in his power. But how was this to be effected? ‘Nothing so easy,’ said Mr. Van Maanen; and out came a decree which declared that every person who was dismissed from, or who voluntarily quitted office, must have a satisfactory testimonial from the King, without which he was deprived of all his public rights as a citizen. He could neither vote for nor be eligible to the local magistrature or the Chambers.

It was these accumulated griefs, long fomenting in the public mind, which, when the revolution in France gave a stimulus to discontent, produced rebellion. The King, it is true, whose unhappy policy had proceeded from the best intentions, promised that the complaints

that had become too loud not to be heard should be redressed in an extraordinary assembly of the Legislature. But this assembly was to be a joint assembly of the two countries, an assembly that was to meet in Holland, while the greatest number of the Belgian complaints was against the influence of Holland. It was only necessary for the Dutch to vote together, and three or four Belgians to vote with them, in order to legitimatise the refusal of all the Belgian requests.

Such were the facts which severed the two countries, and made it clear that any attempt to re-unite them on their old basis would be unsuccessful.

The problem before the British Foreign Office was how to recognise and satisfy the legitimate aspirations of those who had struck for freedom, while at the same time preventing their aggressive neighbour, towards whom they were drawn by ties of language, religion, and sympathy, from profiting by the movement for her own ambitious purposes. To side with Holland would have been contrary to all the traditions which Palmerston had inherited from Canning. To acquiesce in French aggrandisement would have been little short of national disgrace. How England was represented at this crisis will be shown in some detail, not only because of its historical interest, but because, as history repeats itself, a useful lesson may be learnt from these events, applicable to an analogous state of things existing at this moment in the east of Europe.

Sir Henry Bulwer in his memoir relates that it was at this time, on his return from the Hague, that he first made the acquaintance of Lord Palmerston at a party at Lady Cowper's, and describes his appearance as that of a man in the full vigour of middle age, very well dressed, very good-looking, with the large thick whiskers worn at that time. His air was more that of a man of the drawing-room than of the senate; but he had a clear, short, decisive way of speaking on business which struck the diplomatist. All the questions he put went straight to the point; and one could see

that he was gathering information for the purpose of fortifying opinions. The opinion he had formed was that if we wished to prevent Belgium becoming a French province, we had to contrive a plan for giving it a separate existence.

He had just at this time entered office; Lord Aberdeen quitting it on November 16. Negotiations, however, had already commenced, and a conference between the Great Powers had been established in London, at the request of the King of Holland, who not unnaturally applied to those who had formed his kingdom to maintain it. The cessation of hostilities had also taken place, and was shortly afterwards succeeded by an armistice—the conditions being that the forces of each country should withdraw within the limits they possessed previous to their union. On December 20, 1830, the future independence of Belgium was pronounced by the Great Powers.

The question of the future destiny of Belgium, thus taken up by Europe, was not, however, an easy one, and our own Minister of Foreign Affairs had a peculiar difficulty in assuming it as necessary to dissolve the kingdom which it had been considered one of the triumphs of England in 1814–15 to create.

Holland had many partisans amongst English statesmen, who, imperfectly acquainted with the facts, thought that the recent insurrection in Brussels had been an uncalled-for imitation of that which had taken place in Paris. They said and believed that in abandoning the Dutch we were subordinating ourselves, so to speak, to the French. When they could no longer pretend that the two countries should be subject to the same Government, they still contended that we were partial and unjust in the bases we laid down for their separation; and there was a certain feeling in favour of the Protestant country against the Catholic one which was not altogether to be despised.

It was not, moreover, likely that even if Lord

Palmerston's conduct had been free from all objections, it would have been viewed with unanimous approbation. He was one of those who, when but recently divorced from the Tories, had, by joining the Whigs, made office possible for the last and impossible for the first. Opposed during a long period of his life to Parliamentary Reform, he was now connected with a Cabinet which brought forward a measure of reform that twenty-nine out of thirty of the party he had recently belonged to deemed revolution.

Amongst the most able, the most violent, the most eloquent, and least scrupulous of that party was the gentleman who, it may be remembered, was the last messenger sent by the Duke of Wellington to Lord Palmerston, when, previous to the meeting of Parliament in 1830, the Duke was negotiating for allies; and in a debate, July 12, 1831, Mr. Croker made a violent onslaught on his former friend, accusing him of keeping back papers not only from the House, but from the Conference.

The right honourable gentleman (Mr. Croker) [says Lord Palmerston, in his reply,] had done what in him lay, by provocation, accusation, and, what is worse, exculpation—for I can forgive him anything sooner than his entering into a defence of my conduct—to draw me into a discussion of the whole question. Now instead of entering into those details and those arguments and explanations which must necessarily recall the whole of these transactions—which I have already told the House that, as a minister of the Crown, I think it my duty not to do—I will repeat that it is not my intention to depart from the decision I have already come to; and, in my opinion, the right honourable gentleman might have acted with greater advantage to the interests of the country if he had abstained from introducing the subject. But it seems that, in the absence of the principal performers, he has been to-night allowed a whole benefit to himself. He has given us a display, part tragedy, part comedy, and part tragi-comedy; and I wish I could encourage him by stating that he sustained each portion with equal success. Everybody knows that he is an exceedingly happy joker—happy sometimes in his self-satisfaction; and

while he confines himself to the light and comic strain he makes himself agreeable to everybody ; but he must not attempt too much versatility. He may be a good statesman-of-all-work, but I assure him that he is not a good actor-of-all-work ; and in his attempts at the heroic he is apt to confound pathos with bathos, and to overleap the narrow bounds between the sublime and the ridiculous. I recommend him, therefore, in future, if he wishes to preserve his reputation, to observe the rules laid down in some of his earlier and fugitive productions in the dramatic art—to cease to vex the grander passions of the soul—

To leave high tragedy, and stick to farce !

He will thus yet afford much amusement : if it be not very natural, it will at least be very entertaining.

It would appear that the latter allusions of this passage had specific reference to a certain co-partnership of a literary and satirical character which in previous years had existed between Mr. Croker and Lord Palmerston. For though the latter did not make it so appear in his jocular allusions to certain squibs¹ which had been attributed to the pen of the Tory subordinate officer and political scribe, Croker, in his reply, took care to rectify the omission.

His noble friend had said that he (Lord Palmerston) did not write in newspapers. Such an observation from his noble friend was to him (Mr. Croker) a little surprising, if it meant to imply that, in a moment of relaxation from official business, he would not condescend to employ himself in such an occupation ; and, indeed, the noble lord's friends around him cheered the statement with a vociferation which appeared to imply that the occupation itself was in some degree a degrading one. Now, what he was about to say, he would assure his noble friend he would say in perfect good humour. He would say that if that cheer meant to insinuate that those who wrote for newspapers pursued a degrading occupation (Lord Palmerston

¹ The authors of the *New Whig Guide* were Lord Palmerston, Sir Robert Peel, and Mr. Croker. 'We three,' writes Mr. Croker, 'were the only culprits. I was editor. *The Trial* was Peel's. We each gave touches to the others' contributions, but so slight as not to impair the authorship of any individual article. I do not think Peel wrote any of the verses ; Palmerston wrote very little of the prose. Peel's natural turn was humour, but he was extremely shy of indulging it.'—*MS. Mem. of Mr. Croker.*

nodded dissent. His noble friend signified that he did not share that opinion; and he should not therefore say what he was about to utter. He might be allowed, however, to observe, in reference to this topic, that if any person should hereafter collect those fugitive pieces which had been attributed to him (Mr. Croker)—with what justice the House would be presently able to judge—he repeated, that if such a collection should be made, and that the merit of those pieces should continue to be attributed to him, he should feel it his duty to do justice to his noble friend by declaring that some of the best and most remarkable were his (Lord Palmerston's) own. He remembered well the days which he spent with his noble friend, not certainly in business of the grave importance which now occupied his noble friend's time;—he recalled with pleasure those earlier days, in which they pursued and enjoyed, not indeed the 'search of deep philosophy,' that the poet delighteth to remember, but—

Wit, eloquence, and poesy—

Arts which I loved, for they, my friend, were thine.

The encounter was a graceful and an historical one: it is, however, better to withdraw our attention at this time from Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, and turn to him in Downing Street. His letters from Paris in the year 1829, when he was out of office, show the feeling prevalent amongst many to whom the late revolution had given influence with respect to extending the limits of France. Nothing perhaps could have been more tempting to these persons or to the monarch of the barricades himself than the present state of Europe and the present position of the Low Countries. On the other hand, there were the Northern courts, which, if united with Holland and England, would have felt in no wise indisposed to declare themselves against revolution and against Louis Philippe, and who thought that they had the first general in Europe, a statesman of no small consideration in the British Parliament, on their side. Luckily for Lord Palmerston, he had in London two men able and inclined to help him: M. de Talleyrand—who represented France, and who, though he showed no disinclination to favour French

schemes of aggrandisement whenever he thought a good opportunity for doing so presented itself, was nevertheless persuaded that the one great object which France had at that moment to secure was the English alliance—and a young diplomatist, M. Van de Weyer, who, representing Belgium, combined in a remarkable manner ability with modesty, and ardour with reserve. Thanks to these auxiliaries, to the moderating sagacity of the monarch (named for a time ‘the modern Ulysses’), and to the great name and experienced wisdom of Lord Grey, a crisis was passed over peaceably which might otherwise have affected a past and the present generation.¹

The difficulty of producing order out of chaos was at that time indeed so great, that whoever looks calmly now at the difficulties which a statesman had then to contend with, must be more and more surprised at their having been overcome. There was to decide upon the boundaries of the future States, some of the places naturally belonging to Belgium being still in the hands of the Dutch, and a portion of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg—a country which the King of Holland held, as representing a branch of the House of Nassau under the German Confederation—having taken part in the recent revolution. These boundaries once settled, there was still to settle the navigation of the Scheldt; the division of the debt—the guardianship or demolition of fortresses which Belgium by itself could not adequately defend—the establishment of a republic or the selection of a king—and this with the German sovereigns on one side fearful of the extension of France and the expansion of French principles, and the French people on the other, excited, jealous, ambitious, and under a new Government which had as yet neither an ancient authority nor a newly-acquired prestige.

¹ After the election of King Leopold, another person who exercised a considerable though unostentatious influence over the history of his time was Baron Stockmar, who contributed not a little to smooth away the difficulties along which the independence of Belgium was jolted on to its achievement.

Nor was this all : here was the Dutch nation, proud of its historical renown, smarting under its recent humiliation, governed by a sovereign obstinate by character, and rendered more so by the conviction that right was on his side ;—there the Belgians, inflated by their late triumph, believing that they had it in their power to create a European war if they thought proper, and disposed to use or abuse this power. Under such circumstances the course of negotiation could scarcely run smooth. It had various epochs. The first was the most critical. Revolution had united, as it were, France with Belgium, and the Government with which Louis Philippe's reign commenced was anxious to maintain its popularity in Belgium, without having made up its mind exactly how it should use that popularity.

At this time were proposed by the conference what were styled *les bases de séparation* in twenty-four articles,¹ accepted by the French representative in London, as by the representatives of all the other Powers, and accepted also by the King of Holland, but rejected by the Belgian Provisional Government, and not agreed to, with respect to some of its provisions, by the French Cabinet.

This state of things was brought to a crisis by a majority of the Belgian congress, then assembled at Brussels, offering the Belgian crown to the son of the King of the French. That monarch, kept in check by his own judgment, and the unmistakable warnings of Lord Palmerston, declined the perilous honour he was invited to accept; and the Belgians were sobered by seeing that they could not count upon France going to the extremity of braving Europe in support of their

¹ The principal provisions of this arrangement were, first—Holland to be what it was in 1790; second, Belgium to be the rest of the Netherlands, excepting Luxembourg, which was to remain part of the Germanic Confederation; third, convenient exchanges of territory between the two countries to be arranged by the Powers; fourth, rivers traversing both states to follow *Acte General* of the Congress of Vienna, and to be free; and fifth, Belgium to form a neutral territory, the five Powers guaranteeing its integrity and inviolability.

exaggerated pretensions. Meanwhile political changes took place in Paris. M. Périer, anxious for peace and order, succeeded M. Lafitte, who had appeared to be constantly wavering between a policy of internal and external tranquillity and a policy of agitation at home and aggression abroad. Henceforth began a gradual approximation of ideas, which brought the united conference and the Belgian Government and congress at last to the choice of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (who was to marry a French princess), as the fitting occupant of the Belgian throne; and to a new plan of arrangement (called 'the eighteen articles'), between Belgium and Holland. But just as Holland had accepted and Belgium refused the twenty-four articles, Belgium accepted and Holland refused the eighteen, on the faith of which, notwithstanding, King Leopold accepted the Belgian crown. It is to be observed that Lord Palmerston for a long time—guided, no doubt, by old traditions and the fact that the Prince of Orange, who had never joined in his father's policy, possessed many partisans in Belgium—had shown an inclination favourable to his selection, though he had taken no active part in support of it; nor did he now accept Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg as a candidate put forward by England, justifying France to claim some compensating advantage; but he readily approved of him as a prince known to the Northern courts, and not disagreeable to them; closely connected with the Royal Family of England, and about to be so with the Royal House of France; independent as to means, brave, and prudent. This is the first period in that long diplomatic struggle with which Lord Palmerston commenced his career as Foreign Minister, and his letters are so characteristic that a large number will here be quoted notwithstanding the space they will occupy in a work of which it is desired as much as possible to confine the limits.

Lord Granville, to whom the following letters were written, was the British Ambassador at Paris:—

Foreign Office : Jan. 7, 1831.

My dear Granville,—In a conversation which I had a few days ago with Talleyrand, about the affairs of Belgium, I mentioned to him an idea which had occurred to me, as an arrangement which might probably smooth some of our difficulties. The King of the Netherlands would wish his son to wear the crown of Belgium; the Belgians want much to have Luxembourg. Could not the King give up Luxembourg to his son, on condition of his being elected by the Belgians? and might not the Belgians choose the Prince of Orange, on condition that he should bring Luxembourg with him? Talleyrand looked very grave, and said he thought his Government would not like to see Luxembourg united to Belgium. I asked why, inasmuch as it had been so united hitherto, and would not be more inconvenient to France when united to Belgium alone, than when united to Belgium joined with Holland. He said, the fact was that their frontier in that direction is very weak and exposed, and Luxembourg runs into an undefended part of France. He then said, Would there be no means of making an arrangement *by which Luxembourg might be given to France*? I confess I felt considerable surprise at a proposition so much at variance with all the language and professions which he and his Government have been holding. I said that such an arrangement appeared to me to be impossible, and that nobody could consent to it. I added that England had no selfish objects in view in the arrangements of Belgium, but that we wished Belgium to be really and substantially independent. That we were desirous of living upon good terms with France, but that any territorial acquisitions of France such as this which he contemplated would alter the relations of the two countries, and make it impossible for us to continue on good terms. I found since this conversation that he had been making similar propositions to Prussia about her Rhenish provinces, in the event of the possibility of moving the King of Saxony to Belgium and giving Saxony to Prussia. To-day he proposed to me that France should get Philippeville and Marienburg, in consideration of France using her influence to procure the election of Leopold for Belgium. I do not like all this; it looks as if France was unchanged in her system of encroachment, and it diminishes the confidence in her sincerity and good faith which her conduct up to this time had inspired. *It may not be amiss for you to hint, upon any fitting occasion, that though we are anxious to cultivate the best understanding with*

France, and to be on terms of the most intimate friendship with her, yet that it is only on the supposition that she contents herself with the finest territory in Europe, and does not mean to open a new chapter of encroachment and conquest.

Foreign Office : Jan. 21, 1831.

The protocol which I send you has been the result of two hard days' work. We were at it yesterday from four till half-past nine, and to-day for several hours. Talleyrand wanted the neutrality to extend to Luxembourg, but the objection was, that that duchy belongs to a sovereign who is independent, and to a confederation of which he is member, and that the conference has no power to deal with the right of peace and war, which belongs to the sovereign of Luxembourg and to the confederation. I pointed out to him that there are but two military roads out of the duchy, the one southward to Thionville and Metz—awkward places for any army that could be held in Luxembourg to run against—the other northward, by Givet or Dinant—a direction which would not be chosen for invading France; that consequently France could have nothing to fear from Luxembourg. That, on the other hand, Luxembourg seems to belong to the system of defence for the Prussian frontier of which Coblenz is the centre, and that it must be important for Prussia, as flanking the line of advance from Thionville to Coblenz. He fought like a dragon, pretended he would not agree to the neutrality of Belgium if Luxembourg was not included, then said he would accept instead of it the cession to France of Philippeville and Marienburg. To this we of course positively objected. First, we had no power to give what belongs to Belgium and not to us, and we could not, under the pretence of settling the quarrel between Holland and Belgium, proceed to plunder one of the parties, and that too for the benefit of one of the mediators. Besides, if France began, the rest might have a right to follow the example. At last we brought him to terms by the same means by which juries become unanimous—by starving. Between nine and ten at night he agreed to what we proposed, being, I have no doubt, secretly delighted to have got the neutrality of Belgium established. If Talleyrand complains that our confidence in him seems abated, you may say that this was the natural consequence of our finding that he was aiming at obtaining for France territorial acquisitions, at the same time that France was crying out for non-intervention and peace. We are bound to say, however, that

after Talleyrand has bound his Government by the self-denying declaration contained in this protocol, we can say not another word on that subject.

Foreign Office : Jan. 27, 1831.

Talleyrand read me to-day part of a letter he had received from Sebastiani, which was very satisfactory as to the course of the French Government upon the affairs of Belgium. It sanctioned the signature of the eleventh protocol, declaring Belgian neutrality and renouncing territorial aggrandizement; it renewed the former declarations that the French Government would neither consent to a union of Belgium with France, *nor accept the crown if offered to Nemours*; it stated that Leuchtenberg had declined; that the objections to Charles of Bavaria were insurmountable, being founded upon his personal hostility to the King and his political hostility to France, upon his ultra-principles in public matters and his over-liberal practices in private, and his marriage or connection with an actress. It then again pressed the young Neapolitan as the only remaining choice free from objections, and expressed a hope that we would, as an act of friendship and kindness towards the King and Government, consent to this arrangement.¹ Talleyrand also told me that he would answer for it that no marriage would take place between the prince and an Orleans princess. What the private and personal character of Charles of Bavaria may be I know not; but even if there was a real objection to him on that score, a country just rising into order from the chaos of revolution requires a man of full age for its king, and a lad of nineteen (alluding to the Neapolitan Prince) is really not fit to be at its head. However, our objections to this choice are not so strong as to make us positively refuse to assent to it if all the other parties concerned thought it the best way out of the difficulties of the case. Talleyrand also said that his Government wished him to ask me about the armaments going on in England. I asked him, 'What armaments?' he said, 'Our naval ones.' I said the best reply I could make to that question was by asking another, namely, What was the nature and object of the naval armament in the French ports? I said that perhaps it might be enough to say that if they were getting a few ships ready we were only following their example; but that, however, I did not want to make a matter of importance of what was a very simple affair; that I believed the papers had given some exag-

¹ The nephew of Louis Philippe, who seems always to have had an eye to family interests.

gerated statement of what was doing in our dockyards; that the fact is, that we had last summer four line-of-battle ships in the Mediterranean, of which two had come home for repair or other reasons, and that we are going to send out two others to supply their places; but I added, laughing, that I did not believe either of us were making naval preparations which the other might look upon with any jealousy. You may as well mention this conversation to Sebastiani, and take that opportunity of asking again about the Toulon ships. *It is no harm, however, that the French should think that we are a little upon the alert with respect to our navy, because I believe it is the fear of a naval war which has greatly tended to induce the French Government to make the efforts necessary for the preservation of peace.*

Foreign Office: Feb. 1, 1831.

Talleyrand sounded me as to my agreeing to naming Duc de Nemours King of the Belgians. I told him we should look upon it as union with France, and nothing else, and it was for France to consider *all* the consequences which such a departure from all her engagements must necessarily expose her to; that I do not believe the bulk of the French nation wish for Belgium at the price of a general war, and that I do not believe the bulk of the Belgians wish union with France or a French prince. The other three Powers¹ are quite unanimous on the subject, *and I must say that if the choice falls on Nemours, and the King of the French accepts, it will be a proof that the policy of France is like an infection clinging to the walls of the dwelling, and breaking out in every successive occupant who comes within their influence.* I told Talleyrand that I thought that he had but one course which as a public man he could honourably pursue; that the King his master had but one course which without a violation of public faith was left open to him. What that was it was needless to point out, but that I could not bring myself to believe that it would be departed from.

Foreign Office: Feb. 2, 1831.

The Cabinet have considered the question of the Duc de Nemours, and have determined, as I tell you in my official de-

¹ Austria, Prussia, and Russia had agreed to the proposal of the British Plenipotentiary, that in case the sovereignty of Belgium should be offered to a prince of one of the reigning families of the five Powers, such offer should be unhesitatingly rejected. The French Plenipotentiary took the matter *ad reprehendum*.

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spatch, that we must require from France the fulfilment of the engagement by a refusal to accept for him the crown if offered.

We are reluctant even to think of war, but if ever we are to make another effort this is a legitimate occasion, and we find that we could not submit to the placing of the Duc de Nemours on the throne of Belgium without danger to the safety and a sacrifice of the honour of the country.

We are ready to agree to any reasonable proposition which can be made for giving a sovereign to Belgium unobjectionable to any party; and as I told you before, we should not have insurmountable objections to the Neapolitan prince if his election could be accomplished and would remove all other difficulties. But we require that Belgium should be really and not nominally independent.

Foreign Office: Feb. 8, 1831.

The change of tone you mention in Sebastiani,¹ between one o'clock and five on the 4th instant, probably arose from his receiving in the interval an account from Flahault,² perhaps by telegraph from Calais, that the Cabinet had met on Wednesday to consider the election of Nemours, and had determined to require France to refuse acceptance at the risk of war. Flahault went back yesterday without having accomplished much during his mission. He again reverted to the proposal of an alliance offensive and defensive between England and France in a conversation which I had with him yesterday; he suggested that it might be kept an entire secret from all the world, but that it

¹ 'Paris, February 4th, 1831. Half-past six, P.M.

'MY DEAR PALMERSTON,

'Never was a change of tone, of temper, and of language so rapid as that which took place to-day in the case of Sebastiani. At one o'clock he was warm, warlike, and mounted on his highest horse; at half-past five he comes into my room to announce the telegraph communication of the election of the Duc de Nemours, and in a much subdued, but most friendly tone, to inform me of the King's positive refusal, and begs me to obliterate all mention of what passed between us this morning on the subject of the protocol. He expressed a wish to act cordially with the other Powers of the Conference; but what he expressed with most earnestness was his desire that the confidence between us should be unbounded. "Tell Lord Palmerston," he said, "that we will not have a thought concealed from him, and that I look to his acting towards us with the same frankness."

'Yours ever sincerely,

GRANVILLE.'

² Count Flahault had been sent to England on a special and confidential mission.

might afford France a ground for disarming by the security it would give her. I said that these offensive and defensive alliances were not very popular in England; that he could not doubt our desire that France should remain as she was, neither conquering nor conquered; and *that if she was unjustly attacked, England would beyond a doubt be found on her side*; that our position at present ought, I conceive, to be that of impartial mediators between France on one hand, and the three other Powers on the other; that as long as both parties remain quiet we shall be friends with both; *but that whichever side breaks the peace, that side will find us against them*; that there does not at present seem any immediate danger threatening France, to guard against which such a treaty could be necessary; on the contrary, if danger exists, it is more likely to come *from* than *against* France. I said, however, that we would bear the idea in mind, and that at all events they might rely upon this, that while France remains quiet and does not revive the Buonaparte system of aggression and aggrandizement, it will be the wish and interest of England to cultivate the closest friendship and alliance with her.

Foreign Office: Feb. 15, 1831.

I will write to you officially by a special messenger to-morrow, after a Cabinet which I have summoned to take into consideration a formal communication to the French Government upon the subject of their menacing armaments. I confess that I like the aspect of their proceedings less and less every day. Their assurances of friendship and peace are indeed incessant and uniform, but they continue actively preparing for war when nobody threatens them; and while every day discloses more and more their designs upon Belgium, and the underhand proceedings which they are carrying on with reference to that country, they every day betray an unceasing disposition to pick a quarrel, and to treat us in a manner to which we can never submit. *Pray take care, in all your conversation with Sebastiani, to make him understand that our desire for peace will never lead us to submit to affront either in language or in act.*

If they are straightforward in their intentions, why cannot they be so in their proceedings? Why such endless intrigues and plots, and such change of plans, all tending to the same object—the establishing in Belgium that influence which they have renounced in the 20th January protocol?

If the Neapolitan Prince is elected freely by Belgium of its own accord, well and good; but if he is to be placed there by a

French intrigue, and, being nephew to Louis Phillippe, is also to be his son-in-law, there would be but little difference between such an arrangement and that of the Duc de Nemours.

Talleyrand told me to-day they meant to offer to the Belgians, as an inducement to take this Prince, their aid for a better arrangement of the debt, and improved limits. I remarked, that as to limits we never would permit the territory of Holland to be made over to the Belgians, nor would the Confederation of Germany give up to them Luxembourg; and that as to debt, that which we decided was, that the two original debts previous to the union, which were put together by the treaty of 1814, must now be separated and taken back by each party, and that the debt incurred since the union should be divided between the two in a just proportion.

Foreign Office: Feb. 17, 1831.

Sebastiani really should be made to understand that he must have the goodness to learn to keep his temper, or, when it fails him, let him go to vent his ill-humour upon some other quarter, and not bestow it upon England. We are not used to be accused of making people dupes.¹ Pray explain to him that Talleyrand misunderstood what I said to him about the Prince of Naples, and seems to have overstated it to his court. He asked me to direct Ponsonby to desist from giving support to the Prince of Orange. I said I should advise Ponsonby to do what I had always told him to do, namely, to take no part whatever in favour of anybody. But I did not say to Talleyrand—at least, I never meant to say—that Ponsonby would assist in putting forward Prince Charles.²

I have a great personal regard for Sebastiani, and I believe him to be really friendly to England; but what confidence can be placed in a Government which runs such a course of miserable intrigue as that which the present French Cabinet is pursuing about Belgium? saying one thing here, and unsaying it

¹ Alluding to an observation of Sebastiani, that the French Government was accused of being duped by the English one.

² Lord Granville writes on February 24—‘I wish to apprise you without delay, that the Prince of Naples having been thrown overboard, the King and Sebastiani have recurred to the project of having Prince Leopold elected King of Belgium, and married to an Orleans Princess. . . . The King represented to me that the Belgians urged most earnestly that he would give his daughter in marriage to their Sovereign, whatever Prince might be elected.’ Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg had been one of the first candidates thought of.

there; promising acceptance¹ through Bresson, and refusal through Talleyrand; changing its opinions, declarations, and principles with every shifting prospect of temporary advantage.²

Foreign Office: Feb. 23, 1831.

I send you a protocol,³ which has been signed at the wish of Talleyrand, by whom and by Matuszewicz⁴ it has been drawn up. Talleyrand means it as a measure of peace, and to strengthen the hands of his Government against the violent party.

We hear that Casimir Périer⁵ is to be Minister of the Interior, instead of Odillon Barrot, as at first supposed. If this is true, it is well.

Ponsonby says the fortresses on the Belgian frontier are fully provisioned, and without garrisons—who are the guests for whom this feast is prepared? Is it for the French?

Foreign Office: March 1, 1831.

Cowley's⁶ statement that Austria does not mean to meddle with the Pope's territory is satisfactory and relieving. We are all too busy with Reform to make it possible to give you instructions about Italy, and I have not yet taken the opinion of the Cabinet, but I should myself say to France, that it would not be worth her while to risk involving all Europe in war for the sake of protecting the revolutionists in Romagna. If we could by negotiation obtain for them a little share of constitu-

¹ Acceptance of the Duc de Nemours.

² Lord Granville in his reply, dated February 21, says, 'I hope that the severe but salutary lesson given to him (Sebastiani) in your private letter to me of the 17th, and which you *sent through the French Foreign Office*, will have the effect of making him keep his temper under control.' The mode of conveying indirectly to a government opinions that it might be uncivil to state directly, through the medium of letters certain to be opened and read, was not unfrequently resorted to.

³ This protocol referred everything to the Treaty of Vienna, the principles of which it declares to be still in force. Those principles were to provide for the good government of the Netherlands, and prevent a European war concerning them.

⁴ One of the Russian plenipotentiaries.

⁵ The preceding ministry had intended and been preparing for war, which justified Lord Palmerston's apprehensions. The change was a change for peace, and represented Louis Philippe's feelings, though not those of M. Lafitte, whose plans Lord Palmerston, by his firm and resolute bearing, had defeated.

⁶ Lord Cowley, British Ambassador at Vienna.

tional liberty, so much the better ; but we are all interested in maintaining peace, and no one more than Louis Philippe.

So long as the French really and *bond fide* keep within their limits, they need not wish to have truer or warmer friends than they now have in Downing Street.

Foreign Office : March 9, 1831.

Reform is thriving, inconceivably popular in the country, and likely to be carried in the House, and, whatever the Tories may say, will not be Revolution, but the reverse.

I wish the French Government would make up their minds to act with good faith about Belgium, and we should settle the matter in three weeks ; but the men in power cannot make up their minds to be honest with stoutness, or to play the rogue with boldness. Might they not be reminded that when the Russians have reconquered Poland, which (were it not for the ill-concealed spirit of aggrandizement of France) I should say I am *afraid* they will, the tone of Russia about Belgium will be different from what it has been, and that Prussia and Austria will probably be swayed by her influence ?

If, therefore, the French ministers mean what they say about Leopold, and are not amusing us, they had better not delay the matter till the Poles are at the foot of Nicholas.

Their protest about Bouillon, I discovered from Talleyrand, is founded upon a secret intention of getting it themselves : it really disgusts one to see the Government of a great country in a great crisis of affairs, when such great interests are at stake, scrambling and intriguing for such pitiful objects as the ruined castle of Bouillon and its little circumjacent territory. But it will not do ; their argument will not hold water, and the Treaty of Vienna is dead against them. The part which was ceded to France, or rather left to France, in 1814, is given to Luxembourg by Art. 68 of the Treaty of Vienna, because it is within the limits therein mentioned, and the part which was not so ceded to France is attached to Luxembourg by the 69th Art.

We have thought it necessary to get an explanation as to the meaning of Chokier's title of Regent : ¹ we must first know what his title means, and whether it implies Nemours as King.

Foreign Office : March 11, 1831.

I am sorry for the determination of Austria about Italy ; it is wrong and foolish. It will be impossible for England to take

¹ Baron de Chokier had, on February 24, been elected Regent by the Belgian Congress, pending the negotiations for a sovereign.

part with Austria in a war entered into for the purpose of putting down freedom and maintaining despotism ; neither can we side with France in a contest the result of which may be to extend her territories ; we shall therefore keep out of the contest as long as we can.

The Reform plan gains ground every day, both by the reflection of members themselves, and also by the influence exerted upon them by their constituents. The country is decidedly for it, and enthusiastically.

The events referred to in the foregoing letter as occurring in Italy, were insurrections in the Papal States and the Duchies of Modena and Parma. The insurgents, who had acquired power without the loss of a single life, were for a time completely successful. They failed, however, to stir up revolt in Naples, Tuscany, Piedmont, and Austrian Lombardy, though they addressed stirring appeals to the inhabitants of those provinces. The new Pope, Gregory XVI., who had been elected just as the insurrection broke out, and the dispossessed sovereigns of Parma and Modena, applied for aid to their powerful neighbour Austria, who had massed 100,000 troops in Lombardy. France, however, who was at this moment under the influence of the war party, fanned the hopes of the insurgents by declaring that she would not allow Austrian troops to interfere in any quarrel between an Italian prince and his subjects ; as her counsels modified, she quenched those hopes by letting it be understood that she would not take any steps to prevent Austrian troops from marching into the revolted districts, provided they did not prolong their occupation. They did consequently enter into the countries which had thrown off the established authorities, put down without difficulty the rebellion, and at the demand of France were withdrawn.

To return, however, to Belgium. One critical period in its affairs was now over ; the Duc de Nemours' candidature had been put on one side, and at Paris M. Périer had replaced M. Lafitte.

Foreign Office : March 15, 1831.

My dear Granville,—We are delighted at Casimir Périer's appointment,¹ and hope it may be the means of procuring peace in France and out of it. Pray cultivate him, and make him understand that the English Government place great confidence in him, and consider his appointment as the strongest pledge and security for peace. I trust France and Austria may still not quarrel about Italy. Esterhazy thinks his court will agree to the French proposal, and wishes *very much* that we should be parties to the negotiation, thinking that they might fare better for having an uninterested party as a third in the matter.

Our Cabinet are willing, and I shall write to this effect to Seymour.

Talleyrand said to me to-day, When you write to Lord Granville, pray tell him not to treat the Belgian affair *comme une grande chose ; en maintenant ce n'est qu'une petite chose* it can be soon and easily settled. This may be very well for France to say, but we never can look upon the Belgian affair as a trifling matter, but, on the contrary, as one of the greatest importance to England.

Périer ought to understand that France cannot have Belgium without a war with the four Powers. Whether she could have it by a war with the four Powers is another matter.

Foreign Office : March 18, 1831.

It is absolutely necessary to come to an understanding with Casimir Périer about Belgium. If he is willing to take the straight line, and act fairly with the four Powers, we shall settle the matter amicably and honourably to all parties. But if he lends himself to the petty intrigues of the Palais Royal upon this matter, I foresee that it must end in war. Talleyrand says he has written to his court things on this subject which would make us stare to hear them ; and he has begged us all to write in the strongest terms to our ministers at Paris, urging them to bring the French Government to a point upon it.²

The way to put it, as it strikes me, is this—Europe never will consent, unless forced to it by a disastrous war, that Belgium shall be united, directly or indirectly, to France.

¹ As President of the Council (Prime Minister of France), a post which he retained till his death, 1832.

² Here is another proof of how steadily Talleyrand—at times suspected by Lord Palmerston, and anxious, no doubt, to get the best terms he could for his Government—stuck, with or without instructions, to his main object—that of keeping France and England united.

France cannot attempt to bring about such a union without violating many solemn engagements, and forfeiting her character for honour and good faith. There are two courses open to her. Either she may break loose from her treaties and her engagements, brave the united resistance of all Europe, and seize upon Belgium by force of arms, and try to keep it at all risks. Or, she may fulfil her engagements honourably and strictly, and, casting aside all selfish interests and sordid views, concur with the other allies in bringing about such a settlement of Belgium as may be best for the general security and permanent tranquillity of Europe. Either of these courses may have something to recommend it to a great country; the one its boldness, and noble contempt for the laws of nations; the other its integrity and honour. The middle course must at all events be unworthy, having neither the honesty of the one nor the daringness of the other.

We can feel no doubt which is the choice that Casimir Périer will adopt; but we do feel very anxious that he shall distinctly and promptly make known the decision which he takes. The greater part of our difficulties with the Belgians have arisen from the double diplomacy, double-dealing, infirmity of purpose, and want of principle in the French Government. Whether the sin lies with Sebastiani, Soult, or Lafitte, or the King, or his secret advisers, male and female, I cannot tell, nor is it material to explain. The result has been most embarrassing. The encouragement given to the deputies who came to offer the crown to the Duc de Nemours, to expect that France would support their pretensions with respect to limits, has been the reason which has induced the Belgians to throw our protocols in our face, and to issue their absurd proclamations.

Upon two points we must come to an immediate understanding: the limits between Belgium and Holland, and the interference of Belgium in the Grand Duchey of Luxembourg.

If the French Government will make the Belgians clearly understand that France thinks the limits drawn by the conference equitable and just, and that she will give the Belgians no support, moral or physical, in their attempts upon the Dutch territory, I have no doubt we shall soon bring M. Chokier to reason upon this matter.

As to the ultimate settlement of Belgium, the more that country is drawn back to Holland,¹ the better for itself and for

¹ For a long time Lord Palmerston adhered to the idea, that though the separation between Holland and Belgium was a necessity, Belgium

Europe. As a source of attack against France, Belgium is made powerless by the neutrality which has been agreed to; and as a further security for France, there could be no objection to dismantle some of the fortresses nearest and most menacing to her frontier.

As to Sebastiani's pretended alarm at the armament of the German Confederation, the armament of France, and the accumulation of troops in her frontier provinces, must compel all the States of Germany to prepare the most effective means of resistance.

To us here, who know not only the real sentiments of Prussia and Austria, and I may say also of Russia, but also the great difficulty which they would have in bringing into the field any force at all adequate¹ to make an attack upon France, the alarm expressed by the French Government with respect to these Powers, and their apprehension that some attack upon France is intended, wear the appearance of thin pretences to excuse the military preparations of the French Government, and to hide for the moment their own ambitious designs. This may be all a mistake of ours, and the French may be honestly and sincerely afraid. But if that be so, you may assure them in the most positive and unequivocal manner, that although all the other Powers would probably unite to resist aggression on the part of France, no one of them has the slightest or most distant intention of becoming an aggressor itself; *and the English Government could almost take upon itself to be answerable to France for the sincerity and good faith of the pacific declarations of the other Powers.*

The Belgian Government, supported, up to this time, directly and indirectly, by France, accepted the armistice established by the Great Powers, and adopted whatever concessions they made in favour of its own pretensions, but declared in every other case that the conference had merely the power to make proposals, and not to establish conditions; refusing to receive any representations as to the choice of a king, or any

might still be governed by a prince of the Nassau family, and the Prince of Orange would, as I have said, have been his choice; but he always made the selection of a sovereign subordinate to the settlement of the country and the general interests of Europe.

¹ A remark that shows how much the condition of Germany has been changed by the genius of a Bismarck in these later years.

decision as to the limitation of territory, assuming that the territory which the Belgian Congress had declared to be Belgian was to be Belgian as a matter of course. The tone of Regent Chokier's Government had become so haughty, indeed, as to be ridiculous, and a M. D'Arschot came over to London as their envoy extraordinary.

But Lord Palmerston's anger was not against the Belgians, who, he thought naturally enough, tried to swagger and get all they could, but with the French Government for encouraging their exaggerated demands; and in fact, at the same time that the English Government refused to accept Count d'Arschot as the Belgian Government's representative, the French Government received M. Le Hon in that character.

Foreign Office: March 25, 1831.

I have had two long conversations with M. D'Arschot; the substance of what I told him was as follows:—While the Belgians continue to treat the conference in so unbecoming a manner, and to set up pretensions which place them in a state of moral war, if not actually of physical war with the four Powers, and with all Germany, the letters which he has brought from the Regent to the King must remain in his pocket. We can hold no relations with the Belgian Government; and though I shall be happy to receive M. D'Arschot at my house as an individual, I cannot ask him to the Office, nor hold any communication whatever with him in his official capacity, for I acknowledge none in him. We are willing to recognize Belgium as independent, and assist her in remaining so, provided she will be so in reality; but union with France we cannot permit, because it would give to France an increase of power dangerous to our security. We know we should have to fight France after such a union, and we had better therefore do so before it. We believe the other three Powers to have similar feelings, and to be equally determined to prevent such a union. That the limits which the conference has fixed for the separation of Holland and Belgium are perfectly equitable and just, and have been acknowledged to be so by France; that Holland must retain her ancient territory, such as she possessed it in 1790, when she was an independent state, and Belgium a dependent province. That as to Maestricht, it is an indispensable protection to

Holland in the valley of the Meuse, and never can be surrendered to Belgium. That as to Luxembourg, the conference have decided nothing, because they had no power to do so; the treaties of 1814 and 1815 have decided that question; and those treaties cannot be broken by the Belgians without the consent of the Confederation, who are probably stronger than the Belgians.

That we have only acknowledged a fact, and have not created it. We have said that the Diet have a right to re-establish their authority and that of the Grand Duke in Luxembourg—and to this declaration France has subscribed.

When D'Arschot wanted to talk with me on the choice of a King, I told him it was pure waste of time to discuss that matter as things now stood. Their constitution, as they will call it, declares part of Holland and all Luxembourg to be parts of their territory, and requires their King as his first act to swear to maintain the integrity of their territory; these claims must be given up before anything can be acknowledged by the five Powers, and therefore they would make the King swear one day an oath which he must necessarily break the next.

You were quite right in what you said to Périér and Rothschild about Landau and Bouillon: *we can have no security for Europe but by standing upon a strict observance of treaties, and an abnegation of all interested views of aggrandizement.* The moment we give France a cabbage garden or a vineyard, we lose all our vantage-ground of principle; and it becomes then a mere question of degree or the relative value of the different things which, one after the other, she will demand.

If once we admit that the *pacific* ministry is to be supported by gratifying the war party without the risks of war, to obtain our object we must do it effectually, and we all know—not, indeed, what *will* satisfy the war party, but what will *not*, and most undoubtedly Bouillon and Landau will never do so.

Be inexorable on that point: I am sorry Périér mooted it.

As to disarming, I see no reason why the conference should not lead to some general arrangement for this; and if France is sincere, it might easily be effected.

Foreign Office: April 1, 1831.

Talleyrand read me two days ago a despatch from Sebastiani, saying that France would support Leopold; and that he had no doubt that England, for the sake of an arrangement so advantageous to her, would agree to all the French

wishes about Bouillon and Luxembourg and Maestricht, &c. Talleyrand, before I could say anything, said that the answer he meant to give was, that the election of Leopold was an object of comparative indifference to us, and that we were not disposed to make any sacrifices to obtain it.

I said he was quite right, and begged him also to say that, even if we looked upon Leopold's election as a matter of English interest, still we were bound by engagements to other Powers, and that we should *preserve our good faith in preference to consulting our selfish interests*; that consequently the election of Leopold would make no change whatever in our opinions and determinations, and that we should not be a whit more inclined to support the unreasonable pretensions of the Belgians with Leopold than without him. But I said the reason we wished for Leopold, next after a member of the family of Orange, was that we think he would become a good *Belgian king*; that he would be no more English than French, but would look to his own interests, and to those of the State which he governed.

Malcolm has by this time four sail of the line; a fifth is going out immediately; and Hotham, who succeeds him in the command, will sail in a week or ten days with a three-decker; and Malcolm will leave his own ship there and come home in a frigate.

We shall thus be strong enough in the Mediterranean to do what we like with any fleet the French can have in that sea.

A better state of feeling between the two Governments was now established, and produced endeavours to bring their ideas more closely into harmony respecting Belgian arrangements. A question which subsequently became of importance, that of dismantling some of the Belgian fortresses, now began to be discussed.

Foreign Office: April 12, 1831.

My dear Granville,—Talleyrand has read to us, in conference, his last communication from Sebastiani about Belgium, which he received last week. It is highly satisfactory; and pray let Périer know how sensible we all are of the change of tone and disposition which he has infused into the French Government.

We are going to prepare an answer to this despatch; and we mean to make an acknowledgment of the many important points of agreement between France and the other four Powers, and to touch very lightly upon those matters in which there are still shades of difference remaining.

Talleyrand has spoken to me about the fortresses. I said that we had spent a great deal of money on these fortresses, and that they were by no means intended as points of attack upon France, but as means of defence against France; that, however, I apprehended that this was a matter upon which we all might come to an understanding, especially if the dismantling of some of them would be useful to the present Government. The fact is, that these places are too numerous by far for the military means of Belgium, and that some of them must be dismantled, to prevent them falling into the hands of France upon the first rupture which they might tempt her into. The most plausible notion upon this subject is, I think, to dismantle those fortresses which are in the front and centre, and to leave those which are upon the sea-coast and the Meuse; the former must fall a prey to France; the latter could be succoured by England and by Prussia.

These details, however, you had better not enter into with the French Government, but only say, generally, that we are not indisposed to discuss the matter. Talleyrand asked me again yesterday about our naval preparations. I told him—what is true—that they do not exceed our peace establishment for our foreign stations and our guard-ships at home; but that our guard-ships are getting their crews on board. It is Graham's intention to cruise by-and-by for the benefit of exercise to the men.

Don Miguel's proceedings towards the English at Lisbon are, however, so outrageous, that we may possibly be obliged to send some of our sea captains to pay him a visit.

A communication now came from Paris, the substance of which was to advise our yielding to the wishes of France about Bouillon, whether they were exactly just or not, for that the French nation, being mortified about the turn of Italian matters, the French Government wanted to be able to tell the Chambers they had at least gained something from the allies. And that if we did not oblige the French Government in this they might go to war, and that it was not worth while to go to war for so small an object. Lord Palmerston's answer is remarkable, and of universal application: 'You don't stave off war or stop demands by yielding to urgent demands, however small, from fear of war.'

The maxim of giving way to have an easy life will, if you follow it, lead to your having life without a moment's ease.'

Foreign Office : April 13, 1831.

My dear Granville,—I am sorry to receive your despatch of the 11th, which reached me this morning; and should be still more so if I thought Sebastiani likely to remain in office (which, however, I trust will not be the case), because it indicates that the political intermittent fever which has so long hung about the French Government still afflicts them, and that the hot and cold fits come on them by turns.

I should say that I think I see in Sebastiani's tone the rainbow of Skrzynecky's victories.¹ But however the French may raise their pretensions in consequence of the reverses of the Russians, still we ought to be steady to our point, since we have never required more than is strictly just; and events in Poland cannot make that less so than it was. If the French are bent upon encroachment and war, no concession will keep the peace, and the surrender of rights will only be, like the buying off of the Danish ravages, a temptation to a speedy repetition of such profitable attempts.

Now as to Bouillon, it seems quite clear, from the treaties of 1814 and 1815, that the larger and south part of the Duchy, including the town, was added to Luxembourg in 1815, and that the communes of Gidinné and Vaurians were at a later period added to Belgium; and if you will look at any map of the kingdom of the Netherlands published since 1818, you will see these territories thus distributed. How, then, are the conference to assign to Belgium that which existing treaties determined to be a part of Luxembourg?

The French continually come upon us with the argument, Do only consider our difficulties, and how we are pressed; and so consent to do some little thing unreasonable, unjust, dishonest, against treaties and principles, in order to enable us to say that we have carried some one point at least. In reply, I would say, Choose some point to be carried which is consistent with treaties and engagements and justice, and probably you will be able to carry it; we will give you every support which can honestly be afforded you, but that which you ask is impos-

¹ General Skrzynecky had, since the 25th of February, been in chief command of the Polish army, and had defeated the Russians with great loss at Wawer on the 30th and 31st of March.

sible. Why should we wish to help you to maintain yourselves? Why, in order that you may maintain your engagements; but if the way to keep you in power is to allow you to break these engagements, we are sacrificing the end to obtain the means.

Foreign Office : April 18, 1831.

As to any pretension which France may set up to be a party to the discussion, which of the fortresses are to be dismantled and which kept up, it never can for one moment be listened to by the four Powers, whatever P rier may think or say upon the subject. France was not consulted as to their construction, and for the best of all possible reasons, namely, that they were intended as a check and barrier against aggression by France; and it would have been a strange and anomalous proceeding to have invited the expected invader to deliberate in council upon the best means of providing a defence against his possible attack.

For the same reason as these fortresses were erected, not as Talleyrand says, *en haine de la France*, but *en crainte de la France*, it would be ludicrous to discuss with her which of them should be dismantled.

Talleyrand wanted necessarily that France should be a party to that protocol, but we made him feel that it was utterly impossible she should.

If therefore P rier should contend that all the fortresses ought to be demolished, you may make him comprehend, in civil and friendly terms, the view which I have explained above, and that the principle upon which these fortresses will be considered will not and cannot be that Belgium is to be deprived of all defence, and that through her Holland and Prussia are to be thrown open to France; but that it is intended to reduce the number of these places more nearly within the limits of the probable means of defence of Belgium, succoured, if necessity should require it, by the other Powers of Europe.

I see no harm in conveying this idea clearly and distinctly to P rier's mind, because, as that is a principle from which we cannot depart, the sooner and more distinctly it is understood by the French the better.

One of the great merits of Lord Palmerston's mode of dealing with questions was that he never shirked a difficulty. When people know how much they differ, they try to see how far they can agree; the longer they

remain doubtful as to how far they differ, the more their differences increase. On this question of the fortresses, Lord Palmerston also insisted the more positively from the fact that Lord Granville, who often acted as mediator between the two Governments, did not quite agree with him, and thought that the French should have a voice in it as well as the allies.

Foreign Office : April 22, 1831.

My dear Granville,—You say in your letter of the 18th that the French Government urge that the nation will not be satisfied with any Government which appears to have no influence in the councils of the great nations of Europe, and that therefore we ought to receive liberally and with favour any interpretation of treaties attempted to be established by them which may not materially affect the security and interests of other nations. Now to this doctrine I must demur; and we cannot feel any confidence in a Government which urges it. What do they mean by influence in the councils of other nations? If they mean the power of inducing those nations to connive at or submit to French encroachment or aggrandizement, it is the old cloven foot in a new disguise, and the same hateful spirit of aggression reviving under a different pretence. What France may want to get, or to have done, is either just or not; it is either right or wrong. If it is just and right it ought *therefore* to be done; and if it is unjust and wrong it ought *therefore* not to be done; and I never can admit that it can be wise to give way to the unjust pretensions of France for the purpose of gaining for the French Government, be it Périer or Sebastiani, the support of the violent party, or even of the moderate encroachers. Depend upon it, no good is gained by such concessions; you only whet the appetite instead of satisfying it. We should betray our own weakness and encourage fresh demands. What is the use of having a moderate and pacific administration in France if, for the purpose of keeping them in the good graces of the violent and warlike, we submit to the demands of the latter instead of having the benefit of the good faith of the former? It is a contradiction in terms, and when such arguments are used, distrust the sincerity of those who employ them.

If the French Government want to have influence over the other Cabinets of Europe, let them convince those Cabinets that France is disinterested and honest; that she has no views of

aggrandizement and encroachment upon her neighbours; that she sincerely wishes to remain at peace herself, and to maintain peace between and in other countries. Then her opinions may be received without suspicion, and being founded upon no secret designs, will probably be entitled to consideration.

Périer is honest; but it is not in human nature that he should not every now and then be swayed by the dishonesty¹ of Sebastiani, and, I fear I must add, the want of fixed principle of the King. But make him understand how unreasonable it is for any government to ask that other governments should sacrifice principles and permanent and general interests to please, not even the French ministers themselves, but the violent party of whom that government are afraid.

I have suggested to Bulow that if Prussia marches into Poland to help the Russians, and if France attacks the Rhenish Provinces, it would be impossible for England to make war to help Prussia.

Foreign Office: May 18, 1831.

I do not yet see our way out of Belgian difficulties. Prince Leopold will not accept till the Belgians have acceded to the Act of Separation; and they, on the other hand, say that they cannot accede to that Act in the present state of the country, nor until they have a Sovereign, Chambers, and a regular Government.

Here we are, then, at a dead lock. Leopold is, however, I think, quite right not to accept until he knows what it is which is offered to him. Were he to go now he would be like Miguel, recognised by nobody; and, in fact, they offer him not a throne so much as a quarrel with all Europe, and complete uncertainty of ever getting out of it.

The Deputies² talk of going back to Brussels the day after to-morrow. They profess to lament the anarchy and disorder which awaits their country, but to be hopeless of being able to save it. It seems to me—and I tell them so—that if the evils on one hand are so great, and the sacrifice required on the other so small, it is strange they cannot make the one to avoid the other. The way I put the matter to Devaux³ to-day was this.

¹ This term is only used as implying that Sebastiani's views of aggrandizement, derived from his old master Napoleon I., were dishonest.

² Sent to offer the crown.

³ One of the Ministers of State in Belgium, and sent to England on a special mission.

You say you cannot accede to our *Bases de Séparation* because by so doing you would cede Maestricht, which you have declared to be part of your territory. I say you have as yet no territory at all by any right but that of conquest and military occupation, which is an imperfect right till completed by the formal cession of the sovereign to whom the country so conquered and occupied previously belonged. You have conquered your own country, Belgium, and have driven the Dutch King's troops out of it, and it is yours *de facto*, and will be yours *de jure*, whenever he makes a treaty ceding his right of sovereignty. But Maestricht is in his hands still, and that place, therefore, is yours neither *de facto* nor *de jure*; and it is as absurd to say that it has become your property merely because the Congress has so decreed it, as it would be to declare Belgium possessors and owners of Aix-la-Chapelle or Lille upon similar grounds. We therefore require you to cede nothing to which you have any shadow of a right as far as Maestricht is concerned.

One cannot help wishing the Poles heartily success; and one should be glad to help them in any way consistent with our good faith towards Russia.

Foreign Office: May 29, 1831.

I have had a letter from Lord Ponsonby from which it appears very doubtful whether the Belgians will agree to the Articles of Separation between them and Holland.

I have written to him to-night to say, that if the Belgians do not do so by the 1st of June, he is to carry into execution without further orders the instructions already given him, and to quit Brussels. We conclude that General Belliard¹ has received similar instructions, and will do so too; but I wish you to ascertain that fact, and if such instructions have not been given him, request the French Government to give them, by telegraph if necessary, in order that they may reach him in time: it would be very unfortunate if Belliard were to remain after Ponsonby had left, as it would look like a difference of purpose and policy between France and the other four Powers on the Belgian question where none exists, and would consequently do mischief.

If the Belgians resume hostilities it may become necessary for the five Powers to blockade the Scheldt, according to their

¹ General Belliard, a very distinguished French officer, subsequently accredited to King Leopold, had been named French Commissioner from the conference.

former decisions ; not that the King of Holland has not a naval force at the mouth of the river amply sufficient for that purpose, but because perhaps the moral effect of such a measure by the five Powers might prevent the necessity of land operations.

We shall be strictly within our principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of Belgium. We shall not march a man into Belgium for the purpose of meddling in the interior ; as long as they remain quiet within their limits nobody will molest them ; but the moment they stir a step to attack Holland, they will get a most exemplary licking, in all probability by the Dutch unaided ; but if necessary by the Dutch assisted by the five Powers.

People all say the Belgians are madmen, and there is no use in reasoning with them. I have observed a good deal of method and calculation in their madness, and at all events they are not destitute of that cunning which belongs to insanity. I cannot help thinking, therefore, that when they find that we are really in earnest, and that they have driven us to the extreme point to which we will go, they will gradually recover their senses, and find out a way to arrange matters somehow or other.

At all events, however, it is impossible to go one step further in concessions to them. Their pretension, now newly revived, to the left bank of the Scheldt is preposterous.

Maestricht never was theirs, and will not be theirs.

Foreign Office : May 31, 1831.

Tell Casimir Périer that you have repeated to me his communication to you at dinner the other day, and the desire which he expressed to be well with England. Assure him that this Government, and I individually, as its official organ, entirely participate in his sentiments on this subject. We feel strongly how much a cordial good understanding and close friendship between England and France must contribute to secure the peace of the world and to confirm the liberties and promote the happiness of nations. *We are deeply convinced that it is greatly for the interest of England and of France that this friendship should be intimate and unbroken. But true friendship cannot exist without perfect confidence on both sides. Each party must be convinced that the other has no secret views and selfish objects to be pursued to the detriment of the other. Suspicion and distrust are fatal to confidence and friendship.*

Now, when I first came into office in the autumn, I, as well as the rest of my colleagues, felt the greatest desire to be well

with France, and a confident belief that nothing could prevent us being so. We knew that we, on the part of England, had no selfish objects to pursue, no interests to be promoted which could be at variance with the just rights of others, or which could give to any other nation well-founded cause of jealousy. We fancied that France had been in the same temper. We heard her repeated declarations of a wish to cultivate the closest alliance with us; and believing that she had been cured of the disease of conquest, and that the enjoyment of free institutions of her own had taught her to respect the independence of her neighbours, we imagined that the alliance to which she invited us was to be a bond of peace and a covenant of justice. But we had not long been engaged in the management of affairs when we found symptoms of different dispositions in the French Government; and the spirit of aggression and the ardent thirst for aggrandizement which was betrayed, instead of being concealed by the underhand intrigues and double diplomacy which was intended to veil them, proved to us that those who thus had been courting our alliance only meant to make us the instrument of their own ambition—that their object was, in imitation of the master of their school (Buonaparte), to draw us away from those whom they intended to attack, and, having worked with us as tools, to deal with us afterwards as occasion might require. Hence it was that when Flahault brought us civil and complimentary propositions of alliance between France and England, we, knowing full well what was meant thereby, met them by civil and complimentary refusals. This feeling of suspicion and distrust went on increasing to the end of Lafitte's administration, and everything we saw of the policy of that administration tended to drive us away from French connection, and to teach us that the interests of England and Europe required us to draw closer and closer the other three great Powers of the East. Since the accession of Casimir Périer we have observed a complete change in the spirit and temper of French policy. Everything which has sprung from *him* has been calculated to inspire confidence; and if now and then the old spirit has broke out in those who are acting under him, we have always felt that these were unauthorised demonstrations, and that they would be checked when known by him.

Say, in short, that we have the greatest confidence in and respect for him, and that we are convinced that so long as he is at the head of affairs in France the two countries will become daily more and more united by close and intimate friendship.

It will not be without its use that you should take advantage of any opportunity you may find to say to the King how much the good understanding between the two countries depends upon the respect and confidence which are inspired by the personal character of P rier, and how greatly his appointment to be Prime Minister in France has contributed to the peace of Europe.

I will send you an official answer about Metternich's proposal for a congress; but in the meanwhile you are quite right in supposing that we should be as adverse to it as the French. We ought to prevent any more congresses till we have another French war in Europe, which, I trust, will not be in our time; and, by-the-by, do not encourage Sebastiani in his endeavours to draw to Paris the settlement of matters which might be treated of in our conference.

Another question now arose between England and France. Outrages had been committed at Lisbon upon two French subjects, MM. Bonhomme and Sauvinet. The French had sent a squadron under Admiral Roussin to support their Vice-Consul there in demanding redress. Satisfaction not being granted, the French commenced reprisals, whereon Don Miguel claimed the aid of the British Government, on the ground that as he was not at war with Great Britain, she was bound by ancient treaty to defend him against all aggressors. Lord Palmerston refused this application, stating that, while perfectly aware of the obligations towards Portugal imposed on England by treaties, 'His Majesty's Government do not admit that the true meaning of these treaties can compel them blindly to take up any quarrel into which a Portuguese administration may, in its infatuation, plunge its country, or to defend that administration, right or wrong, against all whom it may choose to injure or affront.'

Windsor Castle: June 3, 1831.

My dear Granville,—We shall certainly not interfere between France and Portugal unless the French Government wish us to do so; that is, always supposing that the French have no intention of invading Portugal, and mean to confine their operations to the capture of ships. It may be worth while,

however, for the French Government to be quite sure that they ask nothing but what is entirely reasonable and just before they proceed to extremities, because even when one has to deal with such a fellow as Miguel, it is a great thing to be perfectly in the right.

The accounts from Greece make us doubt very much the wisdom of choosing Prince Otto of Bavaria for sovereign. He is but sixteen, and cannot, for four or five years to come, be really and substantially King.

Foreign Office : June 10, 1831.

I do not like the contents of two of your last despatches about Luxembourg and Lisbon. If Sebastiani treats the existing treaties of Europe as *vieilles*, he may bring an old house about his ears. With respect to his intention of bombarding Lisbon, it may be as well to request Périer to pause before he takes such a determination. England is upon very ticklish grounds in this dispute between France and Portugal. In an ordinary case we should be bound to interpose our good offices, according to the stipulations of the treaty, of which I enclose an extract ; and it is only because we think Don Miguel is very much in the wrong that we do not do so. I am not quite sure, however, whether, upon a full consideration of the subject, the Cabinet may not be of opinion that our engagement requires us to do something, and of course that something would be to advise Don Miguel to do all that we may think France justly entitled to exact.

But if the French were to attempt to land in Portugal, or to threaten to bombard Lisbon, we might find ourselves compelled, very unwillingly, to interfere and to assist the Portuguese ; and it is unnecessary to say how much we should regret any event which could place us in collision with France. A bombardment of Lisbon seems not an appropriate measure of retaliation for the offence : it would be punishing the innocent inhabitants for the sins of the guilty Government ; and, besides, if we stood by and allowed such a thing, we should have an immense outcry in this country on behalf of the English in Lisbon, whose property the French shells would not distinguish from that of Don Miguel himself. I shall write you a despatch on this subject ; but you may as well speak of it to Périer, and show him the extract from the treaty of 1703, which is still in force, having been renewed by the treaty of 1810.

The Belgians are arrived. I have seen Devaux and No-

thomb.¹ They appear to me preparing to yield; and we have no alternative but requiring them to do so.

The desire of the French and English Governments amongst themselves, and of all the Governments, to facilitate the sovereignty of Prince Leopold, had at last led to the adoption of new conditions of separation between Belgium and Holland, contained in eighteen articles instead of the twenty-four previously proposed. To these Lord Palmerston now alludes :—

Foreign Office : July 3, 1831.

My dear Granville,—The accounts we have from Brussels show that the French and Belgian Republicans will make a great effort to prevent the acceptance of our propositions; but the best-informed seem to think that they will not succeed.

It is said that the army, the civic guard, and the majority of the people, are all for Leopold and for peace. No efforts, however, ought to be spared to bring about a favourable result. There is a suspicion in Belgium that Soult and Pellet are counter-plotting; and I have seen a letter to-day from Brussels, in which there is the following statement :—

General Pellet writes to a friend at Lille : That if the Belgian friends of France will advance one step towards her, she will advance three steps with fixed bayonets towards them—or words to that effect.

It also adds that Pellet, being asked to change the garrison of Lille, replied that it was not possible—'*cela pourra gêner les affaires de nos Frères Belges qui bientôt demanderont nos secours.*' I think you would do well to communicate this confidentially to Casimir Périer, who will be best able to judge what degree of probability the statement carries with it.

Foreign Office : July 15, 1831.

The King of the Netherlands means to refuse the eighteen propositions, but Wessenberg and Bagot had on the 12th persuaded him to postpone for a couple of days the announcement of his refusal.² Leopold goes off to-morrow morning, and will

¹ Named Commissioners to the conference.

² Baron Wessenberg, one of the Austrian plenipotentiaries, being commissioned by the conference, had, on June 27, repaired in person to the Hague, as the bearer of the eighteen articles proposed by the conference to Belgium and Holland, as the preliminaries of a treaty of peace, to give the King of the Netherlands all the information required regarding them.

be at Brussels on Tuesday. We shall recognise him immediately, and I conclude France will do so too; the other three will pause, if the King of the Netherlands refuses, but they will ultimately and soon come in. It may be quite as well for Leopold, with respect to his new subjects, to be recognised at first only by England and France.

Reform is going on well, but slowly. Peel had a meeting at his house yesterday, at which it was discussed whether they should try to improve the Bill, and send it up to the Lords as good as they could make it, or whether they should do their best to spoil the Bill, and send it up to the Lords in such a state as to make it sure to be thrown out. The meeting, much to their credit, adopted the first resolution.

Foreign Office: July 25, 1831.

I have received to-day your letters and despatches, enclosing copy of the French King's speech. The speech is boastful and arrogant, and must give offence all over Europe. I told Talleyrand that I thought the part of it that relates to foreign affairs *too full of pretence*, and that there were many things in it which *we* should never have thought of saying. He seemed to feel conscious that it was open to criticism—which, indeed, all the other members of the conference had taken care to let him know; but he excused it by saying it was necessary for the Government to take this sort of tone, in order to keep its ascendancy at home, and that *the best thing they could do was to make a speech which should please the French much, and not very much displease other people*.

The Etonian part of the Cabinet are at Windsor to-day, and therefore I cannot consult Lord Grey or summon a Cabinet; but I apprehend our Government will think it necessary to ask the French Government whether their fleet will not come away from Lisbon, as ours did when we had obtained the satisfaction we required; at all events, there can be no harm in your hinting, as from yourself, that the English Government and Parliament will begin to be jealous of the French occupation of the Tagus if the French fleet should remain there.

England never would stand the occupation of the Tagus by the French; and no Government here could be allowed to connive at it.

The allusions in these letters to the great Reform Bill, which was being fiercely debated at home, are few

and scanty. Such as they are, however, they must not be taken as the measure of the approval which Lord Palmerston felt and manifested for its provisions. His mind had strongly ripened on the question, and he spoke strenuously, though infrequently, in its favour. During the debate which ensued on the introduction of the Bill in March, 1831, he justified his change from the views of his early youth by the frank acknowledgment that as he grew older he undoubtedly had grown wiser. On the general indisposition of men to change, he based one of his chief arguments for the measure by reminding the House that most of the measures which impartial posterity stamps with the mint-mark of purest wisdom and most unalloyed good, are only wrung from the reluctant consent of England, after long and toilsome years of political discussion. Taunted for abandoning those principles which his late leader Canning supported, he asserted that they were bad exponents of that statesman's opinions who looked only to the particular sentiments which he might have expressed at particular times, without fathoming the depth of the great principle by which his whole public life had been guided. Lord Palmerston repudiated the conclusions which those persons would draw who endeavoured to pin down Canning's large mind by the Lilliputian threads of verbal quotation. He offered a key for the discovery of what would probably have been Mr. Canning's views on that occasion, by quoting the passage of his speech in 1826, when he said that 'they who resist improvement because it is innovation may probably find themselves compelled to accept innovation when it has ceased to be improvement.'

Lord Palmerston's views on this question of Reform cost him his seat for the University of Cambridge, but at the general election of 1832 he was returned by his native county, and became member for South Hants.

CHAPTER VIII.

FRENCH IRRUPTION INTO BELGIUM—QUESTION FINALLY
SETTLED.

THE letter of July 15, which states that King Leopold was starting for Brussels—the King of Holland having rejected the arrangement which the Belgians had accepted—marks the close of the period in these transactions which has been described as the most critical and the most dangerous, because during this period it was uncertain whether France would range herself peaceably by the side of the established Governments of Europe, or whether, as representing a new order of things, arising out of her recent revolution, she would provoke a general war of conquest and opinion. This question was decided when King Leopold was raised to the Belgian throne. That event, however, had taken place without the assent of the King of Holland to the conditions on which it had been based. Hence the chances of new complications, amongst which the Government of France, influenced by principle, passion, vanity, or interest, might excite the Northern courts to resist her, and justify them in doing so.

On the one hand, it was pretty certain that any act in which we joined the French would be tolerated, if not approved of, by those Northern courts: on the other hand, it was pretty sure that any act which left the French isolated would place them on the verge of hostilities with Europe. Their policy, therefore, if they meant peace, was not to separate from us; our policy, if we meant to be their ally without being their victim, was to deter them from pursuing any course that was

aggressive or unjust. The King of Holland was not long without creating one of those new complications which were to be apprehended. For, pretending that the armistice to which he had assented was broken by King Leopold's assumption of an independent authority to which he had not given his sanction, he sent an army at once into Belgium, defeated the Belgian forces, and only retired before French troops—that marched to repel the invaders, without concert with the allies, but not without manifold assurances and explanations. It is at this moment that the following correspondence commences; and, as it will be seen, there were not a few dangers and difficulties still to encounter.

Foreign Office : August 5, 1831.

My dear Granville,—So here is a pretty fly out of the King of the Netherlands! Who has bit him I cannot guess; but we have some suspicion of France. Bagot has always thought there was some secret understanding between France and the Dutch Government. Talleyrand, if you remember, proposed to me some time ago that we should goad the Dutch on to break the armistice, cry out shame upon them, fly to the aid of the Belgians, cover Belgium with troops, and then settle everything as we chose! Is this the realization of the first step of this plot?

France has been angry about the fortresses. Has she fancied that by urging the Dutch to war she should have a fair pretence to enter Belgium as an ally, and thus to get into these fortresses, and keep or demolish them as she chose? Talleyrand was silent yesterday in conference when the matter was discussed; but to-day he backed me well, and acted as fairly as possible. This might, however, have been occasioned by his finding that the Cabinet have taken the matter up seriously.

The great thing to be done now is to prevail on the French Government to prevent the French soldiers from running into Belgium, and to induce them to stick to the alliance and concur in the decision of the conference.

Sir Robert Adair¹ sets off to-morrow. Codrington's squadron will be in the Downs on Monday; and a three-decker just arrived from the Mediterranean at Spithead, instead of being paid off, will be fitted out again for sea.

¹ Named Ambassador Extraordinary at Brussels.

The step deprecated by Lord Palmerston took place. The French soldiers did run into Belgium. This measure caused great excitement, as will be seen by the following letters:—

House of Commons: August 11, 1831.

My dear Granville,—I write you a few lines from the Speaker's room to tell you how much the feelings of this House are excited by the march of the French troops into Belgium.

I have been assailed with questions and notices of motions on the subject; all of which have for their object to express the strong expectation felt that now that the Dutch troops are retiring from Belgium, the French troops will also return to their own territory. This was *the assurance given verbally by the French Ministers to the Plenipotentiaries of the four Powers; and it was on the faith of this assurance that the conference adopted the march of the French as a measure of the alliance*, and forbore to make those objections which they would have been entitled to make to a decision taken by France singly upon a point of such vast importance to the other Powers.

Pray take an early opportunity of speaking to Périer on this subject. Tell him that you have as yet no instructions to make any communication to him on the subject; but that, *anxiously desirous of doing everything that may depend upon you to preserve unimpaired the good understanding which subsists between the two countries, you think it right to apprise him that the entrance of the French troops into Belgium, even with the consent of the other Powers, is looked upon with the greatest jealousy in England, both in and out of Parliament; that I was led by the assurances given to you, and more especially by the communication afterwards made to me by Talleyrand, which I was told the English Government might make use of in Parliament—that I was led by these to hold out to the public here the expectation that the Dutch troops once driven back (refoulées) within their own limits, the French would retire to the Department of the North; that if this expectation should not be fulfilled, the French Government will be accused of bad faith in the whole transaction; and that, in short, with the strongest desire to be friends with France and to preserve the peace of Europe, it is impossible for us to say what decisions we may be driven to take. The French Government are perpetually telling us that certain things must, or must not, be done, in order to satisfy public opinion in France; but they must re-*

member that there is a public feeling in England as well as in France; and that although that feeling is not as excitable upon small matters as the public mind in France, yet there are points (and Belgium is one) upon which it is keenly sensitive, and upon which, if once aroused, it would not easily be appeased.

Foreign Office : August 12, 1831, 10 P.M.

We have no official communication to make to you till we know what the French Government mean to do about our last protocol; and upon their decision on that point may turn the question of peace or war. But I think it right to lose no time in communicating to you a conversation which took place to-day between Talleyrand and Bulow, and which was related to me immediately, in confidence, by the latter, because it is highly important in the present state of things that you should be aware of it. We had a conference here to-day, to place on record the last communication from Verstolk.¹ Talleyrand came first, and after him Bulow, both being in the Red Waiting-room till the rest should arrive. Talleyrand immediately began about Belgium, and said to Bulow that that country could not go on as it was; that Leopold is a poor creature,² and unfit to be a king; the Belgians a set of cowardly vagabonds, unworthy to be independent; that we have got into a difficulty that threatens to upset either the French or the English ministry; that if the French troops retire, there is an end of Périer; and if they do not, the English Government must fall; *that there is but one solution of these difficulties, and that is partition*; that if France, Prussia, and Holland united, the thing would be simple, and England must be contented with the making of Antwerp a free port. He dwelt at some length upon this, *his old and favourite project*, till their conversation was interrupted by the arrival of the other plenipotentiaries.

I have also heard to-day that orders have been received from Paris by stockjobbers to sell out on the expectation of a

¹ Baron Verstolk van Soelen, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Hague, had written to the conference on the subject of the renewed hostilities.

² M. de Talleyrand did not show his usual discrimination of character when he made his first assertion as to King Leopold, and was hardly just or friendly to the nation his Government affected to protect when he made the second. His proposal for partition was made in the teeth of the engagements of January and June, 1831, and necessarily justified the suspicions with which Lord Palmerston regarded the whole conduct of France at this epoch.

fall, in consequence of the supposed determination of the French Government not to evacuate Belgium.

All these are serious things, and of vast importance. I can give you no specific instructions upon them without a Cabinet decision; and we can take none till we know what the French determine to do. But you will know how to throw out, as occasion may offer, hints and warnings to P rier, so as to let him at least understand all the *possible* bearings of the decision he is about to take, without expressing any doubts of his good faith, but, on the contrary, dwelling upon our confident reliance on it.

We have been again attacked to-night in the House for standing by passive spectators of hostilities committed by France upon our two ancient allies, Portugal and Holland.¹

Foreign Office: August 13, 1831.

We were delighted to receive your despatches and letter,² which I received late last night after I had sent off my letter.

¹ It is to be observed that Lord Palmerston, instead of dreading discussions in Parliament, as it is now the fashion to do, always takes advantage of them in support of a national policy.

² Paris: August 10, 1831.

My dear Palmerston,—I told P rier this morning that you thought he had put your confidence in him to a severe trial, when, without any previous understanding, the French Government had ordered the march of their army into Belgium: he assured me that your confidence was not misplaced—he thought trick and deceit as dishonourable in public affairs as in private life, and in the end never answered. When he spoke to me doubtfully of his majority in the Chamber, I said that perhaps the unpopularity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs might lose him some votes. That is true, he answered; but since I have been Prime Minister, Sebastiani has acted cordially with me, and in entire accordance with my opinions and views; and I should think I acted dishonourably by him if I gave him up in consequence of a clamour which the press has raised against him. I begged him not to understand me as complaining of Sebastiani; but he would allow me to express the wish that, if any change were to take place with respect to the Foreign Department, he would himself take the *portefeuille*; his manner of answering me gave me reason to think that he was not indisposed to adopt my suggestion. He is very anxious, as indeed you must be, to settle definitively the Dutch and Belgian question—men's minds will not be tranquillised until it is settled; and after having driven back the Dutch, and saved the Belgians from the Dutch, the conference will have a right to speak more authoritatively to both than they have hitherto done.

I have been at the Palais Royal this evening. I never found the King so cordial and so overflowing with professions of doing nothing but in concert with England.

Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

So far so good ; the ratification of our protocol,¹ and the renewed assurances by Périer of the good faith and honour of the French Government, are as satisfactory as anything can be ; but when you wrote, the decision of the King of the Netherlands to retire was not known in Paris ; and the important and eventful question then remains :—Will the French Government withdraw their troops into France as soon as the Dutch have evacuated Belgium ? Pray make them comprehend *all* that hangs upon that decision.

Grey writes to you. He is peremptory on this point ; and even if the Cabinet had the slightest wish to give way upon it—which they have not—public opinion in England would prevent them. It is, then, a question of war or peace. On *Thursday* next Vyvyan² renews his motion on Belgium. On that day at latest I shall be compelled to give the House of Commons a categorical answer, *Yes or No, to the question, Do the French troops evacuate Belgium or not ? Pray enable me to give an answer by that day, and let not the French Government mistake the import of the answer which they may enable me to give.* The Yes or No which I shall have to utter will imply events of most extensive consequence to the two countries, and to all Europe.³

Foreign Office : August 17, 1831.

I have been talking to Talleyrand, who gave me to read a private letter to him from Sebastiani, dated the 14th. In that letter Sebastiani announced the retirement of 20,000 French into France, and the falling back of the remainder upon Nivelles ; but there was an ugly passage alluding to the fortresses, and hinting that an arrangement must be made about them before the French army would entirely evacuate Belgium. Talleyrand asked me what I thought of the letter. I said that his Government would deceive themselves if they thought that we could ever consent to mix up the fortress question with the

¹ Protocol of August 6 : 'It was agreed upon that the French troops should not cross the ancient frontiers of Holland ; that their operations should be confined to the left bank of the Meuse ; that under no contingency should they invest the town of Maestricht, or that of Venloo ; . . . in fine that, in conformity with the declarations made by the French Government to the representatives of the four courts at Paris, the French troops should retire within the limits of France as soon as the armistice shall have been re-established as it existed before the renewal of hostilities.'

² M.P. for Okehampton.

³ The great merit of Lord Palmerston's diplomacy is that it is not ambiguous.

evacuation of Belgium, that the French Government have bound themselves to evacuate Belgium, and we must expect them to fulfil their engagement; that as to the fortresses, if they expected that we were to sign a treaty with them for the destruction of those fortresses, I would tell him that I would never put my hand to such a treaty, even if the Government agreed to it; but that I was very sure that the Government would be of opinion that our honour requires that France shall not be a party to such a treaty; and that moreover we cannot even deliberate upon the question of demolition till the French troops are out of Belgium. I asked him what his Government wanted—to have the thing done, or to make a theatrical display? If the former, they ought to be satisfied with the decisions we have taken and communicated to them. We wish some of these fortresses to be dismantled as much as they do, and it *will* be done. If they want only dramatic effect, that may suit them, but it does not suit us; and the other Powers of Europe will not submit to humiliation to gain a few votes for the Périer administration. We wish to maintain that administration because we believe it to be pacific, and that France, under its sway, will behave like a good neighbour. But if it is necessary for us all to endure humiliations in order to keep that ministry in, then we will say, let us have Mauguin and Lamarque at once; at least we shall then know what we are about and whom we have to deal with. *We fully mean to dismantle many of these Belgian fortresses; but we will never endure that France should dictate to us in this matter at the point of the bayonet.* What I said seemed to make some impression upon Talleyrand, and he begged me to write to you accordingly. I hear that young Périer has brought instructions to him to renew his application for Philippeville and Marienburg; but we must be firm, and resist these encroaching claims, or we shall not know where to stop.¹ *The only value to us of Périer and his Cabinet is, that we believe them to be lovers of peace and observers of treaties; but if they*

¹ This decided language, which a less resolute minister would have avoided as likely to provoke war, really prevented it, as will be seen by the following extract from a letter of Lord Granville, dated Paris, August 15, 1831:—

‘My representations and Talleyrand’s despatches of the state of public feeling in England have alarmed them (Périer and Sebastiani) a little, and produced the half-measure, which Talleyrand is instructed to announce, of the immediate return to France of 20,000 men, and of the retreat of the remainder into that part of Belgium between Nivelles and the French frontier.’

are to be merely puppets, put up to play the part cast for them by the violent party, what is it to us whether they stand or fall? If they were to fall, and their successors were to engage in a war of aggression, all Europe would again unite against France, and the treaties of 1815 might perhaps in some future day be looked upon at Paris as an arrangement they would be glad to get back to. These considerations could not even be adverted to if we were pressing the French Government to yield to unreasonable pretensions of ours, because they would only put up their spirit to resist the more; but when the question is whether the Government shall act honourably by its allies, at the risk of being criticised by a few bad speakers in the Chamber, such considerations are not out of place or season.

Foreign Office: August 17, 1831.

I like not your letter nor your despatches,¹ nor those which Talleyrand read to me to-day by desire of Sebastiani. The despatches which Talleyrand himself writes to Sebastiani are perfect, and evidently written that he may read them to me. What else he writes I cannot tell, but I am not so sure that what he reads to me is all he sends, and that the rest is in the same tone.

One thing is certain—the French must go out of Belgium, or we have a general war, and war in a given number of days. But, say the French, we mean to go out, but we must choose our own time and our own terms. The time, however, they have agreed shall be settled by the conference, and it must be as early as is consistent with the objects for which they professed to go in.

They came in at the invitation of an allied sovereign, whose neutrality and independence they have agreed to guarantee, and they marched for the accomplishment of the objects which the five Powers have all been aiming at. What terms then are they entitled to make as to their retreat? None! With regard to the fortresses, make them understand that their pretensions are utterly inadmissible. The very basis upon which we can agree to the demolition of any of these fortresses is the security derived from the guarantee of France and of the other Powers.

That guarantee, then, must be given in the fullest and most formal manner before we can stir a step; and to dismantle these fortresses while the French have them in possession would be a disgrace to all the five Powers; and as to making France a

¹ They stated that the French would not go out of Belgium without some previous arrangement as to the fortresses.

party to the treaty for their demolition, that is impossible. Nothing shall ever induce me to put my name to such a treaty, and I am quite sure the Cabinet never would sanction it.

We have had no Cabinet to-day upon your letter and your despatches, because we want to learn the result of my letter and Grey's of Saturday last. Sebastiani and Soult apparently want to pick a quarrel with all their neighbours, or to compel everybody to submit to their insolence and aggression.

They miscalculate their chances, however, I think; and they will find that a war with all the rest of the world, brought upon them by a violation of their word, will not turn to their advantage, nor redound to their honour. They will not be the better able to carry on the war on the Continent for losing all their commerce, and for being deprived of the revenue arising therefrom. The ruin of their seaports will create general distress throughout the country; the Chambers will soon be sick of barren glory if they succeed, or of defeats brought needlessly upon them if they fail; the ministry will be turned out, and the King may go with them. The Carlist party will make an effort, and with the Republicans may give much embarrassment. Austria and Prussia are well prepared for war.

Foreign Office, August 18, 1831.

I send a despatch and a protocol.¹ We had a conference after the Cabinet this morning, and the protocol is a faithful record of our proceedings. We felt that the four Powers have a right to require the French troops to evacuate Belgium as soon as the Dutch have done so; but not having yet any official report of the latter fact, we postponed expressing any opinion as to the time of the French evacuation.

Talleyrand told me during the conference that he had received to-day a messenger who brought him letters, by which it appears that the French troops *will* evacuate, that the French Government do not mean to set up any claim about Philippeville and Marienburg, but that they must have something settled about the fortresses; and he suggested, as from himself, that I should write to you to say that if the French will only go out of Belgium, the fortress question shall be settled to their satisfaction.

I told him we never would agree to mix up the two questions;

¹ No 33; noting the fact that 20,000 men of the French army had been ordered to return to France, and reserving to a future opportunity the settlement of the period at which the occupation of Belgium by the French troops should entirely cease.

that the French entered Belgium as a measure of the alliance to succour Leopold, promising solemnly that they would go out when that object had been accomplished. That in their verbal communications to the ministers of the four Powers, in their subsequent note in Talleyrand's communications to me, and in the 31st Protocol, the return of the French troops is declared to be dependent upon the accomplishment of the objects for which they went in. But that in no one of those communications is it pretended that these troops marched in to demolish the fortresses; such an act would indeed have been to make war against the four Powers, and not to co-operate with them.

I asked him whether his Government wished that people hereafter should believe the French Government on its word, and would be able to put any trust in their promises. That if they did wish this, they must fulfil their promises and keep their word, and not now, when all the conditions of retreat are about to be made good, start upon us a new condition entirely foreign to the circumstances which led to the march, and to the object for which it was directed.

Let France keep her word honestly and fairly, let her evacuate Belgium as soon as the Dutch have retired to their territory, and then we will lose no time in settling the details of an arrangement which we all wish to carry into execution just as much as France herself. By pursuing such a course, she will preserve her honour pure. She will retain her friends, maintain peace, and at the same time attain her object. By a contrary proceeding, she will put all these things to risk.

If the French want *éclat* with the Chambers and the public, what better mode of acquiring it than being able to say that they flew to the aid of the Belgians, and saved them from their Dutch invaders; that they marched to defend the principle of national independence, and in support of the engagements of France; that having with unexampled rapidity succeeded in *all* their objects, they have not sullied their laurels by any sordid or interested attempts; that they have maintained their honour spotless, and have instantly withdrawn, thereby showing their respect for that independence which the energy of their arms had rescued and established?

I have seldom seen a stronger feeling than that of the Cabinet about this question of the fortresses.

Foreign Office: August 23, 1831, 11 P.M.

There never was certainly a more difficult task than that which we have now to perform in getting the French out of

Belgium. The French wish to stay in ; the Prussians do not know their own mind on the subject, because they have always a secret thought that if the French stay, and war ensues, partition must follow, and they will come in for their share.

Austria is the nearest to us in her feelings on this point, and has no particular interest to pursue in it. Russia, who, I suspect, knew more of the Dutch King's inroad than she would choose to own, is always ready to use hard words and high language to everybody, but would not be sorry to see us all quarrelling together. The Dutch (here, at least) affect to wish the French to stay, pretending that the desire to get rid of them will make the Belgians easier to deal with ; and the Belgians say they want their protection while the Belgian army is remodelling, and until Holland has agreed to a truce. But it is of great importance to get the French out.

I had a long conversation yesterday with Talleyrand. He began by saying he came to ask a little help and a small act of friendship, which would cost us nothing and would be very useful to them. It was about the fortresses. He only wished that what we meant to do should be done immediately, and the French would then immediately withdraw. I said we felt great friendship for, and should be glad to help them, but there were things we could not do. That, if I understood him, they wanted to attach a new condition to their retreat, and *that* one nearly touching our pride and interests, namely, the demolition of the barrier fortresses. That we could not submit to such a condition, because it would be humiliating ; and that we must claim the performance of the engagements entered into by France. Besides, I said, how is this to help you ? Are you to keep our determination secret, or are you to make it public ? If you keep it secret, how can it help you in France ? and if you are to make another *coup de théâtre* of it, and boast that the French army did not retire from Belgium till the Powers of Europe had named the fortresses to be demolished, that may be very useful to Périer's government, and highly gratifying to the good people of Paris, but it will be so at the expense of the administration of Lord Grey, and of the just pride of the English nation, to say nothing about the other three ; and I added that, however much we wished well to Périer, there is no reason why we should undergo humiliation to give him strength.

We discussed this matter to-day in Cabinet, and it was agreed that all we could do would be to begin the discussion between the four Powers and Leopold, for the purpose of selecting the

fortresses to be dismantled ; but that France could not possibly be a party to this discussion, and that the retreat of her troops cannot be coupled with this question, but must stand upon the grounds upon which it was originally placed.

Foreign Office : August 25, 1831.

I have received with great satisfaction the despatches and letters,¹ which arrived yesterday and to-day, announcing that orders have been given for the evacuation of Belgium by the French.

With respect to the fortresses, we will do all we possibly can to meet the wishes of the French Government ; but they must allow us to do it in our own way. The proposition that we should empower Adair to treat with Maubourg² on this matter is quite inadmissible. The question is a military question, which must be decided upon full consideration, and not by spinning a teetotum. It is only here in London that all the reasons which bear upon it can be fully brought into discussion ; and Austria and Prussia, but especially the latter, have as strong an interest as we have in the decision.

Foreign Office : August 26, 1831.

My dear Granville,—You have done capitally, and the successful result of your efforts is most satisfactory.³ Our opponents are now obliged to tender us their *doleful congratulations* upon our fortunate escape from what they looked forward to as a certain piece of luck.

I cannot wonder at Leopold's wishing to retain for a time some portion of the French troops. But when we have the Dutch acceptance of our armistice, and the Belgian army is a little reorganized, he may be able to let them go, and the sooner this is done the better. Adair says that Belliard tells him that

¹ *Extract of Letter from Lord Granville.*

‘Paris : August 21, 1831.

‘Pérrier promised that he would endeavour to do what he could to meet our wishes ; and when, in answer to what he had mentioned of the request of Leopold to retain some part of the French troops for his protection, I said that *this request ought rather to have been addressed to the conference than to the French Government*, he fully acquiesced in the justice of that observation.’ Lord Palmerston has noted on this the words ‘*Quite true.*’

² Latour Maubourg, French Ambassador.

³ The French Government had by this time promised to withdraw their troops, though they had not done it.

there would be danger of Orange risings if the French were all to go. This may be true, and certainly is an additional reason for keeping a *small force*. *But I do not think the presence of a foreign garrison good for any sovereign*; and if Leopold means to stay at Brussels, he should have his own people about him, and none others.

I hope we may soon be able to come to an agreement in the conference as to the proper terms of peace between the parties, and then we must tell them *that is what they are to have*; for as to their coming to any common understanding together, they would not do it in six years, instead of six weeks, if it depended upon their convincing each other. By giving the upper nook of Limburg, the whole of the right bank of the Meuse and Maastricht to Holland, the Dutch interests as to territory would be amply provided for; and Prussia, being secured on her own frontier, would probably be pretty easy as to other arrangements; though I see that Bulow has a mighty longing for the fortress of Luxembourg, with a small district round it: not that he has ever dropped the slightest hint of such a notion, but knowing him pretty accurately, I see it pretty clearly at the bottom of the well. This may account for Werther's readiness to give France Philippeville and Marienburg: the consent of Prussia to that cession would be purchased by the acquiescence of France in the cession of the Luxembourg fortress to Prussia. *But let us stave off all these nibblings: if once these great Powers begin to taste blood, they will never be satisfied with one bite, but will speedily devour their victim.*

Talleyrand has for some time past been preaching to all who would listen to him the necessity of partitioning Belgium, and sending Leopold to Claremont, unless he were made Grand Duke of Luxembourg; and he put up Alexander Baring the other day to broach this doctrine in the House of Commons. There would be no harm, I think, if you were to hint to P  rier that this sort of language held by the French Ambassador here, in the face of the known engagements of France, is calculated to excite in the public mind those suspicions of French policy and intentions which have broken out lately in Parliament and in the papers, and therefore must be prejudicial to the French Government, besides tending to impair the cordial good understanding which we wish to see maintained, not only between the two Governments, but between the two nations.

You will have seen very violent language in the 'Times' against France. We cannot help it. The 'Times' breaks loose

every now and then, and goes its own way. However, its tone of late cannot have done much harm, since it must have tended to convince the French that the Government would be supported in the tone we have been taking about Belgium, and might even have gone further without exceeding the sentiments of others.

It has been seen that Lord Palmerston consented to a small body of French troops remaining in Belgium, but he soon repented of this:—

Foreign Office: September 3, 1831.

We shall never get on with the Belgians till the French are out of Belgium. There is no end to the intrigues which their presence gives rise to. I do not believe a word about the danger to which Leopold is exposed from what they call anarchy: it is all a pretence got up between Brussels and Paris. No doubt the late invasion greatly unhinged the Government, and unsettled men's minds and revived the hopes of the Orangists; but since the Dutch are gone, and cannot come back again, surely Leopold's army and civic guards must be able to maintain order; and if they *will* not do so, and uphold their King, I do not see what right we have to interfere in the matter. But this is a pretence: the French want to push their own interests, and specially the fortress question, as is proved by Gérard's asking for the citadel of Tournay.

Foreign Office: September 16, 1831.

So there is an end of the poor Poles! I am heartily sorry for them; but their case had become for some time hopeless. The only thing now to be done is for the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna to take care that that treaty is not violated by Russia.¹

¹ I find these notes for despatches written to Lord Heytesbury on the Polish question:—

'March 22, 1831, to Heytesbury.—The revolt of Poles and their casting off authority of Emperor and King could afford Russian Government no grounds for departing from stipulations of Treaty of Vienna. That revolt cannot release Russia from engagements to other Powers, which had for object not merely welfare of Poles, but security of neighbouring States.

'The article relative to national representation and institutions has not been fulfilled by Russia.

'November 23, 1831.—Recommend amnesty full and complete. The Treaty of Vienna declared that Poland should be attached to Russia by its constitution. A constitution the Emperor of Russia accordingly gave; and it is no forced construction of the meaning of that treaty to consider the constitution so given as existing thenceforth under the sanction of the treaty.

We are quite satisfied with the French communication about the evacuation of Belgium, and have drawn up a civil protocol on the subject which I send you to-day.¹

We have to-day had a conference with Goblet about the fortresses: he is an intelligent and well-conditioned man, and understands the business.

'But argued, same Power which gave may modify or take away; but constitution once given became link which under the treaty binds Poland to Russia, and that link cannot be unimpaired if constitution should not be maintained.

'Constitution carefully guards against any change by mere act of executive authority.

'Art. 31 declares that Polish nation shall for ever possess national representation: a Diet of King and two Chambers.

'Art. 163.—Organic statutes and codes of laws cannot be modified or changed except by King and two Chambers.

'Art. 45.—Every King of Poland shall swear before God and on Scriptures to maintain constitution and cause it to be executed; and Emperor Alexander on November 27, 1815, formally gave this constitution, and declared he adopted it for himself and successors.

'Europe looks to re-establishment of law and justice from submission of Poles, and not to acts of retaliation and vengeance; such acts could not be palliated if resorted to by a Power which has subdued all opposition, and can plead for its measures the necessity of no pressing emergency.

'Has been stated in proclamations of Russia that only a part of Poles had joined revolt, and majority remained faithful.—Innocent should not be punished for guilty; but if whole nation has shared in revolt, proof of deeply-seated discontent not likely to be removed by sweeping abrogation of constitution.

'March 12, 1832.—It does not follow that because war between two states dissolves treaties, therefore civil war annuls constitutions.

'This despatch to be communicated to Count Nesselrode.'

¹ Sept. 15, 1831.

The plenipotentiary of France opened the conference by declaring that the French Government had, of its own free will, resolved upon withdrawing from Belgium the last remaining division of French troops, which had been left there until the present time solely at the express desire of the actual sovereign of the country; that the retreat of this corps will commence on the 25th of this month, and that on the 30th Belgium will be entirely evacuated.

In reply to this declaration, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia expressed to the plenipotentiary of France the satisfaction with which they received it. This new demonstration of the generous principles by which the policy of France is guided, and of her love of peace, had been expected by her allies with entire confidence, and the plenipotentiaries requested the Prince de Talleyrand to be persuaded that their courts would know how to appreciate at its just value the resolution taken by the French Government.

Lord Palmerston's letters on these most important questions concerning Belgium have been thus largely inserted because they strongly bring out the leading qualities of his character, both as an individual and a diplomatist—those qualities being boldness of language and directness of purpose.

A critic might be tempted to say that he was rather prone to suspect intentions and to conceive prejudices; but whilst allowing he was open to these charges, it is but just to observe that by his firmness of conduct and clearness of argument he finally succeeded in carrying his two points, viz., the departure of the French troops from Belgium; and the destruction by Belgium and the allies of those fortresses which they deemed the most desirable to destroy, without taking into consultation the Power against whose disposition for conquest they had been erected. The fortresses destroyed were Menin, Ath, Mons, Philippeville, and Marienburg, the last two of which the French had first wished to acquire, and then desired to have left, with a wish (not improbably) of subsequently obtaining them. There can be no doubt that the whole of this correspondence shows that disposition for conquest, aggrandizement, and glory which distinguished the French nation, and which made M. de Chateaubriand say '*La France n'est qu'un soldat.*' It is the same vivacity, the same energy, the same chivalrous impulses which have made them constantly anxious to extend their frontiers and to be careless of their lives; which have made them the life, the animation, the glory of Continental Europe—the cultivators of art, the diffusers of civilization, the generous sympathizers with every humiliated nationality in its distress. We must take them for such as they are—uniting ourselves frankly with them where our interests and principles are the same, defending ourselves frankly and boldly against them where our principles or interests differ—not showing subserviency in their prosperity, nor indifference in their adversity—and remembering that when they could unite, the union

of France and England has been hitherto the peace and prosperity of the world. Another difficulty had now, however, to be met.

The Dutch Government had acceded to the first plan of separation proposed by the conference; to this the Belgians had refused their assent. It has been seen that in order to facilitate the election of King Leopold the allies had altered their original stipulations as contained in twenty-four articles, and had adopted new ones contained in eighteen. To these, the Belgians, not without difficulty, agreed, whilst the Dutch would not agree. But after the inroad of the Dutch and the defeat of the Belgians, Holland stood in a position very different from that which she had previously occupied. She was no longer the Power which had been driven from Belgium by a successful revolution, but the Power which, after that revolution had been fully organized, showed a capacity to vanquish it, and would have done so but for the intervention of a foreign state. It was impossible to deny that this added greatly to her moral force; and it was now thought that all circumstances, past and present, should be taken into fair consideration, and some final resolve imposed on the two parties.

This was done in an arrangement consisting, like the first, of twenty-four articles.¹ Belgians and Dutch

¹ There were, during the course of these transactions, three projects for the settlement of the differences between Holland and Belgium.

The first gave Holland all her ancient territory and Luxembourg to the King of Holland, and to Belgium all that had not belonged to Holland in 1790.

The second left the question of Luxembourg undecided, seeming to suggest it might be assigned to Belgium, maintaining its established relations with the Germanic Diet, the King and kingdom of Holland receiving adequate compensation; and pointed out that Belgium was entitled by the first proposition which the King of Holland had accepted, to various portions of territory which were considered Dutch, but which had not belonged to Holland in 1790.

In the last the conference took into its own hands the disposal of those possessions which had neither belonged to Holland nor Brabant in former times, but had become annexed to the monarchy of the Netherlands, distributing such possessions in the manner it thought most equitable and convenient between them.

alike objected ; but the Belgians finally dropped their opposition, owing, no doubt, to the influence and moderation of their King, who nevertheless bitterly complained.

'Here am I,' he said in a letter to Lord Palmerston, 'who was only induced to accept the throne of Belgium on certain conditions, which the allies solemnly guaranteed to me. The King of Holland defies the allies, and attacks me in consequence of those conditions, and now I am required to agree to things which, if they had been imposed on me originally, I should have refused.' The correspondence of this monarch would show the ability with which he defended the cause he represented ; but the preceding letters have already, perhaps, trespassed beyond the limits of quotation with respect to Belgium, and only two short extracts therefore can be given, which will sufficiently attest King Leopold's appreciation of Lord Palmerston's conduct.

January 2, 1832.—It gives me the sincerest pleasure to be able to thank you most warmly for the honest and vigorous line of policy which you have adopted in the present complicated state of European affairs. The fortress business is satisfactorily settled.

Again, April 17, 1832.—I must do you the justice to repeat what I have often already expressed—it is impossible to adopt a more honourable, straightforward line of policy than you do.

King Leopold, in reality, was much too sensible a man not to see that Belgium had still to be legally created ; that it had never yet existed as a kingdom, and might at any moment pass away under some new combination if it did not receive a legitimate existence. He was therefore inclined to accept any conditions at all reasonable, and which he could get his people to sanction, providing those final conditions were to be really final and made imperative if necessary on the resisting party.

Finally all the Powers agreed to the twenty-four articles, though Austria and Prussia, and Russia especially, made some reserves as to the navigation of

rivers, the construction of roads, and the partition of the debt—questions which, as they related exclusively to Holland and Belgium, Russia left to an agreement between the parties themselves.

M. Van de Weyer, then Minister in London, had the courage to accept an Lord Palmerston's advice the arrangement thus made, notwithstanding such reserves; an act which saved his country from interminable embarrassment, though some of the more sanguine patriots in the Belgian Chamber at the time condemned it. The important thing, in fact, was to get all the Powers to agree to the territorial limits that were to be assigned to the two countries, and to place that country, henceforth to be considered neutral, inviolable, and independent, under their common safeguard. The matters reserved were altogether secondary; and it would have been most unwise to have rejected the concurrence of Russia in the settlement of all the greater affairs because she did not wish to bind herself so imperatively as to the smaller ones.

A decision, moreover, was taken by the conference, which of itself established two orders of questions. The territorial delimitation it had fixed was pronounced to be incapable of change, and to be effected if necessary by compulsion. The other questions it still left within the domain of negotiation.

A difference, however, here again took place. The three Northern courts, whilst agreeing that measures of compulsion had been necessary as to territory, would have made those measures of a pecuniary nature. The two Western Powers thought this mode of action more dilatory, more uncertain, and in reality more oppressive to the Dutch nation. Besides, as the convention of the 15th of November was considered not so much a joint treaty as a separate one, which each of the Powers had made with Belgium by separate ratifications at separate times, each held itself free to carry out its provisions in the manner it deemed best. Consequently, after a certain delay, which was granted in order to

give Count Orloff, a special envoy of the Emperor Nicholas, the opportunity of dissuading the King of Holland from a useless resistance, on his declaration that King William's obstinacy was unconquerable, an embargo was placed on Dutch vessels, the harbour of Antwerp was blockaded by an English fleet, and the fortress attacked by a French army. Meanwhile, the decided conduct of our Government in all preceding matters had strengthened instead of diminishing the confidence of France and England in each other. The French knew what we would tolerate, and what we would not; we knew that the French would not do anything manifestly unjust that we resisted. There was no jealousy this time, therefore, as to the employment of a French force, no new disputes or demands as to its withdrawal.

In this way, Antwerp and its fortress became finally and unequivocally the property of the Belgians. As the King of Holland would not give up the two small forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek, he was punished by the Belgians retaining, pending an ultimate agreement, those parts of Limburg and Luxembourg which were eventually to belong to the Dutch. This ultimate agreement was not concluded till April, 1839; but in 1833 an indefinite armistice was established; and from this period all that was important concerning Belgium might be considered settled.

It will be seen that in the correspondence between Lord Palmerston and his brother he does not speak with much amiability of the conduct of King William of Holland; but when Count Orloff had given him up there was little to say in his favour; and in fact, that which might have been a dignified firmness, if his prolonged resistance could have had any patriotic result, was querulous obstinacy when he was uselessly causing expense and discomfort to his own subjects, and keeping open a question which unforeseen events might again render troublesome and dangerous to Europe.

To be just one must acknowledge there were many

phases in these transactions, and it is difficult to take any one and affirm that this party was entirely right in it, and that one entirely wrong; but throughout them Lord Palmerston kept his eye fixed steadily on the general result, taking for his guide the desire to place the two countries in such a position as would tend, when the generations which had raised their hands against each other had passed away, to draw their descendants together by connecting interests, instead of tearing them apart by conflicting passions. The wisdom of his policy can be tested now, when we ask ourselves—at nearly fifty years' distance—whether, if either Holland and Belgium were threatened to-morrow by an invading army, they would not be more likely to coalesce as separate states for their common defence, than when their names were united and their hearts divided under 'the Kingdom of the Netherlands.'

CHAPTER IX.

EVENTS IN EUROPE—PART TAKEN BY ENGLAND IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN—CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. TEMPLE FROM 1833 TO MAY 12, 1834, INCLUDING MENTION OF THE QUADRUPLÉ ALLIANCE.

DURING the negotiations relating to Belgium which have just been described, important events were taking place in other parts of Europe. The Polish revolution was put down by Russia, and the nationality of Poland trampled under foot. Mehemet Ali, the Governor of Egypt, having overrun Syria, threatened Constantinople. In Germany the princes had combined in 1832 to suppress the liberties that had been granted to their subjects. In Italy, Austria had interfered to maintain the Government of the Pope. Greece, disgraced by the assassination of the illustrious statesman¹ who had dedicated his life to her regeneration, had obtained a sovereign predestined to be unfortunate, and a better frontier, which was purchased from the Porte. This consisted in an extension of territory to the north from the Gulf of Arta to that of Volo, and was paid for out of a loan of two millions and a-half sterling, guaranteed by the Powers on the accession of King Otho—‘whom the Muses themselves’ (so said the poets of Greece) ‘descended from Helicon to proclaim.’

Such were the events in which we played a subordinate part, for they took place in countries more or less beyond the sphere of our control; but there were countries placed within our reach, where our beneficent influence might be felt, and the prestige of England,

¹ Capo d'Istria.

connected with the principles of freedom, made to prevail. To these countries, namely, Portugal and Spain, our foreign policy had been principally directed.

In the former, Don Miguel, by a series of acts betraying stupidity, cruelty, and injustice, had discredited himself equally with Europe and with the people over whom he had established a temporary tyranny. Forced to give a degrading satisfaction to England and France for unjustifiable violence committed on their subjects, he had day by day rendered himself more odious and contemptible to his own countrymen. Don Pedro, moreover, had arrived in Europe, and by a successful expedition seized Oporto, July 9, 1832. Encouraged, no doubt, by the well-known sentiments of our Government, and the belief in success that those sentiments inspired, he had found means to raise money and equip a fleet, which, when it passed from the hands of Admiral Sartorius to those of Admiral Napier, destroyed the usurper's. Not long afterwards Don Pedro was in possession of Lisbon.

In the meantime a new state of things had arisen in Spain. By the old laws of that kingdom, females were included in the royal succession. On May 10, 1713, Philip V. introduced the Salic law. Charles IV. had, in 1789, re-established the ancient constitution. The Cortes, in 1812, had reverted to the Salic law. King Ferdinand had, by decree in March, 1830, revived the decree of Charles IV. But in a dangerous illness which shortly afterwards occurred, the priestly party surrounding the sick monarch's privacy had prevailed on him to annul this decree of March; thus leaving his brother, Don Carlos—the avowed partizan of the extreme absolute party—inheritor of the throne. Ferdinand, however, had recently married a Neapolitan princess, young, beautiful, clever, and ambitious. By her he had two daughters, whose claims she naturally protected; and at her representations, having unexpectedly recovered from his indisposition, he again re-established the old law, 31st December, 1832, and settled the crown, after

his death, on his daughter's head. The assent of the Cortes had, moreover, on 20th June, 1833, sanctioned this resolution, so that the infant Princess Isabella was proclaimed Queen, and her mother Christina, Regent, when Ferdinand, who did not long survive his last dispositions as to the succession, died, September 29, 1833. Some of the old nobility, a large party in the clergy and army, and the large majority of the peasantry, no doubt, if they had been consulted, were in favour of Don Carlos, considering that he had lost his rightful position through the weakness of an old man and the intrigues of a pretty woman. On the other hand, all those who wished to escape from absolute government and monkish thralldom fixed their hopes on a new order of things. The minister of the day, M. de Zea, would willingly have maintained the young queen's rights, and preserved, though in an enlightened spirit, the old institutions. But the Queen Regent had the tact to see that she must have more than her dead husband's testament to give value to her living daughter's royal inheritance, claimed as this was by a prince of mature age, whose partisans had already taken arms, and whose cause was supported by the clergy—the most influential body in the kingdom. She allowed herself therefore to become the head of a constitutional party; and thus, there were Don Miguel in Portugal, Don Carlos in Spain, pretenders to the crown, against the law, and in favour of arbitrary government; and the two Infantas—Donna Maria and Queen Isabella—supported, the one by her father, the other by her mother, in favour of more liberal opinions, and with more plausible reasons for claiming the royal authority.

To understand the following letters we must also shortly recall events that happened in the East. The battle of Konieh on the 21st December, 1832, had opened to Ibrahim Pasha the road to Constantinople. The Sultan, alarmed, demanded troops and a fleet from Russia. The request was granted; but before the fleet arrived from Sebastopol, Admiral Roussin, the French Ambas-

sador, drew up, with the consent of the Porte, the basis of an arrangement with Mehemet Ali; and the Turkish Government, hoping this arrangement would be accepted, was induced by the French admiral to request that the Russian fleet on its arrival should be withdrawn. Lord Palmerston, in his letter of 21st March, alludes to this stage of the affair. But Mehemet Ali refused the arrangement. Ibrahim Pasha moved forwards. The demand for Russian assistance was renewed, and 15,000 Russian troops were landed in April on the shores of the Bosphorus. Finally, the Turks yielded to most of the demands of Mehemet Ali, and on July 8 concluded a treaty with Russia called the Treaty of Unkiar Skelesi, by which in fact they placed themselves under Russian protection by closing the Dardanelles to the ships of war of other nations. England and France protested, but their remonstrances remained unheeded.

Foreign Office: March 21, 1833.

My dear William,—I have received your letters from Florence and Rome. I am glad you have had a prosperous journey, and had got so near to its end.¹ Roussin has settled capitally the Turkish dispute with the Egyptian, and has done well in sending back the Russian admiral with a flea in his ear. The Russians will no doubt be very angry, but that will not signify.

The terms to be imposed on the pasha are good, inasmuch as he does not get Damascus or Aleppo, and so has not the avenues of Mesopotamia; and, moreover, he is to hold his pashaliks from year to year, as he is supposed to hold that of Egypt; and he is not to be like the Barbary Deys, which was what he wanted. His real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom, including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself; but as it would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be. We must try to help the Sultan in organising his army, navy, and

¹ Mr. Temple had been gazetted British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Naples.

finances; and if he can get those three departments into good order he may still hold his ground.

Domestic affairs go well. You see by what spanking majorities this reformed House of Commons is passing the most violent bill ever carried into a law; which combines in one act the Insurrection Act, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus, and Martial Law.¹ It is a real *tour de force*, but then it is to be followed by remedial measures, and there is the difference between us and Metternich or the Pope; we coerce as they do, but then we redress grievances as they do not. It is also to be remarked that few absolute Governments could by their own authority establish such a system of coercion as that which the freely chosen representatives of the people are placing at the command of the Government of this country.

The session must necessarily be a long one, but be it ever so long we shall hardly dispose of all the great questions pending: India Charter, Bank Charter, Slavery, Poor Laws, Irish Church Reform, English Commutation of Tithes, &c. Some, however, must be got through. The King and Queen are highly cordial with us; and the court, finding they cannot shake us off, think they may as well make us friends.

Your horses went off some time ago, and I hope will arrive safe. Biondetta has presented me with a seventh colt by The Colonel²—there never was such a mare for colts; and if they all turn out as well-shaped as Moses, I shall have no cause to complain.

Stanhope Street: April 19, 1833.

I am concerned to inform you that the whole of the Temple family, with all its connections, have been suffering more or less under the prevailing epidemic;³ but I, by right of primogeniture, have had a larger portion than the rest.

I have shut my door upon the *corps diplomatique*, because

¹ Lord Palmerston here refers to the measure known as the Coercion Bill (Act IV. of 3 and 4 William IV.), brought in by the Government for the suppression of disturbances in Ireland. The first reading, March 5, was carried after a debate of five nights by 466 to 89. On the 11th, the second reading was carried by 363 to 84; and in the various divisions in committee the numbers in favour of the provisions of the Bill showed the strength of the Government: 246 to 85, 352 to 70, 123 to 44, 205 to 40, &c. On March 29 the Bill was read a third time and passed by a majority of 435 to 86.

² Won the Leger in 1828, after running a dead heat for the Derby with Cadland.

³ Influenza.

during the holidays there really was no business of importance; and if I had let in one I should have had them all, some out of kindness, some to fill their despatches; and I should have been tied to the stake, to be baited as long as they chose to bestow their tediousness upon me. I have seen some, however, who had real business. I wrote to the king last Wednesday to excuse myself from the levée; and Taylor,¹ in answer, said he was commanded by the King to desire I would take care of myself, and not play any tricks; by which, he said, he did not mean diplomatic tricks, of which the monopoly belonged to the Dutch King and Ancillon.

We have made no way with the former. Dedel has given us a note, which is just like all the former performances from the Hague, shuffling, evasive, and unreasonable. In short, the King is determined to do anything rather than make any arrangement whatever, partly from his unconquerable desire of recovering Belgium, partly from his fearing that when peace is made, and the Dutch have to pay their bill, they will vote a king too expensive a luxury, and reduce their establishment down to a stadtholdership. In the meantime the three Powers are saying one thing here and another at the Hague, and trying, for various reasons, to spin the thing on as long as they can. They see that it cannot now lead to war, and they think it gives us and the French useful occupation, which prevents us from meddling with other things.

You see that Zea² has gained a victory at Madrid, has ousted his dissentient and liberal colleagues, banished the nobles who would not follow his orders, and imprisoned the Queen in her palace. This seems to me too violent a system to succeed long, and Zea is not a man of sufficient capacity and scope of mind to play the tyrant with effect. The wine merchant and the consul predominate over the minister and the statesman, and he is utterly devoid of dignity of character and commanding qualities of mind. To be sure, he is in the *pays des aveugles*, and therefore may be king. In the meantime he is creating a union of all parties, but a union against himself, and an explosion seems not improbable. While Zea continues Mayor of the Palace,

¹ Sir Herbert Taylor, Private Secretary to the King.

² Zea Bermudez, Spanish Prime Minister during the last days of Ferdinand and the commencement of Queen Christina's regency, opposed himself equally to Don Carlos and his partizans, and to the Liberals, who wished to establish a constitutional government. For a time he succeeded against both, but ended, as a matter of course, by being overthrown.

there is no chance of our persuading the Spanish Government to come to any arrangement upon Portuguese affairs. Zea is bound to Miguel as Faust to Mephistopheles—whether merely by obstinate vanity and prejudice, or, as some people say, by promises of titles and estates in the event of Miguel's success, it is difficult to say ; but I verily believe he would rather give up Ferdinand, or even Madame Zea herself, than his beloved Miguel—it is the passion of a mother for her deformed child.

As to the contest between Pedro and Miguel, it is anybody's race yet. The story of Sartorius¹ having run away with the fleet is not true, and, I trust, for the honour of an Englishman, not likely to be so. A vigorous and daring effort might carry Lisbon, and dethrone Miguel in a very few days. It is not unlikely that the changes in Spain may lead to some such attempt, by proving that nothing is to be expected from diplomacy, and that the bayonet and not the pen must decide the issue.

You will learn the result of Turkish affairs much sooner than we shall ; but I cannot believe that Mehemet Ali will think of standing out against Austria, France, Great Britain, and Russia, any one of whom could crush him with their little fingers. If he yields (with a bad grace, no matter), Turkey may go on as she is for some time longer ; and if the Sultan really has any stuff in him, he might in a few years make himself independent, by well organising his army and navy, his finances and his administration of justice. But it is very difficult for one man to reform and set to-rights a large empire ; especially when that one man does not know what to aim at, or how to go at it, and when all those about him who ought to help him thwart and oppose him. I wonder whether Metternich would allow that some alterations might be useful in Turkey, or whether he would extend even to that country his abhorrence of change.

The affairs of Italy seem to be in a miserable state, and the governors appear to be doing all they can to make themselves hated by the governed.² I speak more particularly of the Papal States and Modena : as to the latter, the Grand Duke is mad,

¹ There had been a quarrel between Don Pedro and Admiral Sartorius, who at first commanded Don Pedro's fleet, about arrears of pay. The sailors mutinied, and the Admiral had threatened to confiscate the fleet in payment of his men ; but the affair was settled by Sartorius being paid and resigning his command, in which he was succeeded by the more enterprising Napier.

² The Papal Government, amongst other unpopular acts, had restored various taxes which had been reduced or abolished in consequence of the popular demands during the Revolution of 1831.

and that accounts for, though it cannot justify, his vagaries. The cardinals are supposed to be in their sound senses, and it is lamentable to see what the sound sense of a cardinal amounts to.

Here, we are going on well, and the present Government is as likely to stand as any that ever existed. In fact, no other Government can be formed; Peel and the Tories would find no support in the House of Commons or the country, and a Government of O'Connell, Hume, and Cobbett might do when we become a republic, but would be impossible under a monarchy.

Althorp will be able to repeal taxes to the amount of a million this year, not a bad financial exploit.

Stanhope Street: April 23, 1833.

The Sardinian *chargé d'affaires* has communicated to me, by order of his court, the treaty offensive and defensive with Naples against the Barbary powers. It seems a natural alliance, and one is glad to see the Italian states looking to each other for support. We hear that a declaration is likely to be made at the Hague by the three Powers, telling the King of the Netherlands that he is no longer of any use to them, and that he bores them to death—that they have now started fresh game in the East, and beg he would have the kindness to finish his affairs.

Foreign Office: May 7, 1833.

The last accounts we have from Constantinople are of the 16th of April, and by them we are led to infer that matters will be settled between the Sultan and the Pasha, as the only undecided question was which of the two should have Adana.¹

The settlement of this matter will be a great advantage, for if it had gone on the French and Russians might have come to blows, and that would have been a war in Europe. We are going to send Sir Pulteney Malcolm back to the Mediterranean, and he will take another three-decker with him, so that he will have two three-deckers, two large 74's, and two 50-gun frigates, equal to 74's, and besides a large armed steam-vessel, which he says is more useful to him than another 74, as it carries four heavy 32-pounders, one of which, as Paddy might say, is, I believe, a 64-pounder.²

¹ On May 5 the Sultan gave Adana up to Mehemet Ali.

² It is to be observed that generally when Lord Palmerston talks of diplomacy, he also talks of *ships of war*. His postscript to a diplomatic act is an allusion to the force that is to support it.

We have not settled who succeeds Malcolm in the North Sea, but it will probably be Dundonald, for the benefit of the Dutchman, in case he should drive us to war.

The Government have fully recovered their shake¹ of the other day, and it has indeed rather made us stronger instead of weaker, by proving that there are no respectable set of men ready to take our places. We must stay in by the necessity of things.

Though I asked Thompson to put off his motion on Friday last, because my whistle was not then quite in tune for a long debate, yet I am not quite well again in every respect.

The Duke of Orleans is arrived, and I dined at Talleyrand's with him yesterday. He is wonderfully improved since I saw him in Paris in October, 1830. He was very well then, but he has since become a man, is grown very good-looking, and has got the manners and deportment which belong to his station. He is really a very creditable-looking heir apparent to a crown, and seems, from the short conversation I had with him, to have become as much developed in mind as in person.

There is no truth whatever in the Tory reports of a quarrel between me and Grey. No two men, I believe, ever went on better together in office, and very few half as well. I never met with anybody with whom I found myself so constantly agreeing. The King was in a horrid fright while he thought we might go out, and positively commanded us to stay.

Foreign Office: June 25, 1833.

I am glad to be able to tell you that the storm which hung over the Government is pretty well blown over, and the ministry may now be considered safe. The Duke made a grand mistake in beating us in the Lords about Portugal. The question being

¹ Lord Palmerston here alludes to a defeat Government sustained on April 26, when Sir W. Ingilby, M.P. for one of the divisions of Lincolnshire, moved that the malt-tax should be reduced from 20s. 8d. to 10s. per quarter. However, on April 30, on Sir John Key's motion to repeal the house and window taxes, Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, moved as an amendment, 'That a great deficiency of revenue would be occasioned by the reduction of the malt-tax to 10s. per quarter, and by the repeal of the taxes on houses and windows, which could only be supplied by the substitution of a general tax upon property; and that, as the effect of that course would be to change the whole financial system of the country, it would at present be inexpedient to adopt it.' This was carried by 285 to 131; and when Sir W. Ingilby moved for leave to bring in a bill founded on his first motion, leave was refused by 238 to 162 votes.

one in itself unimportant, our defeat upon it did not compel us to resign, and yet it was a question so intimately blended with general principles of government that the House of Commons was sure to take it up as it did, in the opposite sense, and to bear us triumphantly through. Nothing therefore was to be gained by the victory of the day, while the display of strength put us on our guard with reference to future occasions, on which a defeat would have been more inconvenient, and embarrassing. We have profited by the warning. The King has written a very strong letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury for the benefit of the right reverend bench. The peers in general have been assailed with warnings from all quarters. We have modified our Irish Church Bill, and though the Tories may still fight us upon it when it gets into the Lords, and possibly may beat us upon some minor details, yet I think we are quite safe against any important defeat. The fact is—though the Duke and some of his friends will not and cannot believe it—a Tory Government is an utter impossibility in the present state of the public feeling. The country would not stand it, even if the House of Commons would; but the House of Commons would *not*, and such a Government would be wholly unable to conduct the affairs of the country even for the shortest possible time. I condole with the Holy Alliance, but they must bear with us still, for they cannot get rid of us. The King was in despair at the idea of a change so brought about at this moment, for he foresaw all the evils of which it must be productive. Peel also was, I believe, by no means well pleased at the move made by the Duke, and I understand that he was not at all consulted upon the occasion; in fact, there is very little communication between Peel and the Duke.

We have nearly settled our East Indian question and our Slavery Abolition measure. The Indian Company are pretty well satisfied with our proposed arrangements for the renewal of their charter; and both West Indians and saints are moderately dissatisfied with our plan for the abolition of slavery. To be sure, we give the West Indians a tolerably good compensation. I really believe that the twenty millions which are to be voted for them are about the whole value of all the estates at the present market price; so that they will receive nearly the value of their estates, and keep those estates into the bargain. I must say it is a splendid instance of generosity and justice, unexampled in the history of the world; to see a nation (for it is the national will, and not merely the resolve of the

Government or the Parliament) emancipate seven hundred and fifty thousand slaves, and pay *twenty millions sterling* to their owners as compensation for the loss they will sustain. People sometimes are greatly generous at the expense of others, but it is not often that men are found to pay so high a price for the luxury of doing a noble action.

Some persons on the Continent want to have it supposed that the English are so bent upon economy and retrenchment that no provocation or injury would rouse them to incur the expense of another war. This vote of so large a sum for the satisfaction of a principle ought to show those persons that it would not be safe to rely too much upon their calculation.

Our session can hardly end till the beginning of August. I have individually had an easy time of it; for the House has been too much engrossed with domestic matters of the utmost importance to pay any attention to foreign affairs; but I shall be glad when the session is over, as perhaps I may then manage to get down to Broadlands for a week, and I long for a little run. I have, however, quite recovered from my attack of influenza, and feel no remaining effects from it, and I have relapsed into my usual and habitual state of uninterrupted good health.

We have a flight of German princes come over to us; but Princess Victoria is hardly old enough as yet to make it worth their while to come. The Duke of Brunswick, the Prince of Solms, two Dukes of Wurtemberg, Prince Reuss-Lebenstein-Gera, have all been seized with a sudden desire to see England. We shall see what will come of it all.

We expect Dedel back again next week. It looks as if the Dutch King really meant to negotiate for a definitive treaty; and indeed the convention of May 21,¹ by placing Belgium in a position in which she can exist without a definitive treaty, takes away one great inducement which the King had for refusing to sign such a treaty.

Foreign Office: Sept. 3, 1833.

The end of the session is a great relief. I hope you liked the Speech; it is long, but I think good. The King spoke the passage about Turkey with emphasis, and looked round at Lieven to see how he took it.² Metternich is delighted with

¹ Provided for an armistice until the conclusion of a definite treaty.

² The passage alluded to was the following: 'The hostilities which had disturbed the peace of Turkey have been terminated, and you may be assured that my attention will be carefully directed to any events

the Russian treaty with the Sultan: he is easily pleased! Maria's affairs go on prosperously in Portugal; she has now the race, though she has not got to the winning-post. Miguel and Bourmont deserve to be hanged for burning all the wine at Oporto; there never was so atrocious an outrage. What the three Sovereigns are going to meet for in Bohemia, time will show. Nesselrode writes to Lieven (to be shown to me) that it is only for an *épanchement de cœur*, and that politics have nothing to do with it. How can people take the trouble of writing such stuff! It is as if they wished to prevent one from believing *anything* they say.

Stanhope Street: Oct. 8, 1833.

I am glad to hear the King of Naples perseveres in his conciliatory system: pray encourage it as far as you can *without appearing to meddle too much in matters which do not concern us*.¹ But if the despotic courts frown upon him, he may be more likely to value the smiles of England.

The news we have had from Spain and Portugal is highly important and interesting. From the first we have just received, by the Bayonne telegraph, the news of the death of Ferdinand. From Portugal our Lisbon news is of September 24, announcing the sudden departure of Bourmont² and his officers for Spain—evidently in consequence of accounts they had received of Ferdinand's approaching danger. Portugal was to them only an interlude; their real scene of action is Spain. It is impossible to speculate here as to the turn of events in Spain; but Vial, the Spanish minister, declared to me that civil war would immediately break out, and that he expected Carlos to go to Toledo, and there to declare himself King. The Duke of Wellington, I hear, says, 'Leave them alone; they will not do each other much harm.' However, I think the Christinos will carry the day; but if Carlos makes an attempt, there will be a reaction, *and it will end in constitutionalising Spain*.

Maria's cause has won the day in Portugal, though the race is not quite over; but the departure of Bourmont and any difficulties in Spain must be fatal to Miguel. He has been supported

that may affect the present state and future independence of that empire.'

¹ The sentence in italics is in strong contradiction to the charge which Lord Palmerston's opponents used to make of his restless desire to interfere in everything.

² Marshal Bourmont, known as the Conqueror of Algiers, commanded Don Miguel's forces in Portugal for some time.

for some time past by Bourmont and Spain, and without those props he must fall. I expect soon to hear of his retreat from before Lisbon ; and as soon as his army begins to fall back it will fall to pieces also. The triumph of Maria, and the accession of Isabella, will be important events in Europe, and will give great strength to the Liberal party. England, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain, looked upon merely as a mass of opinion, form a powerful body in Europe ; and Greece, further on, is rising into a state upon similar principles.

What have been the subjects of discussion at Schwedt and Munchengrätz seems to be gradually getting out ; and the *épanchemens d'amitié*, which Nesselrode desired Lieven to tell me were the only reasons for these meetings, seem to have consisted of a very general political benevolence. An eventual partition of Turkey between Austria and Russia is thought to be one of the topics ; and this seems to me very probable. It is needless to say that England and France would oppose this to the utmost of their means. I told Esterhazy of this report, and said it was very inconsistent with what Neumann¹ had been ordered to tell me six months ago by Metternich—that if Russia attempted to appropriate to herself one inch of Turkish territory, it would be war with Austria. Esterhazy said that Metternich had never gone quite so far with him, but had told him that Russia had frequently asked him to consider what should be substituted for the Sultan and his empire if they should fall ; and that Metternich had always evaded the discussion, saying that his object was to maintain what exists, and that it was therefore needless for him to inquire what should be set up in its place. Ancillon and Nesselrode do not like our protest² at Constantinople. We shall repeat it at Petersburg ; and we have ordered the 'Caledonia,' a three-decker, and one of the seventy-fours from the Tagus, together with an armed steamer, fully equal to a seventy-four, to join Malcolm off the Dardanelles. This will give him six sail-of-the-line, a steamer, and two or three fifty-gun frigates, besides smaller vessels—a very respectable squadron, three of them three-deckers. We shall send an eighty-gun ship to the Tagus, to keep up our complement of three sail-of-the-line there ; and if things were to end well in that quarter, we should send another line-of-battle ship from thence to Malcolm.

I have not, however, yet authorised Malcolm to go up the Dardanelles. The Cabinet meet the 3rd November, and then we must

¹ Austrian Secretary of Embassy, then Chargé d'Affairs.

² Against the Russian treaty of Unkiar Skelesi, July 8, 1833. (?)

consider this Eastern Question, and give instructions about it. If all remains quiet, of course there is nothing to be done. But an insurrection is probable. If it produces civil war, the Sultan, at the head of one party, may call in the Russians to put down the other; and then comes the question, Shall we let them return, or can we prevent them from doing so? We hear from Odessa that their Black Sea fleet is not to be laid up in ordinary this year; but the Black Sea is difficult of navigation in the winter. The Turkish Government, threatened by Russia, may invite the English and French squadrons to come up to Constantinople, to defend the Bosphorus. My own opinion is, that in such case they ought to go up; and I think that when we have seven liners and the French six, the eleven or twelve Russians will never venture to face us, with a host of transports besides in their train; indeed, the English fleet alone would be enough to stop them.

They have laid down two sail-of-the-line at Archangel, to be sent round to the Black Sea next summer; but we must have some explanation with the Turks about the passage of ships of war through the straits, which, by the treaty of 1809 with us, is declared not allowable.

Another and more likely subject of discussion between the three sovereigns are the affairs of Germany; and this extra congress of prime ministers, which is to take place next December or January, will probably lead to some violent and foolish resolves about Germany, its press, the universities, and the legislative chambers. These sort of measures are likely to recoil upon their authors, and do them more harm than good.

If Portuguese and Spanish affairs were more within their reach, they would have done something about them, but geography forbids. As to Belgium, the three courts¹ are seized with a sudden desire to finish that matter, having probably at last discovered that this question has been the means of bringing England and France into closer contact.

Poor Italy seems in a dreadful state, at least the Papal territories. The Emperor of Austria will hardly venture to take the title of Protector of Italy. I believe the *Times* invented the report in order to hang on it a flaming article against Austria.

At home we are going on well. Ireland is perfectly quiet—more than it ever was before. In England our harvest has been good. The unions are dwindling; the manufacturers are

¹ Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

all employed, and everything prosperous. A part of this prosperity has been owing, however, to an over-issue of Bank-notes by the Bank of England; and when they contract their issues again, as they will do a few months hence, we shall have distress and complaint again. This is the evil of paper; and even the abolition of one-pound notes does not wholly protect us.

I continue very well, though still confined much to London; but last month I was a few days at Panshanger, and once or twice at Windsor for a day, and got some long rides, which did me great good.

I have no immediate prospect of Broadlands; but I hope to get there in November or December, and that will suit me just as well as now, or rather better, if I should be able to get a gallop or two over the forest. How does Moses turn out? His younger brother is now in work, and promises well.

Foreign Office: Dec. 3, 1833.

All is going on well here in England, and the country prospering greatly. O'Connell's Irish Parliament has come down to an American State Legislature, a large Quarter Sessions with no political functions.

In Europe things are going on not amiss on the whole. We have won in Portugal, though Miguel is not quite driven out; but it is impossible that he should not be so in the end, and if Pedro had proper sense he would have expelled Miguel already. In Spain liberal measures must be pursued, which is saying in other words that the influence of England and France must take the place of that of the three northern Powers. We have reconciled Sardinia and France, and they are both very much obliged to us. We have left the Swiss alone, and they have settled their internal disputes.

Austria seems to have failed in her attempt to establish her Italian Confederation, of which she was to be the protectress; and we understand that the failure was very much owing to the independent spirit of the King of Naples. This is a feeling, on his part that deserves encouragement; and whenever you have an opportunity, throw in a word to point out how much more importance Naples must acquire as a State perfectly independent and unshackled, than as a subordinate member of a confederation under the protectorship of a great Power like Austria, who is always meddling in other people's affairs, and wanting to govern other states in her own way, instead of leaving them to theirs. In fact, if Naples would only give herself fair play,

develop her natural resources, open her ports to the commerce of the world, and give free scope to her own industry, she would become a considerable power of her class.

Russia, however, is the only Power with which we are likely to come to a real quarrel, and even with her I trust we shall be able to keep the peace. But she is pursuing a system of universal aggression on all sides, partly from the personal character of the Emperor, partly from the permanent system of her government. They are establishing in the island of Åland, within thirty miles of Stockholm, a fortified camp to contain twenty thousand men—a measure clearly and solely offensive. They are erecting fortresses along the line of the Vistula—obviously to threaten Austria and Prussia; they are intriguing to get hold of some of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube; and they are never quiet on the side of Persia. All these German conferences and measures are, I believe, as much Russian as Austrian. But Turkey is the most likely cause of collision; though I think they will hardly pursue their schemes of aggrandisement there at present. The famine in the southern provinces of Russia will make it very difficult for them to do much in the way of soldiering in those parts this year.

I have not yet been able to get out of town for more than four days at a time. I had three days' shooting at Woburn last week, and pretty good sport. An official party: Grey, Brougham, Lansdowne (non-combatants), Althorp, Melbourne, Ripon, Graham, John Russell, Auckland, Ellice, myself, young Ellice, and Lord Charles Russell, were the sharpshooters. But we did not do more in the way of pheasants than we have sometimes done at Broadlands. No day did we kill a hundred.

Foreign Office: March 3, 1834.

We are doing well here; the Government, as you will see by our late divisions, is very strong in the House of Commons upon all great questions, however we may be now and then beat upon small points. Reduction of numbers in army and navy are negatived by immense majorities, and we may be beat upon little questions of a few hundred pounds. This is just as usual; and I must say that this reformed House of Commons is growing to be wonderfully like all its predecessors: impatient of fools, intolerant of blackguards, tired with debate, and disposed generally to place confidence in Government upon all matters which the members do not understand, or in which their particular constituents have not a direct interest. Property and land are strong in this House, and it is highly Conservative. The session

will not be very long or very difficult, as far as we can at present anticipate.

The Peers lie quiet. They could beat us if they would ; but they know it would do them no good, and they abstain. The King is in remarkably good health, and cordially with us ; the country prosperous ; trade and manufactures thriving, and the farmers suffering only just enough distress to make them happy and comfortable. I am, on the whole, better than I have been for some time, being less severely fagged, not compelled to work so much by night, able therefore to get up earlier, and occasionally riding to Wormwood Scrubs before breakfast.

With Russia we are on a footing of cold civility. She is not ready to go to war for Turkey, and, perhaps, thinks it better to take the place by sap than by storm. We shall therefore have no war this year ; and a year gained is a great deal in such matters. Austria may open her eyes ; and if she joins us *really* in resisting the schemes of Russia, we shall checkmate Nicholas. Austria will join us, if she sees we are in earnest and determined to show fight. Pray remember me very kindly to Mareuil,¹ for whom I have much regard, and with whom I co-operated most agreeably while he was here.

Stanhope Street : April 21, 1834.

I have been very busy ever since I returned from Broadlands on the 4th of this month, working out my quadruple alliance between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, for the expulsion of Carlos and Miguel from the Portuguese dominions, and I hope it will be signed to-morrow. I carried it through the Cabinet by a *coup de main*, taking them by surprise, and not leaving them time to make objections. I was not equally successful with old Talley and the French Government, for they have made objections in plenty. But they were all as to the form in which I had proposed to make them parties to the transaction, and not to the thing itself. I have, however, at last satisfied their vanity by giving them a proper place among us. My first plan was a treaty between the other three, to which they should be acceding parties. I reckon this to be a great stroke. In the first place, it will settle Portugal, and go some way to settle Spain also. But, what is of more permanent and extensive importance, it establishes a quadruple alliance among the constitutional states of the west, which will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the east. I have, ever since Ferdinand's death, felt that morally this alliance must exist ; but it was not till a

¹ He had for a short time been French Minister in London.

keep my business down so as never to have above one day's arrear at the utmost, but seldom so much as that.

Foreign Office : May 12, 1834.

I am sending off a messenger suddenly to Florence and Rome, to try to get the Pope not to appoint an agitating prelate Archbishop of Tuam ; and I write a few lines by him to you, as he may as well go on to Naples from Rome while the Pope is pondering upon his answer. I have sent you a copy of our Quadruple Alliance Treaty by the last Malta mail ; we have heard to-day that the Spanish ratification had reached Bayonne in its way hither ; and a letter has been received in town by the Portuguese Consul-General from his correspondent at Plymouth, saying that the African steamer was arrived there from Lisbon, which she left on the 6th, and that she brings an account that Miguel, having heard of our treaty, which arrived at Lisbon on the 4th, had agreed to decamp, and was to embark in the 'Stag' frigate for England on the 9th. This may be true, or may be another version of the stock-jobbing story of the Bayonne telegraph. But I have no doubt that if not true, it is only premature, and *will* be true very shortly. *This treaty was a capital hit, and all my own doing.*

We are getting on swimmingly in Parliament, with immense majorities, and our session cannot be very long ; probably about the middle of July will see it out.

I wish you could contrive to put something more in your despatches than the movements of the Royal Family.¹ Tell us now and then what the Neapolitan Government think or mean to do about the affairs of the world—Spain, Greece, Italy, Morocco ; what is the internal state of the country, as to commerce, finance, army, &c. We hear of a war between Naples and Morocco : is it true, and what is it about ?

Our Queen is going to see her mother this summer ; this has made a great to-do at court. The Princesses wish her not to go, fearing the King will make love to the Maids of Honour in her absence ; and the Tories are sorry, thinking they shall have a friend out of the way if they should want her ; but the King is determined she shall go, and has made all the arrangements for her journey.

The great fact that comes out in this correspondence is the Quadruple Alliance, which, as Lord Palmerston says, was all 'his own doing.'

¹ Good hints to a diplomatist, which might perhaps be oftener given.

It is to be observed that, during the foreign administration of Mr. Canning, a French army had marched into Spain to put down a constitution, and a British force had been sent to Portugal to maintain one. The English nation had seen with regret and humiliation the action of France, and sympathised with that of its own Government. If then the feelings it had thus manifested were honourable and natural, it was difficult to conceive a treaty more completely national and honourable than one which united France and England in support of the constitutional cause in Portugal and Spain. Such a treaty was concluded and signed in London, April 22, 1834.

This treaty was the full completion of Mr. Canning's policy. It brought together a combination of nations in the west, in support of the institutions we enjoyed, as a counterpoise to a combination that still existed in the north against such institutions. Mr. Canning's tact and talent had been shown in selecting the points for resistance where England was strong, and in manifesting spirit and determination where spirit and determination were more likely to preserve peace than to provoke war. Lord Palmerston had displayed the same tact and talent.

The Russians had annihilated the nationality of Poland; the Austrians had marched their armies into the Roman States to suppress the aspirations of their populations; the sovereigns of Germany had coalesced against the liberties which, in other times, they had promised to their subjects. In these events of Germany Lord Palmerston took a great interest. He was convinced that the unpopular policy of the Diet would break up the German Confederation, and that an unjust policy on the part of the German sovereigns would alienate their subjects from them. He believed that England's opinion had a certain moral force, which England in certain circumstances was called upon by duty to exercise; and he thought also that she added eventually to that moral force by attempting to exercise it on the

side of mercy, liberty, and justice, even when her counsels did not at the moment prevail. In this case he deemed it more imperative than usual that the voice of England should be heard; for the King of England was also the King of Hanover, and, as King of Hanover, was inclined to a policy which in a King of England his ministers could not approve. But whilst Lord Palmerston thought the British Government required on certain matters to express its opinion without doing more, he deemed that with respect to Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, England and France could act as well as speak. They had done so. Belgium as a neutral, independent, and liberally-governed State, had been created by their union: a Liberal Government, and with a Liberal Government a prospect of future improved civilisation and prosperity, had in Spain and Portugal been established by it. To give a solemn sanction to these achievements, and to preserve them undisturbed against intrigue and force, a treaty was now entered into. In that treaty the British and French Governments recognised liberal principles in a manner which gave to those principles in the eyes of the world a certain weight and power. Their declaration in favour of those principles also—though bold—was safe. To select noble ends, to pursue them perseveringly, and attain them peacefully, is statesmanship; and after the signature of the Quadruple Alliance, Lord Palmerston held the rank of a statesman on the continent of Europe.

CHAPTER. X.

LORD GREY CEASES TO BE PRIME MINISTER—LORD MELBOURNE SUCCEEDS HIM—LORD MELBOURNE TURNED OUT—SIR ROBERT PEELE IN HIS TURN EJECTED—LORD PALMERSTON RETURNS TO FOREIGN OFFICE—HIS POLICY IN REGARD TO BELGIUM, PORTUGAL, AND SPAIN.

It is dangerous for a Government to be too strong: Lord Gray's had been so. When the Reform Bill was passed, Whigs who were sanguine thought there would never be a Tory Government again. Lord Palmerston was rather of that belief; and undoubtedly it took some time for opinion to work itself round to the Conservative side. But the violent measures adopted towards Ireland had tried the minds of many of the Reform party. None liked so strong a dereliction from their general principles, and though some bowed to what they believed a necessity; others, less disposed to adopt expediency as the overruling guide of conduct, rebelled and went into opposition.

Parties of that kind are strong against a Government when they have the sympathy of a portion of the Government; and that was the case now. Lord Althorp, who had to introduce the Irish Coercion Bill, was in heart so opposed to it that he broke down in opening his case, and gave the opportunity to Mr. Stanley (afterwards Lord Derby) of jumping up from his seat, seizing Lord Althorp's notes and papers, and drawing from them the substance of one of the most eloquent speeches ever delivered in the House of Commons. Lord John Russell had not the same scruples as Lord Althorp with respect to adopting temporary

measures, however severe, for the maintenance of public and individual security; but he held that tranquillity in Ireland could not be permanent until the great mass of the Irish population were conciliated, and that that conciliation was to be sought through measures affecting the property of the Protestant Church Establishment in Ireland.

Many thought that both were wrong in the course they pursued—Lord Althorp in supporting a measure which his judgment did not sanction, and Lord John Russell in raising a theoretical question to which he could propose no other practical solution than the appropriation of a miserable sum which, after providing for all the requirements of the Protestant Church, might be spared for other purposes: a proposition limited to affirming that an imaginary surplus might be applied to an imaginary object.¹ At all events, as Mr. Stanley's Coercion Bill led to the dissatisfaction of a portion of the more liberal supporters of Lord Grey, so Lord Russell's Irish Church views alienated another portion of the more moderate supporters of that minister.

The following letter best explains the causes which, according to Lord Palmerston's view, led to Mr. Stanley's and Sir James Graham's secession, and then speaks of other matters. The reader will remark the nice tact with which Lord Palmerston sees the precise position of the seceders—the impossibility of their uniting immediately with Sir R. Peel, and the probability of their doing so later:—

Foreign Office: June 27, 1834.

My dear William,—We have filled up our ranks again, and pretty well; and I think we are quite safe for some time to come. In the course of time Stanley and Graham may unite with Peel, and then there will be the materials out of which another Government may be formed. At present such a union could not take place without loss of character to all the parties

¹ This could be said with truth; but the Appropriation Bill, as it was then called, was *the thin end of the wedge*; and as such it was regarded by its advocates and opponents.

concerned in it. Our strength, however, is in the House of Commons; and though Stanley's loss will be felt in debate, yet on the whole the change has not diminished the number of our adherents, but, if anything, increased our strength for a division; because the great majority of the House is with us on the question upon which the split took place.

To me personally it is a great loss. Stanley, Graham, and Ripon were three of my most intimate friends; and though I am equally intimate with many who remain, and very well with all who have come in, yet I hate these sudden changes of private intercourse, more especially when the necessary course of official life makes one's official colleagues so much one's private companions. I regret to be thrown out of habits of intercourse with men I like and esteem so much.

The way they managed the thing was this: Stanley had unluckily stated some time ago (last year) in Parliament that he never could agree to any different appropriation of the surplus of Church property, and that whenever that question came practically to be considered he and his colleagues must separate. John Russell had said, about six weeks ago, that if ever a nation had a just grievance the Irish were that nation, and that grievance the Church, and that he would separate if this grievance was not speedily remedied. Durham and Co. immediately put their wedge into this crack. They got Ward¹ to bring the question on prematurely, to force us to a vote upon it; and when it was found that we should parry the blow, and have a majority on the previous question, an effort, which proved successful, was made to get Stanley and Graham to resign before the debate came on.

Nothing ever did so well as the Quadruple Treaty: it has ended a war which might otherwise have lasted months. Miguel, when he surrendered, had with him from twelve to sixteen thousand men, with whom he could have marched into Spain, forty-five pieces of artillery, and twelve hundred cavalry. Had he dashed into Spain, and taken Carlos with him, there was only Rodil with ten thousand men between him and Madrid, and part of Rodil's army was suspected of Carlism. But the moral effect of the treaty cowed them all—generals, officers, and men; and that army surrendered without firing a shot.

Metternich has, I hear, been foiled in his congress by the

¹ The late Sir Henry Ward, G.C.M.G. He was successively Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, Governor of Ceylon, and Governor of Madras.

King of Bavaria. In the meantime he is taking his revenge upon Frankfort and Switzerland; on the former by military occupation, on the latter by a fresh shower of irritating notes, in the hope of goading her to something which may afford him a pretence for interference. France, however, declares positively that she will not stand any military interference in Switzerland, and as to any other it will be nearly of no effect.

With Russia we are where we were, bickering and on the point of a quarrel. The Lievens go away in a fortnight. I am very sorry on private grounds to lose old friends and agreeable members of society, but on public grounds I do not know that their loss will be great. They are to keep house at Petersburg for the sucking Czar, and the great Czar and his wife are to go to their evening parties whenever they like to drop in. It is a splendid existence, certainly, and with much more of liberty than generally belongs to a Russian courtier; but I believe the Lievens would both give their ears to stay here.

Of the following letters that of July 11 details the circumstances that led to Lord Grey's retirement and the momentary dissolution of the Whig Government—a consequence, let it be observed, of the false position that Lord Althorp had taken up on the Coercion Bill. That of the 15th speaks of the reconstruction of the Cabinet under Lord Melbourne, and insists strongly on the fact that 'men might go out of the Government and come into it, but that those who came in would necessarily be of the same political principles as those who went out.' The assertion would have been true for some time to come, if Lord Palmerston had said that 'those who come in *and stay in*;' but with respect to the mere coming in, a subsequent letter of November 16 contains a startling contradiction to the previous prophecy.

Mr. Littleton was Secretary for Ireland, and had confided to O'Connell that the Government, in renewing the Irish Coercion Act, did not intend to re-enact that part which related to public meetings. This was true, as far as the Irish Government were concerned, who were, however, subsequently overruled by a majority of the Cabinet. Mr. Littleton's object in thus communi-

cating with O'Connell was to deter him from agitating on the occasion of the pending Wexford election; and, on the strength of the assurance, the great Irish agitator had, in fact, caused the 'Repeal' candidate to retire. He was naturally indignant when the Bill appeared after all with the obnoxious clauses intact, and he told to the House of Commons the whole story of the Secretary's indiscretion:—

Foreign Office: July 11, 1834.

My dear William,—You will see by the papers that Grey and Althorp have resigned, and that consequently, though no other member of the Government has actually done the same, the administration is virtually dissolved. The papers will explain the why and the wherefore of all this imbroglie; in two words, it may be stated to be this: that Althorp, having given up his own opinion about the clauses in the Coercion Act against the meetings, was willing to have proposed and supported those clauses as long as the fact that his own opinion was against them, was known only to his colleagues; but when, by O'Connell's betrayal of Littleton's indiscreet confidence, it became known to all the world that Althorp's own opinion was against the clauses, he felt it impossible to support them in the House; and as the Bill had been brought in with them in the Lords, he resigned. On the other hand, Grey, who long had thought of retiring, did not choose to continue in office after the loss of Althorp; and thus, the two heads having been cut off, the members have become virtually defunct.

What the new arrangement will be I cannot pretend to foretell; as yet I am not aware that the King has sent for anybody to form a new Administration; what he would like would be to have a Government composed of a mixture of parties, thinking that such a Government would be the most secure; but such a Government cannot be formed. It is impossible that Wellington and Peel should unite in Government with the members of the present Administration, or they with him. A pure Tory Government would be swept away by the House of Commons, and if it were to dissolve, it would not find a new House more manageable. Stanley and Graham could hardly coalesce *just now* with Peel and Wellington. We then are driven back, by the insurmountable difficulties of making any other arrangement, to the necessity of endeavouring to re-

organise a Ministry out of the materials which compose the present; and I think that is most likely to be the result. There would be some minor difficulties in the way, but the strong pressure of the public necessity would compel the persons concerned to overstep them. As far as I am concerned, I am truly delighted that this break-up did not happen six months ago, or before the Quadruple Alliance had worked out its final result.'

Foreign Office : July 15, 1834.

Our crisis is over; the Ministry is reconstructed, Melbourne at the head.¹ This arrangement will do very well, and will give satisfaction to all whom it is desirable to satisfy. The Radicals will be very angry that Durham is not brought in, and the Tories will be furious that Wellington and Peel were not sent for. I *know* that these last were perfectly ready to take the Government if it had been offered to them, and *fancied* they could manage this House of Commons without a dissolution. In this they would have been egregiously mistaken, and a dissolution under present circumstances, and made as it would have been a battle royal of conflicting extremes, would have produced disastrous effects in the country. The Tories would not have gained above fifty or sixty votes, which would still have left them with less than 200 out of 650 : what chance then could they have had even with their new House of Commons? However, all this is luckily avoided by the good sense of the King. He wished to have a coalition formed, but both parties told him that was impossible. Melbourne, the Duke, and Peel, all agreed in this, that it was impossible they could agree as colleagues. The moment the King found that his attempts at coalition had failed he gave Melbourne a commission to form a Government of his own. It is a great pity that Grey has retired, for he is just as fit for duty now, and will be so for several years to come, as he has been for several years past; but he is fanciful sometimes about himself, and I suspect he has for a long while been worked upon by persons who wanted him to go out, thinking that if he resigned others more to their taste would get to the top. They have been disappointed, and will continue to be so. The country does not want extreme parties, and the King will not have

¹ Lord Lytton was dining at a house where, during Lord Grey's administration, his probable successor was discussed. Various candidates were put forward; but Lord Durham, alluded to as one, said at once, 'Melbourne is the only man to be Prime Minister, because he is the only one of whom none of us would be jealous.'

them. The result which has now happened must surely deceive those foreign Governments who have been speculating upon the return of the Tories to power. It must prove to them that the Tories cannot come back to office, let what will happen to the Government of the day. That men may go out, and men may come in, but that those who come in will necessarily be of the same political principles as those who go out. That consequently, whether the particular administration of the day is stable or tottering, the political system of England is settled and unchangeable. They ought, therefore, to make their own calculations upon this foundation, and not to be perpetually thwarting us, and treating us like people whose friendship they slight, and whose hostility they disregard because they think that our existence will be too short to enable them to profit by the one or to suffer from the other. This has been the mistake of Metternich in all his dealings with England since 1830. He had always lived under the delusion that in six months he should have his dear Tories in again, and has thought that if he shaped his policy so as to conciliate our goodwill, we should be turned out before he could reap any advantage from doing so, and that he would thereby have made a needless sacrifice.

Within four months, however, Metternich's 'dear Tories' were in office, though Lord Palmerston was right, as they were not allowed to remain there long. The death of Earl Spencer, which removed his son Lord Althorp to the House of Lords, was the immediate occasion of the dismissal of the Whig Administration. For a dismissal it was. The King had long been uneasy about the treatment of the Irish Church by the Ministry, and, as is explained in the following letter, he took advantage of Lord Melbourne's proposals as to how the leadership of the House of Commons should be filled, to inform him that the services of himself and his colleagues were no longer required.

Foreign Office : November 16, 1834.

My dear William,—We are all out; turned out neck and crop: Wellington is Prime Minister, and we give up the seals, &c., to-morrow at St. James's at two. I am told that Ellenborough succeeds me. The Speaker takes the Home

Office *ad interim*, and till Peel returns from Italy, and Murray goes back to the Colonies. Goulburn and Herries are to have office because they can get re-elected. Stanley, I think, will not join : it would be a bad speculation for him to quit all his natural and family connections to come third into the Tory party, to which he does not belong. This attempt to reinstall the Tories cannot possibly last : the country will not stand it ; the House of Commons will not hear it. All I dread is the collateral effect of the storm by which they will be driven away. Either they will dissolve, or they will not. If they do not, they will be outvoted in the Commons, and every man there expecting a dissolution, every man who has liberal constituents, will be making violent speeches and declarations, in order to curry favour with his electors. If they dissolve, then matters will be worse, because, though they may gain sixty or seventy votes, yet that will not give them a majority ; and the greater part of the rest of the House will have been tempted on the hustings to pledge themselves chin-deep to most extravagant measures. Triennial Parliaments, ballot, and universal household suffrage, will be the cry on almost every hustings, and no man who does not bid as high as that will have any chance in the great towns. The Tories will be turned out ; and then it will be difficult to make a Government which shall be acceptable to the Commons, and shall not at the same time consist of men pledged to all sorts of extreme measures. The Duke, after having saved England in the field, is destined to be her ruler in the Cabinet. The way this came to pass is this. Lord Spencer was taken ill ten days ago, and died this day-week at Althorp, in Northamptonshire. His death was known in London on Monday last, the 10th. The first thing Melbourne had to do was to consider who should lead the House of Commons. The Hollands, Ellice, and some other Whigs, strongly recommended John Russell ; some thought of Abercrombie. Melbourne asked me what I felt about it. I said it would be inconvenient to me to take the lead with my official business, but that I would do it if the Government wished ; and that I would, in short, either take it or leave it alone, as might be most convenient for the arrangements of the Government. On Tuesday or Wednesday Melbourne wrote to the King at Brighton, to say that, as when he first took his present office he had represented the influence of Althorp in the Commons as one great foundation of the strength of the Government ; now that Althorp was removed to the Lords by the death of his

father, he deemed it his duty towards the King to ask his Majesty whether he wished him to propose arrangements for supplying Althorp's place, or whether he preferred asking advice from other quarters. Melbourne added, that he would never abandon the service of the King as long as it was thought that he could be of any use ; and that, however much the Government must feel the loss of Althorp in the Commons, nevertheless there was no reason whatever to doubt that we should still retain the confidence of that House of Parliament.

The King appointed Melbourne to come down to Brighton on Thursday, as Melbourne in his letter had proposed to do. On Thursday he went down, and had a long conversation with the King that day before dinner, and on Friday morning before he left Brighton. The result was, that the King objected to all the arrangements proposed ; stated that he could not agree to the kind of measures about the Irish Church which Melbourne said the Government would have to propose, although those measures are not ripe for being laid before the King, but were explained to him to be in principle precisely conformable to what had been stated to him when Melbourne took office, and to which he had then agreed. At that time he admitted that the Irish and English Churches stood upon different grounds, and that it did not at all follow that what was right to be done for one should also be applied to the other : that the Irish Church required still further reformation, and that no danger could arise to the English establishment from correcting the abuses or defects of the Irish. Now, he said, that the two stand upon the same foundation ; that one cannot be touched without endangering the other ; that he is head of the Church and bound to uphold it, and that he could not agree to the sort of measures which Melbourne said would probably be proposed to him. On Friday morning the King gave Melbourne a written memorandum, in which he stated shortly the sum of these considerations, and added that, for these reasons, he thought it better at once to relieve Melbourne from the precarious situation in which he stood, weakened in the Commons, and without any counterbalancing strength in the Lords, than to charge him with the task of proposing fresh arrangements ; and he added verbally, that he should send for the Duke of Wellington.

Melbourne came to town on Friday evening. The Duke went to Brighton on Saturday (yesterday) ; and this morning Melbourne heard from the King that the Duke had accepted, and that we were to be at St. James's to-morrow at two, to de-

liver up' our seals. This is a rapid military manœuvre. The Duke not only had his list ready cut and dry, but had his men on the ground, ready to take charge of the position.

Hudson, the Queen's Secretary, was sent off last night in search of Peel, who is somewhere in Italy. I don't think Stanley will join them, even if asked.

I am glad this did not happen six months ago, as several questions have since then been placed in a much better condition. Portugal is settled; Spain is safe; Belgium cannot be ruined, though they may cripple it by putting high duties on the Scheldt. I wish we had gone on six or eight months longer; and then really I should not have been sorry to have had some good long holidays, after four years or more, as it then would have been, of more intense and uninterrupted labour than almost any man ever went through before.

I shall now go down to Broadlands and get some hunting; and, if Parliament is not dissolved, may perhaps run over to Paris for three weeks in January, previous to the meeting of Parliament.

While the King had thus suddenly sent his ministers to the right-about, the following letter shows that he had not determined on a change of advisers from any dissatisfaction with the minister who had charge of Foreign Affairs :—

Brighton, November 16, 1834.

Although the King will see Viscount Palmerston to-morrow, His Majesty cannot further delay, under the present circumstances, expressing to him the high and grateful sense which His Majesty will not cease to entertain of the ability, assiduity, and zeal with which his Lordship has uniformly discharged the arduous duties of his important office, and of the attention which he has shown to His Majesty on every occasion, and in every communication submitted and made to him during a period of four years.

His Majesty has, at all times, derived satisfaction from the free and unreserved character of Viscount Palmerston's official intercourse with him, and from the anxiety which he has shown to afford to him upon every matter the most ample information, and all the explanation which he could possibly require, and His Majesty assures Viscount Palmerston that he will always take a constant interest in his welfare and happiness.

WILLIAM R.

The frank nature of the Sailor King had found a congenial response in the equally frank and straightforward character of the Minister, and they parted with mutual feelings of regret. There were, however, to a man of Lord Palmerston's active turn of mind many consolations in being, for a time, free from the fetters of office, and he turned with eagerness to other duties and pursuits.

Stanhope Street: November 25, 1834.

Pray send the enclosed to Mr. Pulling, of Lymington, who is said to be now at Naples. It is to ask his support at my election—an election I am sure of, either by dissolution, if the new Government are able to stand, or else by return to office if the new Government fall. My own opinion is that they cannot stand.

I think Peel must accept the commission which the King has given to him, and not to the Duke, to form an administration. If he were not to do so he must abandon for ever all pretension to be leader of a party. But I doubt whether he will consent to dissolve. I think his own bias will rather be to abide by the decision of this House of Commons, and to try to propitiate it by great professions of reform. The effect of a dissolution must be injurious to the principles which he professes. The Tories would gain, it is true, and would become a more powerful opposition; but, on the other hand, the Radicals would gain more: first by the return of actual Radicals for places for which Whigs at present sit; and further by the swallowing of Radical pledges by many members who are in their opinions Whig. I think Peel will feel this strongly; but he may be overborne by the violent people of his own party, whom he will not be able to control.

I am staying in town a few days longer to learn events, and to wind up some private business long neglected, but in a few days I go down to Hampshire to take the field, and commence itinerant spouter at inn meetings of freeholders, and to ride about the country canvassing. Really and truly, for my own comfort and enjoyment, I should not at all dislike a year's respite from the confinement of office. It would not be a bad thing for me either, in a political point of view, to take a turn at House of Commons work as a regular employment.

The Duke professes at present that no change is to be made in our foreign policy. This is said during the interregnum, and

while he has hopes of catching Stanley or Graham, for whom he is angling. In truth, however, it will not be easy for him to make any great change in our foreign policy. Portugal and Belgium are settled; Spain is beyond our control; Russia he hates more than I do, and Turkey he will be just as anxious to protect. With France he will *mean* to keep friends, though he may do it with a less good grace than we did; the main difference will be that he will be cronies with Metternich, with whom we were always bickering.

At the dissolution consequent on the formation of the short-lived Peel Administration in 1834, Lord Palmerston lost his seat for South Hampshire, and the year 1835 found him in temporary banishment from the House of Commons. He had rather underrated the increase of strength which a dissolution would give the Government, but he was right in saying that it could not stand, notwithstanding the great ability of its chief. He was right also in saying that Mr. Stanley and Sir James Graham, who had seceded from the Whig Ministry, could not join Sir Robert Peel then, though they might afterwards. They both of them declined his overtures. The Duke of Wellington had succeeded to the Foreign Office.

Lord Palmerston, himself, although no longer a member of Parliament, was throwing himself with sufficient ardour into the strife to write to his brother as if he had been personally present in the division lobby.

Stanhope Street: March 10, 1835.

We have beaten the Ministry twice, on the Speakership¹ and the Address,² but not by the majority I expected. Still they are in a minority, even when aided by Stanley: and no Government can possibly go on if it has not a majority, and a *sure* majority, in the House of Commons. Whenever Stanley votes against them with his fifty followers they will be in a woful plight; and he will do so when the proper time comes. They want to coax him to join

¹ Mr. Abercromby was chosen by a majority of ten over the votes given for Sir Charles Sutton.

² Amendment to the Address carried by a majority of seven.

them, and then the Duke would make believe to retire, by going to the Horse Guards, and Goulburn and Herries, &c., would make way for Stanley's friends; but Stanley will not give in to this. He has a much better game to play by keeping aloof. It never could answer to him to place himself as Peel's second and follower—abandoning all the natural and hereditary connections of the Derby family, and transplanting himself into the Tory nursery. He will do no such thing. He will try to keep the present Government in till the Irish Church question is settled, and when that only point of difference between himself and his late colleagues is got rid of, he will turn round on Peel and help to knock him over, and join in re-establishing a Whig Administration.

This is what Stanley will do, if things take the course he wishes; but the House of Commons will not wait for this slow process, and will probably dismiss the Peel Government before Easter. The Government will probably carry to-night the continuance of the Malt Tax, because our people will vote with them on that question. But on Friday Hume moves a short supply of three months, in order to place the Government on its good behaviour.¹ That vote may be carried, and if it is it will be a deep humiliation to the Government. If they are not beaten then, they will be so on John Russell's motion on the 23rd about the Irish Church, and *then*, I think, they must retire.² Peel had a meeting of friends at the Foreign Office on Saturday last about the Malt Tax, and told them that there was a degree of beating which even he could not stand, and that if he was defeated about that tax he should go out. The next fortnight or three weeks will certainly be very important. I do not believe in another dissolution. The Government will not venture upon so unconstitutional a step; and if they were to do so, I do not think they would gain by it; on the contrary, they would probably lose.

I have not yet heard of any seat, and indeed I should rather defer coming into Parliament till after the change of Government, if change there is to be, in order not to have two elections.

The death of the Emperor of Austria may produce important consequences; but if, as the *Chronicle* of to-day announces and as indeed is most probable, Metternich has succeeded in

¹ Mr. Hume withdrew his motion two days after.

² Lord John Russell's resolution to appropriate to education the surplus revenues of the Irish Church.

getting the new Emperor into his hands, there will be no change in the policy of Austria, except that, as Metternich will be more powerful when governing over an imbecile Emperor than he was when governing under the last Emperor, the Metternich system will be pursued with more uncontrolled vigour, and with more undeviating perseverance than ever.

The symptoms of discontent, however, which have shown themselves in Transylvania and in Hungary are not to be wholly disregarded; and whenever the waters which Metternich is forcibly damming up shall break loose, there will be a considerable commotion in the land.

We are all curious to know what has been the cause, and what is the object, of the sudden sailing of our fleet from Malta. Ponsonby always has had a longing to have the squadron opposite Seraglio Point, and I believe after all there is no place in Europe in which it could be more useful. But I hear he is still acting under my instructions, as almost all our diplomatists are; for after all the abuse which the Tories were pleased to lavish upon me, the Duke seems to have discovered that the measures and instructions of his predecessor required '*no reform*.' Pozzo looks uneasy, and not happy; as an individual he must regret his Paris habits of life, which were much more agreeable to him than his mode of living here can possibly be; and as a Russian Ambassador, the perilous condition of the Tories must be truly painful to him. But, on the whole, Russia has not, I believe, much to choose between Whig and Tory; for I suspect that the Duke is, if possible, more hostile to Russia than I was—fully as much impressed with the necessity of checking her insatiable ambition, and quite as determined to employ the means which England possesses to do so. The fact is that Russia is a great humbug, and that if England were fairly to go to work with her we should throw her back half a century in one campaign. But Nicholas, the proud and insolent, knows this, and will always check his pride and moderate his insolence when he finds that England is firmly determined and fully prepared to resist him.

Lord John Russell's resolutions in favour of appropriation were on the morning of April 3 carried against Ministers by a majority of thirty-three; and a second resolution of the same character was carried in Committee on the Irish Tithe Bill four days later by a majority of twenty-seven. On April 8 Sir R. Peel

announced the resignation of his Cabinet, and for ten days the country was in a state of uncertainty as to what Government they were to rely on. The King sent successively for Lord Grey and Lord Melbourne, and the latter at last succeeded in forming an administration.

In regard to Lord Palmerston himself, his Quadruple Treaty had gained him a considerable reputation abroad, but at home he had rather lost than gained since 1830 in public opinion. The country had been too much occupied with internal affairs to think much of foreign. It is difficult to have more than one excitement at a time; and the Reform Bill had filled the national mind. In Parliament, Lord Palmerston had not taken a lead: his official duties fully occupied his attention and his time. But this was not all. When the Tory party was in office and the Whigs in almost hopeless opposition, a small band of clever men who stood between the two, and were almost sufficient to decide the fate of parties, had great attention paid to them: there was a disposition rather to overrate than underrate them. It was necessary to have heard Lord Palmerston make one of his great thoroughly prepared speeches in order to form any idea of his capacity as a speaker. He had made two or three of these speeches in opposition. Since being in office he had made none; and a large portion of the new House of Commons had not heard the eloquence which had made his reputation. The Whigs, moreover, are, as everyone knows, exclusive. His early friendships were in a camp hostile to theirs. There were no juvenile associations linking them together. As to the Radicals, they considered him one step further off from them than the Whigs; and upon his losing his seat at Cambridge by advocating reform, and then his seat for Hampshire, there was a moment when, after Sir Robert Peel's discomfiture and a new Cabinet was formed, it became a doubt whether he would again be Minister of Foreign Affairs. Lord Melbourne, however, an old acquaintance, and an impartial judge of

ability, was Prime Minister; Lord Palmerston got a quiet seat at Tiverton, and returned to the Foreign Office. But it could not be said that, with the exception of the Premier, he had any decided political friend in the Cabinet or out of it. He ruled notwithstanding in his own department.

Foreign Office : April 21, 1835.

My dear William,—Here I am again at my old work. The Government will, I think, stand; the Tories are strong in this House of Commons, but some thirty or forty people who are for the Government in the abstract will come over, some twenty or thirty more will stay away, and thus we shall have a much larger majority in office than we had in opposition. The two great measures for this session are the Irish Church and Municipal Corporation Reform. These must be carried if possible; and if the Lords throw them out, that will strengthen our position and weaken that of the Tories; but I hope they will do no such foolish thing.¹

The Duke has acted with great fairness and honour in his administration of our foreign relations; he has fulfilled with the utmost fidelity all the engagements of the Crown, and feeling that the existence of his Government was precarious, he made no arbitrary changes in our system of policy. The truth, however, is, that English interests continue the same let who will be in office, and that upon leading principles and great measures men of both sides, when they come to act dispassionately and with responsibility upon them, will be found acting very much alike. I shall remain in the House of Commons. I was, being Ludolf² two days ago upon the Chapel question. He said he was against the principles of the Catholic religion to allow of Protestant chapels; I answered him by quoting the case of Rome itself, where Protestant chapels are allowed. He said the lower classes at Naples are not so enlightened as at Rome; I said I feared the objections were not in the lower classes, who usually care little about such things, but among some prejudiced officers in some public department of the State; that in all governments there are some persons who, from honest but erroneous opinions, oppose every innovation, but I hope that the enlightened persons who form the real Government at Naples would overrule these

¹ The Appropriation Clauses in the Irish Church Bill were struck out in the House of Lords, and the Bill abandoned by Ministers.

² Neapolitan Minister.

minor objectors. I observed that if there is any real objection to our building a chapel, I could not see why the Neapolitan Government should not allow us to hire one, if a suitable one can be found. He promised to write to his Government upon the subject, and I wish you would not lose sight of the matter. Ludolf told me he believed that our merchants at Naples had sent, or were going to send, a petition to the House of Commons. I told him that if such a petition got into the hands of any Liberal member no power on earth could prevent its being presented, and that disagreeable things might be said to which it would perhaps not be easy for me to reply as I should wish to be able to do.

Lord Palmerston soon followed up the policy which the Quadruple Treaty had initiated, by obtaining the consent of the King and his colleagues to the raising of 10,000 men in England to serve Queen Isabella in Spain, under the name of the Auxiliary Legion. This act was greatly criticised. To those who believe that war is not part of the general system of the universe; that it can and ought to be avoided at all times; or is only justifiable when a nation has to defend itself against an actual invader, the permission, which in fact is the encouragement, given to your subjects to serve under a foreign standard, and in a war which you, as a Government, do not take part in, must appear condemnable. But, on the other hand, if we once admit, what experience seems to prove, that wars, 'like earthquakes, plagues, and storms, are part of heaven's design,' in an incomprehensible universal system, directed to great ends, invisible to our intelligence—if we believe, taking history as our instructress, that a country which cannot rely on its defences cannot rely on its peaceful security, then the necessity of having an army skilled in the science of war, and drawn from a people imbued with a military spirit, justifies a sovereign in allowing his subjects to engage, if so inclined, in a contest for principles which they are disposed to support, though he may not deem that the national honour or the national interests are so deeply engaged as to command the nation itself to take part in the conflict.

All men, in fact, have a natural right to espouse a cause, whether in or out of their country, which they consider for the benefit of mankind; that right may be restrained by laws which the Government under which they live may deem fit to enact; but surely the Government which can restrain a natural right, can justifiably release it, and the prevailing feeling at the time was, that the sanction given to the British Legion was perfectly justifiable, and that it even answered the end for which it was intended, viz., that of preventing Spain and Portugal from relapsing into the bigotry, despotism, and sloth from which they had been struggling to emerge.

It is easy indeed to show that these countries have not realised our sanguine hopes and expectations. The progress of nations cannot be at once solid and rapid. But it is no small matter to stop them in a bad direction and to incline them towards a good one. Indeed, if anyone would temperately compare the condition of the Spanish Peninsula in 1829 with its present condition he would be astonished, not at the small, but at the immense change for the better, morally and materially, which has taken place in it. The fact that the Spanish people went on for some time after 1867 without any fixed form of government, controlling disorder, putting down revolt, neither giving way to wild democracy nor yet seeking safety in tyranny, is a striking proof of their progress.

‘Granted,’ would say an advocate of non-interference; ‘but what is the prosperity and liberty of Spain and Portugal to us?’ One might reply, that there is hardly a spot in the world which can improve without the influence of that improvement extending itself to regions apparently remote. Nor can there be a doubt that the fate of two important countries in Europe affects Europe generally, and especially England, which by its vast commercial relations has in fact an inherent interest in every portion of the universe.

Is a nation which forms one of a community of

nations to be guided by influences directly opposite to those which would guide an individual who forms one of a community of individuals? Is a nation to be unsympathetic, inert, when it perceives other States pursuing a system hostile to its ideas, to its institutions—a system which, if directed against itself, would destroy what it is most proud of possessing and most desirous to conserve? Is it then to be taught that it should have no regard for principles as principles, but simply as to the direct application of them against its own property and safety? Society would dissolve if each individual looked simply to his own throat and his own money-chest, and did not combine against murder and theft. A community prospers most where each member of it looks to the common benefit more than to his peculiar advantage. Just as a man is amongst men, so is a State amongst States. Nor is there any generous sentiment that the one should entertain which the other should discourage.

At all events, whatever might have been the effect of Lord Palmerston's policy in Portugal and Spain, there was some opportunity of judging the effects which this policy had produced in Belgium. In 1830, there were barricades in the streets of Brussels, confusion throughout the country, disorder in men's minds as well as in their affairs. No one knew what to expect, few knew what to desire. Independence was doubtless wished for, but at the same time it was despaired of.

In 1835 a king was on the throne, ruling with as much regularity as if he had inherited that throne from a long line of ancestors. A constitution which would not perhaps have succeeded elsewhere, but which granted every liberty that a people could ask for, and that few people could temperately exercise, was in full and quiet operation. There was nothing to fear from powerful neighbours nor from internal distractions. The sovereign selected did honour to the dignity he had received. In later years the position he had acquired and the calm which he had established round his

authority deceived people as to his character. He appeared to do little and to have little to do. It was not so at this time. He was then studying the country over whose destiny he had to preside with a minuteness of attention of which he made no parade, but which was involuntarily visible in his conversation. There was hardly a bridge, a road, a church, a public building, an individual of any note, with which or with whom he was not acquainted. A courtier of his once said, 'Our Prince unites the most quiet of all manners with the most active of all minds;' and the praise was hardly exaggerated.

In 1840 his rule indeed had become almost too easy to him, and he used occasionally to say that he at times regretted he had not accepted the destiny that had once been offered him in Greece.

His ambition, however, became satisfied in another way. Allied with the Royal Houses of England, France, Portugal, and, finally, with the Imperial House of Austria, maintaining his influence when that of his father-in-law had passed away, renowned for his tact, his judgment, the dignity and urbanity of his manners, and enjoying the widest extent of popularity without the least apparent effort to create it, he was perhaps the only monarch in Europe of whom it could be said that he gave importance to his kingdom instead of deriving importance from it. But to return to England.

Foreign Office : March 5, 1836.

My dear William,—We are going on well here, and the Government is gaining strength every day; our measures are approved by the House and the country, and our majority in the House of Commons is certain, and a dissolution would increase it. The Lords will, I expect, be more manageable than last year, because their hopes of a change of Government or a change of majority in the Commons must now have become very slight.

We stand as well abroad as at home, The acceptance of our mediation by France and the United States is a great

feather in our cap.¹ It is a tribute to the high character of England which, perhaps, never before was equalled, and is a triumphant answer to the Tory assertions, that the honour and character of the country had suffered under our administration of affairs.

When two of the most powerful maritime nations accept us as mediators upon a point of national honour, it is clear that they must think that we have not forfeited our own.

The naval augmentation of 5,000 men was voted last night in the House of Commons *unanimously*; even Hume (though disapproving) giving up his objection. This must have an effect abroad, as showing that we *can* obtain supplies from Parliament when we really want them.

I will send you a copy of Peregrine Courtenay's 'Life of Sir William Temple' as soon as I can get it bound for you. It is an interesting work.

There will be no change of policy in France. Louis Philippe is really minister, and Thiers is all for English alliance, and Madame Lieven,² and Talleyrand will be disappointed. They tried to rout out Broglie as they tried to get rid of me, in hopes by that means of breaking off the alliance between England and France.

The Liberal party, on the principle of treating Ireland as on an equal footing with the mother country, were proposing this session, not only to get rid of the Orange ascendancy in the Irish corporations, but to re-establish them on a wider basis. To this the Tories objected, and succeeded, as Lord Palmerston puts it, in dishing the measure in the Lords.

Foreign Office: May 2, 1836.

My dear William,—The Lords are dishing the Irish Corporation Bill, but the Irish members all say they would rather have it as the Lords are making it, than let things continue as they are. To get rid of the Orange corporations would be to them a riddance worth any sacrifice almost. If the Lords do not put in a clause preventing the Crown from granting charters,

¹ In the long-standing dispute between those two countries as to claims made against France for losses sustained by American subjects under the Berlin and Milan decrees. It had led to the withdrawal of the French Minister from Washington.

² Wife of the Russian Ambassador.

the Crown can grant new charters to all the great towns in Ireland in spite of the abolition of the old corporations. The charters cannot give power to levy rates, but in most of the Irish towns there are local Acts giving all the powers necessary for such purposes; so that collision on the Irish Bill will not involve us in any insurmountable difficulties.¹ Everything looks well. Manufacturers are prospering, wheat is getting up, and agriculture doing better, and the country in great contentment. Offences in Ireland are also much diminished. I hear from pretty good authority that Metternich the other day wanted to increase the Austrian army and Collowrath to reduce it; and that after a sharp contest Metternich was obliged to give way; but that a family council is to be appointed to exercise that power of deciding in such cases which the present Emperor is too imbecile to exert. This seems a prelude to the decline of Metternich's power, and a great blessing for Europe it would be that his orb should set in the night of private life.

England is to be as full of railways as a ploughed field is full of furrows, but the crop they will bear is more doubtful.

I am glad the chestnut turns out well. I am riding another of Biondetta's, now six years old, by Tarrare. It has not high action to look at; but when one is on it, one feels upon a football, he is so springy.

Remember me to Matuszevic,² and tell him that though we battled in conference, and are supposed by the world not to have parted friends, I have a very great regard for him, and am quite sure we shall meet as good friends as ever when we next come together again.

Foreign Office: July 9, 1836.

The Tories had hoped much from the division on the Irish Corporation Bill, but the eighty-six majority have settled them for the present. We shall, therefore, probably go on till next session, at all events. But the King and the Court hate us, and wish us at the devil. I believe I am the only one of the ministers whom the King likes personally. He was fond of Melbourne, too; but has not yet forgiven him for cramming Dr. Hampden down his throat the other day for an Oxford professorship. He likes Lansdowne and Minto also. The rest he dislikes. He said the other day to Cutlar Ferguson, who

¹ The Bill was, however, dropped on its return from the Lords, as the Commons rejected their amendments.

² Had been one of the Russian plenipotentiaries at the Conference about Belgium, and was now Minister at Naples.

came with some courts-martial, 'Aye! you are just like Lord John Russell, who never can find his papers.' Russia is coquetting with Durham;¹ and in order to cajole him, is obliged to be civil to us; so his appointment has answered. Metternich has taken a fling, as if bit by a horse-fly, and Ancillon² has mimicked him as a donkey would do. The King much approved my answers to both. The Lords will pass the Irish Corporation Bill next year, if we are still in office. They could not well do so this year, but it would have been better for them to have done so; they would have escaped much rowing which they will now get during the interval.

Stanhope Street: September 29, 1836.

These military insurrections in Spain and Portugal are the devil; and are doubly provoking because they would not have happened if our worthy friend and faithful ally, Louis Philippe, had fulfilled his engagements, and acted up to the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty. But, be the cause what it may, he has pretty nearly thrown us, the Queen, and the treaty over. Some say it is his fear of republicans; some his desire to curry favour with Austria and Russia, in order to marry the Duke of Orleans to a princess; some that he wishes Carlos to succeed, that he may marry a French princess to Carlos's son. He is a great goose for his pains; for any result but the triumph of the Queen's cause would be fraught with danger to him and his dynasty.

I by no means, however, despair of that cause. The Queen's party want nothing to ensure them success *but* money, honesty, ability, and courage, *slight* requisites, and found in Spain on every roadside. It is, however, quite marvellous that those qualities should be so rare in the Peninsula; and, at all events, their absence shows what a detestable system of government has existed in those countries for a long time past.

Our master is becoming more calm, though not in his heart more reconciled to having servants whom he did not choose. Personally, he is civil and good-natured, though, politically, he liketh us not. We shall, however, maintain our ground till Parliament meets, and then we are safe.

I am daily expecting to hear of some row in the Neapolitan territory. If the King's 70,000 men do not take a fancy for a constitution, they have taken lessons from Austria to some pur-

¹ The Earl of Durham was British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

² Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

poss, and are fully as wise as they are valiant. It is to be hoped, however, that they will remain quiet; for the Austrians would come in again if there was a move, and then all hope of improvement would be at an end. Whatever may happen, however, your line is clear.

We have nothing to do with the internal affairs of other countries, and neither impose nor oppose constitutions. The French Government professes the utmost cordiality, and the firmest determination to maintain the alliance unimpaired. I can hardly keep my countenance when poor Bourquenay repeats to me these prescribed assurances.

Foreign Office: November 1, 1836.

The little differences between Radicals and Whigs are of no importance, and will disappear in unanimity when Parliament meets. The registration has been on the whole favourable to us; and an income of upwards of £150,000 a year, of different charitable trusts, and which had hitherto been employed chiefly in largess to Tory voters in borough towns, has by recent decrees of the Court of Chancery been placed in the hands of other trustees who will apply it to other uses for which it was destined by the bequeathers. This is a gain to us. On the whole, we should certainly increase our majority by a dissolution, and therefore, as the Tories could not take office without dissolving, I think they will wait for some more favourable opportunity to turn us out. In the meanwhile, I believe the Queen is in a dangerous state of health.

She was subject to a constant eruption on her face; she had recourse to lotions and various quackeries to get rid of it; snuff of some particular kind, and Heaven knows what. It seems that the cause was not removed, but only shifted in its effect; and they say her lungs are now affected. Her loss would be a misfortune, notwithstanding her political bias against us. The King would probably marry again; and then we might have a long minority before us, which is one of the worst things in a representative Government; or else the Queen's place would be taken at Court by the old Princesses, who are quite as Toryish, but not so sensible as the Queen.

The King is grown calm again, having recovered from his disappointment at not getting rid of us at the end of the session.

Commerce is prospering, our manufactures thriving, agriculture reviving; and every foreigner who takes a tour into the

interior of the country comes back in a state of wonderment at the prosperity of England. The crisis with which the money-market was threatened has blown over, and our revenue goes on progressively increasing as the taxes are taken off.

I had a long talk the other day with Signor Arpino about commercial matters. He is intelligent and enlightened, but has something still to learn in political economy. We shall see whether Bowring¹ will open the minds of the Neapolitans. He is a very good-humoured, lively, agreeable, well-informed man; a complete Republican in his opinions, and would put up the guillotine in a manner as gentle and kind-hearted as that in which Izaak Walton would handle the frog he was to impale. However, you should be civil to him. He professes great regard for me; and indeed I have been useful to him. His 'Commercial Reports,' however, are able documents, and contain much valuable information.

I went down to the Winchester Music Meeting last week. Almost all the county was there. Winchester never was so full since the barracks were tenanted by troops. The like number of civilians probably never was found within the city. I stayed the two days with Garnier.² I called on Dr. Latham, now ninety-seven, well, hearty, and cheerful; eating a good dinner at five, complaining only that his eyes no longer enabled him to read, and that when he had walked a mile and a half or two miles, he grew weary. I was very glad to have an opportunity of calling on him; at his time of life, perhaps, it is unlikely I may ever have another.

I went on for three days afterwards to Broadlands. I like my new gardener much; as a gardener, he is better than poor Watson, but as a companion, of course he cannot replace his predecessor. You will find the place improved when you return.

Louis Philippe has been treating us scurvily about Spanish affairs. But the fact is, he is as ambitious as Louis XIV., and wants to put one of his sons on the throne of Spain, as husband to the young Queen; and he thinks this scheme more likely to be accomplished by the continuance of disorder in Spain than by the termination of the civil war, and the establishment of national independence. Still, depend upon it, Carlos cannot

¹ Sir John Bowring. A negotiation was going on for a commercial treaty with the kingdom of Naples.

² Dean of Winchester. Curiously enough, he also reached the age of ninety-seven, or thereabouts.

win, though it certainly is not the fault of the Queen's generals that he does not. I hope there may be a counter revolution in Portugal, but so do not hope the Holy Alliance. They think the Constitution of 1820 may bring back Miguel and despotism again, as it did once before. They hate Pedro's charter, because it is too reasonable a system of government; an impracticable constitution is a thing to their heart.

The constitution of 1820, above referred to, established what amounted almost to universal suffrage among one of the most ignorant populations in Europe. The Cortes forming only one body, claimed the initiation of all laws and the right of approving all treaties, besides the privilege of altering the fundamental laws without the consent of the Crown. The King had no power either of prorogation or dissolution. He had a right of veto, but only conditionally, until the Cortes declared their adherence to the original measure, when he was bound immediately to give his sanction to the bill. Even the appointment of civil, military, and naval officers could be claimed by the Cortes on the vote of a majority. The charter which Don Pedro promulgated in 1826 was a constitutional form of government, more nearly modelled on our own. Donna Maria, however, had been compelled in August of this year, under the pressure of a revolutionary rising, to restore the 'impracticable' constitution, and, as will be seen by the next letter, a counter revolution, attempted in November, failed through want of energy.

Brighton : December 1, 1836.

My dear William,—I came down here yesterday for a Council, among other matters to fix the meeting of Parliament for January 31. I find the King well, and tolerably quiet; with a little gout for the first time in his foot, but by aid of a large cloth shoe he walks about as well as usual. The Court are patient under their affliction at not being able to get rid of us, and seem to have made up their minds to a Christianlike resignation.

The questions for next session will be Irish Corporation Reform, Irish Tithes, and English Church Rates. I do not

despair of our being able to settle them all in a satisfactory manner. The Tories will probably let the Irish Corporation Bill pass—we shall perhaps be able so to divide and modify the Appropriation plan, as to get it through; and for Church Rates, we have a scheme not yet digested which I think will do. Something also we must do about Irish Poor Laws; but the less the better.

Peninsular affairs are so bad that they cannot become worse, and must therefore become better. The attempt at counter-revolution at Lisbon was an ill-concocted, premature, and ill-executed scheme of the Court party, in which we had no share. Saldanha had a plan which, if time had been allowed him, would have succeeded. He was working in the provinces, and in due time the change would have been made spontaneously, as it were, by the nation itself, and without violence or convulsion. But the adherents of Terceira and the Court party were jealous of Saldanha, and fearful that if he was allowed to make the counter revolution, he would thereby acquire influence and power, from which it was their *first* object to exclude him. Hence they resolved to be beforehand with him, and judging of others by themselves, and remembering how small an armed force overcame them, they imagined it would be just as easy to overcome the Republicans. But they were deceived. They miscalculated their own means, their own courage, and the means and courage of their opponents. Those who undertake to make revolutions should have either overpowering force, or overawing courage. These silly courtiers had neither; and they failed ignominiously. The result, however, has not been as bad as it might have been. The Passos¹ Government have found out that they had exaggerated their own strength, and, becoming more sensible of their dependence on the clubs, they are trying to emancipate themselves by drawing closer to the Chartists;² and after all perhaps they may end in establishing a good and moderate kind of constitution. It was not worth while to have a civil war in Portugal for the mere sake of maintaining Palmella, Villareal, and Valenza, as hereditary legislators in a House of Peers. The nobles both in Spain and Portugal are the most incapable part of the nation, and therefore a remodelling of the Upper Chambers in both countries seems a reasonable thing.

As to Spain, the Queen wants money, good generals, and

¹ Manuel Passos was the revolutionary Minister of the Interior.

² The advocates of the form of government established by Don Pedro's charter.

honest men; how she will get any of these, Heaven knows. But Carlos is out of the question. Suppose him to drop from the mountains of Biscay upon Madrid—how is he to maintain himself there? His Biscayans would not leave their own country to go and mount guard at Madrid: the robbers and plunderers who run about under Gomez would never submit to be restrained by discipline, and accept pay instead of plunder. Carlos would, therefore, be without any military force; but if he had one, who are to be his ministers? Could the Bishop of Leon, or Erro, or any of his Inquisition-mongers, pretend now to govern Spain? It is out of the question. It seems, therefore, to me, that however bad the present condition of the Queen's cause, that of Carlos is far more desperate. Louis Philippe, who is as ambitious as Louis XIV., schemes for acquiring possession of the Northern Provinces of Spain, and he thinks that the result of civil war and misery will be to lead those provinces to seek French protection; but this will never be. This was Talleyrand's scheme.

We had a tremendous hurricane the day before yesterday, and I hear I have had fifty trees blown down at Broadlands. It is lucky I have planted a good many young ones, so that I shall the less miss those that have been blown down.

Railways have made a difference in such liability to delay on the road as is related in the following letter:—

Broadlands: December 31, 1836.

I came down here last Tuesday through the snow, and was twelve hours coming, including one hour I stopped to dine; but we have had less snow here than elsewhere. Of course it is not the general depth of it that has blocked up the roads, but its accumulation by drift in particular places. We know nothing of what has been passing on the Continent; all the mails having been stopped by the weather. One of my messengers reached the Foreign Office last Thursday, having started from Boulogne the Friday before, and having thus been seven days getting from Boulogne to Downing Street. He tried to go by land from Dover to London, but found it impossible, and so took shipping and came by sea. We shall do very well in Parliament, in spite of all the attacks of the Tory papers, and the boasts of the Tory Dinnerites. The Radicals will stand by us; and we shall produce some good measures, which will be well received, and make us popular. We shall begin with Irish

Corporation Reform, and other measures of that kind, and leave Irish Tithes and Appropriation Clause till late in the Session. The Corporation Bill is the best to fight the Lords upon, and if we force them to strike upon that, we shall be stronger for other things. I understand, also, that they are likely to surrender upon that bill.¹

Unfortunately the principal feature in foreign affairs for the two or three years succeeding the Quadruple Alliance was a gradual alienation from France. It was generally said that M. de Talleyrand, who had manifested throughout his long life a constant tendency towards an English alliance, had rather cooled in this respect during his embassy in London: personal feelings were supposed to have had some influence over his opinions.

Accustomed to great consideration and respect in his own country, even when in disgrace, he did not think that he was treated with that attention in England to which his high individual position, apart from that conferred by his official dignity as ambassador, entitled him. Few people except Lord Grey, Lord Holland, and Lord Lansdowne knew indeed anything very clear about him. To the newer generation he was 'Old Talleyrand'—something of the past. The organ of veneration, moreover, was not broadly pronounced in Lord Palmerston himself. When a juvenile Secretary of War, he had faced the Duke of York; when serving in the Cabinet of the Duke of Wellington, he had never shown any disposition to give way to his Grace as a superior mortal. He treated M. de Talleyrand with the same want of peculiar deference. The old man, who had directed the early course of that great revolution which had changed the face of the world, who had confronted Napoleon in the zenith of his power, who had seated Louis XVIII. on the French throne, and who had had no small share in placing the crown on Louis Philippe's head, was treated by our Foreign Secretary—so said the Frenchmen attached to the French Embassy—just

¹ They did not do so, but carried a motion for postponement.

as M. Thomas, if he had been named French ambassador, would have been; appointments made with him were not always kept with perfect exactness. He complained of being kept at times for one or two hours in the ante-rooms of the Foreign Office; and though—having the conviction that peace could only be preserved in Europe, and the new monarchy preserved in France, by a good understanding with Great Britain—he bore all these marks of indifference with apparent imperturbability, he is reported to have felt them deeply, and to have left England with an impression as to English arrogance and presumption which induced him to advise his royal master not to neglect other alliances. It is certain that after his retirement a change of tone in our general relations was perceptible; and those young men who frequented the great diplomatist's *salon* in Paris began to say that it would never do to keep France à la remorque de la haute Angleterre.

But what was most to be regretted was that, when the connections between England and France became less close, the differences between the two countries broke out precisely on the spot where it was most for the public interests that they should not appear. In 1835 M. Torreno had become Prime Minister in Spain, succeeding M. Martinez de la Rosa, the first constitutional minister who ruled in that country since 1815. M. Torreno had been one of the first deputation that had originally applied to Mr. Canning for assistance against Napoleon; a man of great ability, both as a statesman and as a debater, bold, not over-scrupulous, gallant, as fond of pleasure as of business, and accustomed to take the lead in one and the other. Mr. George Villiers, the late Lord Clarendon, was English minister. To great charm of manners and an acute intellect he joined that self-confidence which high birth and high fashion usually confer.

Two clever men brought together in public affairs either like one another very much or not at all; and M. Torreno and Mr. George Villiers liked one another

not at all. In the land of serenade and the guitar it is always pretended that love and politics go hand in hand, and the old question of *qui est-elle?* was raised on this occasion, although there were public motives sufficiently evident for inducing Mr. Villiers to see things with eyes that differed from those of M. Torreno.

It was natural that when the Absolutist party was overthrown in Spain it should have for its successors the Liberals, already well known. It was natural also that a new set of Liberals should immediately arise ready to contend for power with the old ones. M. Torreno had passed many of his years in France. He knew French statesmen, particularly those whom the recent revolution had brought into power. He was noble by birth, and besides having the prepossessions of an aristocrat in favour of his own class, he had a strong idea that, to keep combined the various elements of the Spanish monarchy, it was necessary to unite representative institutions with a strong central administration. He represented then the Liberal party of gentlemen in Spain, which was for resisting democratic demands and absorbing municipal powers. This party affected to be moderate, and was called the Moderados. The party in power in France was a party professing the same principles. Some of its statesmen had emphatically declared '*gouverner est résister.*'

On the other hand, the more advanced party in Spain, headed by lawyers, doctors, and soldiers risen from the middle classes, professing no fear of the democracy with which it was connected, contending that the life of Spain was in its local self-government, called itself Progressist; and this party was very much the same as that governing in England, which also professed no fear of the democracy, which also was for creating popularly-elected corporations, and which also styled itself the party of progress.

Nothing, then, but the closest understanding between the French and English Governments, and a perfect union between their two representatives at

Madrid—an understanding and a union which ought to have existed, and which did not exist—could have prevented that fatal schism between France supporting one Spanish party, and England supporting another, which led to evils almost incalculable in their consequences; since they ended by striking crowns from the heads of two sovereigns. It is needless to add that things did not become better when the Moderados were ejected by a revolution at La Granja, of which, with the usual Spanish exaggeration, the party vanquished accused Mr. Villiers of being the promoter; many, indeed, asserting, with that audacity which is the remarkable characteristic of Spanish politicians, that Mr. Southern, Mr. Villiers' private secretary, was seen in the gardens with a hat full of guineas which he was scattering amongst the insurgent soldiers.

France and England in short at first held the same language and followed the same policy. It was after the ministry of M. Torreno that this situation altered; and the person who greatly contributed to the change was in many ways remarkable.


Spain has at all times produced men of adventurous character, who rise suddenly to a great height and fall as suddenly into a deep abyss. M. Mendizabal was one of these men. Of Jewish extraction, his magnificent head, his tall and stately person, his manners, which evinced that dignity mingled with suavity which often proceeds from an inward consciousness of power, and is almost natural to Spaniards and Orientals when in authority, created for him a sort of prestige, which his undoubted talents increased. Those talents, hitherto only displayed in finance, had procured him a considerable fortune, which he risked in assisting Don Pedro in Portugal; and that cause having triumphed, he had added much both to his wealth and to his reputation. 'Mendizabal is the man for Spain,' everyone said; and as what everyone says is for a time believed, Torreno, who wanted someone who could aid him in finance without being his rival in power,

thought that he could not do better than call Mendizabal into Spain, and make him Finance Minister. But he did not know Mendizabal, who had nothing of the subaltern in him.

He was no sooner, indeed, in Madrid than he set up his own standard. The notion that he could fill an empty treasury gave him immense power. This he sought to increase by adopting a more liberal line of policy, which would call up the inert masses of the nation, and, by flattering their feelings, obtain access to their pockets. His language, his attitude, his opinions, and more especially the belief that he would find in some way or other the money that the State urgently required, gave him ere long an ascendancy in the court and the country which led to Count Torreno's retirement, and to his being the Count's successor. Now Mendizabal had resided in England; he had English prepossessions; he had been placed in office as the result of English opinion; he advocated that course of popular concession against which Louis Philippe was then contending; and thus, from the time he became preme in Spain, the ardour of the Government in France for the objects of the Quadruple Alliance greatly diminished.

The immense popularity of the new minister, however, could not be of long duration, for the very reason that it was immense. People expected he would perform miracles; and miracles he could not perform. It was soon, in fact, discovered that he had not the goose that laid golden eggs in the secret cabinet where at first he was supposed to conceal it.

He was, moreover, notwithstanding his democratic tendencies, more fit to be the minister of a despotic prince than a leader in parliamentary discussion. He knew nothing of the management of an assembly, and especially of an assembly which contained distinguished orators who were accustomed to command its attention. Amongst his opponents were men who had long considered themselves the chiefs



of the popular party, and who did not at all approve of the manner in which they had been supplanted. M. Isturitz was one of these, and joining the Moderado opposition, he turned out, with the favour of Queen Christina (who had begun to fear her enterprising protégé), Mendizabal, as Mendizabal had turned out Torreno. But a party had been created too powerful to be thus set aside. The insurrection at La Granja, was the consequence; and the Queen Regent was forced by Sergeant Garcia to give her sanction to the impracticable constitution of 1812.

A few extracts from Lord Palmerston's letters will give an idea of the course of those affairs, and show the coolness that had already established itself between the two Governments.

Foreign Office: August 19, 1836.

Dear Aston,¹—This acceptance of the constitution of 1812 by the Queen Regent, and the change of ministry at Madrid, are the consequences of the mistaken policy of the French Government about Spain. The French last year grew jealous of our influence in Portugal, Spain, and Greece. In Portugal they succeeded in ousting Carvalho, and got Loulé appointed instead; and a pretty mess Loulé and his colleagues made of it! *That* intrigue nearly brought Portugal to bankruptcy. They then succeeded some months later in Spain, and turned out Mendizabal, and gave the power to Isturitz and Cordova; but there they were tampering with matters in a more ticklish state, and the consequences have been more serious. They have produced great and extensive misery in Spain during the last four months, and now they have established, nominally at least, a most absurd and stupid constitution. In Greece they were defeated without much loss. But what a little and narrow-minded policy and view of European affairs that must have been, which led the French Government to exhaust against their dear friend and ally all those resources of intrigue and diplomacy which, if well applied, might have produced some results honourable to them and beneficial to Europe! *However, so goes the world, and one must take men as one finds them, and make the best of what is, shut one's eyes to failings and faults, and dwell as much as one can upon good points.*²

¹ Mr. Aston was British Minister *ad interim* at Paris.

² This was a very frequent observation of Lord Palmerston's.

Stanhope Street : Sept. 20, 1836.

My dear Granville,—. . . I think the tone for you to take is, that we look upon France as backing out of the alliance as fast as she can, that we are sorry for it, but wash our hands of the consequences ; and upon those who have advised, or who may execute the plan, must rest the responsibility of any inconveniences which may follow ; that constitutional government *must* triumph in the Peninsula, and that France will find herself in the disagreeable predicament of having abandoned a cause overclouded for the moment, but destined to succeed, while we shall have the merit and honour of having consistently supported it ; that France will lose her credit with the Liberal party in Europe, whom she is about to desert, and will never be trusted or favoured by the Holy Alliance men, unless she could assimilate her Government to their model, which is impossible ; that she will therefore be hated by the first and despised by the latter. Such will be her fate as to her external relations, nor will the effect of her policy upon her internal condition be much more fortunate. *Her Government will become identified, in the opinion of the nation, with the arbitrary party in Europe, and with the enemies of free institutions.* Discontent will increase : the discontented will enter into communication with the ultra-Liberals of Spain and Portugal, and plots and conspiracies will spring up like mushrooms. . . . The French Government no doubt think that when matters have gone to a certain length in Spain, France will be called upon to re-enact the drama of 1823. But grievously do they deceive themselves in that. Spain is not the same as then ; France is not the same as then. Louis Philippe could not send an army to put down institutions in Spain merely because those institutions were too democratic. The order for such an army to march would be the knell of his dynasty. . . . *France is putting herself in a false position, and at no distant time she will find her mistake.* We have performed the duties of friendship in warning her ; the fault will be hers if the warning is in vain.

Stanhope Street: Sept. 27, 1836.

We ought to come to an explanation with the French Government, and to understand what it is they wish either to bring to pass or to prevent in Spain. Do they want Don Carlos to succeed ? Would that be consistent with the honour of a party to the Quadruple Treaty ; would it be conducive to the interests of the dynasty founded in July ? Do they think the

establishment of a republic in Spain would greatly tend to the internal tranquillity of France? It seems to me that, next to Isabella herself, Louis Philippe is the person in Europe most interested in a speedy suppression of the civil war; and he is indisputably the individual who has the greatest power of putting the war down.

Foreign Office: Jan. 27, 1837.

Our speech will be moderate and short. On foreign affairs we shall say little, and especially not one word about France or French alliance. We can say nothing in their praise, and therefore silence is the most complimentary thing we can bestow upon them.

Foreign Office: Feb. 3, 1837.

Nothing, you see, could have passed off more quietly than our two nights on the Address. Nobody but our friend Bowring said a word about France. After all the vapouring of the papers about foreign affairs this is what Hume, in his classical language, calls a '*mere monte mus*.' I take it that if affairs had gone ill in Spain, and had afforded a good handle against us, the Tories would have laid hold of it; but that as matters seem turning out well, they would rather wish the thing settled, in order to have one stumbling-block the less in their way.

If, as you say, the French will have been mortified at not being mentioned in the speech, they will probably not be pleased at being so wholly forgotten in the debate.

Foreign Office: Nov. 3, 1837.

I have had a conversation with Sebastiani about Molé. He asked me how things went on between you and Molé. I said, well and ill. That nothing could be more cordial than Molé's manner of receiving you, and that he always spoke to you *with the greatest openness and confidence about the weather, and the French elections, and what was going on in the Chambers, and so forth*; but that whenever you bring the conversation to those European questions in which England and France have a common interest, and upon which something or other is to be done, Molé immediately shuts himself up in his cold reserve, has no opinion, is not sufficiently informed as to the facts, will reflect upon the matter, and, in short, evades giving any answer.

Affairs had now arrived at a state in Spain that brought pretty well to a close the deep interest with which for some time past the Spanish peninsula had been regarded. It was evident that the cause of Don Carlos would be the losing one; but it was also evident that the Christinos when triumphant would still be agitated and weakened by divisions, and that the country, though rescued from stagnation, tyranny, and superstition, would only arrive slowly and by degrees at anything like settled prosperity and stability.

It is not necessary, therefore, to prolong quotations on this subject. What has been cited was intended to show, and is sufficient to show, that Lord Palmerston had, or thought he had, serious complaints to make against the French Government as to the unfair and unfriendly manner in which it performed its duties as an ally, and that the differences between the two Governments first broke out in Spain.

The fact of these differences is important, because they no doubt prepared the way for subsequent differences in the East; inasmuch as Lord Palmerston ceased to attach the same consideration to intimate relations with France which he had attached to them when he thought that Power might be relied on for maintaining a steady union for peaceful and liberal objects among the Governments of the West.

CHAPTER XI.

ACCESSION AND CORONATION OF QUEEN VICTORIA—SPEECH ON
BRITISH POLICY IN SPAIN—STATE OF THINGS AT CONSTANTINOPLE
—POSITION OF MEHEMET ALI IN EGYPT.

BEFORE proceeding further with the narrative of public events on the Continent, a most interesting one must be noticed that had occurred to us in England—namely, the accession of Queen Victoria. Two short notices taken from Lord Palmerston's correspondence allude to it.

Foreign Office: June 20, 1837.

My dear Granville,—The poor King was released from his sufferings at an early hour this morning. He retained his mental faculties to the last, and was able to give directions on business even so late as yesterday.

The Privy Council met this morning at Kensington, and was most numerously attended. The proclamation will be to-morrow. The Queen went through her task to-day with great dignity and self-possession. One saw she felt much inward emotion; but it was fully controlled. Her articulation was peculiarly good; and her voice remarkably pleasing. To-day and to-morrow the two Houses do nothing but take the oaths. On Thursday there will be a message, as usual in such cases, to the two Houses; and an address in reply. We shall then go on with such business as may not admit of postponement, and in about a month in all probability we shall dissolve.

Foreign Office: June 27, 1837.

To-day the Queen received the Addresses of the House of Commons, and afterwards the foreign ministers. They were introduced one by one. Nothing could be better than her manner of receiving them; it was easy and dignified, and gracious.

In the House of Commons during the session of 1837 Lord Palmerston had to encounter two vigorous attacks upon the Whig conduct of foreign affairs; and our relations with Spain were specially chosen as apparently offering the weakest points to the enemy. On March 10 Lord Mahon, who had been Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the Peel Administration, brought the whole subject before the consideration of the House, and expressed the want of confidence in Lord Palmerston entertained by those for whom he acted as spokesman. Lord Palmerston, in a very clear and able speech, defended the policy of the Government. He said that he differed widely from Lord Mahon in thinking the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act disgraceful to the Government of this country. 'Examples of the same kind were to be found in the most brilliant periods of the history of England. The age of Elizabeth, which hardly any Englishman could make light of, was full of instances of the precise kind alluded to by the noble lord. That great and enlightened sovereign frequently allowed her subjects to volunteer in support of the Huguenots of France and of the Protestants in the Low Countries, and even to interfere in the affairs of Scotland; and she acted wisely in so doing.' As to the loss of British authority, he denied it, and urged facts in contradiction, adding: 'If when the noble lord complained of the decay of British influence in Spain, he meant the power of dismissing one minister by underhand intrigues, and substituting another by means equally discreditable, he (Lord Palmerston) desired no such influence.' He concluded by contrasting the efforts of the Tory party to maintain the cause of despotism with the successful endeavours of the Government towards a more enlightened policy. The former supported in Portugal Don Miguel, and in Spain Don Carlos, author of the assassination decree of Durango¹ and the champion of the Inquisition; while 'Ministers might boast of the

¹ Refusing quarter.

'support they had given to national liberty in Spain, of the part they had taken in the emancipation of the Greeks, of the free constitutions of Belgium and Portugal which had grown up under their auspices; and if he could contribute, however humbly, to the establishment of the same happy state of things in Spain as existed in Belgium and Portugal, he should esteem it a source of proud satisfaction to the latest hour of his life.'

Lord Palmerston was considered to have had the best of this encounter; and there is little doubt that the attack would not have been renewed unless the complete defeat of General Evans'¹ troops on March 16, before Hernani, had encouraged the Opposition again to try their fortune, trusting to the alliance of that large body of political speculators who judge of measures and of policy chiefly by the event. Sir Henry Hardinge accordingly, on April 18, moved for an Address to the King condemning the employment of British forces in Spain; and he was seconded by Sir Stratford Canning. The debate lasted for three nights; and towards the end of the last night Lord Palmerston rose to reply. He observed that the manner in which the question had been dealt with by his opponents was not fitted to impress him with the strength of their convictions. Their courage seemed to ebb and flow with the tide of war in Biscay. Last autumn, when it was thought that Bilboa would be taken, loud was their song of triumph; but Bilboa was relieved by British naval co-operation, and then nothing further was said upon the subject. Now this disaster seemed to have renewed their courage. He justified the Quadruple Treaty and the Order in Council permitting the enlistment of British subjects in the service of Spain, and reminded the House that the question before them was no less than whether England should disgracefully abandon an ally whom she had pledged herself to

¹ Afterwards Sir De Lacy Evans. He was at the head of a British Legion of about 4,000 men.

succour. This, however, he said, was far short of the real and ultimate tendency of the motion. The contest now waging in Spain was but a portion of that great conflict which was going on elsewhere throughout the world. The House had to decide that night between two opposite systems of foreign policy, intimately connected with and deeply affecting all our domestic interests. The object of one party was to support Carlos and despotism; that of the other to uphold Isabella and the constitution. In the days of the Reformation, when religion divided the different Powers of Europe, we saw despotic sovereigns and free states united in league to defend the principles of religious liberty. In the present day things were reversed in this respect, and we now saw men of the most opposite opinions on religious subjects united together to retard the progress of political improvement. The opinion which the House of Commons was about to pronounce would, in fact, decide not only between conflicting parties in England, but between antagonistic principles struggling for ascendancy in every other country of Europe.

The general opinion about Lord Palmerston's speech on this occasion may be gathered from the following letter, written to Lady Holland from the House of Commons on the night in question, by a Member of Parliament who was never one of the great Foreign Secretary's personal admirers; namely, Mr. Edward Ellice:— 'Lord Holland is so anxious to hear Sir R. Peel's answer to Lord Palmerston, who has just sat down, that I have promised to write a report of the debate for him. It is, however, useless to say more of it than that Palmerston has made so admirable a speech in every respect as completely to have gained the House, and to have re-established himself entirely in their good opinion, if there was a question of his having lost it in some quarters. He spoke for three hours; and I never heard a more able, vigorous, or successful defence of the foreign policy of a Government, or war better or more happily

and fearlessly carried into the enemy's quarters. What more can I say? I would if I could find terms in which to praise it to your full satisfaction. Lord Holland will wait the end of the debate, which cannot be yet for an hour and a half, as Peel has *much* to answer. The House was riotous with cheering throughout the speech.'

The House divided, when 242 members voted for the motion and 278 against it, giving the Government a majority of 36.

William IV. having died in 1837, the country was now preparing for the coronation of the Queen.

Stanhope Street : April 14, 1838.

My dear William,—The Government has, I think, got over all its threatened dangers, and we shall have the making of the Coronation Peers. That will be a good job for us ; twenty or twenty-five new votes in the Upper House, though they may not give us a majority, will yet make us cut a more respectable figure. The Queen is as steady to us as ever, and was in the depth of despair when she thought we were in danger of being turned out. She keeps well in health, and even in London takes long rides into the country, which have done her great good.

Spanish affairs look better. The Queen's troops are everywhere successful, and the Cortes have agreed to a loan. If this loan is large enough to pay the army and to fill Torreno's pockets, which are pretty deep, the war will be finished this summer, and Carlos will be compelled to retire to hide his ignominious head somewhere else. In the meanwhile, things are looking much better in Portugal. The Government has at last resolved to put down the clubs ; and having willed to do so, found itself immediately able, and the anarchy which has ruled over Portugal for a year and a half was put down in a couple of days. If Spain and Portugal can be made independent, free, and prosperous, they will become a most valuable addition to the balance of power in Europe ; and the time may come when Austria and Prussia will heartily thank us for having done that which they have so stoutly resisted. France and Russia may, naturally enough, take a different view of the matter.

People think that Nicholas is following the fate of Paul, at least in regard to mind. He certainly has grown morose, irritable, and violent. This may be the natural effect of finding so

many things in his empire going wrong. The young Prince will be here for the Coronation. They say he is mild, but has not the talent of his father. We want a King Log on the Russian throne; we have had too many King Storks.

There will be lots of extra ambassadors, and shoals of princes, at our Coronation. Heaven knows what we shall do with them, or how and where they will find lodging. They will be disappointed, both as to the effect they will themselves produce, and as to the splendour of the ceremony they come to witness. State coaches, fine liveries, and gilt harness make no sensation in London, except among the coachmakers and stablemen; and even they look more to the neatness than to the magnificence of the turn-out; and the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs, after all, will beat them all. And then as to dinners, balls, and the like, money alone will not do them; there must be a house of suitable dimensions, and that is not easily found. I do not think that marriage has yet entered the Queen's head; perhaps some of her visitors may inspire her with the idea; but after being used to agreeable and well-informed Englishmen, I fear she will not easily find a foreign prince to her liking. We had a most ludicrous end to our Spanish debate, but it was worthy of the motion. They were half ashamed of it, and will certainly not bring it on again, at least in our House—though Londonderry has given notice for it in the Lords.

Your despatches are remarkably well written: so clear, such good English, and in so sensible a style, without affectation or unsuitable pretension.

The motion referred to above was to the effect that in the opinion of the House no advantage had resulted to Spain or England from the Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act, in order to enable Englishmen to serve in Spain. The debate, in which Lord Palmerston took no part, was adjourned, and next day when the order for resuming the discussion was read, no member rising to address the House, the Speaker put the question. There was a cry of Aye from the Opposition, and of No from the ministerial side of the House. Whereupon the Speaker said, 'I think the Noes have it,' which was challenged, and a division took place amid great confusion, all parties being taken by surprise and entirely unprepared for so abrupt a con-

the idea that Turkey could not be a power in Europe unless she became European. He was the first Turk, indeed, who, going beyond this, conceived the idea of making the Turkish empire not merely the empire of the Turks, but the empire of all those born in Turkey, and destroying by degrees those religious distinctions which made a small part of its population a guard over the rest. The Turks were still to be for a while a privileged class, but Christians were to be admitted into all employments, and any Christian who served the State for a certain time was to enjoy the privileges and prestige of the dominant people. His notion was, that the Christians who were employed in this way might be depended upon, and that the Mussulmans, becoming by degrees accustomed to see Christians in authority, would be less shocked when the time came for making general that favour which was in the first instance to be partial.

At all events, a serious attempt was being made to reform and, if possible, revive the old empire. Lord Palmerston, as it may be seen by some of his letters, judged this possible and desirable for the peace of Europe; whether his view was or was not a right one may be canvassed hereafter. It suffices here to say that it existed. The great obstacle at the moment was internal division; for the ambition of Mehemet Ali, though appeased for the moment by the sacrifices recently made to him, still aspired not merely to sovereign independence in Egypt, but to dictate, as mayor of the palace, the policy of the Porte at Constantinople. This remarkable man, who, with his son Ibrahim as his lieutenant, kept the Turkish empire in a ferment for nearly ten years, after having seized Egypt and assumed a viceregal position, had invaded and conquered Syria, had driven the Sultan to implore, although in vain, the succour of England, and had finally only been checked in his onward career by the presence of a Russian army.

His prestige was great both with European Chris-

tians and Eastern Mussulmans. The obedient servant of the consuls at Alexandria, he spread artfully the belief that they would be his masters wherever he was master. Checked in the progress of his victories by Russian arms, he presented himself to the Mahometan populations as the representative of Islamism, whilst Mahmoud was but the vassal of the Czar. But his prestige with both was unsound, for it was based in a certain degree on deception. To rule over Egypt with a strong arm was not a difficult thing. The people were serfs, and had been serfs from all recorded time. Public opinion and political power were confined to a few Turks, a few Mamelukes, descendants of the old dominant race, then both in soul and body subdued, and a few renegade or purchased foreigners, all looking up to an able and determined man who could give them distinction and wealth. But the crafty and imperious Albanian¹ would have found very different elements to deal with had he ever succeeded in seating himself, whether as real or nominal sovereign, on the shores of the Bosphorus. The crafty Greek would have betrayed his counsels, the haughty Osmanli resisted and plotted against his authority, his power unsupported by tradition would have fallen to pieces at the first blow which cracked its surface; and it is easy now to see that they who imagined that with some thousands of half-drilled Arabs, commanded by a few European adventurers, he could have built up a new dynasty or revived an enfeebled empire, were the victims of a romantic delusion. But, on the other hand, his prestige within the region where he ruled was not at that moment to be upset by the unaided resources of the Turkish Government. The very attempt that the Porte was making to acquire a new force was a weakness, for its first efforts were to disorganize and dissatisfy—effects which had been seen in the defeat of its armies and the decline of its boldness and independence.

¹ Mehemet was Albanian by birth.

Meanwhile a state of excitement existed amongst the populations, and especially amongst the Embassies at Constantinople, which only a resident at Pera can comprehend. Everyone expected something—no one knew exactly what to expect. The Turks about the *Serai* were divided into two parties; the one, wishing for present peace at all hazards, urged the Sultan to place himself fairly under the protection of Russia; the other, imbued with a bolder and more patriotic spirit, preached incessantly a combination to destroy Mehemet Ali. A new rumour every day was in circulation. The French and English ambassadorial residences were then fixed within a stone's throw of each other at Therapia, a small village fronting the entrance into the Black Sea; and the two ambassadors, Admiral Roussin and Lord Ponsonby, each went to his window on getting out of bed, the one at six in the morning, and the other at six in the afternoon, prepared to see without surprise the Russian fleet anchored under their eyes. It was perhaps the only point on which these representatives of the two countries agreed. Both men of energy and ability, the one a philosopher, the other a fine gentleman, self-willed, and assuming rather to direct their respective Governments than to be directed by them, they were united by a common apprehension, in which each encouraged the other. This apprehension was no doubt an exaggerated one, but it could not be considered as altogether absurd.

The uncertainty of the position was, however, soon to cease. In the month of May Mehemet Ali announced to the French and English Consuls-general in Egypt his intention to declare his complete independence from the Porte. This intended realization of his long-meditated and long-suspected plan was to be met, in Lord Palmerston's opinion, by prompt and vigorous measures.

Foreign Office: June 5, 1838.

My dear Granville,—Your communication about Egypt is important, and tallies very much with other information which

we have received from elsewhere. I must bring the subject under the serious consideration of the Cabinet. My own opinion is, and has long been made up, we ought to support the Sultan heartily and vigorously ; with France, if France will act with us ; without her if she should decline.

But all this is only thinking on paper, and, till the Cabinet have decided, you can say nothing to Molé. I foresee difficulty in getting the Cabinet to take any vigorous resolve. There are very few public men in England who follow up foreign affairs sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events which have not happened.

Foreign Office : June 8, 1838.

The Cabinet yesterday agreed that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare himself independent, and separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish empire. They see that the consequence of such a declaration on his part must be either immediately or at no distant time conflict between him and the Sultan. That in such conflict the Turkish troops would probably be defeated ; that then the Russians would fly to the aid of the Sultan, and a Russian garrison would occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles ; and once in possession of those points, the Russians would never quit them. We are, therefore, prepared to give naval aid to the Sultan against Mehemet, if necessary and demanded ; and we intend to order our Mediterranean fleet immediately to Alexandria, in order to give Mehemet an outward and visible sign of our inward resolve. We should like the French squadron to go there too at the same time, if the French are willing so to send it. With respect to the mode of making our communications to Mehemet, much is to be said both ways. Separate declarations have the advantage which Molé mentions ; a joint and collective declaration would give us some hold over Russia, if it was founded upon a previous and recorded agreement between the five Powers, giving to the five some determining authority over the conduct of each ; but this would be a tedious matter to arrange, and would not be settled in time. What I should like, and what I should *think* I could get the Cabinet to agree to, would be a short convention between England and France on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, by which the two former should bind themselves for a limited time to afford to the latter naval assistance, in the event of her demanding it to protect her territory against attack ; and the wording might be so framed as to include the case either of Russia or of Mehemet Ali. I am convinced that such a conven-

tion as I describe would save Turkey, and preserve the peace of Europe, by *its mere moral effect*, and without our being called to act upon it.

Now, all this I write to you on the supposition that France is honest and can be trusted—not in the execution of the treaty, because, at all events, she could not help executing such an engagement,—but I mean in the previous negotiation; and you will use your judgment as to the degree to which you will confidentially sound Molé on this matter. *It must not be forgotten that one great danger to Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and Russia*, which, though prevented at present by the personal feelings of the Emperor, may not always be as impossible as it is now; and it would be well to fix the policy of France in the right track with respect to affairs of the Levant while we have the power to do so.

Marshal Sebastiani, the French Ambassador in London, was not explicit enough in stating to his Government the views of the British Foreign Office; so Lord Palmerston again communicates them to the British Ambassador.

Foreign Office: July 6, 1838.

The short state of the case appears to be this: if Mehemet Ali finds the least disunion between the Great Powers of Europe, he will endeavour to make himself independent, and take his chance of the split which consequent events may produce among us. But if he does declare himself independent, and war ensues between him and the Sultan, and the Russians interfere, the chances are that some serious quarrel will ensue between France and England on the one hand, and Russia on the other; or else that England and France will be forced to remain passive spectators of things done by Russia, which could not be acquiesced in without discredit to the Governments of England and France. The question then is, which is the most likely way to prevent Mehemet Ali from taking the step he is meditating; and if he should nevertheless take it, which is the best way to prevent the evil consequences which that step might produce?

Our opinion is, that for both these purposes a previous concert between the five would be most desirable. We think—First, that if we could announce to Mehemet that such a concert is established, and that we are all prepared conjointly to help the Sultan against him, he would abandon his intentions, and remain quiet. But next, we think that if, in spite of this warning, he was to move, such a concert would afford the best

security for bringing the matter to an end without any disturbance of the peace of Europe.

We wish, and so does Sebastiani, that the representatives of the five Powers should be assembled in London; that we should there lay the case before them, and propose a combined system of action; that, suggesting if the Porte should want aid by sea and by land, the three maritime Powers should give aid by sea, and Austria assistance by land; we should state without disguise that the solitary interference of Russia, however she may think herself justified or bound to exert it, would excite great jealousy in this part of the world; and that, as in the general interest and harmony, it seems desirable to avoid such jealousy with honour to all parties, and without any sacrifice of important interests, we propose the military action of Austria, which, from the intimate union existing between Austria and Russia, would be perfectly compatible with the honour of Russia, while, on the other hand, from the geographical position of Austria, it would not be the source of the same jealousy to England and France.

In all probability the mere announcement of such an arrangement of this kind would keep Mehemet quiet; but if it did not, it would at least insure a result consistent with the maintenance of general peace.

It will be remembered that Mehemet Ali, although he retained Syria, had been kept out of Constantinople solely by Russia having come to the aid of the Porte, and that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was the price which the Sultan had been compelled to pay to the Czar for his assistance. Lord Palmerston's persistent aim from the moment of the signing of this treaty, which virtually bound Turkey hand and foot to Russia, was either to neutralise or overthrow it. He had been gradually seeking to acquire the national and parliamentary support absolutely necessary for him in his enterprise, and the tone which he now assumed witnessed to his belief that he had secured it.

Windsor: Sept. 13, 1838.

My dear Ponsonby,—I had a long talk the other day with Achmed Fethi Pasha,¹ and gave him the best advice I could

¹ Turkish Ambassador.

about his Government and country. I strongly urged upon him how expedient it is for the Sultan to abstain from attacking Mehemet Ali, because Mehemet's army is now probably better than, or at least as good as that of the Sultan. I said that the Sultan ought to employ himself in organising his army and navy, and in improving his revenue, and should thus make himself strong enough to be able to beat Mehemet Ali by his own means. That the Sultan ought not to break with Russia, or give Russia any just ground for quarrel; but that there is no good reason why the Porte should allow Russia to interfere as she does in all the internal details of the administration of the Turkish empire, and especially to prevent and defeat every arrangement which has for its object the improvement of any part of the Turkish system.

I said that this practice of constant interference on the part of Russia arises out of, and is endeavoured to be justified upon, that article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi by which the Emperor and Sultan engage to consult each other confidentially upon their respective affairs. But that it would be most important for the interests and independence of the Porte to get rid of that treaty; but the question is, how to get rid of it before it expires? That the only way seemed to me to be, *to merge it in some more general compact of the same nature.* That the present threats of Mehemet Ali appear to furnish a good opportunity for such an attempt, and that the Porte might found upon those threats an application to England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to enter jointly into engagements with the Porte with a view to maintain the independence of the Turkish empire. Such a treaty, I observed, if it could be obtained, would supersede that of Unkiar Skelessi, and place the Porte in a state of comparative independence.

Sept. 22, 1838.

My dear Bulwer,¹—I am glad to hear your opinions respecting the future prospects of the Sultan with reference to Egypt and Syria, because it is always interesting to know how matters strike an intelligent mind observing events on the spot. I own that I have myself considerable doubts on the subject; but the present bent of my mind is to think that our policy should be founded upon the basis of an endeavour to maintain the Sultan and to uphold the integrity of the Turkish empire. There can be no doubt that it is for the interest of England

¹ Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople.

that the Sultan should be strong; and it is evident that he would be stronger with Syria and Egypt than without them. I am, therefore, for continuing to aim at a maintenance of the integrity of the empire; we can think of a confederation when unity shall have been proved to be impossible.

People go on talking of the inevitable and progressive decay of the Turkish empire, which they say is crumbling to pieces. In the first place, no empire is likely to fall to pieces if left to itself, and if no kind neighbours forcibly tear it to pieces. In the next place, I much question that there is any process of decay going on in the Turkish empire; and I am inclined to suspect that those who say that the Turkish empire is rapidly going from bad to worse ought rather to say that the other countries of Europe are year by year becoming better acquainted with the manifest and manifold defects of the organisation of Turkey. But I should be disposed to think that, for some years past, the foundations at least of improvement have been laid; and it is certain that the daily increasing intercourse between Turkey and the other countries of Europe must in a few years, if peace can be preserved, throw much light upon the defects and weaknesses of the Turkish system, and lead to various improvements therein.

What Lord Palmerston here says is very greatly the truth. When Turkey was a barbaric Power, with its flowing robes and latticed windows, it existed as a romantic mystery, which no one thought of inquiring into; when it became more or less Europeanized, people put on their spectacles and began to criticise it with European eyes, and to judge it by European notions; and it may almost be said that what superficial observers pointed at as symptoms of deterioration were proofs of improvement.

We must here interpose a reference to the ministerial crisis at home which threatened to deprive Lord Palmerston of this opportunity for settling affairs in the East. The Government had become weak, and on a Bill for suspending the Jamaica Constitution—a proposal in their opinion necessitated by the antagonisms aroused in that island by the abolition of slavery—Ministers in a full House only obtained a majority of

five. They resigned in consequence, and Sir Robert Peel was summoned by the Queen. He, however, after some delay, abandoned the task of forming an Administration. Whatever may have been his other difficulties the one that he publicly assigned as the cause of his failure was that Her Majesty declined to permit the removal of the ladies of her household, who all happened to be members of Whig families, and closely connected with the leading politicians of the Whig party.

Foreign Office: May 10, 1839.

My dear Granville,—The Tories have failed to make a Government, not from any difference between themselves, but from a difference with the Queen. They insisted on the removal of the Ladies of the Bedchamber. The Queen declared she would not submit to it; that it would be too painful and affronting to her; that those ladies have no seats in Parliament; that the object in view in dismissing them was to separate her from everybody in whom she could trust, and to surround her with political spies if not with personal enemies. They came three times to the charge. First, Peel made the demand singly, then he brought to his aid the Duke of Wellington, and again he came back with the unanimous opinion of his Cabinet that was to be. The Queen, alone and unadvised, stood firm against all these assaults, showed a presence of mind, a firmness, a discrimination far beyond her years, and had much the best of it in her discussion with Peel and the Duke. She sent Peel this morning her final refusal to comply with this condition, and Peel thereupon resigned his commission to form a Government. We shall of course stand by the Queen, and support her against this offensive condition which the Tories wanted to impose upon her, and which her youth and her isolated position ought to have protected her from. It remains to be seen whether this House of Commons will support us in supporting her; and if it will not, whether this House does or does not faithfully represent the opinion of the country. However, nothing is as yet settled, but I believe Melbourne is or has been with the Queen.¹

¹ However just the views that Lord Palmerston expresses on this particular case, the decision taken on it hardly forms the subject for a precedent. There might be female sovereigns who, if they had for their intimate friends the wives of political partizans hostile to the

The position in which Mehemet Ali continued to stand towards the Sultan created causes of irritation constantly and necessarily : nor could these be removed so long as one thought he had to seek his safety by increasing his power, whilst the other thought his power insecure so long as that of his vassal and rival remained undestroyed.

In fact, Mahmoud had long concentrated all the hopes of his remaining life on the overthrow of his audacious vassal, and had by degrees been collecting an army on the Syrian frontier, for which many anticipated, it must be owned, success ; for the Egyptian Administration, whilst it maintained order, was as rapacious as that of the Turks, and more harsh and cruel ; so that the imperial troops had little to fear from the inhabitants, whilst, with their artillery directed by European engineers, and an army drawn from a Turkish population, it was not altogether reckless to despise the slight superiority in discipline which French officers had been able to give to the less brave and hardy Arabs.

The European Powers were so far agreed in the first instance that they unanimously combined to preach to both parties abstinence from action. ‘ We will not allow Mehemet Ali to cross the Syrian boundary if you don’t attack him,’ they said to Sultan Mahmoud. ‘ If you attempt to pass the line of your present boundary you will incur the displeasure of all Europe,’ they said to Mehemet Ali.

It is easy, indeed, to see why every great European Power wished to avoid a conflict in the East. If the Pacha of Egypt were successful, and his son Ibrahim marched on to Constantinople after victory, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would be called into execution. England, France, and Austria did not want to see Russia the established protectress of Turkey ; it was inconvenient to prevent this by force, difficult to do so

Cabinet that was to conduct the affairs of the State, would render the steady confident action of a Government impossible.

by arrangement; whilst Russia herself did not wish to be involved in the complications which an appeal to her assistance would produce.

France had an additional motive for desiring to preserve the *status quo*. She did not desire to see the Sultan disturbed on the Bosphorus; but she did not desire to see Mehemet Ali disturbed in his possession of Syria and Egypt. There is, in fact, a policy dating far back in the traditions of the French Foreign Office, which would assign to France the possession of or patronage over Egypt. Napoleon's expedition indented this policy deeper into the French mind. It was a policy natural for France if France was the enemy of England; but it was a policy impossible for France if there was to be a sincere alliance and friendship between the two countries, because the mistress of India cannot permit France to be mistress directly or indirectly of the road to her Indian dominions. Now the French Government did not want to quarrel with England; and yet it did not like to abandon an idea which it had become a custom to consider national.

The *status quo* therefore just suited it. But there was one party whom it did not suit, and that was the Sultan. The *status quo* was not only the severance of a large portion of the empire from his authority, it was the destruction of that prestige by which he held the rest; and there was daily forming a considerable party, even about his throne, in favour of placing, by some violent course or other, the sceptre of Constantinople in the hands of his youthful son, Abdul Medjid, under the guardianship of the old and fortunate despot at Cairo. Diplomatic arguments were therefore of little avail, and Mahmoud went on perseveringly increasing his army, with a determination to risk all for all on the first favourable opportunity.

This was thought to have arrived in the spring of 1839, and on June 24 a great battle was fought at Nezib. The Turkish general, Hafiz Pacha, was defeated—not so easily as it was represented, for the Turks

fought well, and were on the point at one moment of gaining the victory; but once routed, the rout was complete. Misfortunes never come singly. On June 30 the Sultan Mahmoud died, and almost immediately afterwards the Turkish Grand Admiral, Achmet Pacha, went off with the fleet and delivered it up to Mehemet Ali at Alexandria. Its army scattered, its navy gone, the Porte had no national means of defence. But Russia, as I have said, was bound to be its defender if called upon to be so; and the other States of Europe therefore had to determine whether they were to allow this office to be undertaken by Russia singly or by themselves and Russia conjointly. This was at once decided by the ambassadors of all the Powers at Constantinople agreeing to a note in which they pledged their Governments to protect the young heir to the empire, and advised his Ministers to listen to no offers from Egypt without their concurrence. But to what extent and by what means was this joint protection to be afforded?

A new series of negotiations commenced, in which France gradually detached herself more and more from England, without confessing that she did so.

For instance, Lord Palmerston said that Mehemet Ali should be at once forced to restore the Sultan's fleet. Marshal Soult said, 'Certainly, but *not just now*; when we have settled every other point we will settle that.' Lord Palmerston said Mehemet Ali's limits should be defined, and he should be forced to withdraw within them, receiving in return the hereditary investiture of what he retained. 'Quite right,' said the Marshal, 'and we will settle all about Mehemet Ali presently; but the first thing to do is to settle about Constantinople: Ibrahim may march forward to it at any moment; then comes the question of the Russians doing the same thing; that is the first object to look to,'—thus endeavouring not only to turn attention from Egypt, but to involve us in difficulties with Russia, which would prevent any subsequent agreement between that Power and ourselves.

In negotiation, the worst course possible is to disguise real differences by plausible expressions. The disagreement which exists between two parties who wish to agree should be stated in the clearest and broadest manner at the commencement. The sore should be probed to the bottom, or there is no chance of healing it. At all events the discovery which our Government had to make was as to what the French Government would *really do*; as to what it *professed* its wish to do that was of small importance.

Sept. 1, 1839.

Dear Bulwer,—Your letter gives a very clear and distinct view of the confused and indistinct thinkings of the French Government. It is evident that, either from their own notions of French interests, or from fear of the newspapers, the French Government will not willingly take the slightest step of coercion against Mehemet Ali, either for the purpose of getting back the Turkish fleet, or in order to enforce any arrangement which the five Powers may agree to propose to the two parties. My last communications to you will, however, bring the French to a point. They will see from those communications that, anxious as we are to continue to go on with them, we are not at all prepared to stand still with them. They must therefore take their choice between three courses:—either to go forward with us and honestly redeem the pledges they have given to us and to Europe; or to stand aloof and shrink from a fulfilment of their own spontaneous declarations; or, lastly, to go right about and league themselves with Mehemet Ali, and employ force to prevent us and those other Powers who may join us from doing that which France herself is bound by every principle of honour, and every enlightened consideration of her real interests, to assist us in doing, instead of preventing from being done. I can hardly think Louis Philippe equal to the third course. The second is that which he would wish to pursue. But perhaps if he shall find that England, Austria, and Russia are agreed as to the first course he will follow us, even against his own inclination. The more I reflect on these matters the more convinced I am that there is no possibility of a permanent settlement without making Mehemet withdraw into his original shell of Egypt; and Campbell's description of his manner when he received from Constantinople the account of the collective note

sufficiently shows how conscious he is of his own inability to resist united Europe.

As to the Turkish empire, if we can procure for it ten years of peace under the joint protection of the five Powers, and if those years are profitably employed in reorganising the internal system of the empire, there is no reason whatever why it should not become again a respectable Power. Half the wrong conclusions at which mankind arrive are reached by the abuse of metaphors, and by mistaking general resemblance or imaginary similarity for real identity. Thus people compare an ancient monarchy with an old building, an old tree, or an old man, and because the building, tree, or man must, from the nature of things, crumble, or decay, or die, they imagine that the same thing holds good with a community, and that the same laws which govern inanimate matter or vegetable and animal life govern also nations and states. Than which there cannot be a greater or more utterly unphilosophical mistake. For besides all other points of difference, it is to be remembered that the component parts of the building, tree, or man remain the same, and are either decomposed by external causes, or are altered in their internal structure by the process of life, so as ultimately to be unfit for their original functions; while, on the contrary, the component parts of a community are undergoing daily the process of physical renovation and of moral improvement.

But whilst France thus shrunk back from us Russia came forward to take her place by our side, and M. de Brunnow had been sent to London to explain the feelings of his Government on the subject under discussion. The next letter shows clearly the position in which the various parties then stood—the one party bidding for our confidence as the other was losing it..

Windsor: Sept. 24. 1839.

My dear Bulwer,—As Sebastiani will write to-day an account of a conversation I had with him yesterday, and in which I told him frankly the substance of all Brunnow had said to me, I wish you to be fully informed without delay. Brunnow says that the Emperor will entirely agree to our views as to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and will join in whatever measures may be necessary to carry those views into effect; that he will unite with us, Austria, and Prussia, either with

France or without her; and that though, politically speaking, he sees the advantage of having France of the party, personally he would be better pleased that she should be left out; that if we trust him as he hopes we do, and feels he deserves we should, he hopes we will trust him entirely, and not appear to show jealousy where we feel none; that consequently, if the measures of Mehemet should place Constantinople in danger, and render necessary any naval or military operation in the Bosphorus or Asia Minor, he hopes we will leave that to him, and that we will on our part undertake whatever is to be done in the Mediterranean and on the coasts of Syria and Egypt; that he is willing not only that anything which he may do with his fleet and army shall be held to be the result of concert, and not the resolve of Russia alone, but he is ready to begin by signing a convention which shall define our objects, determine our means of accomplishment, and assign to each his appropriate part; and that of course under such a convention the Russian force would withdraw as it came whenever the object should have been attained; and Brunnow further said, in confidence, that if such a course were followed there would be no renewal of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. I have told Sebastiani all this, except the preference of the Emperor to leave France out. I said that I had seen Esterhazy, who entirely agreed with me, individually, that it would for many weighty reasons be highly expedient to accept this offer, but that I could not say what the Cabinet may resolve upon, a matter which it has not yet deliberated upon, and that Esterhazy could not say what his Government would determine upon an overture with which it had not yet been made acquainted.

Sebastiani seemed little pleased with the prospect which this step of Russia seems to open of an arrangement of the Turco-Egyptian question in entire accordance with the views of the British Government; but the only point on which he much dwelt was the objection which he urged against leaving to Russia the task of defending Constantinople, which he represented as confirming Russian influence and preponderance in Turkey. I said I did not see this, because if the parts assigned to each Power were to be determined by previous convention, each would act, not for herself, but for the whole, and exclusive influence no longer followed. *Besides, I said, it seemed to me that there was no wise medium between confidence and distrust; and that if we tie up Russia by treaty we may trust her, and trusting her, we had better mix no evidence of suspicion with*

our confidence.¹ He at last only contended for our having a ship or two anchored within the Dardanelles if the Russians should be called to Constantinople; but that would be childish. Throughout the conversation I treated the matter as if France would of course be a party to the proposed convention, and he discussed it upon that assumption. As to the arrangement itself, nothing can be more miserable than the shifts and changes in the opinions and schemes of the French Government; and it is evident that they have wishes and objects at bottom which they are ashamed of confessing. That, in short, their great and only aim is to do as much as they possibly can do for Mehemet Ali, without caring a pin for the Sultan, or having the least regard for their declarations and pledges. Sebastiani argued again for his plan of a frontier line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout. I again started all the objections to it, adding also that if Mehemet Ali had that bottom part of Syria, he would necessarily command the west coast of the Red Sea and the holy cities, which Louis Philippe had long ago said to Granville it would be absolutely necessary to restore to the Sultan. I wish you to see Soult, and to ascertain from him what Sebastiani has written, and what the French Government mean to do, letting Soult understand, that although the Cabinet has not yet come to a decision, they will meet about this matter in a day or two; and that the probability is, that they will resolve to proceed in conjunction with the three Powers *whether France joins or not; but that on every possible account we should deeply regret that France should not be a party to the proceeding*; and you might observe that France has distinctly approved of our object, though from internal difficulties she may hesitate as to taking a share in the means of execution. If Soult should hint that France would oppose the four Powers, you might suggest that she could not do so consistently with her own spontaneous declarations, and that it could not be worth while for France to make war with the four Powers for the sake of endeavouring to give to Mehemet a few square miles and some hundred thousand people in southern Syria; that no French interest could be promoted thereby; while, on the contrary, the character of France as a country which adheres to her word would thereby be greatly affected.

The question at issue, therefore, was whether England was to abandon her policy and accept that of

¹ Nothing is so foolish as half-confidence, when only entire confidence can realise the project for which reciprocal confidence is required.

France. In ordinary circumstances that might have been a matter of doubt; but in this instance, if we had abandoned our views for those of the French Cabinet, we should have given it the supreme authority in one half of the Ottoman empire, and have become contemptible in the other. Nor was this the only danger; directly we sunk in prestige we lost power in our dealings with other States; and if Russia, who was now disposed to act with us, saw that we were afraid of France, there was nothing to prevent her offering her alliance to France instead of to ourselves, and thus realizing a policy which many Frenchmen and many Russians have at times advocated, and which would have established, by an *entente* between the Emperor Nicholas and the King Louis Philippe, the ascendancy of one on the shores of the Bosphorus and of the other on the banks of the Nile.

These considerations determined Lord Palmerston to stand firmly by his own original views, though he became more and more convinced that they would not receive any real support from the military President of the French Council, who had by this time lost the first quality of a cunning man—that of *not being thought cunning*. At the same time, Lord Palmerston did not wish to be precipitate; and having drawn up a statement of grievances which Lord Granville thought too strongly expressed, he makes alterations, but says in a letter dated November 5, ‘Though some of the facts and arguments that are used will, as you say, touch Louis Philippe in the raw, yet it seems to me necessary to do so, and we cannot sacrifice ourselves out of delicacy to him.’

Again, he states what are the reasons which he believes caused Louis Philippe to wish to assist Mehemet Ali against the Porte.

Foreign Office: Nov. 22, 1839.

My dear Granville,—I understand that Louis Philippe said to some Foreign Minister the other day, that the reason why he protects Mehemet Ali is, that France will probably be at war with England before two years are over, and that then the

French will want the co-operation of Mehemet Ali's fleet in the Mediterranean. A *very friendly speech*, if really made; but I had the information in a very secret way, and tell it you rather as a clue to sound by, than as a statement you could repeat.

Another letter shows the Cabinet of St. Petersburg making propositions conciliatory to our policy, and the Cabinet of France arming a squadron apparently destined to oppose it.

Foreign Office: Dec. 6, 1839.

My dear Granville,—I received yesterday a despatch from Clanricarde, stating that the Russian Government agrees to our proposal about the Dardanelles, and is willing that if a Russian force shall enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all the other co-operating Powers shall enter the Dardanelles. Brunnow is coming back immediately to London, in order to carry on the negotiation, which was suspended while this question was unsettled. This will give us a pull upon France, and will enable us to carry out our own views into execution about Turkey and Egypt; for Austria and Prussia will side with us and Russia;—and France, if she stands aloof, will be left to herself.

I mentioned yesterday to Sebastiani, but in a friendly manner, that we had lately heard that the French Government are equipping eight large ships of the line at Toulon, besides the nine which they now have in the Levant, and that one naturally asks oneself, against whom is this formidable display of naval force directed? Not against Russia, because she has only twelve sail, and they are within the Black Sea; not against the Turks and Egyptians, because the former are prisoners, and the latter are friends: it must then be against us; and this is countenanced by a violent article against England in the '*Journal de Paris*' the other day, said to be written by Duchâtel, and in which there is a boast that England shall be forced to subscribe to and guarantee the independence of Mehemet Ali, and that Gibraltar shall be given back to Spain.

Sebastiani said he would write about this. I told him that we are going to commission three more line-of-battle ships to relieve three now in the Mediterranean whose time of service is out; but that of course if the French equip seventeen sail of the line we cannot pay off any, but may have to commission more, as this subject will of course be commented on when Parliament meets.

I am confident that if France would join us we should carry our points without firing a shot or striking a blow; but even without France we shall still carry these points.

In the mean time Lord Palmerston could not be persuaded to be frightened by Mehemet Ali's threats or those of his backers.

Foreign Office: March 11, 1840.

My dear Granville,—The accounts sent me by Hodges of his interview with Mehemet Ali lead me to think that Mehemet will end by yielding. Mehemet was very angry, extremely agitated, very violent, and most vehement in his assertions that he will never give way, supporting his assertions by solemn oaths; *all this indicates conscious weakness and internal fear*: already he has recalled four thousand men from the Hedgas to Egypt, and if he means to put Egypt into a state of defence he must spend a great deal of money, which he has not, and must recall more troops from Syria and Arabia. We are agreed with the three Powers; France has no real interest in any other arrangement than that which we propose. The Mehemet Ali cry in Paris and elsewhere is got up by Mehemet Ali himself, and we never can allow that he, acting through a fictitious public opinion in France, shall dictate to us; neither, indeed, can France herself, even if it be the real and deliberate opinion of France, give law to Europe.

Let the French say what they like, they *cannot* go to war with the four Powers in support of Mehemet Ali; would they hazard a naval war for such an object? Where are they to find ships to equal or to contend with the British navy alone, leaving out the Russian navy, which in such a case would join us! What would become of Algiers if they were at war with a Power superior to France at sea? Would they risk a Continental war? and for what? Could they help Mehemet by marching to the Rhine? and would they *not be driven back as fast as they went*? It is impossible. The French may talk big, but cannot make war for such a cause. *It would be very unwise to underrate the force of France, and the evils of a war with her in a case in which she had a national interest and a just cause*; but it would be equally inexpedient to be daunted by big words and empty vapouring in a case in which a calm view of things ought to convince one that *France alone would be the sufferer by a war hastily, capriciously, and unjustly undertaken by herself*.

Soult by this time was out : the two fractions of the French Opposition, that of M. Guizot and M. Thiers, had made what was termed '*un mariage de raison*,' and combining together had broken up his Administration. M. Thiers had become President of the Council, and M. Guizot been named Ambassador to London. This was a great change in the internal policy of France, but it did not change our notions or add much to our hopes with respect to its foreign policy. Lord Palmerston's feelings as to what he considered to have been and to be the uncertain character of that policy are expressed without much reticence in the following letters to Lord Granville :—

Carlton Terrace : April 16, 1840.

It has long been quite evident that the French Government has been deceiving us about the affairs of Buenos Ayres, as they have done about almost every other matter in which we have had any communications with them, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Tunis, Turkey and Egypt, Persia, &c., upon all of which their language and their conduct have been directly at variance. The truth is, however reluctantly one may avow the conviction, that Louis Philippe is a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed. However, there he is, and we call him our ally ; only we ought to be enlightened by experience and not to attach to his assertions or professions any greater value than really belongs to them ; more especially when, as in the case of Egypt, his words are not only at variance with his conduct, but even inconsistent with each other. The Cabinet have determined that we must without delay bring the French to a clear and definite arrangement about their fleet ; unless they will reduce their ships in commission to ten—the number which Soult stated to you in July last—as the intended amount of the French active force, we must go down to Parliament and ask for an additional vote upon the specific ground of the unexplained armament of France. I shall make an official communication to you and to Guizot on this matter.

Broadlands : April 23, 1840.

What you say of the French in general is very true. There is no trusting them ; and they are always acting a double part. I am afraid, however, that their double-dealing at present is not to be ascribed solely to weakness and timidity. The truth

is that Louis Philippe is the prime mover of the foreign relations of France, and one must admit in one's own mind that if he had been a very straightforward, scrupulous, and high-minded man, he would not now have been sitting on the French throne.'

It is not surprising that with such feelings as are here expressed, a British Minister deemed it desirable to continue in accord with those Governments which not only expressed sentiments similar to his own, but seemed willing to act upon them. With Austria disposed, like ourselves, to preserve the solidarity of the Ottoman empire, whether against the designs of Russia or France, there was a natural sympathy. Russia has never since the days of Catherine been in a hurry to extend her dominion eastward. She considers her ultimate influence over that portion of the world too certain to be precipitate in attaining it. Susceptible as to the manner in which France had endeavoured to excite the suspicions of England against her, not indifferent to the advantage of breaking up a combination which for the last ten years had been weighing upon her, and having no interest whatsoever in extending the power of Mehemet Ali and the influence of France over Egypt and Syria, unless she were directly and immediately to benefit by it, she was, as willing to act with us, if we had the courage to act with her, as France, thinking we should not have that courage, was unwilling.

¹ Lord Granville pointed out to Lord Palmerston that there was a good deal of difference between insincerity proceeding from ill-will, and insincerity proceeding from feebleness and timidity. 'The King does not want to quarrel with us,' he said, 'but neither does he want to quarrel with the French press and the French Chambers. He has fixed no greedy eyes on Egypt, but he does not want to quarrel with those who have;' and this was perfectly true. But Palmerston said, 'I can't enter into motives, I must look to acts. And if a reputed friend will not act as a friend, I must consider he is not one.' In respect to Lord Palmerston's last remark, it must have been made without a knowledge of the fact that Louis Philippe, before accepting the throne for himself, privately offered the Duchesse de Berri to proclaim her son king and take for himself the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, if Her Royal Highness would leave the Duc de Bordeaux in France. When this was refused, the Duke of Orleans had no choice as a good Frenchman but to save his country from confusion by allowing the crown that was on the ground to be placed on his head.

The Porte had been told she might rely on France one of her trusted allies; the Pacha of Egypt had taught to believe that France would stand his side. We had been assured that all that we desired most just and reasonable, and yet there was nothing we wished or proposed that France had shown a willingness to do. Admiral Roussin had, as Ambassador of France at Constantinople, been one of those representatives who had advised the Sultan not to yield to the demands of Mehemet Ali but trust to the protection of the Great Powers. Admiral Roussin was a member of M. Thiers' Cabinet; still M. Thiers saw no other issue from his difficulties than to bring about an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which would strip all other Governments but that of France of their pretension to be the Sultan's protectors. For this purpose it was necessary to prolong the negotiations between the Powers, to obtain certain concessions from Mehemet Ali, and to urge their acceptance with the hope, as a more safe and practicable issue out of its difficulties than any that could be expected from an agreement between several States that had different interests. It was not easy to keep such a plan long secret; it was discovered; and the consequence of its discovery was a treaty (July 15) between those States which M. Thiers intended to circumvent; and this treaty was not, until signed, communicated to France. The mine, in short, by which M. Thiers meant to blow Lord Palmerston was met by a countermine which blew up M. Thiers.

Lord Palmerston, however, did not pass through this crisis without considerable difficulty. There is a numerous class of men who are always for living an easy life. To foresee and guard against future evils—to face boldly confronting difficulties—to maintain the prestige of a great State against the encroachments of a rival one—are all troubles which a gentleman who is steady and short-sighted, or timid, tries to avoid. The whole of this class—which calls itself safe and prudent

—enlisting under it men who had taken a fancy for Mehemet Ali, or who had literary or other intimate connections in France, was opposed to Lord Palmerston, whom they called adventurous, dangerous, and, above all things, *troublesome*. He had to act in this matter alone, and to encounter opposition from all sides.

It was under these circumstances that the following letters were written to Lord Melbourne, ten days before the famous treaty of July 15:—

Carlton Terrace: July 5, 1840.

My dear Melbourne,—The difference of opinion which seems to exist between myself and some members of the Cabinet upon the Turkish question, and the extreme importance which I attach to that question, have led me, upon full consideration, to the conviction that it is a duty which I owe to myself and to my colleagues to relieve you and others from the necessity of deciding between my views and those of other members of the Cabinet on these matters, by placing, as I now do, my office at your disposal.

I have, indeed, for some time past, found myself in a difficult situation in regard to this affair.

The collective note of July last, the decision of the Cabinet held at Windsor in October, the course and tenour of my written communications with foreign Governments for several months past, sent round in circulation to the Cabinet; our verbal communications with the envoys and ministers of those Governments in this country; and with Brunnow in particular; the two drafts of convention, which, if I mistake not, I read some time ago to the Cabinet, the one drawn up by myself, the other by Brunnow and Neumann, were all founded upon one view of the question, namely, the expediency of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire; and I have considered myself as negotiating with the knowledge and sanction of the Cabinet in furtherance of that view. On the other hand, other members of the Cabinet have, in their conversations with those very foreign ministers with whom I was thus negotiating, held language and opinions founded upon a different view of the matter; and I have been told from various quarters, that persons not belonging to the Government, but known to be in habits of intimacy with members of the Government, have studiously, both at home and abroad, incul-

cated the belief that my views were not those of the majority of my colleagues, and that consequently I was not in this matter to be considered as the organ of the sentiments of the British Government.

The particular and immediate object which I have been endeavouring for some months past to accomplish, in conjunction with the representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, has been to persuade the French Government to come in to some plan of arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which the other four Powers could consider compatible with the integrity of the Turkish empire, and with the political independence of the Porte. In this I have ultimately failed. Perhaps the object was in any case unattainable in the present stage of the affair; but the circumstances to which I have adverted were certainly not calculated to diminish my difficulties.

The question which the British Government now has to decide is, whether the four Powers, having failed in persuading France to join them, will or will not proceed to accomplish their purpose without the assistance of France, but with the certainty, both from positive and repeated declarations of the French Government and from conclusive political considerations, that they will meet with no assistance from France in the execution of their measures.

My opinion upon this question is distinct and unqualified. I think that the object to be attained is of the utmost importance for the interests of England, for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the maintenance of peace in Europe. I find the three Powers entirely prepared to concur in the views which I entertain on this matter, if those views should be the views of the British Government. I can feel no doubt that the four Powers, acting in union with and in support of the Sultan, are perfectly able to carry those views into effect; and I think that the commercial and political interests of Great Britain, the honour and dignity of the country, good faith towards the Sultan, and sound views of European policy, all require that we should adopt such a course.

I think, on the other hand, that if we draw back, and shrink from a co-operation with Austria, Russia, and Prussia in this matter, because France stands aloof and will not join, we shall place this country in the degraded position of being held in leading-strings by France, and shall virtually acknowledge that, even when supported by the other three Powers of the Con-

tinent, we dare embark in no system of policy in opposition to the will of France, and consider her positive concurrence as a necessary condition for our action. Now this appears to me to be a principle of policy which is not suitable to the power and station of England, and which must frequently, as I think it would in the present instance, lead England to make herself subservient to the views of France for the accomplishment of purposes injurious to British interests.

The immediate result of our declining to go on with the three Powers because France does not join us will be, that Russia will withdraw her offers to unite herself with the other Powers for a settlement of the affairs of Turkey, and she will again resume her separate and isolated position with respect to those affairs; and you will have the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi renewed under some still more objectionable form. We shall thus lose the advantages on this point which it has required long-continued and complicated efforts on our part to gain, and England will, by her own voluntary and deliberate act, re-establish that separate protectorship of Russia over Turkey, the existence of which has long been the object of well-founded jealousy and apprehension to the other Powers of Europe.

The ultimate results of such a decision will be the practical division of the Turkish empire into two separate and independent States, *whereof one will be the dependency of France, and the other a satellite of Russia; and in both of which our political influence will be annulled, and our commercial interests will be sacrificed*; and this dismemberment will inevitably give rise to local struggles and conflicts which will involve the Powers of Europe in most serious disputes.

I have given to these matters for some years past my best and unremitting attention. I do not know that I ever had a stronger conviction upon any matter of equal importance; and I am very sure that, if my judgment is wrong on this matter, it can be of little value upon any other.

Twice my opinion on these affairs has been overruled by the Cabinet, and twice the policy which I recommended has been set aside. First in 1833, when the Sultan sent to ask our aid before Mehemet Ali had made any material progress in Syria, and when Russia expressed her wish that we should assist the Sultan—saying, however, that if we did not, she would. Secondly in 1835, when France was ready to have united with us in a treaty with the Sultan for the maintenance of the

integrity of his empire.¹ Subsequent events in each instance showed that I had not overrated the imminence of the danger which I wanted to avert, nor the magnitude of the embarrassments which I wished to prevent.

We are now arrived at a third crisis, when the resolution of the British Cabinet will exercise a deciding influence upon future events; but this time the danger is more apparent and undisguised, and the remedy is more complete and within our reach.

The matter to be dealt with belongs to my own department, and I should be held in a peculiar degree personally responsible for the consequences of any course which I might undertake to conduct. I am sure, therefore, that you cannot wonder that I should decline to be the instrument for carrying out a policy which I disapprove, and that I should consequently take the step which I have stated in the beginning of this letter.

Although Lord Palmerston believed that the majority of the Cabinet would concur in his course of policy, he also had reason to believe that a minority might express such strong objections as to create embarrassment for the Prime Minister if these objections were brought into direct collision with the opinion of the majority. He thought it, therefore, right to place the matter at once in Lord Melbourne's hands as far as he was concerned. He added that though he did not see that his retreat need break up the Government—he did not think—even if it were demonstrated that it would do so—that any man could be expected to work out in his own department a course of policy which he thought injurious to the interests of his country. Lord Melbourne entreated him to withhold his resignation and added: ‘Do not think one thing: have no notion that your resignation must not dissolve the present Government; and how another is to be formed in the present state of parties and opinions I see not.’

¹ I could not persuade the Cabinet to agree to this without the immediate accession of Austria, and Austria would not without Russia; and as the engagement was to be against attack or encroachment by Russia, Russia of course would not at that time enter into such a treaty.—*Mem. by Lord Palmerston*, October 7, 1842.

The waverers, however, yielded. Knowledge, pluck, and perseverance won the day for the Foreign Secretary, and he carried the Cabinet with him, however grudgingly, in the bold course which he had determined to follow.

The terms which were to be offered to Mehemet Ali under the proposed convention are related in the next letter :—

C. T. : July 13, 1840.

My dear William,—I am on every account very glad that the Sulphur question is settled ; it is a great embarrassment out of the way, and we want all our ships to be in the Levant, where we have work for them to do. We have determined to go ahead with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, as France will not join us ; and we mean to compel Mehemet Ali to evacuate all Syria, except a southern bit between the sea, Lake Tiberias, the Jordan, and the Dead Sea, and bounded to the north by a line drawn from the Mediterranean just above the fortress of Acre to Lake Tiberias. We mean to give him ten days to accept this offer, Egypt to be held by hereditary tenure, and the end of Syria for his life. If he does not accept this in ten days, then we shall offer him Egypt by hereditary tenure, without the lower part of Syria ; and if he does not in ten days more accept that, then he will not have Egypt by hereditary tenure ; and if he resists, he must abide the issue of events. Minto¹ writes by this messenger to Stopford, to prepare him for the instructions which he may shortly expect to receive, to support the Syrian people against Mehemet and Ibrahim. I have been overwhelmed with business of all kinds of late, but continue quite well.

Prince Albert is to be sole regent during the confinement of the Queen, and if any misfortune were to happen during the minority of the heir to the throne, or rather, of the infant sovereign, there is already a Bill in force to provide for the regency till the arrival of Ernest,² if, as a signal punishment for the sins of the nation, he were to come to the throne of England.

My Priam filly three-year old, out of Gallopade's dam, has won the only two races she has started for ; one at Stockbridge

¹ First Lord of the Admiralty.

² King of Hanover.

and the Queen's Plate at Guildford; and she may win a stake this week at Southampton,

C. T.: July 27, 1840.

I send you, for your own private information, the convention which we signed the other day between the four Powers and Turkey. We have tried for many months past to persuade France to join us in some practicable arrangement; but having at last failed in every endeavour, we have been obliged to act without her. Thiers and Guizot are very angry, of course, because they had persuaded themselves that the English Cabinet never would be induced to separate itself from France on this question. Guizot had been deceived by the foolish language held by Holland and Clarendon, who went talking away in favour of Mehemet Ali. However, the French had some foundation for their mistake; for when it came to the point, I found such resistance on the part of Holland and Clarendon, and such lukewarmness on the part of some of the other members of the Cabinet, that I sent in my resignation, saying that I saw there was a disinclination in some leading members to adopt my views; and that, as I never would be the instrument to work out a policy which I thought injurious to the interests of my country, and full of danger to the peace of Europe, I relieved Melbourne from the embarrassment of deciding between me and those who differed from me, by placing my office at his disposal. The dissidents upon this withdrew their opposition, and the waverers came round to my views. I was quite sure that France would not venture to quarrel with us, and oppose the four Powers by force of arms in order to protect Mehemet Ali; and so it has turned out. Thiers has sent a querulous reply to my mem., complaining of unkind and uncourteous treatment; but ending with a declaration of his determination to maintain peace.

We can soothe his personal feelings; and when he has got over his mortification, which he soon will do, perhaps he may be induced to help us, by persuading the Pasha to yield. This may open a new line for the gratification of French vanity; and, so as we carry our objects, we care not much by what fair means it is accomplished. It is lucky that we have finished our Neapolitan dispute; and one reason which made me so impatient to do so was, that I foresaw we should want our whole disposable force to carry on our operations in the Levant. I daresay Thiers thinks that we have out-manœuvred him in this matter by getting him to finish his mediation sooner than

he would have brought it to an end ; and this makes him more angry. But his ill-humour will blow over, and his interest will make him come round to us again.

In the meanwhile Neumann, Bulow, and Brunnow are delighted, and their Courts will, I doubt not, be equally pleased. In fact, if we had yielded to France on this occasion, we should have made her the dictator of Europe, and her insolence would have known no bounds ; and we should soon have had to quarrel with her upon some matter directly affecting the interests or the honour of the two countries, and upon which perhaps neither party would have been able with honour to give way.

Our session is nearly over ; and the Tories are split more than ever. The Duke and Peel are not upon speaking terms ; they quarrelled about the Canada Union Bill. Peel pledged himself for it ; the Duke afterwards against it ; and Peel wrote to the Duke to say that if he, the Duke, turned the Government out upon that Bill, Peel would not belong to the new Government, because that Government must be founded upon opposition to the principle of union between the Upper and Lower Canadas, while Peel was pledged in favour of that principle.

Lord Palmerston was 'curious,' as he says, to know how his treaty had been taken in France. The popular rage at Paris was unbounded, and war was spoken of everywhere. Lord Palmerston, however, was not alarmed, and he judged rightly of the prospect as promising a peaceful solution :—

Carlton Terrace : July 21, 1840.

My dear Bulwer,¹—I am curious to know how Thiers has taken our convention. No doubt it has made him very angry ; it is a great blow to France ; but she has brought it on herself by her own obstinacy in refusing to accede to any reasonable terms. I am inclined to think that Thiers has been misled by Ellice and Guizot, and has acted upon a belief that the English Cabinet would never venture to take such a step ; and that if France would only hold out firmly the rest of Europe would yield to her will. France is now in a difficulty ; but the best way out of it is the honestest ; and the wisest thing Thiers could do would be to send off outright to Mehemet, and to tell him to

¹ Had been moved to Paris.

accept at once the first proposition that will be made to him. If Thiers does not do this, he will consolidate an alliance from which France has excluded herself; and it cannot be agreeable to Louis Philippe to have France placed by him in this respect in the relative situation in which she stood in 1815.

Thiers will probably at first swagger; but we are not men to be frightened by threats; and he will be far too wise to do any rash things that would bring him into collision with England alone, to say nothing of the other three Powers; especially in a matter in which France is wholly in the wrong. You say Thiers is a warm friend but a dangerous enemy, it may be so; but we are too strong to be swayed by such considerations. I doubt, however, that Thiers is much to be relied upon as a friend; and knowing myself in the right, I do not fear him as an enemy. The way to take anything he may say is, to consider the matter as a *fait accompli*, as an irrevocable decision, and a step taken that cannot be retraced.

Point out that when four great Powers bind themselves to a fifth, as we have done to Turkey, they must have resolved to carry the matter through at all hazards; that France has more than once declared that she agreed with us in thinking the arrangement we mean to execute the best; and that her only difference with us has consisted in her thinking that we have not the necessary means to accomplish our purpose, and in her having determined not to join us in attempting to enforce it. And the French Government should, if necessary, be reminded that it has been told over and over again by us since last September, that if she would not go on with us we should go on without her; that we were ready and willing to go on with France, but not to stand still with France. Guizot said that the French Government would now feel it necessary to be in force, in great force, in the Levant. Be it so. We shall not be daunted by any superiority of naval force which she may choose or be able to send thither. We shall go to work quietly in our own way, in presence of a superior force, if such there be, just as undisturbed as if it was laid up in ordinary at Toulon. France knows full well that if that superior force should dare to meddle with ours, it is *war*; and she would be made to pay dearly for war so brought on. But Louis Philippe is not a man to run a-muck, especially without any adequate motive.

Guizot has looked as cross as the devil for the last few days; and, indeed, on Sunday, when he dined here, he could scarcely keep up the outward appearances of civility.

Foreign Office: July 22, 1840.

It is very far indeed from my wish to irritate or goad Thiers into any hostility towards this country, and therefore I highly approve your conciliatory language, mixed as it has been with proper firmness; but it would never do to let Thiers bully us. I dare say all you say of Thiers is true; but after all Thiers at the utmost can only be France; and we none of us intend that France shall domineer over the other Powers of Europe, or even over England alone. Of all mistakes, in public affairs as well as in private, the greatest is to truckle to swagger and bully, or even to unjustifiable violence.

I have no doubt that Thiers thought he had laid his plans so cleverly that he should compel all the Powers of Europe to place the whole matter in his hands; but I think the four Powers united with Turkey are as much as France alone, in a case of this kind, with other things on her hands, will like to deal with.

Windsor: Aug. 23, 1840.

I am more than ever confirmed in my belief that for the present at least the French will remain quiet, and that there will be no war. However inconsiderate the French nation may be, the French interest growing up every day will make them pause before they begin an unprovoked and aggressive war against the four Powers.

Thiers, therefore, sooner or later will give the order to 'cease firing;' the smoke will soon blow away from the eyes of the French people, and they will see more clearly the objects which have caused their false alarm; and both Thiers and Louis Philippe will take care to keep out of a quarrel which nobody means to force upon them. The language of Guizot to me is as pacific as possible; the result of what he says is, that France will remain quiet and wait for the course of events. The newspapers and war party have had their day; now will come the turn of those who have been injured by these manoeuvres, and of those who would be ruined by actual war; and these people will probably now make their cries heard, though in a less noisy manner.

The Bordeaux deputation which met Thiers on his return from Eu is a sample. France now is a very different thing from the France of the Empire. Then war was the only way which anybody had of getting money; now war would put an end to most people's chance of getting money. A quarter of a century of peace does not pass over a nation in vain. But people say

that Thiers is a dare-devil, capable of anything, and therefore highly dangerous, and consequently a man whom one ought to give way to. Now I hold just the opposite doctrine. I do not fear a reckless fellow, at least as an open enemy, and am never for giving way to such a man unless he happens by a miracle to be right.

However, do not let my contrary opinions dissuade you from writing me your own. For I may possibly be wrong, and at all events it is right I should know what are the impressions made upon an able man observing things upon the spot.

The French Government, however, though using conciliatory language in London, was holding its opposite at Constantinople. M. Pontois, the French Ambassador there, threatened that if the Sultan ratified the treaty, France would assist Mehemet Ali and attack the four Powers. Lord Palmerston made an official remonstrance about this conduct of the Ambassador, expressing his conviction that it must have been unauthorised, and he gave private instructions to the representative of England at Paris as to the tone which he should assume.

Carlton Terrace: Sept. 22, 1840.

My dear Bulwer,—Notwithstanding the mysterious threatening with which Thiers has favoured us, I still hold to my belief that the French Government will be too wise and prudent to make war; and various things which come to me from different quarters confirm me in that belief. Besides, bullies seldom execute the threats they deal in; and men of trick and cunning are not always men of desperate resolves. But if Thiers should again hold to you the language of menace, however indistinctly and vaguely shadowed out, pray retort upon him to the full extent of what he may say to you; and with that skill of language which I know you to be the master of, convey to him in the most friendly and inoffensive manner possible, that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war, she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and commerce before she sees the end of it; that her army of Algiers will cease to give her anxiety, and that Mehemet Ali will just be chucked into the Nile. I wish you had hinted at these topics when Thiers spoke to you; I invariably

do so when either Guizot or Bourqueney begin to swagger ; and I observe that it always acts as a sedative. I remind them that countries seldom engage in unprovoked war, unless they have something to gain by so doing ; but that we should very soon have nearly three times the number of ships that France could put to sea, and must, therefore, have the command of all their interests beyond sea ; and that even if we had not such a decided superiority upon our own bottom, Russia would be with us, and has a fleet equal to the fleet of France. These considerations perhaps might weigh more with Louis Philippe than with Thiers, but I am inclined to think that they will weigh with somebody or other at Paris. However, I may be mistaken, and the French may either make war, in spite of their assurances, or commit some violent and outrageous act of aggression against the Sultan, which the four Powers will be obliged to resent ; in that case France must take the consequences, and her Government bear the responsibility. We are going on quietly but steadily with our naval armaments, and the months are now approaching when we shall get men easily. We raise all our seamen without a farthing of bounty, the only inducement held out to them being the certainty of good pay and treatment, and the advantages of pension after a certain period of service. The merchant vessels will soon be coming home for the winter. They will discharge their men, and we shall then get as many as we like. In the meanwhile, the *Britannia* and *Howe*, each of one hundred and twenty guns, and an eighty-four whose name I forget, will sail for the Mediterranean in a fortnight, and will make seventeen good ships on that station. Three more will immediately be got ready to take their places at home ; as to the steamers, we have got seven hundred of various kinds belonging to the country, and I do not believe the French have got one hundred. You may therefore be fully justified, not in following the example of Thiers by turning braggart, but in declining civilly to accept from the French Government the threats which it may try to put upon us.

While Thiers is telling you that this last absurd proposal of Mehemet is the last word of Mehemet and of France, Guizot is getting conveyed to me through all sorts of out-of-the-way channels, that if we would but make the most trifling concession, if we would give way the very least in the world, the French Government would jump at our proposals, and the whole thing might be settled satisfactorily (to France he means,

of course). But as to the offer which has been modestly trumpeted forth as a concession, it happens to be just the reverse; for France has said for some time past that she would engage that Mehemet should be content with Egypt hereditary and Syria for his life; but now by a juggle he wants us to give Syria for the life of Ibrahim, which is nothing less than an anticipated inheritance of Syria for Ibrahim; and, therefore, something more instead of less than what was talked of by France before. Really Thiers must think us most wonderful simpletons to be thus bamboozled. As to concessions, the fact is that, when four Powers make a treaty, they intend to execute it; and as we made our whole extent of possible concession to France before the treaty, by offering to let Mehemet keep St. John of Acre, there is nothing more left that we can concede. If we go further at all, we must let Mehemet have Beyrout and Damascus, neither of which it is by any means possible to allow him to retain.

I conclude, by the great anxiety that some parties have to settle the matter soon, though at our expense, that they look forward to a speedy settlement of differences at the Bourse at the expense of other people; and that, having made a large sum by the fall, they want to double their profits by the rise. Pray let me know when the next settling day happens at the French Bourse. I should like to know what day it will be, as I foresee that it will be a critical period.

Metternich is just as stout and firm as we are, and Thiers' intrigues will fail there also. I must say I never in my life was more disgusted with anything than I have been by the conduct of certain parties—useless now to name—in all this affair.¹

I hear from persons who have been in Germany that the same feeling of indignation that is felt by us against the conduct of the French Government is felt by the Germans, and that France would find no friends beyond the Rhine. One notion of Thiers seems to be that he might attack Austria, and leave the other Powers alone. Pray undeceive him in this, and make him comprehend that England is not in the habit of

¹ In a notebook of Lord Palmerston's I find the following remark: 'Clive at this critical juncture was not merely abandoned and left one to the resources of his own mind, but was embarrassed by the conduct of those who should have aided him.' (Extract from Malcolm's *Life of Clive*). 'So it was with me in 1840, as to the execution of the treaty of July.—P.'

deserting her allies; and that if France attacks Austria on account of this treaty, she will have to do with England as well as with Austria, and I have not the slightest doubt on earth that she would find Prussia and Russia upon her also. It is quite impossible that the severe pressure brought upon all interests in France by Thiers should not soon begin to be felt, and that loud complaints should not force him to take his line one way or the other. You think he may then cross the Rubicon. I still think that he will be unwilling or unable to do so.

Great efforts, as affairs became in appearance at this time desperate, were made in Paris and in London to induce our Government to give way—for there are always people who mistake cowardice for prudence, and who say, ‘*After all, what does it signify?—better not have a row.*’ But firmness carried the day. On the refusal of Mehemet to yield, the blockade of the Egyptian and Syrian coasts was declared. Our fleet advanced. Beyrout surrendered to Admiral Stopford, and Sidon was stormed by Admiral Napier, who also advanced inland with his marines, and defeated Ibrahim in the Lebanon.

October 5, 1840.

My dear Granville,—Napier for ever! I thought Carlos da Ponza¹ would do all that man could do; and among other things, that he would drive the Egyptians out of Syria; and this he seems likely to accomplish. Pray try to persuade the King and Thiers that they have lost the game, and that it would be unwise now to make a brawl about it. They are beat, and there is an end of the matter, and they will only make their defeat the more remarkable by anything in the way of display which they may now attempt. The intrigues and cabals which Thiers and his English and foreign auxiliaries have been playing off against me in every direction exceed belief.

Carlton Terrace: Oct. 7, 1840.

My dear Bulwer,—I should like to hear something more precise about the supposed plan for burning our fleet; because the mere knowledge that such a plan is in agitation, without

¹ Sir Charles Napier.

information as to when and how and by whom, does not help one much in preventive measures. We often get information of this vague kind of intended assassinations, fires, and other outrages, which have no foundation in truth; and the previous notice of which, even if well founded, would be quite useless for purposes of precaution, because unaccompanied by any detail.

If a man says to me, 'Take care of yourself, and be on your guard, for there is somebody who means to shoot you,' such a warning may frighten, but cannot assist in protecting me. If, on the other hand, a man says, 'There is a plot to waylay you as you return home by such a road to-morrow evening, and the men who mean to attack you will meet in smock-frocks and fustian jackets at the Rising Sun alehouse at the corner of Cut-throat Lane, at five o'clock in the afternoon,' then one may either take another way home, or send the parish constables to arrest the conspirators.

This letter relates to rather a singular affair. Mr. Bulwer being left in charge of the Embassy at Paris, received one morning, from a person who was generally accurate, information that an attempt to burn our fleet was about being made. The person in question could not or would not give any details. Lord Granville had just come back, and was told what had occurred, and he thought it ought to be conveyed to Lord Palmerston.

Strange to say, an attempt¹ was made to burn some of our ships the same day or the day after.

Lord Palmerston and Lord Granville were both disposed to consider that the fires had been accidents, and the information a mere coincidence. But a couple of months later, Lord Granville said to Mr. Bulwer, 'You remember that report you received as to the intention to burn our ships? I disbelieved its truth at the time, but I have good reason to know that there was much more in the scheme which you heard of than I had supposed.' And he then mentioned the name of the party who, he had heard from good authority, had been

¹ The fire at Devonport on Sept. 27 was serious, and caused the destruction of two men-of-war—the *Talavera*, of seventy-four guns, and the *Imogene*, of twenty-eight guns, besides other damage.

engaged in it—a name not unknown to France—and therefore as it belonged to an honourable family, Mr. Bulwer never mentioned it. It was thought, however, that the business was directly connected with stock-jobbing, and only indirectly with politics.

The following letter states the progress of affairs in Syria; and the last paragraph indicates that Lord Palmerston thought that if M. Thiers remained in office, and could carry out his policy, war was by no means improbable:—

Carlton Terrace: Oct. 7, 1840.

My dear Granville,—I cannot help thinking that the detailed accounts which you will have received in Paris by our newspapers of the events in Syria, must have had some effect upon public feeling in Paris; because those accounts show that the operation was mainly Turkish and Syrian, and that the people of Syria are heart and soul for the Sultan, and against Mehemet Ali. France, surely, never could take up arms to compel a whole nation to submit to the yoke of a tyrant from whose oppression it hopes to get free. In short, I look upon the question about Syria to be pretty well decided.

With regard to your house, I should say that, in the event of your coming away, you should bring all your archives away with you, and that you might leave the consular agent in charge of the house.

It will be seen from this last paragraph that war was held to be on the cards; but it was not thought that this would be by a declaration of war on the part of France, but by some act which would oblige or induce the other Powers to declare war against her. The letter now given was written under this impression:

Carlton Terrace: Oct. 8, 1840.

My dear Granville,—Pray go to the King immediately, and say you are instructed to deprecate in the most friendly, but at the same time the most earnest, manner, steps which we hear are under consideration, and which if taken would either make war inevitable, or at least render the continuance or resumption (if they have ceased) of friendly relations a matter of the utmost difficulty. We hear that two things are under considera-

tion: first, what is now called an Anconade¹; secondly, some declaration as to what France will and what she will not permit.

Now as to the first, it would be (and you will know how to convey the idea in civil terms) nothing more or less than an act of piracy. The five Powers, France included, have declared their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. Four out of the five are labouring to carry their principles into practice. The fifth, for reasons of her own, declines being a party to the execution, and *therefore*, because the other four are acting up to her own principles, she is to seize possession of a portion of the territory of the very sovereign whom she has pledged herself to support.² Such a proceeding would be so inconsistent with every principle which governs or ought to govern the intercourse between man and man, or between nation and nation, that we are sure that the King of the French will never permit a thing which would cast an indelible stain upon the honour of his crown. It would besides bring twenty or thirty Russian line-of-battle ships into the Mediterranean; what to do when they got there it is not for us to say. But England could not remain a tame spectator of such a proceeding, and surely there is no need of creating fresh subjects of angry feeling between the two countries.

Then as to a declaration. *If France makes us a friendly communication tending to lead to an amicable discussion of the present state of affairs, we shall receive it and deal with it in the spirit in which it is made; but if France haughtily tells the four Powers that she will permit them to do certain things in aid of the Sultan, but will not permit them to do other things, it is manifest that such a communication can only tend to make all reconciliation impossible.*

It will be observed that Lord Palmerston draws a broad and accurate distinction between making a friendly communication—which he says will be received and dealt with in the spirit in which it is made—and making a haughty and menacing one. He never

¹ Landing troops somewhere in Turkey, as the French had formerly landed them at Ancona.

² This was the false position in which the Cabinet of Soult had placed M. Thiers. It had said, 'We, the French Government, are on the Sultan's side.' The French Government, then, could not consistently act against the Sultan. All the allies were doing the French Government had said it wished done, but thought could not be done.

supposed that any Government which was not in a position that forced it to be obedient to the will of another Government, could be so servile as to be afraid of expressing its ideas, or so stupid or so insensible as not to have ideas.

An extract from a letter of the 20th October is here given because it refers to a singular intention which betokened that restless desire to do something, when it cannot do the thing it wants, which has often characterized the French Government. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Granville :—

Can you find out by any means at your disposal what is the *coup d'éclat* for which the French squadron has been brought back to Toulon? I conclude it is to be ready to meet and drive back the Russian squadron from the Baltic; but that squadron will not come out at present, though we now hear that it will winter at Revel, where it will be free to come out almost the whole of the winter.

The French fleet was not collecting at Toulon, as Lord Palmerston supposed, for the purpose of driving back the Russian fleet should it make its appearance in the Mediterranean; another purpose was assigned to it. Queen Christina, as it is known, had just retired or been driven from Spain, and the Government of General Espartero, then the Regent and supposed to be acting under English influence, was installed in the place of that of the Queen Mother. The notion of the French Cabinet was to seize the Balearic Islands, partly as a protest against English action or supposed action in the affairs of the Spanish peninsula, and partly because, if a war in the Mediterranean should eventually take place, it would be of great importance to France to have those islands, with reference to their connection with Algeria, in their power. The seizure of islands belonging to Spain, because Mehemet Ali was driven out of Syria, seemed a proceeding so little in relation with its cause, that, although it was positively stated that such were the instructions given to Admiral

Lalande, no one could at that time feel confident that he was not misled; but at all events the information, such as it was, communicated to Lord Granville, and through him to Her Majesty's Government, reached the British Chargé d'affaires at Madrid, who warned the Spanish Government of the design contemplated. M. Thiers, however, went out of office shortly after this. Nothing was done with respect to the Balearic Isles, and of course great doubt was entertained as to whether the plan had really existed. All doubt, however, was soon dispelled; for M. Joubert, who had been in M. Thiers' Cabinet, being provoked by a question put in the course of discussion as to what the Government he had belonged to—the menacing language and attitude of which was not denied—had ever seriously contemplated, rose up from his seat, and said that if the Government to which allusion had been made had remained but a short time longer in office, the French flag would have floated on the Balearic Islands!

If the 'Curiosities of Diplomacy' are ever published, this anecdote may take a place amongst them.

But to continue with the correspondence. In a letter of the 23rd October, Lord Palmerston speaks of the continued success of the Turks and allies in Syria, and notices the death of one of the most beloved and accomplished statesmen of his time—Lord Holland; a letter of the 29th returns to this subject. Lord Palmerston's eulogy is the more to be appreciated, since the statesman whose loss he deploras (unrivalled for the charm derived from wit and vivacity blended with experience and knowledge) had of late been his active opponent. During the time when Lord Palmerston's policy was most in jeopardy from the assaults made on it at home, Mr. Bulwer accidentally learnt at Paris that Lord Palmerston would be severely attacked at the next Cabinet meeting. The information came from a Frenchman, who had evidently received it from London. It seemed to Mr. Bulwer so unfair that information of this kind should get to Paris, that he wrote to Lord

Palmerston, telling him what he had to anticipate. It was Lord Holland who made the anticipated attack, and *then* Lord Palmerston got up and read the letter from France, pointing out the great impropriety of people knowing at Paris, with the Court and Government of which we were not on friendly terms, what would take place in the British Cabinet respecting foreign affairs, before he, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, knew it himself. This stopped all further discussion.

Carlton Terrace : October 23, 1840.

My dear Granville,—Our news from the Levant and from Paris is equally good : continued and rapid success in Syria, and the break-up of the Thiers' Ministry in France. These two things will lead to the full execution of our treaty without any interruption of peace. It is quite astonishing to think what progress we have made in Syria in the fifteen days between the 11th, when we landed, and the 26th, when our accounts came away. It is plain that we have as good as driven Mehemet out of the whole of Syria, and our accounts from Egypt show that his power even there is tottering to its base. In the meanwhile, Guizot is quite resigned to driving the Egyptians from the whole of Syria, and will thankfully be content with our leaving the Pacha in possession of Egypt. He may make a fight for more, but that is what he will be really satisfied with. Indeed, I have good reason to believe, by information I have received from Paris, that Mehemet has sent to Thiers to beg he would make the best terms he could for him ; adding that 'he, Mehemet, would gladly accept any terms whatever.' He is a beaten man, and his political and physical existence are both at their last gasp. Still, if he makes immediate submission, and saves us the trouble of going through the whole process of forcible ejection, it will be well to leave him in possession of Egypt.

We shall be anxious to hear from you what are the speculations as to a new administration. We heard yesterday that the deputies were coming up imbued with the spirit of peace, and that has probably had some share in bringing about the discomfiture of Thiers.

What a sad loss to us all this is of poor Lord Holland, both publicly and privately ! He kept the Whig party very much together, and his society was the most agreeable and delightful that anyone ever knew.

Carlton Terrace : Oct 29, 1840.

It is impossible that we should not all be deeply afflicted by the loss of poor Lord Holland ; but those who, like you, have been intimate with him from early life, must of course feel the loss even more strongly than others.

There never certainly was a man more calculated by nature to win the love and to attach the affections of all who came near him. There was a natural overflow of heart, an absence of gall, and an unaffected kindness about him, which one rarely finds combined with so much talent and such various attainments and such endless knowledge. He thought, or rather he felt, strongly on political affairs ; but he never mixed any personal feeling with his public differences. Latterly he had quite lost his usual good sense and reason upon this Turkish affair ; and indeed the state of mind he displayed about it seemed almost the result of bodily infirmity ; but this never led for a single moment to the slightest diminution of that kindness and cordiality with which he had always treated me.

Louis Philippe seems to have held to you the same language which Flahault and Guizot held while here, namely, that it is necessary, in order to assist the King to maintain peace and keep down the war party, that we should make to the entreaties of the King those concessions which we have refused to the threats of Thiers. But this is quite impossible, and you cannot too soon or too strongly explain it to all parties concerned. We have not acted as we have done out of spite against Thiers, nor from any personal feeling of good-will or ill-will towards any man ; nor can such feelings be made the foundation of the political conduct of a Government in matters of great European importance. We withstood the threats of Thiers, because what he asked could not be granted without great injury to the interests of Europe ; and we cannot expose those interests to injury out of complaisance to Louis Philippe or Guizot, any more than out of fear for Thiers ; and, moreover, if we were to give way, the French nation would believe that we gave way to their menaces, and not to the entreaties of Louis Philippe. Besides, there would be an end of all things if the Powers of Europe were to be making sacrifices of their important interests to appease the organizers of *émeutes* in Paris or to silence the republican newspapers ; and then into the bargain we are carrying all before us in Syria, and shall very soon have placed the whole of that country in the hands of the Sultan ; and it would indeed be childish to hold our hands when nothing but a little

perseverance is required in order to carry all our points. I can assure you that you would be most usefully supporting the interests of peace by holding a firm and stout language to the French Government and to Frenchmen.

Nothing is more unsound than the notion that anything is to be gained by trying to conciliate those who are trying to intimidate us; by conciliate I mean to conciliate by concession. It is quite right to be courteous in words, but the only possible way of keeping such persons in check is to make them clearly understand that one is not going to yield an inch, and that one is quite strong enough to repel force by force. Some of our Whig friends and grantees have done great mischief by giving way to unfounded alarms and holding what is called conciliatory language. The knowledge of the existence of such feelings and language in many quarters, where more spirit and sagacity ought to have been shown, has, I know, very much encouraged the French in their attempts to bully.

My opinion is that we shall not have war now with France, but that we ought to make our minds up to have it at any time.

All Frenchmen want to encroach and extend their territorial possessions at the expense of other nations, and they all feel what the 'National' has often said, that an alliance with England is a bar to such projects. I am not in the least surprised that the *doctrinaires* in Thiers' Government should have been the most warlike. I should rather have expected it to be so. I do not blame the French for disliking us. Their vanity prompts them to be the first nation in the world; and yet at every turn they find that we are their equals. It is a misfortune to Europe that the national character of a great and powerful people, placed in the centre of Europe, should be such as it is; but it is the business of other nations not to shut their eyes to the truth, and to shape their conduct by prudent precautions.

It is not unimportant to read the next two or three letters, because it is often urged as an argument against what we are doing or saying, that a Foreign Minister or Sovereign has declared an opinion in flat contradiction with our own. The King of the French used to say on the subject of curtailing the power of Mehemet Ali, 'No doubt that Pacha should be brought to his senses, but he is a second Alexander. I have not an

army which could cope with the army which he could bring into the field.' As King Louis Philippe said this to everybody, half of those to whom he said it believed it; and the absurdity of Lord Palmerston attempting to put down such a mighty man as Mehemet Ali was ridiculed at half the clubs in London. Perhaps a timid Minister in Lord Palmerston's place would have been a ridiculous one; but everything in affairs depends upon the manner in which it is done, and the spirit in which it is undertaken. That which the King of the French had declared to be impossible was proved to be not even difficult.

Foreign Office : Nov. 3, 1840.

Nothing can be more striking than the entire fallacy of the representations made by the French of Mehemet Ali's power. The moment we began our measures of coercion, Ibrahim was to fly off like a shot to Constantinople, and Heaven knows what was to happen, besides a rising of the whole population of the empire in his favour. But, lo and behold! Ibrahim has plenty to do in Syria, and it seems that the subjects of the Sultan are not much disposed either to rise or to fall for Mehemet Ali.

Carlton Terrace : Nov. 15, 1840.

Do not the French begin to find out that they have been grossly deceived in their estimate of Mehemet Ali's power, which has been shaken to the foundation by 2,000 marines and 6,000 or 8,000 Turkish recruits? or do they only feel like people who, not having been deceived themselves, have failed in an attempt to deceive others? Another thing, too, has now been made plain besides the weakness of Mehemet Ali, and that is the real design of France in all these matters. Remusat has let the cat out of the bag by declaring that France, in protecting Mehemet Ali, meant to establish a new second-rate maritime Power in the Mediterranean, *whose fleet might unite with that of France for the purpose of serving as a counterpoise to that of England.* That is plainspoken, at all events.

If the French scheme for the Levant had succeeded, we should infallibly have had war before long, and growing out of those very affairs on which we should have made concession in order to preserve peace. The moral and diplomatic contest we have had with France now will probably tend to keep the two nations without war for some years to come.

Thus it will have been seen that the forces of Ibrahim, when confronted with a small resolute European force inspiring a Turkish one, and aided by a friendly population, was like the flock of sheep which Don Quixote mistook for an army. With Mehemet Ali's prestige had sunk as a matter of course that of M. Thiers; and when he went out Louis Philippe said, '*M. Thiers est furieux contre moi, parce que je n'ai pas voulu faire la guerre. Il me dit que j'ai parlé de faire la guerre; mais parler de faire la guerre et faire la guerre, sont deux choses bien différentes.*'¹ One is not obliged in diplomacy to consider every menace of war as actual war.

M. Guizot succeeded M. Thiers on October 29, 1840. A mutual dissatisfaction had grown up between them after the signature of the secret treaty in London. M. Thiers accused M. Guizot of having been duped and deceived. M. Guizot, on the contrary, declared that M. Thiers had been deaf to his warnings. One of Lord Palmerston's letters touches on this point, and says:—

July 29.

It is an important fact, and one which I know from a person who has seen Guizot's despatches, that from the 17th of March down to the 9th of this month Guizot continually warned Thiers not to be deceived about the conduct of the English Government; and told him that, if France did not come in to our views, we should infallibly go on with the four Powers, and without France; and Guizot moreover said that the event was imminent, and that a convention between the four, and without France, 'might be signed any day of any week. Thiers therefore cannot say that he was taken by surprise.

The fact is that M. Guizot foresaw and warned M. Thiers that he could not go on long in his endeavours to effect a compromise between Abdul Medjid and Mehemet Ali behind the back of the other Powers

¹ 'M. Thiers is furious with me, because I would not make war. He says I talked of making war; but talking of making war, and making war, are two very different things.'

without being discovered ; but it is equally certain that in regard to the treaty itself he was as ignorant as M. Thiers. At all events when differences arise between two political rivals—for the moment coalesced—their several partizans are sure to inflame the differences, and in the present case, there were not only disputes about the past but debates as to the future.

M. Guizot said that the whole question at issue had depended on the strength of Mehemet Ali. The French Government had considered he was strong enough to resist the forces that had been directed against him. If they, the French Government, had been right, the allies would have had to give way, and France, without any effort, would have been triumphant. As it was, the French Government was wrong. Mehemet Ali had been ignominiously worsted ; the French Government therefore had to give way, and submit to the consequences of its erroneous opinion. To enter into a war to support Mehemet Ali's pretensions—pretensions which had no other basis but his supposed strength—after his weakness had been proved, would be an inconsistency in logic and a blunder in policy.

So argued M. Guizot. M. Thiers, on the contrary, maintained that France had been insulted ; that a great European question had been settled without her and in spite of her ; that the position of Mehemet Ali was now a secondary affair ; that French honour was a primary one, and that France, when prepared, should demand, and if necessary insist in arms on, some satisfaction. It is clear that, under such circumstances, no intrigue was necessary to bring forward M. Guizot as the successor of M. Thiers ; he became so naturally when the King determined in favour of peace instead of war.

The result of the treaty had thus been the defeat of Mehemet Ali ; the overthrow of a warlike Ministry in France ; and the installation of a peaceful one ; but the affairs of the East were not yet settled, and the peaceful Ministry said, ' We are peaceful, therefore let us have

the air of doing what the warlike ministry could not do.'

It will be seen what Lord Palmerston says on this subject:—

Carlton Terrace : Nov. 26, 1840.

My dear Granville,—There are several objections to authorising M. Guizot to say that the intervention of France has induced the allies to grant Egypt to Mehemet Ali. First of all, to do so would imply on our part an engagement towards France which we never have taken, and which we have pointedly, by my despatch of the 2nd of November, as well as by other despatches, explained that we have not taken. We have *informed* France that we have advised the Sultan to leave Mehemet Ali in Egypt, if Mehemet shall submit within a certain period of time; but we have also explained, that if Mehemet shall not so submit, he must take the consequences, and abide the chances which await him. We have never told France that Mehemet would at all events be left in Egypt; and therefore we could not acquiesce in a declaration by which the French Ministers would be able to say that the interference of France has retained Mehemet in Egypt.

Besides, we cannot acknowledge any protectorship of Mehemet Ali in France. Mehemet is the subject of the Sultan, and nothing more, and never can or will be anything more; and neither France, nor any other foreign Power, has any right whatever to erect itself into the protector of that subject against his legitimate sovereign, unless France intends to make war upon the Sultan.

I am very sorry to find that M. Guizot is still hankering after Mehemet Ali, and clinging to the broken-down policy of Thiers.

Pray communicate the substance of this letter to M. Guizot.

The crowning event of the campaign had yet to come. St. John d'Acre was supposed to be impregnable, and had resisted all the efforts of Napoleon. It was now taken by the British fleet after a three hours' bombardment. This exploit—for such it was—brought about Mehemet's submission, and he was allowed to retain Egypt, but was compelled to restore Syria to the Sultan.

Foreign Office : Nov. 27, 1840.

My dear Granville,—This is indeed glorious news from Syria ; and our fleet has maintained its old reputation. This exploit must settle the Eastern Question, and will, moreover, when coupled with our previous successes in Syria, place England on a footing with respect to other Powers which will be greatly conducive to the permanent maintenance of peace.

This result will also render Guizot's task more easy ; for nobody can think in France of going to war now to revive a dead man.

Carlton Terrace : Nov. 30, 1840.

In your letter of the 20th you say that what the French wish is, 'that the final settlement of the Eastern Question shall not appear to have been concluded without their concurrence.' But this is exactly what I now wish should appear. If France had joined us in July, and had been party to the coercive measures we undertook, we should have been delighted to have had her assistance, and she would then have come in as an ally and protector of the Sultan. But France having then stood aloof, and having since that time avowedly taken part with the Pacha, morally although not physically, if she were now to come in and to be a party to the final settlement, it would not be as a friend of the Sultan, but as the protector of Mehemet Ali ; and of course we could not permit her to meddle with the affair in that capacity and with such a view.

As to the stale pretence of wounded *amour propre* and mortified vanity, the recent debates prove that she acted from much deeper and more rational motives than vanity and *amour propre*, and that she had laid down to herself during the last fifty years a systematic plan of aggrandisement in the Levant, to the intended detriment of England. It is the being baffled in this scheme when close upon its accomplishment that excited the fury which has lately burst forth ; and the fury was the more intense and ungovernable, because they who felt it could not in decency avow its real cause, and were obliged to charge it upon feelings of which any man out of his teens must necessarily be ashamed.

The following letter of the 8th December shows Lord Palmerston at the culminating point of his desires :—

Foreign Office: Dec. 8, 1840.

My dear Granville,—This day has brought us a flight of good news: Mehemet's submission, Dost Mahomed's defeat, and the occupation of Chusan. The first settles the Turco-Egyptian question. The great point now will be to decide on what yet remains to be arranged, in such a way that Mehemet shall be really and *bond fide* a subject of the Sultan, and not a protected dependent and tool of France.

One general result of this long but successful contest over Eastern affairs was to produce the same respect for the names of Palmerston and England in the East, as had been already produced in Europe. Those names were whispered in the tents of the Arabs with fear and reverence. Who could measure the strength of that nation which had so easily and so rapidly accomplished such mighty results? They saw that England acted with energy and decision, and carried out to its full accomplishment whatever she announced to be her set intention. No wonder that the star of Queen Victoria appeared to them to be in the ascendant.

CHAPTER XII.

AFFGHANISTAN AND CHINA—DISPUTES WITH NAPLES AND UNITED STATES—SPEECH AT TIVERTON ON DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT—RETIREMENT OF MELBOURNE MINISTRY.

THE narrative of Turkish and Egyptian affairs must now be succeeded by a brief account of what had been passing relative to the affairs that Lord Palmerston has just alluded to, in Afghanistan and China; for though they did not belong practically to the Foreign Office, they were within the range of its administration.

Our relations with Eastern nations were until lately managed by companies. This arrangement was on the one hand disadvantageous—by confining commercial relations; while on the other it was advantageous—by regulating political ones. The company was represented by a small body having the enjoyment of privileges on the acceptance of obligations, which a company could easily compel its own limited number of servants to observe.

When the Chinese trade became open to all comers, all sorts of irregularities commenced, the most notable of which was the smuggling of opium contrary to Chinese law. An officer, called a superintendent, who had been sent out to regulate our commercial intercourse, ought to have had the power to do so; but he was impotent; and the question constantly arose as to whether he should attempt to protect the illicit practices of his countrymen, or allow them to be put down and punished. The declaration that we were not to protect British subjects in violating the Chinese laws came out from the Home Government, but it came out late.

The Superintendent, Captain Elliott, had already applied to the Governor-General of India for some ships of war; and had already commenced war—these ships having arrived. It was judged difficult under such circumstances to stop it, without producing impressions that would have led to future wars. Guided by political expediency, but acting with very doubtful morality, we allowed the continuance of hostilities. Junks were burnt; Chusan, as Lord Palmerston in his recent letter notices, was taken; and eventually (a year after Lord Palmerston was out of office), a treaty was concluded, by which the Chinese agreed to pay us a large indemnity, to open to us four of their chief ports, and to cede the island of Hong Kong.¹

The war in Afghanistan was a more serious adventure; and it is difficult to sketch its outline more briefly and eloquently than it is sketched in the following passage, which, with slight alterations, is copied from a little work the merits of which are hereby acknowledged:—²

At this time the north-western frontier of our possessions in India was a great sandy desert extending from the jungles of the hill states of Gurwal to the sea. Beyond this lay the Punjab, ruled by Runjeet Singh, the old lion of Lahore. Beyond this again, further to the west, lay a country, one of the most interesting in all Asia. From time immemorial it has served as the great highway—alike for trader and conqueror—from Western to Eastern Asia. This country—Cabul, or Afghanistan—lying directly between Persia and the Punjab, has been traversed by all the great conquerors who penetrated to India from the Mediterranean, the Black, and the Caspian Seas.

An old Indian proverb runs, that he alone can be Emperor of Hindostan who is first lord of Cabul. Alexander of Macedon

¹ On Aug. 10, 1842, in a speech in the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston observed that exception had been taken to his China policy; but on that head he said he would appeal to the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords, merely observing, that if a satisfactory arrangement of commerce with a nation of two hundred millions of people was the consequence, a greater benefit to British manufactures could hardly be conceived.

² *Lord Palmerston: A Biography.* By M'Gilchrist.

had to fight his way through, capturing Herat as he went, ere he met and defeated Porus, discoursed with the sacred Gymnosophistæ, and founded a city in honour of his steed Bucephalus on the shores of the Hydaspes. Timour Bec Mahmoud, the founder of the Mahometan dynasty in India, Nadir, and Baber, all conducted their mighty hordes to India by the same route. It was, and is, the key to India from the north-west.

Although it was by means of English money and the assistance of British officers that the young Shah had been established on the throne of Persia, he prized the Russian alliance more highly than the British. At least so far back as 1835, Mr. Ellis, our envoy at Teheran, said this was the case; and, what was worse, that Persia, at the instigation of Russia, meditated a hostile movement against Herat, one of the three independent principalities into which the country of the Affghans was divided. This excited great alarm in England, and the more so as the Ministers of the Shah made no secret of their intention to proceed, after the capture of Herat, to the conquest of the other provinces of the Affghans—in other words, almost as far eastward as the frontier of our Eastern empire. Meanwhile, it was notorious that Russian agents were busily at work all through the affected districts; and the Russian ambassador to the court of the Shah, Count Simonovich, had absolutely offered to take command of the young Prince's army in the expedition against Herat.

Now the ruler of Herat, thus menaced, was Kamran, the only descendant of the great Timour Shah, who was then in possession of actual power. His relatives and chiefs, Zeman Shah and Soojah Shah, had been successively dispossessed of the throne of Affghanistan, and a rival dynasty, that of the Barokzye, ruled, under Dost Mahomed, in their place. Dost Mahomed was naturally anxious to overthrow Kamran at Herat, as he had overthrown Soojah Shah at Cabul. Thus there appeared the probability of Persia and Dost Mahomed, under the influence, as it was said and thought by our agents, of Russia, uniting in a coalition that had at once to be encountered.

To force the Shah of Persia to raise the siege of Herat—which we did partly by menace, partly by the expedition from India of a small force to Karrak, an island in the Persian Gulf—was the first measure which the Government of India deemed it necessary to adopt; the second was to substitute for Dost Mahomed in Affghanistan, who was an open or disguised

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Although it was by means of English money and the assistance of British officers that the young Shah had been established on the throne of Persia, he prized the Russian alliance more highly than the British. At least so far back as 1835, Mr. Ellis, our envoy at Teheran, said this was the case; and, what was worse, that Persia, at the instigation of Russia, meditated a hostile movement against Herat, one of the three independent principalities into which the country of the Affghans was divided. This excited great alarm in England, and the more so as the Ministers of the Shah made no secret of their intention to proceed, after the capture of Herat, to the conquest of the other provinces of the Affghans—in other words, almost as far eastward as the frontier of our Eastern empire. Meanwhile, it was notorious that Russian agents were busily at work all through the affected districts; and the Russian ambassador to the court of the Shah, Count Simonivich, had absolutely offered to take command of the young Prince's army in the expedition against Herat.

Now the ruler of Herat, thus menaced, was Kamran, the only descendant of the great Timour Shah, who was then in possession of actual power. His relatives and chiefs, Zeman Shah and Soojah Shah, had been successively dispossessed of the throne of Affghanistan, and a rival dynasty, that of the Barokzye, ruled, under Dost Mahomed, in their place. Dost Mahomed was naturally anxious to overthrow Kamran at Herat, as he had overthrown Soojah Shah at Cabul. Thus there appeared the probability of Persia and Dost Mahomed, under the influence, as it was said and thought by our agents, of Russia, uniting in a coalition that had at once to be encountered.

To force the Shah of Persia to raise the siege of Herat—which we did partly by menace, partly by the expedition from India of a small force to Karrak, an island in the Persian Gulf—was the first measure which the Government of India deemed it necessary to adopt; the second was to substitute for Dost Mahomed in Affghanistan, who was an open or disguised

The Superintendent, Captain Elliott, had already applied to the Governor-General of India for some ships of war; and had already commenced war—these ships having arrived. It was judged difficult under such circumstances to stop it, without producing impressions that would have led to future wars. Guided by political expediency, but acting with very doubtful morality, we allowed the continuance of hostilities. Junks were burnt; Chusan, as Lord Palmerston in his recent letter notices, was taken; and eventually (a year after Lord Palmerston was out of office), a treaty was concluded, by which the Chinese agreed to pay us a large indemnity, to open to us four of their chief ports, and to cede the island of Hong Kong.¹

The war in Afghanistan was a more serious adventure; and it is difficult to sketch its outline more briefly and eloquently than it is sketched in the following passage, which, with slight alterations, is copied from a little work the merits of which are hereby acknowledged:—²

At this time the north-western frontier of our possessions in India was a great sandy desert extending from the jungles of the hill states of Gurwal to the sea. Beyond this lay the Punjab, ruled by Runjeet Singh, the old lion of Lahore. Beyond this again, further to the west, lay a country, one of the most interesting in all Asia. From time immemorial it has served as the great highway—alike for trader and conqueror—from Western to Eastern Asia. This country—Cabul, or Afghanistan—lying directly between Persia and the Punjab, has been traversed by all the great conquerors who penetrated to India from the Mediterranean, the Black, and the Caspian Seas.

An old Indian proverb runs, that he alone can be Emperor of Hindostan who is first lord of Cabul. Alexander of Macedon

¹ On Aug. 10, 1842, in a speech in the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston observed that exception had been taken to his China policy; but on that head he said he would appeal to the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords, merely observing, that if a satisfactory arrangement of commerce with a nation of two hundred millions of people was the consequence, a greater benefit to British manufactures could hardly be conceived.

² *Lord Palmerston: A Biography.* By M^cGilchrist.

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enemy, a prince who, owing his throne to our assistance, might be considered our friend. Soojah, whom Dost Mahomed had deposed, was the rival whose cause we resolved to espouse.

In October, 1838, Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, who was, rightly or wrongly, considered as an especial nominee of Lord Palmerston, although Lord Palmerston was certainly not the Minister of the Crown responsible for his appointment, declared war, and decreed the invasion of Afghanistan. Runjeet Singh was to act in combination with us. In November he and Lord Auckland met at Ferozepore, the most advanced of our strongholds in the North-West.

This meeting of the two great chiefs, with their magnificent retinues, was a splendid and imposing sight. Thence the march commenced. The Bombay contingent had to force its way through Scinde, which territory, and its rulers, the Ameers, were also involved in this complicated conflict. At Shikarpore, a place within the boundaries of Scinde, but near the Afghan frontier, they were met by the main expedition from Bengal. Sir John Keane was appointed to the command of the united host, which now proceeded forward under the greatest physical difficulties, wading through artificially-flooded rivers for whole days, then hewing a path through tangled jungles, and all the while having predatory and murderous Beloochees hovering on its flanks. Candahar was entered, Ghuznee stormed in the most magnificent manner, and at last the city of Cabul was in the hands of the British. McNaghten was appointed Political Resident. And there also the joyous and too-confiding Sir Alexander Burnes took up his residence, too unsuspicious of the melancholy fate that was so soon to overtake him. All seemed to go well. Everybody at home was satisfied. The general unpopularity of the Melbourne Government was to some extent redeemed by the *éclat* of the campaign; and the whole country gladly approved when the Crown showered honours upon the organisers and leaders of the enterprise; when Auckland received two steps in the peerage; when Sir John Keane was made a baron, and Pottinger and McNaghten baronets.

Lord Palmerston's success at the time was, indeed, complete. For as to the disasters that three years afterwards followed, owing to the incapacity and want of foresight of those who had the management of affairs within the conquered territory, he was no more respon-

sible than an admiral who commanded a fleet in a certain expedition would be if a ship belonging to that expedition were suddenly upset in a squall three years after the squadron which he had led into battle had returned victorious.

He was right therefore in considering the defeat of the Egyptian forces in Syria, the taking of Chusan, the overthrow of Dost Mahomed, the happy combination of a series of triumphs which only wanted the formal submission of Mehemet Ali—a submission that may be dated on the 14th January, 1841¹—to be complete.

He remained also long enough in office to see the fruits of his policy respecting the affairs of Turkey sanctioned and adopted by Europe, for on July 13, 1841, a treaty was signed in London by the five Great Powers by which Turkey was formally put under the general Protectorate of Europe, and was relieved from the degrading position to which it had been reduced by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi—a treaty which made the Sultan virtually a vassal of Russia.

This indeed seems to have been the epoch in which the good genius of Lord Palmerston was especially triumphant, for he had then been married about a year—December 11, 1839—to Lord Melbourne's sister, the widow of Earl Cowper, a lady whose benign influence was already felt, and who surrounded his political existence with a social charm which gave to his hospitality an attraction that at once enthralled his friends and softened his opponents.

The letters which follow relate to a short but sharp quarrel that we had with the Neapolitan Government on a matter which concerned us as traders. By a treaty concluded in 1816 between Great Britain and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the commercial intercourse

¹ On Jan. 14, 1841, Mehemet Ali restored the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, this transaction completing his submission to the Sublime Porte; the firman of the Porte, which states the conditions under which he was to hold the hereditary government of Egypt, was dated February 13, 1841.

between the two countries was placed on the most favourable footing for both ; and it was stipulated that the Neapolitan Government should grant to no other State mercantile privileges disadvantageous to the interests of England. In 1838 the King of Naples granted to a French company a monopoly of all the sulphur produced and worked in Sicily, to the great detriment of the English trade in sulphur. The British Government remonstrated vigorously, and in July 1839, the King of Naples promised that the monopoly should cease on the 1st January, 1840. It continued, however, and in February, Lord Palmerston called on the Neapolitan Government for the immediate termination of the monopoly and full indemnity for all losses sustained by British subjects since its commencement. Sir William Temple returned to Naples with full powers and instructions to insist on these two points ; but after a delay of a few days, it was announced to him that the King did not consider the sulphur contract a violation of the treaty. The British Government immediately prepared to enforce its demand by the presence of the Mediterranean fleet under Admiral Stopford. On the 17th April, the British ships of war commenced hostilities and captured a number of Neapolitan vessels. Finally, Naples accepted the mediation of France on the terms named by Lord Palmerston.

Foreign Office : March 18, 1840.

My dear William,—I send you some important instructions, which you will execute without delay. We cannot stand any longer the postponement of the abolition of the Sulphur Monopoly.

When this question is arranged, you will then begin with the treaty ; but we cannot allow the abolition of the monopoly to be the result of the new treaty, because that monopoly is a violation of the old treaty, and we cannot conclude a new treaty while the present one remains broken. If matters should come to reprisals, that would not be a reason for you to leave Naples, because reprisal is not an act of war ; and our ships should not establish a blockade or commit any more direct act of hostility

without further instructions from hence. If we come to hostilities, then it would be fitting for you to withdraw and go to Rome to await further instructions.

Our public affairs are going on well. The good majority on the vote of confidence has fixed us for the session, and has enabled us to survive defeats in smaller matters. Nothing could be more foolish on the part of the Tories than to give us that advantage. Prince Albert is much liked, and the Queen has been inviting some of the Tories, and this has had a very good effect. The Duke of Wellington is better, but quite gone by as a public man and a parliamentary leader. We have been giving some dinner and evening parties, which have had a very good political effect, have helped the party, and have pleased many individuals belonging to it.

I keep myself remarkably well, because, as the distance from my new house to the office is too short to make a ride, I have established for myself a rule to ride up to Hyde Park and round the Ring every day between eleven and one, as I find the most leisure moment; and I have hitherto done this every day, and feel much the better for it. It only takes half an hour.

Foreign Office : April 20, 1840.

You will see that we have accepted the good offices of the French Government for the attainment of our demands, but that we cannot abate any part of those demands; and that in order to leave the King of Naples more at liberty to yield to the advice of the French, we have agreed to suspend for three weeks the further continuance of reprisals, without, however, releasing the ships which may already have been taken.

I have felt great pleasure in reading your despatches and seeing your account of the manner in which you have acquitted yourself in the difficult position in which you have been placed. You have acted with judgment, firmness, decision, and temper; in short, it is impossible for anybody to have done better, and I am very glad that you have had this matter to deal with. Your notes are remarkably well written, and, without being at all uncivil or offensive, but being, on the contrary, perfectly polite and courteous, they are as decided and energetic in substance as it was possible to be. I very much approve of your having insinuated in one of them that, even if the Neapolitan Government gave the assurances you required, Sir R. Stopford would still come to Naples.

It is possible that the matter may have been arranged before

the French negotiator arrives, but it is also possible that it may not. In that case, your part during the time he is negotiating will be easy and simple—you will only have to wait to see what he can accomplish; but if he asks you to waive any part of your demands, you will say that your hands are tied on that point, and that you have no power to do so. If the Neapolitan Government yields, there ought to be some instrument drawn up, in the shape of a convention or protocol, to be signed by you and the Neapolitan Minister. I should not think that the French Plenipotentiary would have anything to do with that, in the way of signing it. But it ought to contain a general engagement to make compensation to British subjects for all just claims which they may have against the Neapolitan Government for losses incurred by reason of the acts of that Government or its officers.

Our domestic affairs go on well. We had a tolerable majority the other day on Graham's motion about China,¹ and we stand in no danger, I think, during the rest of the session. My speech on that motion has had great success; all our party were delighted with it, and said it was a triumph to the party, and many of the other side have paid me compliments upon it, saying it amused them and kept their attention alive, and was dexterous. It was a good fair speech, but has, I think, been rather more praised than it deserved. There is no danger at present of war with the United States about the boundary question. All the violent notes you see in the papers mean nothing. Van Buren² wants to get the management of the question into his own hands out of those of the State of Maine, and he has, I believe, succeeded; but he has done this for the purpose of keeping peace and not of making war. In fact, the States are in such a condition of bankruptcy and financial and commercial distress, that it is not likely they would make war unnecessarily and unjustly.

Carlton Terrace: May 13, 1840.

Guizot read me a letter from Thiers, saying that Capriola at Naples had been dismissed at the instigation of the King's confessor, for having accepted the French mediation, but Thiers begged Guizot to assure me that he would not allow either himself or us to be the dupes of the King of Naples. I

¹ 'That the hostilities in China were mainly to be attributed to the want of foresight and precaution on the part of Her Majesty's present advisers.'

² The President of the United States.

foresee that the matter will not be settled without blows, or more vigorous measures on our part; and the first thing we shall do will be to establish a blockade and to cut off all communication between Italy and Sicily.

The French Government have asked us for leave to bring over from St. Helena the remains of Buonaparte, and we have given them permission to do so. This is a thoroughly French request, but it would have been foolish in us not to have granted it; and we have therefore made a merit of doing so readily and with a good grace.

I send you one of our new post-office penny covers; the design is by Mulready, one of our best artists, and, as a work of art, is really excellent. It is difficult to get so much subject so distinctly into so small a compass.¹

We are making good way in our session, and I think it will be over towards the end of July. There is no chance of the Tories ousting us before that time, and therefore we are good for another year. The Duke of Wellington is breaking fast, and if he should be obliged to retire from public life, the Tory party would fall to pieces, and some of the moderate peers would come over to us.

The people of Vienna and Berlin affect to say that we are in the wrong about Naples; but this is evidently for the purpose of driving us to make matters up. I tell them, however, that we do not care what they think, but know ourselves to be in the right, and mean to compel the Neapolitans to give way. I said to Castelficala, that the only thing we regret in the matter is the danger to Sicily; he replied that I might make myself quite easy on that score, as he knew from his own observation that no country ever was more quiet and contented than Sicily! I said I was delighted to hear so, and from such good authority.

The 'Opium war' in China, to which reference has already been made, was not the result of any direct instructions from home. On the contrary, Lord Palmerston (although too late, as it turned out), had declared that Her Majesty's Government could not interfere in behalf of the opium smugglers, 'for the purpose of enabling British subjects to violate the laws of the country to which they trade.' But the war once begun

¹ The first idea under the new penny postage scheme was that the Post Office should engrave and sell envelopes which would go free.

had to be continued with vigour. The capture of the island of Chusan had, however, been a disastrous conquest, for fever prevailed so much among the men there as to win for it the name of our Eastern Walcheren. In a very short time more than one-third of our soldiers there were unfit for duty. At the date of the following letter we were about to attack the forts at Canton :—

C. T. : February 9, 1841.

My dear William,—We have had a very cold and severe winter. It began three weeks before Christmas, and they are now skating on all the lakes and ponds, and yesterday and to-day one might have skated all through the streets and parks, the ground having been covered with a coat of ice. Prince Albert fell into the lake in Buckingham Palace Gardens to-day while skating; but it was not out of his depth, and he was soon extricated; though it is a cold day for a ducking.

Public affairs go on well; our foreign concerns prosper in every direction; we have put down all our enemies in Afghanistan, and I think we shall succeed in carrying our points in China. But partly from the mismanagement of the military officer in command, and partly from natural causes, the sickness of the troops employed at Chusan has been very great, and upwards of 200 men have died. This fully justified George Elliot in going on with the negotiation, instead of breaking it off and going at once to blows. For his force was so weakened that he had not the means to act with effect. The sickness, however, had diminished towards the end of October, and the men were all getting well again.

This affair of Mr. McLeod in America is awkward and unpleasant. I cannot think, however, that the Americans will proceed to extremities with him, and I am the more inclined to think so in consequence of the violent speech of Mr. Grainger, a friend of the new President. Mr. Grainger said that if McLeod was proved to be guilty he would be convicted; that if convicted, he would be condemned; and if condemned, he would most assuredly be executed. When a man connected with a Government that is or is to be holds such language in Parliament, it seems clear to me that it is for the purpose of holding high a principle which he thinks will not be carried into practice. If they were to hang McLeod we could not stand it, and war would be the inevitable result.

At home our affairs go on equally well ; that is to say, the country is quiet and prosperous, Ireland contented, manufactures and trade reviving, and agriculture doing tolerably well. The Chartists are pretty tranquil, though not extinct, nor more moderate in their views and feelings. But the elections which have taken place have not been favourable we had lost, and three seats ; to-day, however, we have gained one back again, for we have carried St. Albans against Lord Verulam's second son. It is a great victory, but, I fear, obtained by gross bribery ; only, as the bribery has been equal on both sides, I suppose both sides will wish to avoid any searching inquiry. There certainly has been more bribery in the small boroughs since the Reform Bill than there ever was before. The Tories are anxious to turn us out and take the government, and they mean to make some grand attack before Easter.

The McLeod affair, alluded to in the foregoing letter, very nearly led to a war with the United States. During the Canadian rebellion an American steamer, called the *Caroline*, which had been engaged in carrying arms to the rebels, was boarded in the night by a party of loyalists, set on fire, and driven over the Falls of Niagara. She was lying at the time within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of New York, and an American citizen lost his life in the affray. In January 1841, Alexander McLeod, a British subject, was arrested while engaged on some business in New York State, and imprisoned on a charge of murder, because, as was alleged, he had been concerned in the attack on the vessel. The British Government demanded his release on the ground that he was acting under orders, and that the responsibility for the deed rested with them, and not with an individual such as McLeod. The United States Government, by the mouth of Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, replied that they could not interfere with the internal concerns of the State of New York, or with the action of its authorities.

The following letter to Mr. Fox, our Minister at Washington, indicates the tone which Lord Palmerston felt bound to assume in presence of such an argument.

The directness with which he informs the United States Cabinet of the intentions of the British Government probably contributed to the maintenance of peace, and may well be commended to the attention of all foreign secretaries who are writing upon questions on which they know that the English people have made up their minds :—

Foreign Office : February 9, 1841.

My dear Sir,—We most entirely approve the tone you have taken and the language you have held about the affair of Mr. McLeod, and so do the public in general. There never was a matter upon which all parties—Tory, Whig, and Radical—more entirely agreed; and if any harm should be done to McLeod the indignation and resentment of all England will be extreme. Mr. Van Buren should understand this, and that the British nation will never permit a British subject to be dealt with as the people of New York propose to deal with McLeod, without taking a signal revenge upon the offenders. McLeod's execution would produce war, war immediate and frightful in its character, because it would be a war of retaliation and vengeance.

It is impossible that Mr. Forsyth can wish to bring upon the two countries such a calamity, and we can have no doubt that he will prevent it. He must have the means of doing so, or else the Federal Union exists but in name. But I presume that if we tell him that in the event of McLeod's execution we should make war upon the State of New York, he would reply that in such case we should *ipso facto* be at war with the rest of the Union. But if that is so, the rest of the Union must have the means of preventing the State of New York from doing a thing which would involve the whole Union in war with England. Forsyth's doctrine is pure nullification doctrine; but that is what he cannot intend to maintain.

I have spoken most seriously to Stevenson¹ on this matter, and have told him, speaking not officially, but as a private friend, that if McLeod is executed there must be war. He said he quite felt it; that he is aware that all parties have but one feeling on the subject, and he promised to write to the President privately as well as officially by to-day's post.

McLeod was tried at Utica, in the month of October; and the jury, by their verdict of 'Not guilty,' cut a

¹ United States Minister in London.

knot which seemed at first likely to yield only to the sword.

Lord Palmerston's remark above, that 'the Tories were anxious to turn them out,' indicated nothing more than what may presumably be considered the normal attitude of every 'opposition'; but when he prophesied a grand attack before Easter he was pointing to something more specific. Indeed, the state of the Government invited attack among the Whig Ministers. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell were still popular, for they had shown vigour, but the Ministry in general, though it contained able men, was a weak Ministry, and its approaching fall became more and more apparent. Defeated by a majority of thirty-six on their proposals about the sugar duties, the Ministry were finally, on the 4th of June, left in a minority of one in a House of 623 members on a vote of want of confidence proposed by Sir Robert Peel in the following terms:—'That Her Majesty's Ministers do not sufficiently possess the confidence of the House of Commons to enable them to carry through the House measures which they deem of essential importance to the public welfare; and that their continuance in office under such circumstances is at variance with the spirit of the constitution.' Lord Melbourne at once announced the dissolution of Parliament, and Lord Palmerston went down to his constituents at Tiverton. Before the Reform Bill, the election of its members of Parliament rested with twelve burgesses and twelve assistants, incorporated by a charter of James I. The following characteristic extract from the concluding portion of his speech at the conclusion of his canvass emphasises the cry with which the Whigs went to the country:—

You for years and years had seen going on, at stated periods, an insulting mockery, called an election for members for Parliament. You have been told that within the four walls of a privileged building some conjuring process was going on, by which two simple gentlemen were to be converted into members of the House of Commons. How that was done not one among you

could not with propriety say anything on the subject to the Government of France. For a like reason I could not in my place in Parliament advert to it; but I thought that when I was standing as an individual on the hustings before my constituents, I might use the liberty of speech belonging to that occasion, in order to draw public attention to proceedings which I think it would be for the honour of France to put an end to, and if the public discussion which my speech produced should have the effect of putting an end to a thousandth part of the human misery which I dwelt upon, I am sure M. Guizot will forgive me for saying that I should not think that result too dearly purchased by giving offence to the oldest and dearest friend I may have in the world. But I am quite sure that M. Guizot regrets these proceedings as much as I can do; though we well know that, from the mechanism of government, a minister cannot always control departments over which he does not himself preside.

We are now about to retire, and in ten days' time our successors will be in office. I sincerely hope that the French Government may find them as anxious as we have been to maintain the closest possible union between France and England. Most anxious, whatever may have been said or thought to the contrary, I am quite sure they cannot be.

This did not, however, assuage M. Guizot's ill-humour, and Lord Palmerston was denied the satisfaction of signing before leaving office the convention which he had so laboured to arrange.

Lord Palmerston's success up to this period was the pedestal of his after fortunes at home, as well as the foundation of that reputation which he enjoyed amongst foreign nations.

He had been successful in two most difficult crises, acting with France in one, against France in the other; but in neither abandoning a principle, nor being false to an ally. In those eleven years which intervened between 1830 and 1841 he had kept up England as 'The Great State,' morally and materially, of Europe. He had always expressed her ideas; he had always maintained her interests. His language was clear and bold; and when he menaced action, or thought action

necessary, he had ever been ready by his deeds to make good his language; yet in no instance had his free speech and ready courage led to those wars which timid politicians fear and bring about frequently by their apprehensions.

He had, in fact, been eminently a peace minister, and chiefly so because he had not been saying that he would have peace at *any price*.

Nor is this all. There had been occasions where he did to a certain degree use threats, not shrinking from blows. There had been others where he merely gave counsel or stated opinions. Was that counsel wise? Were those opinions without effect?

He condemned the arbitrary laws intended to oppress the German people. Where are those laws? He forewarned the King of the French when he 'was getting,' as he said, 'into a false position.' What became of the throne of the King of the French? He condemned the Austrian rule in Italy. What has become of that rule? He condemned the temporal policy of the Pope. What has that temporal policy ended by? Who shall say that our opinion has no moral force, when History stands there to teach the world that our opinion has ever been prophetic of its events?

As to the letters, that which must most strike those who read them is their constant perspicuity in style and correctness in sentiment. Lord Palmerston could express distinctly what he meant, because he knew distinctly what he wanted. Not that he was always exactly right either in the views he took or in his mode of stating them: at times his eagerness after what he thought right hurried him into adopting an extreme opinion or using an exaggerated expression concerning it.

A severe critic might say, more gravity, more measure, more consideration, both in words and actions, might on occasions have been desirable; his personal likings and dislikings were, moreover, often formed on too slight grounds; and you may find in his

writings instances, as in the case of Marshal Sebastiani, where he passes, on better acquaintance, from unqualified blame to almost unqualified praise. But this proves that his prejudices ceased when experience taught him that they were prejudices. There was, besides, a manliness, a sincerity, a high breeding, if I may use the expression, about his thoughts, which kept them, under all circumstances, at a healthy elevation. They were always full of life and freshness. You can fancy, as you read him, that he had just come home from his ride to Wormwood Scrubs before breakfast, and had infused the morning air into his letters and despatches.

But one more remark. The reader will perceive in this particular portion of his life, not unfrequent complaints as to our relations with France, and as to French policy in general. This fact ought not to lead to exaggerated conclusions. You do not quarrel with nor complain much of those from whom you greatly differ. But if you are near agreeing with parties, with whom you never entirely agree, you are certain to be querulous, and may at times, being very angry, be a little unjust.

One knows the natural disposition of the Frenchman is always to take the best side of the pavement, and consequently, if an Englishman walks with him he cannot walk quite comfortably. Our intimate arm-in-arm alliance with France, possessing other advantages, had that great and constant inconvenience. Lord Palmerston, also, might not always sufficiently allow for the possibility of two persons looking at the same thing from two different points of view. Nor perhaps was he entirely right in treating with indifference the peculiar position of Louis Philippe and his many ministers. It was an object to us that there should be a stable Government in France. It was natural for anyone at the head of the Government in that country—where no Government had its foundation deeper than an inch in the soil—to be always looking for some twig

prop it up, and dreading some breeze that might blow it over. But there can be no doubt that the anger of incurring unpopularity was not unfrequently made the pretext for practising political infidelity, and the severity with which Lord Palmerston judges in some cases arose from the duplicity that he had detected in others.

It was a little difficult, too—foreigners said—for him to imagine that a statesman differed honestly from the views he himself honestly entertained. He could not entirely conceive—so they expressed themselves—that Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and French might have Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and French ways of considering things, which to them seemed natural and sensible, but which to him seemed unnatural and foolish. It is doubtful, however, whether this, which somewhat disturbed the perfect sobriety of his judgment, did not give energy to his policy, and place him more in sympathy with his country, which recognized at once that he was *emphatically English*. It is again to be observed that the defects were noticed (for this is a biography, and not a eulogy) were only visible in small matters and comparatively unimportant details. His policy as a whole, his conduct as a whole, admitted, throughout these transactions, of little censure, for never was England more looked up to by the Powers of Europe, as a powerful and enlightened State, than during the time from 1830 to 1841 when he managed her affairs with them. It is, moreover, well to remark, that though he was, at this period, approaching towards threescore, he had not completed half of what may be called his great political career, whilst each day improved, up to the very last, his good qualities and diminished his defects.

CHAPTER XIII.

LORD PALMERSTON IN OPPOSITION.

THE elections of 1841 startled a good many persons at home, but abroad they excited still greater surprise. Foreign statesmen could not conceive how a Government which had shown such vigour, and met with such success in its dealings with other States, should not have obtained a firmer hold on the enthusiasm of their own countrymen.

Some of the causes have already been stated under the influence of which the Melbourne Ministry had been for some time drifting into discredit. No fault, except his dry and curt manner, could be found with Lord John Russell as a parliamentary leader. He had the two qualities most essential for that position—tact and spirit. In face of the most skilful and accomplished debater that ever sat on the Opposition benches in the House of Commons, he never showed any fear of his antagonist; and men often admired the brevity with which, in his replies, he said the thing that was necessary, and omitted everything that was superfluous. In the same manner, Lord Palmerston had achieved the object for which a British Minister is most esteemed without engaging us in war, and he had raised our character and strengthened our prestige as much as he could have done by any successful contest.

Yet, notwithstanding the abilities of these two eminent men; notwithstanding the distinguished talents of almost every member of the highly intellectual Cabinet to which they belonged; notwithstanding the

wit, the good humour, the various accomplishments and statesmanlike moderation of the Premier—than whom few men ever brought to his elevated station a more cultivated mind or a more manly understanding—the Administration wanted that quality which in a face is called ‘expression,’ and neither captivated the affections nor commanded the respect of the public.

On the other hand, the Opposition had the advantage of being personified in a chief who was recognised by a large portion of the nation as the type of enlightened Prudence. Known to be averse to great constitutional changes—of which people were then tired; believed to be favourable to useful administrative reforms—which people then expected; ‘the great man of the House of Commons,’ Sir Robert Peel, had grown during the preceding years into ‘the great man of the country,’ which wished to see him at the head of its affairs. It was no marvel, then, that an election, made to try the strength of parties, placed him at the head of a majority of ninety.

The first question he had to deal with was a financial one. The late Government had gone on from year to year, and from day to day, scrambling by small means through pressing difficulties; without the courage, and consequently without the capacity, to face the growing evil, and provide an adequate remedy for it.

This was perhaps the great moment in Sir Robert Peel’s life. Comprehensive, but practical; bold, and yet cautious, he proposed measures which dealt at once with the present position and the future prosperity of the country. An Income Tax assured public credit and at once checked the deficiency in revenue; and the diminution of duties, where their excess destroyed the security of their collection, or where their collection cost more than their produce, or where they weighed unduly on the comforts or industry of the people,—placed our commercial and our financial policy on a basis which did not include the extreme doctrines of

unlimited Free Trade, nor support the unwise restrictions of exaggerated Protection.

But the Conservative statesman, in doing this, moved on treacherous ground; for no position is so safe to maintain under a despotism, or so difficult to maintain under a free government, as one between extremes. It was thus that Protectionists (though at first only in murmurs) accused the Prime Minister of perfidy, whilst the Free Traders charged him with cowardice: the one because he admitted the general principles of Free Trade; the other because he did not carry them, without any limitation, into practice.

But the great impending battle was on a question which, though called commercial, was in fact more political than commercial. There has been at all times, and in all countries, a sort of bitter feeling entertained by men making sudden fortunes by speculation and trade against those who inherit a fortune in land from a well-known ancestry. In the long process of society this feeling disappears in individuals and families, as in time they rise into the caste from which their forefathers were excluded; but, as between class and class, the manufacturer in the town has a species of feeling bordering on antipathy for the squire in the county. The last is certainly not more selfish than the first. Few manufacturers take the same interest in those who work for their mills that the country gentleman takes in those who cultivate his ground. The country gentleman, moreover, whose fortune is already made, and connected inseparably with the fortunes of his country, takes a larger view of the national interest, and is more to be depended upon in any great national crisis, than the manufacturer or tradesman, whose fortune depends on the events of the hour. It may be added that the frank bearing, the manly and athletic habits of our landed gentry, the influence they derived from ancient birth and traditional associations, their independent positions, had in our old society long made them the dominant

and popular body in the nation. Influenced by this prestige, and the belief that a State should not be dependent on foreign States for a main article of its food, and that, owing to the charges on land, it was impossible for the cultivators of our soil to support unlimited foreign competition, the Legislature had for many years sanctioned restrictions on foreign grain as a matter of course, the only subject at times in dispute being the extent and nature of such restrictions. The great change, however, which had taken place of late in our institutions; the suppression of many seats in Parliament for which peers or country gentlemen returned the members; the calling into political existence of the great manufacturing towns; and above all perhaps, the creation of the ten-pound householders, which gave such overbearing importance to the feelings of the small shopkeeper,—had much weakened the power, and consequently diminished the number of the partisans of the territorial aristocracy. And now there were bold and very eloquent men representing the manufacturers, and gathering round their banner all the partisans of democracy, who, putting themselves in the front of what was called the ‘Anti-Corn-Law Movement,’ went about the country denouncing the landed proprietor as ‘the grasping tyrant, bloated in his superfluity by the taxes he imposed on the food of a starving population.’ The Radicals followed these leaders; but the two great parties contending for office avoided for a while any extreme resolutions.

The Whigs, indeed, had at that time in their ranks many country gentlemen whom they did not wish to offend; and the Tories had so far compromised themselves with respect to Free Trade doctrines in general, that it was impossible for them to be the advocates of high protecting duties on the one article of corn.

The early debates, therefore, were confined to the question as to whether there should be a moderate fixed duty, or a moderate duty regulated by a sliding scale; Lord John Russell contending for the one, Sir Robert

Peel for the other. What delayed a more decided contest was the doubt which prevailed for a time as to what was the real force of the landed party ; for the old belief that some tax on corn was necessary still coloured the speeches of leading statesmen and the articles of leading newspapers ; and few were fully aware of the change which had quietly taken place since 1832 in public thought beneath the surface of public expression.

Lord Palmerston, who, with other Canningites, had always belonged to the school of Mr. Huskisson—a school which recognised the principles of political economy without shutting its eyes to the fact that general political considerations might limit or govern the application of those principles—voted with his party for the fixed duty, but was one of the first to discern clearly that all duty must ere long be removed. His speech, then, on the 9th of February, 1842, is evidently impregnated with this idea, and goes far beyond the arguments in favour of a fixed duty over a variable one :—

Why [says he] is the earth on which we live divided into zones and climates ? Why do different countries yield different productions to people experiencing similar wants ? Why are they intersected with mighty rivers, the natural highways of nations ? Why are lands most distant from each other brought almost into contact by the very means which seems to divide them ? Why, Sir, it is in order that man may be dependent upon man : it is that the exchange of commodities may be accompanied by the diffusion of knowledge, by the exchange of mutual benefits, engendering mutual kind feelings, multiplying and confirming friendly relations. It is in order that commerce may freely go forth, leading civilisation with one hand, peace with the other, to render mankind happier, wiser, better. Sir, this is the dispensation of Providence ; this is the decree of that power which created and disposed the universe. Away, then, with those who, with arrogant and presumptuous folly, would fetter the inborn energies of man ; who would set up their own miserable legislation to oppose the great standing laws of nature.

This quotation shows Lord Palmerston once more in the character of an orator—a character he had reassumed, for the reputation he had acquired in that character during the three or four years that had preceded Lord Grey's Government had gradually passed away during the period he had been conducting a most laborious department, which affords few opportunities of making speeches, and enjoins as a rule, when they are made, caution rather than display. It also shows that he was perfectly convinced at that time that the Corn Laws were doomed, and that he, as a country gentleman as well as a statesman, would be unwise in attempting to prop them up. To turn, however, from home to foreign affairs, as those in which Lord Palmerston was principally interested.

The questions of foreign policy open to discussion during Sir Robert Peel's Administration related to the United States and France. With the former we concluded two treaties: one settling their north-western frontier—a question which, strange to say, had been left in abeyance since the close of the war; and another determining the division of the territory of Oregon, respecting which the claims of the Americans had—as is usually the case in all similar affairs with that people—been growing every year that had left them undetermined. It was only at the moment that the Peel Administration was breaking up that this last treaty was concluded; consequently, no debate took place on it during that Administration; but the Ashburton Treaty provoked many observations, and from no one more than Lord Palmerston.

A Commission had been appointed for the settlement of the question of the boundary between British North America and the United States, which had been pending for forty years. Great Britain claimed as the boundary a line corresponding with the terms of the treaty of 1783. The United States claimed a line not in accordance with this treaty. The Government of Sir Robert Peel determined to send to the United States

a special ambassador, fully empowered to effect an adjustment of this and other differences with that country. The person chosen for this service was Lord Ashburton, who arrived at New York on April 21, 1842.

Lord Ashburton was a gentleman much considered in the United States, and closely connected with them by the commercial dealings of the house of Baring, to which he had belonged. His selection as our special ambassador made it evident that we were prepared to purchase agreement by concession, as he would never, in this position, have accepted a mission which was likely to be unconciliatory or unsuccessful; and, as far as the frontier question was concerned, it must be admitted that the public in our country were well contented to conciliate a people with which it jars on our national sympathies to be in hostility, by concessions respecting an unknown country of which they had never realised the possession. The plenipotentiary on the part of the United States was Mr. Webster, and the negotiations resulted in a treaty (signed at Washington on August 9 in the same year), in which the boundaries between the territories of the two Powers are defined in detail, and stipulations entered into for the safeguard of the interests of settlers and others whose lands passed, by the operation of the treaty, from the jurisdiction of one State to that of the other.

There was another question, however, settled in the Ashburton Treaty on which more interest was felt—the question commonly called ‘The Right of Search.’ Bent on suppressing, if possible, the traffic in slaves, we fully admitted that we had no right to meddle with the vessels of other States employed in that traffic, and which did not give us the permission so to do. But we maintained that we had a right to ascertain whether a ship was entitled to the colours it might think proper to display. This was contested by the United States, who would not allow their vessels to be visited under any pretext whatsoever. This question, which could not be settled on principle, it was attempted to settle practi-

cally, without attending to principle, and many were inclined to consider that a law passed by the United States making the slave trade piracy, and the employment of an adequate American squadron for the suppression of it, was practically equivalent to the acknowledgment of a power which we did not abandon in words, but it would be understood we should not attempt to exercise. Lord Palmerston, however, regarded these transactions from a different point of view, styling the Ashburton Treaty 'The Ashburton Surrender,' inasmuch as that it really resigned a right to which he contended we had an undoubted claim, and which we had hitherto declared we could not resign with honour.

In a letter to Lord Minto he writes—

Ashburton's treaty is very discreditable to the negotiators who concluded it, and to the Government who sanctioned it. The negotiator was outwitted, and the Government has made unnecessary sacrifice of things which are not only losses to us; but in the hands of the Americans will prove instruments of future aggression against us; and as there still remain unsettled several questions which must, one of these days, become subjects of angry discussion between the two countries, it was highly unwise to consent to any arrangement now which will by-and-by give them a greater pull upon us.

The motto of the Government in foreign affairs seems to be, 'Give way.' There is for this course a plausible defence, that it preserves peace, but that defence will not stand examination and discussion.

Lord Palmerston maintained, indeed, as may have been learnt from his correspondence relative to Belgium, that the true policy of England was never to put forward any pretension that was unjust, but to give up none which justice supported as long as there was a possibility of defending it—by arms, if its value justified our having recourse to arms; by negotiation, if we carried our defence no farther than argument; leaving our adversary in doubt, however, till the last as to whether we should finally protest or fight. He laughed

to scorn the theory that you should yield immediately everything for which you were not prepared to go to war.

He used to say that every State would be disposed to give up three out of every four questions sooner than go to war to maintain them. If you choose to give way hastily on these, because you are not prepared to go to war for them, you will most frequently anticipate your antagonist. Nor is this all. It is not concession on this matter or that which is of national importance: it is the habit of making concessions, and creating a belief that you will make them, which is fatal to a nation's interest, tranquillity, and honour. To create such a belief in a democratic Government, especially a Government which is prone to seek at all times to please the multitude, is a sure way to have constant troubles with that Government: from every difficulty you avoid to-day will rise twenty difficulties round you to-morrow; for every man who seeks popularity will attempt to gain it at your expense.

For instance, to give up to-day to the Americans, who are an encroaching people, a point deemed of small importance, is certain to lead to our being asked to give up another point of more importance to-morrow, and being thus eventually brought to give up something of great importance, or to fight because we decline to do so. If it is still said: 'Don't let us fight,' war with the Americans is, indeed, avoided; but other nations, who have watched our conduct with them, will imitate their conduct to us; and the quarrel avoided in the first instance will multiply into a thousand quarrels before the consequences of indifference or timidity are done with. Lord Palmerston's maxim was, 'Never give up a pin's head that you ought to keep and think you can keep; and even if you think that in the last extremity you will not be able to keep it, make as many difficulties as you can about resigning it, and manifest a doubt as to whether you should not sooner go to war than resign it.'

It is wiser, perhaps, to lay down no absolute rule upon such subjects; but if we had to do so, all ex-

perience would teach us that we are more likely to enjoy peace under the Minister who is supposed ready to fight, than under the Minister who is supposed ready to yield. But the opinion of the day backed the Government which, as far as the United States were concerned, was disposed to concession.

Towards the close of the session Lord Palmerston attacked the Government in a speech recapitulating the principal recent events both at home and abroad. It resembles somewhat one of those inimitable philippics with which Lord Lyndhurst at one time endeavoured annually to surprise the constitutional good-humour and philosophic indifference of Lord Melbourne, and is a good specimen of Lord Palmerston's prepared style—clever, gay, epigrammatic, satirical, and producing a great effect in the House. It was a strong instance of his pluck and courage; for to get up in a thin House, at the fag end of a laborious session, to make a long speech from which no one expects any results, in the face of the most formidable antagonist you can arouse to reply to you, is an attempt that may be made without fear by a young member, who has nothing to lose; but it is no small trial to a man who will lose more by a failure than he would gain by a success. But one of the secrets of Lord Palmerston's good fortune was, that he never contemplated a reverse, and could always take it calmly as a temporary accident, of which he would soon efface the effects.

He went back for some of the causes, which were still in operation, to the long war which was closed by the peace of 1815. In that war, all the passions, all the feelings, and all the energies of the nations of Europe, were roused into action; and it was vain to think that men who had been so long discussing their rights, and their wrongs, could at once go back to the same state of comparative political slumber from which they had been roused by the breaking out of hostilities. Nevertheless, there were persons who indulged in that dream; but the delusion was soon dispelled. Italy,

Spain, and Portugal made frequent, though unsuccessful, efforts to wrest from their Government free institutions; which at length Spain and Portugal, under the auspices of England, obtained.

'After the peace, the public mind of this country directed itself with great intensity to our own domestic concerns—to the civil and religious disabilities under which the people laboured; and in 1829 Catholic Emancipation was carried, mainly through the energy, the wisdom, and the firmness of three men—the right honourable baronet opposite, now at the head of Her Majesty's Government, the Duke of Wellington, and a person whose name is not often associated with theirs, the right honourable and learned member for Cork.¹ Lord Palmerston hoped that the Duke of Wellington would add another wreath to the laurels that grace his brow, and attain commercial emancipation for his country. The events of 1830 in France and Belgium hastened the crisis in this country. The interval since 1829 was too brief to allow the resentments which Catholic Emancipation had produced among the supporters of Ministers to subside; and by resigning on a subordinate question, they expressed their conviction that a time was come when a complete measure of parliamentary reform must take place, although 'they' could not undertake it. Lord Palmerston's colleagues succeeded to power, and brought forward a measure more extensive than had been believed possible. The present state of the House, however, proved how groundless were the fears of annihilation entertained by Sir Robert Peel and his party, as were equally groundless their present fears as to striking off the fetters which cramped the productive industry of the country.

There was this difference between Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emancipation—the one was complete in itself, the redress of a specific grievance; the other was a means to a further end.

It was idle to suppose, when you admitted into this House a due proportion of direct representatives of a great manufacturing and commercial community, that those representatives would not state so effectually, and with such force, the various evils under which that community laboured, by reason of your prohibitory and restrictive system, that in the course of a short

¹ Mr. O'Connor.



period of time Parliament would be induced to make great and important changes in that system. But there were many who did not look deep enough into the course of things to be convinced of that. The large party who honestly and conscientiously (for I will not attribute improper motives to them) think that the system, which we call monopoly and restriction, is not only calculated for their own benefit, but for that of the country, believed that these great stages of social improvement depended not upon the action of great and wide-spreading causes, but on the accidental opinions of particular men, who happen from time to time to be in possession of power. They thought, therefore, when from time to time we announced improvements of one sort and another, that if they could only contrive to dispossess us of the power which we held, and place it in the hands of the leaders of their party, they would be safe, and that the system which they had cherished for so long a period would be maintained. They had a majority, a large majority, in the House of Lords; all they wanted was a majority in this House. They set to work, steadily and systematically labouring in the Registration Courts; and gradually they rose upon us, until it became obvious, from session to session, that their numbers were increasing, and that the time would probably come when they would have the command of this House as well as the other House of Parliament. The last session of the late Parliament brought matters to a crisis. Their numbers were, at all events, equal to if not greater than ours; and the measures which we announced—those great measures of commercial reform, some of which we actually brought forward—showed that the time had at length arrived when they must give us battle, and they vigorously prepared for the fight. They fought the battle in this House and in the country. Their victory was, undoubtedly, complete; and our defeat, I am ready to acknowledge, amounted almost to a rout. Great was the triumph; loud was the note of exultation. But, alas! how vain is human wisdom! how short the foresight of even the wisest men!—when a few months passed over their heads, the songs of triumph were changed into cries of lamentation. The very parties whom they had selected to be their chosen champions—the very guardians whom they had armed with power for their defence—turned their weapons upon them, and most inhumanly, and with unrelenting cruelty, struck blows which, if they have not already proved fatal, must, in all probability, lead sooner or later to their utter extinction.

The triumphant party had been deceived; but by whom? By themselves. It was not to be supposed that the late Ministers had so impregnated the air of Downing Street with Free-Trade principles that their successors caught the infection as they would an epidemic; still less that those recently propounded doctrines and opinions were the result of studies since the present Ministers had entered upon office, when it was known that every hour of a Minister's day must be devoted to the current business of his office.

It is not to be supposed that Her Majesty's Ministers applied themselves, between September 3, when they entered office, and February 3, when Parliament met, to the study of Adam Smith, Ricardo, M'Culloch, Mill, Senior, and other writers of the same kind. No; it is clear that the opinions which they have so well expounded in the present session must be the result of long meditation—of studies deliberately pursued during the ten years of comparative leisure which even a state of the most active opposition will still afford, and they must have come into office fully imbued with those sound principles, the enunciation of which has excited so much admiration on this side of the House and has created so much surprise and alarm on the other.

In the course of this speech Lord Palmerston attacked Lord Stanley¹ in the following terms:—

The noble Lord, the member for North Lancashire, is almost the only member of the present Government who, in the course of this session, has said much upon foreign affairs. The noble Lord, on the occasion to which I allude, made a very good off-hand speech: for no man is a better off-hand debater than the noble Lord. But off-hand debaters are sometimes apt to say whatever may come into their heads on the spur of the moment, without stopping to consider—as they would do if they had time—whether what they are going to say is strictly consistent with the facts to which it applies.

I remember to have heard of a celebrated minister of a foreign country, living about the middle of the last century, who was giving instructions to one of his agents as to the language he should hold in regard to the conduct of another Government. The agent, having listened to the instructions, ventured, with great humility and very submissively, to suggest that the language which he was ordered to hold was not

¹ The late Lord Derby.

strictly consistent with fact, and might indeed be thought to be altogether at variance with fact. What was the Minister's answer? 'Never mind *that*! What in the world does *that* signify? it is a good thing to say, and take care you say it.' That Minister would, I think, have made not a bad off-hand debater in this House. However, I assure the noble Lord that I don't accuse him of having, on the occasion to which I refer, or on any other, stated that which he believed to be inconsistent with fact. What I accuse him of, is, speaking about facts in regard to which he happened to be wholly uninformed. The noble Lord charged the late Government in general, and myself in particular, with having, by our restless meddling in every part of the world, created for him and his colleagues such embarrassments, political and commercial, that in every quarter they were met by difficulties arising from the work of our hands. That was his charge; and that charge I meet with an entire denial; and I shall be able to prove my denial, though the noble Lord did not stop to endeavour to prove his charge.

I must say that the noble Lord's charge shows a great want of information on his part, as to the state of our foreign relations. It may be that the noble Lord and his colleagues have been too busily occupied in their own departments to have leisure to ransack the archives of the Foreign Office to know what passed in our time; but then, really, they who are so wholly uninformed ought not to make such positive assertions. But the noble Lord's attack upon me and my colleagues is an instance not only of great want of information, but also of the grossest ingratitude. So far from having left embarrassments to our successors, we have bequeathed to them facilities. Why, what have they been doing since they came into office? They have been living upon our leavings. They have been subsisting upon the broken victuals which they found upon our table. They are like a band of men who have made a forcible entrance into a dwelling, and who sit down and carouse upon the provisions they found in the larder.

Lord Palmerston further stated that the Ministers came into office September 3. The Speech from the throne was on February 3; yet the whole of the Speech, with a single exception, was a record of what had been done by their predecessors: it made no complaints of embarrassments, but contained only expres-

sions of satisfaction at what had passed, and happy anticipations as regarded the future. It mentioned the treaty concluded with the four Powers for the suppression of the slave trade; 'A treaty,' said Lord Palmerston, 'concluded by *us*.'¹ It next mentioned a treaty concluded with the same Powers for opening the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, to which the present Ministers gave a more imposing title; for they described it in the Royal Speech as 'having for its object the security of the Turkish empire and the maintenance of the general tranquillity.' This was saying, in other words, that *we* had succeeded in fixing an important element in the balance of power. The next point was the restoration of friendly intercourse with Persia; the negotiations carried on by the late Ministry with Spain, Brazil, Naples, and the treaty with Portugal he claimed credit for, as also for the settlement with Denmark respecting the tolls of the Baltic; and he would like to know when Ministers could produce a like settlement with Hanover respecting the tolls of the Elbe. Exception had been taken to his China policy, but, on that head, he would appeal to the declarations of the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords; merely observing that if a satisfactory arrangement of commerce with a nation of two hundred millions of people was the consequence, a greater benefit to British manufactures could hardly be conceived. On entering office the late Ministers found eighteen treaties; they concluded fourteen; two of those with Austria and Turkey, of great importance; and also the convention regulating French and English fisheries. There was one instance in which they failed—the settlement of the Portendic claims; their successors would know how that question was beset with difficulties. As for America, the Boundary question there grew up before they entered office—before Lord Stanley grew up—but they had done what it had occurred to no previous Government to do, they

¹ M. Guizot delayed the signing of the Treaty in order to deprive Lord Palmerston of that satisfaction.

appointed two commissions, who had ascertained that the line claimed by Great Britain corresponded with the terms of the treaty of 1783, and that the line claimed by the United States did not. In the Right of Search question Ministers had adopted the arguments of their predecessors. Lord Palmerston claimed credit for opening new markets on the coast of Arabia, of Abyssinia, and, by laying the foundation of the commerce, which must take place, in China, and in the countries to the west of the Indus. The late disaster there, which had nothing to do with the original measure, he attributed to the want of ordinary military precautions.

He contended that commerce had expanded wonderfully under the late Ministry, and gave figures to support this statement. In regard to home affairs, the prospect was rather cheering. Government was pledged to the principle of Free Trade; they could not recede, and they would have the support of the Opposition. As to foreign affairs, he looked with considerable apprehension and fear to a Government acting upon a system of timidity, of apathy, and of compromise.

It is impossible to prove from these extracts, that the Whig champion had the best of the battle; but it would be unfair to deny that he had made a speech which few other men in the House of Commons could have made. Moreover, a public man gains much, if his audacity is sustained by ability, in assuming boldly a great position; and it is not unfrequently that the evident ambition to take the lead in a popular assembly confers, on a favourable opportunity, that lead upon you; and during this session and the succeeding ones intervening between his return to office, Lord Palmerston not unostentatiously put forward and vindicated his pretensions to be the second, if not the first man, in the Liberal ranks. He had, in fact, no alternative but to win this position or retire into private life, for he was just at that critical point in his career at which a bold and aspiring man has gathered round him the cqvrt

opposition of rivals, without having arrived at that in which he secures the open allegiance of followers. In the following year he seemed, however, anxious to have it understood that he was rather an adherent to Lord John Russell than a rival, and on the only occasion on which he spoke at any length, studiously adopted, and said that he adopted, his language and sentiments.

On our main difficulty with France, public opinion was less favourable to the Government. In 1842, apparently without any reason or pretext, beyond the desire of appropriating something that did not belong to it, the French Government determined to take possession, under some title or other, of the Marquesas and Society Islands, having been disappointed in their previous design of hoisting the tricolor in New Zealand. A certain Admiral Thouars, accordingly, bullied Queen Pomare into a prayer to be placed under the protection of the King of the French. The British Government, to which Her Majesty addressed herself for assistance in this emergency, did not feel disposed to interfere. But the British missionaries were less inclined to be quiescent. The islands had long been a field of contention between them and the Catholic missionaries of France, each thinking it a duty to perplex the minds of those ignorant islanders with the mysterious grounds of their own differences rather than with the broad morality and simple faith of the Christian creed.

The Protestants had hitherto had the best of the battle, and at their suggestion the Queen of Tahiti had requested the British Government to take herself and her dominions under its protection. We had declined this honour, though with the most friendly expressions. A certain Mr. Pritchard, at once a Protestant missionary and the British consul, was the great man of the islands, and might in reality be said to have been, for some time past, their actual sovereign. He was, of course, ignorant as to the manner in which the French proceedings would be viewed at home by the Government; but he knew perfectly well how they would be viewed by the

ministers of his own persuasion ; and there can be little doubt that, without going so far as either to encourage the queen or her subjects to absolute resistance to the French authorities, and the recall of that involuntary act of submission that Her Majesty had made to them, he spoke in no measured terms of French violence and Roman Catholic arrogance, superstition, and usurpation. It is probable, also, that he let fall dark hints as to conduct which Protestant England, the Queen of the Ocean, might pursue, and kept up at a pretty high temperature the discontent which the act had of itself not unnaturally produced.

The English in Tahiti did not know whether the French admiral had acted under orders, or only on his own authority ; and they were also doubtful how his conduct in either case would be viewed in England. It may be presumed, therefore, that they rather encouraged than discouraged the growing desire to reassume independence, and the house of Mr. Pritchard became naturally the rallying point of the national and Protestant party.

The Tahiti Government had not, however, gone so far as to renounce the guardianship it had accepted, but it did nothing to stifle the murmurs which this guardianship had provoked ; and Queen Pomare had ventured to change the flag over her palace, which it appears that M. de Thouars had assigned to her, by suppressing some stars and substituting cocoa-nut leaves in their stead. At this critical juncture Admiral de Thouars returned, and being excessively irritated by the accounts he had received, and inexpressibly disgusted at the cocoa-nut leaves, decreed Queen Pomare's dethronement, declared the Polynesian Isles annexed to the kingdom of France, and very unceremoniously seizing Mr. Pritchard, of whose consular dignity he took little heed, threw him into prison, from which, on being released, he was sent from the island. When the news of these proceedings arrived in Europe they produced no little sensation. In England a religious

and a national cry at once arose. 'The open and flagrant usurpation which had just taken place was,' said the Opposition, 'the natural consequence of our silence when the first step towards it had been taken. English honour was insulted; the Protestant religion trampled under foot; and this by the power of France, on an element where it perilled our very existence to admit a rival.' Sir Robert Peel could not have faced this popular feeling had he been so inclined; but in reality he shared it, and the gravest results were to be expected if the French Government adopted as its own the violent conduct of its officer. A large party in France were disposed to urge this course. Every enemy of Louis Philippe advised it; and it was said that some of his family, with the patriotic temerity which has often in their history elevated and humbled the French nation, were ready to accept the risks with the glorious audacity of such a defiance. But that monarch saw very clearly that even if war with England were desirable, it was not so for a cause like this, and before any formal remonstrance could be made against Admiral de Thouars' high-handed behaviour, it was disavowed and disapproved, and M. Guizot, whilst maintaining the protectorate which had been offered to France, refused the sovereignty that had been seized in her name.

This reduced the question between the two Governments to the capture of Mr. Pritchard. But this question was not so easy to deal with. If he had really been promoting a rebellion against a state of things legally established under the suzerainty and protection of France, his consular dignity was no safeguard against punishment for conduct which had nothing to do with his consular attributions. If, on the other hand, he was innocent on all the charges brought against him, he ought to have been reinstated in his post under a French salute, and been not only recompensed for the inconvenience he had endured, but apologized to for the indignity he had undergone.

The English Government, however, could not condemn Mr. Pritchard, against whom no act amounting to insurrection was proved, without being hooted by the English nation; and the French Government could not reinstate him in his post, with marks of respect that would be humiliating to itself, without being hooted by the French nation. Thus the reasonable thing was done rather than the right one—Mr. Pritchard received a sum of money, and did not return to his post. The conclusion thus arrived at, however, was rather acquiesced in than deemed satisfactory; and the tone taken throughout the business by the French Chambers and the French press was so menacing, and even the language of M. Guizot was so haughty, that a pretty general feeling supported Lord Palmerston when he asserted that we had truckled to France, though there was no party so thoroughly convinced of the fact as to be ready to affirm it.

It was in questions of foreign policy that Lord Palmerston was principally interested, and it is by the tone that he gave to the foreign policy of England that he will take his place in our history; but during the period rapidly run over, he had, with an evident intention of being known as an active and able member of Parliament, been mixing constantly in debate without any particular selection of subjects.

The writer of a short sketch says in reference to this fact:—

On no leading topic of legislation, whether of the first or second grade of importance, while Sir Robert Peel was Minister, was Lord Palmerston silent. The distress of the country, Lord Ashley's Bill for the better regulation of mines and collieries, bribery at elections, the Ashburton Treaty, Lord Ellenborough and his Somnauth proclamation, the affairs of Servia, the outrage on Mr. Pritchard at Tahiti, the Greek loan, and the *émeute* at Athens; the state of Ireland, the Protestant Bishopric of Jerusalem, the affairs of Scinde, the suppression of the slave trade, in which Lord Palmerston *made more than one speech of at least three hours' duration*; our relations with Brazil, the

imprisonment of Don Carlos, the enclosure of commons, duelling in the army, gaming, and the question of recovering by law debts incurred at play; the sugar duties, the shipping interest, France and Morocco, the income tax, Maynooth College, railway accidents, and national defences—all obtained his attention and called forth his remarks.

The reader will observe the stress laid on the 'more than one speech of three hours on the suppression of the slave trade.' It is indeed worthy of notice that there was no subject which, during his long political life, was taken up by Lord Palmerston with so much zeal and earnestness as the suppression of the slave trade. He was a man of the world, and it was a subject which did not interest men of the world in general. He was a politician, and it was a subject which did not much interest the ordinary run of politicians. It caused great trouble; it very often thwarted and crossed other views and combinations; it was the hobby in England of a class of men who generally opposed Lord Palmerston's views as to England's relations with foreign countries; and it was wholly misunderstood abroad, where some profound scheme of selfish advantage was generally presumed to be concealed under the cloak of disinterested philanthropy. Still, Lord Palmerston's conduct was unvarying and consistent. He never lost an occasion for advancing his humane object, nor ever pardoned an agent who overlooked it. This has been often alluded to with expressions of wonder, but these could only proceed from persons ignorant of a character which was essentially framed to understand and adopt a great simple idea, and to persevere in carrying it out. He looked upon the destruction of this odious trade not only as a work of generous humanity, but as a work especially connected with the pride and glory of England; and there may be traced throughout all his actions, and all his speeches, two dominant ideas: the one to maintain the prestige and power of Great Britain, and the other to enlist that power and prestige in the service of mankind.

The cause of justice, the cause of liberty, the cause of humanity, he always thought the cause of his country; and it was this which in the long run, as his motives became more and more appreciated, increased the number of his partisans and silenced his detractors, and gave him the exceptional position which towards the close of his life he triumphantly enjoyed.

He was, however, in 1841, though far advanced in life, but imperfectly comprehended, and many yet looked upon him rather as an adventurous politician than a profound statesman.

CHAPTER XIV.

VISIT TO IRELAND—CORN LAW DEBATES—FACTORY BILL AND
BRIBERY AT ELECTIONS—LETTERS—INTERVIEW WITH FACTORY
DELEGATES—SPEECH ON SLAVE TRADE AND GENERAL FOREIGN
POLICY.

THE letters which follow show us Lord Palmerston out of office, enjoying the liberty and opportunity which his retirement from the Foreign Office afforded him. Parliament had been prorogued on the 7th of October, and he had taken advantage of his leisure to visit his property in Ireland and Wales. As early as the year 1825 he had joined with the late Duke of Cleveland (then Lord William Paulet) and Mr. Paxton in leasing and working a slate quarry in North Wales. For very many years it was a loss, and its final success was a striking result of his pluck and perseverance. Lord Palmerston also spent much money and trouble in constructing the harbour, to which reference is made in the following letter, for the use of the fishermen on his property in Ireland:—

Beauesert: November 26, 1841.

My dear William,—We arrived here yesterday in our way home from Ireland. We travel by easy stages, making a course of visits in our way, and we have some more to pay before we get home. I found everything belonging to me in Ireland going on satisfactorily: my estate much improved, and the people better clad, and living in better houses than when I last saw them, twelve years ago. My harbour, which I have been obliged to enlarge lately, is nearly finished; and though it has cost more than I reckoned upon, it will now fully answer all purposes. It will be about 800 feet long, by 300 wide, and will have thirteen or fourteen feet of water at high spring tides. On

the other hand, our slate quarry in Wales will, I trust, now begin to be productive, and if our expectation should be realized, it will become a very profitable concern. Thus, I trust I shall soon find myself none the poorer for being out of office, and certainly as yet I have been much the better for it in health, and much the freer and more amused in mind. I suppose that, like a horse about his stable, though now glad to have got out, I shall soon wish to get back again to my office; but that wish has not yet arisen, and I should, as far as regards myself, very much regret any change which should bring me back to my former labours for a year and a half to come. From Dublin we went to Powerscourt for a couple of days, and drove to see the cascade in one of the heaviest snow storms I ever remember. We came back as we went, by Liverpool, and had a smooth passage. From Liverpool we drove round the coast of North Wales, by Conway, the Menai Bridge, and Carnarvon, to our slate quarry, near Tan y Bwlch. The hills were covered with snow, which gave the country an alpine character, though it did not add to the rapidity of our progress—and certainly our speed was not that of railroads. We passed a day at Powis Castle, where we found Powis in high force. From thence we went for a day to the Levesons, at Aldenham, near Bridgenorth, the seat of Sir John Acton, his son, now a minor; and from thence we came on here yesterday, and have to-day had a good day's shooting. We go to-morrow to Hatherton's, at Teddesley, thence to the Duke of Sutherland's, at Trentham, then for a day to Melbourne, in Derbyshire. and thence to London, where we shall stay a week or ten days, and then go and settle at Broadlands till Parliament meets; and I look forward with great pleasure to hunting, shooting, and thinning plantations as in the olden time. I wish you were coming there too, but you are better employed where you are. I was lucky this year on the Turf; I had but one horse in training, and that was Ilione, and she won me about £1,700 at Newmarket in one stake, and though John Day will no doubt send me in a large bill to set against these winnings, yet a decent surplus must still remain.¹

¹ This mare, by Priam, won the Cesarewitch. Lord Palmerston usually named the animals which he bred himself after his farms or places near Broadlands; but this mare he bought for a small sum, selecting her himself out of a draft of Lord George Bentinck's, at Tattersall's, and found a name for her by recalling the lines in the *Æneid*:

'Præterea sceptum Ilione quod gesserit olim
Maxima natarum Priami.'

Anglesey gave us two days' good shooting at Beaudesert. He is a wonderful man for his age—73 off, and rising 74—and with

After her successes, a lively discussion arose among the classical patrons of the turf as to the correct pronunciation of the second *i* in the name. Some said it was long; some short; bets were made, authorities invoked, and, finally, a large amount of money changed hands on the decision of the Master of Trinity College that the vowel was short, of which there could be little doubt if Virgil is any authority. The story goes, that Lord Palmerston himself, when appealed to, gave the sportsmanlike answer, that 'they might call her just what they liked, so long as she had won the Cesarewitch;' but Lord Neaves, a Scotch Tory Judge, who published at the time the following amusing lines, gave a different version:—

The Whigs can boast of many a name,
Great Normanby and little Johnny;
But for their foremost child of fame
Is he that owns fleet Ilione.

'Mongst Lords and legs a contest rose,
As fierce as e'er we fought with Bony;
From words it almost came to blows,
And still the theme was Ilione.

And some said this, and some said that,
No want there was of cacophony;
With short and long—with sharp and flat,
They sore misnomered Ilione.

Then one bethought him of a way
To terminate this acrimony;
He called as umpire of the fray
The Lord that owns that Ilione.

His Lordship, though a scholar once,
At this appeal was much 'étonné';
But, loth to be esteemed a dunce,
He searched his books for Ilione.

O Peel, your guilt what tongue can tell!
'Twas nothing short of rank felony,
To oust a Lord who talks so well
Of heathen Greek and Ilione.

Had I the might of Pindar's muse,
To sing the praise of Palmerstony,
The deathless Prince of Syracuse
Should yield to him and Ilione.

Pindar, alas! is in his grave,
But this good page of old ebony
To distant days the name shall save
Of Palmerston and Ilione.

only one leg he rides a pony and kills everything that gets up within reach of his gun, either before or behind him.

Broadlands : January 19, 1842.

Our weather has been chiefly frosty, so that I have had no hunting; and the game this year has not been abundant, so that the shooting has been less good than usual; but still we have had game enough to afford good amusement, and an excuse for exercise. But then, after what may be called an absence of ten or eleven years, one finds plenty to do in the place, and the mere marking young trees for thinning the plantations has given me many days' employment. Then come Holmes's accounts, which have necessarily fallen greatly into arrear, and which I have not yet been able to get through.

As to politics, you see as much of them by the newspapers as I do, nearly. The Government is, I conceive, secure for two or three years to come, and it is better for everybody that they should remain in that time. The country will then understand what they are, and find out the difference between them and us. We shall have a little comparative repose, and shall be able to attend somewhat to our own affairs, which it is very necessary we should—at least I find it so for one. But a majority of eighty is not eaten down in a hurry, and it will take some pretty long experience of their mismanagement and narrow-mindedness to open people's eyes.

London: February 8, 1842.

I began this the other day in the country, but being now an idle man with nothing to do, I have not had time to finish it. We came to town to go to Windsor to meet the King of Prussia, and we did nothing else for a week afterwards but meet him from house to house. His success here was beyond anything great, and he will, I trust, have carried away with him impressions of England as favourable as those which he left in England of himself. The only people who found fault with him are the Puseyites, the new Catholic sect who have sprung up in our Church, and who saw with disgust and uneasiness the arrival of a Protestant monarch who is known to wish to bring about some kind of connection between his Protestant Church and ours.¹

We are now in the agony of expectation as to Peel's

¹ There was great indignation expressed in some quarters that he, being a Lutheran, should have stood as sponsor for the Prince of Wales, an Episcopalian!

measures—I say Peel's, because he is the Government, and his colleagues are understood to have little to say upon the matter, except to determine whether they will stay in or go out. The general notion is that he means to propose to-morrow some modification of the sliding scale of corn duties, which will be too much for the agriculturist and too little for the commercial interest, but which, nevertheless, he will ultimately carry, by the support of the Liberals against the high Tories. For we shall probably begin by dividing in favour of a fixed duty against his new scale; we shall of course be beaten by a large majority, and then I presume we shall vote for his amendment, as against the law as it stands; because to negative his amendment would be to declare a preference for the present law, and that would be inconsistent with our own opinions.

On our commercial tariff generally, and on our system of finance, it is supposed that Peel means even to outdo us. People imagine that he intends to make even a greater reduction than we had proposed on the duty on foreign sugar; but it is not supposed that he will touch the timber duties. Other reductions of duty are also expected, and then it is thought that he will make up the deficiency by a tax upon income arising from fixed property—that is to say, not applicable to income arising from professional industry. He will find it difficult to carry such a tax, and there are many strong objections to it; and though it will no doubt produce the amount which it may be calculated to give, yet it will diminish the expenditure of private individuals in taxable articles, and thus in some degree tend to lessen the produce of the indirect taxes. But these details are not to be stated to us till after the supplies are voted. I think the Government will weaken itself by internal differences of opinion, and by the split which this will cause in their party; but I think they are strong enough to bear this, and I see no reason why they should not go well through this year—and if they do so, they may go on equally well one or two years more.

I think that we shall pay you a visit at Naples next winter, for we talk of a tour in the autumn, and I should much like to go to Berlin, Dresden, and Vienna, and thence down to Naples. I have never seen Germany, and wish very much to see Italy again.

Parliament met on February 3, and on the 9th, in a crowded House, Sir Robert Peel unfolded his Corn

Law scheme—a sliding scale. On February 14, Lord John Russell brought forward his amendment, condemnatory of the principle of a sliding scale, and a long debate ensued, during which Lord Palmerston, in a clever speech, taunted Sir Robert Peel with the general dissatisfaction which his measure gave, testified on his own side of the House by an eloquent silence. He said two courses were open to the Minister—either to have stood by the old Corn Laws, in which he would have been cordially supported by a majority in the House, or to have taken a bold course in changing the Corn Laws, in which case he would have obtained support from other quarters.

‘It is not given to man, much less to man in office, to please all parties.’ He admitted that the proposed law was a mitigation of that which it was to replace, but he proceeded to show in how trifling a degree. He contended that the duty should be fixed, and known.

If a moderate fixed duty were established, you would have a complete change in the trade altogether; you would have an entirely different system of transactions in the corn market. For instead of gambling transactions, you would establish a sound and advantageous trade; and instead of the merchant hurrying at every rise in price to the foreign market on the Continent—for the distant markets are hardly touched—and thus at once enhancing the price of corn, you would establish a steady and well-regulated barter, which would at the same time supply the wants and open new fields for the consumption of the produce of your manufacturing industry. Under such an arrangement the merchant would make his arrangements for buying a supply of corn in those places where it was cheapest, and would bring it home at a period when he thought that it could be best disposed of, both to the country and to himself. Above all, you would extend greatly your commercial relations with the United States.

His next letters show how this speech was received, and enlarge upon the difficulties into which Peel’s Government was drifting.

C. T.: February 25, 1842.

My dear William,—We are going on with our Corn Law debate, which has been dull in general, the speeches turning chiefly upon details of scales and statistical matters. Peel's new scale will of course be carried, and it will be an improvement on the present law. But at all events it is the first step towards a larger change, and that is the best circumstance connected with it.

The French Government have got themselves into a nice hobble about the Slave Trade Treaty. They cannot ratify without disgusting their deputies. They cannot refuse to ratify without bringing dishonour upon the Crown of France; and even by withholding their ratification they do not exempt themselves from that mutual right of search which is permanently conceded by the treaties of 1831–33. All this comes from Guizot's pitiful spite towards me for our success in the Syrian affair.

When we signed in July last the treaty about the Dardanelles, by which France re-entered the 'Concert Européen,' I asked Bourqueney to sign the Slave Trade Treaty. He made many shuffling and evasive excuses for not doing so, alleging that he had no instructions or power. I desired Bulwer to ask Guizot to send him power. Guizot said that there were some forms to be gone through about the treaty before this could be done; that it would give him some days' trouble to get those forms gone through, and that he did not think that I was entitled to expect that he should take any trouble *for me*. In other words, he intimated that he should reserve the conclusion of this treaty as an offering to the Tories on their accession to office. Thus he delayed till the end of the year that which might have been done in July or August last; and whereas if he had signed in the summer the ratification would have been exchanged long before the French Chambers met, and he never would have heard a word upon the subject, the delay in the signature postponed the period of ratification till after the meeting of the Chambers, and thus afforded an opportunity for cabal and intrigue. I have no doubt, however, that as soon as the French session is over the French ratification will arrive, for to withhold it altogether would be utterly disgraceful to the French Crown. In the meanwhile our Government have shown more firmness and vigour in this matter than I gave them credit for. They followed the example we set them in 1832, about the Belgian Treaty of November 1831, by mentioning the treaty in the

Speech from the Throne, although it had not been ratified by any of the parties; and they also followed our example in regard to the same treaty, by laying their treaty before Parliament as soon as the English ratification had been exchanged with that of any of the other contracting parties. This is, as it were, throwing down the gauntlet of defiance to the French Government. Some think that the Americans have intrigued at Paris to prevent France from ratifying, in order that France might be free to join America if America quarrels with us about the right of ascertaining, by inspection of papers, the nationality of merchant ships at sea; but this is a miscalculation, because France is as much bound to the principle of mutual search by the treaty of 1831-33 as she would be by the treaty of 1841. I have heard, and from pretty good authority, a different story, and have been told that Cass has declared at Paris that the pamphlet which he wrote and printed, and which was distributed among the deputies, against the right of search, was written by him at the request of Guizot, and was revised and corrected by Guizot before it went to the press. I am afraid that Guizot is by no means above such a petty intrigue. But England is strong enough to brush through all such cobweb work if her Government is only firm enough, and sufficiently conscious of the power and influence of the country whose affairs they direct.

C. T.: March 15, 1842.

There is a storm getting up against the Income Tax, but I think Peel will carry it notwithstanding; a few days more, however, will show more fully how this will be. He will probably be obliged to make some modifications in it. The landed gentlemen are angry. Malmesbury said to me two days ago, 'Peel hit us a right-hander with his Corn Law, and a hard left-hander with his Income Tax, but this measure about timber is a regular facer. My father and grandfather have not touched a stick for forty years, and now I was thinking of doing some good with my elms and firs, when down comes Peel with his free importation of Canada timber, and my trees will not be worth a farthing.' Many Tories hold the same language, and abuse Peel most vehemently. I think these measures will greatly shake the Government, though they will not this year overthrow it. But people will now begin to see that our plan of last year would have been a much better bargain for the agriculturists and landed interest than Peel's is. He foregoes the £700,000 we should have had by foreign sugar; he gives up on Canada timber £600,000, now paid upon it, and £600,000 more which we were

however, only yielded to such pressure for the sake of forwarding the progress of improvement, while the present Cabinet were driven to abandon improvement by coercion.

Another subject that for some time occupied the attention of the House of Commons during this session was that of bribery at elections, and consequent compromises entered into by sitting members to avoid election petitions. Mr. Roebuck moved for a Select Committee to inquire into these matters. After a debate, in which none of the Ministers had spoken, Lord Palmerston taunted them for their silence, but said he could not support the motion, for he did not perceive the illegality of the alleged compromises. If an Act of Parliament were Mr. Roebuck's object, he might at once take public notoriety as a ground for it, without waiting for an investigation, and Lord Palmerston would vote for rendering the inquiry into bribery imperative on election committees. If anything, however, could make Lord Palmerston support the Ballot, which he opposed on principle, as tending to aggravate every existing abuse, it would be a refusal of Government to support a remedy for the evil.

Although the House of Commons refused to affirm Mr. Roebuck's motion, the discussion did not prove wholly devoid of practical result. Lord Chelsea, one of the M.P.'s for Reading, was under an obligation to vacate his seat, by acceptance of the Chiltern Hundreds, within a limited time, under a pecuniary penalty of £2,000, this being one of the terms on which the petition against his return was compromised. When, however, the time arrived for carrying this stipulation into effect, an unexpected difficulty occurred—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, now made aware of the purpose for which the application was preferred, declined to grant it; and Lord Chelsea, who had bound himself to resign his seat, found it beyond his power to do so. Lord Palmerston brought the subject before the House by moving for 'copies of any correspondence which

had taken place since the 1st of July between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and any member of Parliament upon the subject of the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds.'

He objected to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's refusal on two grounds. First, it was a clear and distinct understanding that if the parties implicated should make (before the Committee) full disclosure and full admission of facts, they should be completely indemnified and saved from injury. The refusal of the Chiltern Hundreds must have been considered as an inconvenience or punishment to some one—either to Lord Chelsea, or to the person who was to succeed Lord Chelsea. Lord Chelsea, moreover, would have to forfeit £2,000; and the Chancellor was violating the understanding on which the Committee had proceeded. Secondly, if, when a member of Parliament wished to retire from his seat, Government were to take upon itself to inquire into his motives, an entirely new principle would be introduced, and one that would give the Government a most inconvenient control over public men; *e.g.*, an Opposition leader might have been defeated at a general election, and another member might be willing to vacate his seat for him. Suppose, then, the Government chose to say, 'We will not be parties to such an arrangement; and, to prevent its being carried out, we will refuse the Chiltern Hundreds'?

Mr. Goulburn (Chancellor of the Exchequer) defended his refusal, 'as he felt that he was bound to consider how far, by complying with the application, he should be making himself a party to transactions which the House of Commons had declared to be of an improper character,' but the motion was agreed to.

C. T.: July 18, 1842.

My dear William,—Nothing could be better than your answer to Aberdeen, and I am very glad that you stated fairly to him the applications which the Neapolitan Government have made for the recall of other Ministers: as to demands for recall,

I had plenty of them when I was at the Foreign Office; and whenever an English Minister did his duty faithfully and firmly in difficult circumstances, the Government to which he was accredited, or some other Government whose plans he thwarted, was sure to ask for his recall. My answer invariably was that we were the only judges of whom we chose to employ, and that we never permitted foreign Governments to prescribe to us who we should or who we should not employ.

Our session is drawing to an end. The Government is divided in itself; its supporters are divided among themselves; and the Government and its supporters are at variance upon many matters. But they will all rub on together for a good long time. Peel is necessary to the party, and the party is necessary to Peel; and necessity makes strange bedfellows. The distress in the manufacturing districts is great. It arises, not from scarcity of corn, but from want of employment, and want of wages wherewith to buy corn. I do not at present foresee any early termination of this distress. The Government, it is evident, think it is exaggerated, and imagine that it is magnified in order to force them to a further alteration of the Corn Laws. There may be some truth in this; but there is still enough of real distress to give cause for serious apprehensions. If once a disturbance begins there is no saying how far it may spread, or what degree of irritation may be produced by the employment of force which will be necessary for suppressing it. The Government evidently imagine that by letting corn out of bond, if the distress becomes worse, they can apply a remedy. But this would be good against famine, but is not so against want of employment; such single measures cannot restore permanent commerce, and that is what is wanted at present. When Parliament is up we shall go to Broadlands, and as we have no plans this year, either for the Continent or for Ireland, we shall make Broadlands our head-quarters during the whole of the recess.

The death of the Duke of Orleans is a great misfortune; for a regency which may last some years is a bad, because it is a weak, Government for France. If the Duke had left no children the case would not have been so bad; for those who knew him had not a very favourable opinion of him, and the Duke of Nemours is said to be in all respects a better man. However, it is a dreadful affliction for his family, and a calamity for France and for Europe. It seems to have been the result of over-confidence in his own activity and a forgetfulness of

the different momentum belonging to different velocities.¹

Adieu, Yours affectionately,
PALMERSTON.

Before the House was prorogued Lord Palmerston made a long speech, already described, reviewing the foreign and domestic policy of the Government, and as soon as it was up he went down to pay visits to Lord Melbourne at Bocket and Lord Cowper at Panshanger.

C. T. : September 1, 1842.

My dear William,—This has been the most magnificent summer I ever remember in the whole course of my life. I never recollect so long a continuance of beautiful sunshine; and the wind having generally been east or north, the heat has never been oppressive. Some people have talked of eighty-eight or ninety in the shade, but I have a thermometer always standing out of my window which faces the park and looks south-east, and has the sun upon it till twelve o'clock, and that thermometer—which is a register one—has never been up to ninety even with the benefit of the direct radiation of the sun upon it.

We have been for ten days at Bocket and Panshanger; Melbourne, the Beauvales, the Cowpers, the Ashleys, Milbanke, the Jocelyns, and all the Ashley and Cowper children. We are going to-morrow to Broadlands. I hear a very good account of our partridges and pheasants.

The disturbances in the manufacturing districts are over, and the people are gradually returning to work. They must do so or starve, and I presume that in the long run they would prefer labour to death. There are many hundred prisoners, 500 in one gaol alone (Stafford, I believe), and the Government are going to send down a special commission to try them all. There are no cases of treason, all are merely sedition or rioting. Many will probably be set at liberty without being put on trial at all. Under the new sliding scale more than a million of quarters of wheat have come in in one week at 8s. or 9s. duty, and this just before harvest, and when it was least wanted. Whereas if our fixed duty had been adopted, this quantity would have been flowing in gradually at the time when it was wanted, and we should not have had the high prices which have existed. This new law will be found just as bad as the old one.

¹ He received fatal injuries by leaping from his carriage when the horses were running away.

We seem to have made a most disgraceful and disadvantageous arrangement with the Americans ; but how could it be otherwise when we sent a half Yankee to conduct our negotiation ? Lord Ashburton has, if possible, greater interests in America than in England. He thinks the most important thing to England, because it is the most important to himself, is peace between England and America ; and to preserve that peace he would sacrifice anything and everything but his own private and personal interest. He moreover holds the opinion that the loss of Canada would be rather a gain than an injury to England ; and that was the man the Government chose to negotiate a matter, the chief importance of which to us was its bearing upon the security of Canada. It quite makes me sick to think of it.

C. T. : September 30, 1842.

Politics here are much as they were. The Tory party are indignant with Peel and the Government for having deceived them and thrown them over in every matter which the Tories thought most important ; but these same Tories will still rally round the Government whenever it is attacked, rather than have the Liberal party again in power. Sidney Herbert told me yesterday that one of the Peers, speaking of Peel the other day at Wilton, said : ' If a highwayman stops me on the road and robs me, I have him apprehended, tried, and hanged, and at least I have my revenge to make amends for my loss ; but here I am robbed by Peel of far more than the highwayman would take from me, and I can get no redress.' Our foreign affairs are getting into the most miserable state, and the country is fast falling from the position in which we had placed it. This Ashburton treaty is a most disgraceful surrender to American bully, for I cannot even give Ashburton and the Government the credit of having been outwitted. They must have known the value and extent of all the concessions they were making ; and the provoking part of the matter is, that those concessions have been made without any real necessity whatever, and instead of finally closing our account with the United States, will only be looked upon by them as a first instalment. These things, however, will afford us some matters for debate next session.

Lord Palmerston, during the greater part of his earlier career, was no favourite of the Whig or Radical leaders. He did not belong to one of the privileged

families, and his sturdy independence was distasteful to both, while his 'unaccountable apathy' to mere party politics kept him aloof from their sympathies and councils when out of office. The following letter relates, among other things, to representations supposed to have been made to some of the principal Whigs as to the mischievous tone of the articles in the *Morning Chronicle*, which was then supposed to be greatly under Lord Palmerston's influence:—

Brocket : November 14, 1842.

My dear John Russell,—I return you, with many thanks, the inclosed letter from your brother, which is interesting.¹ I have no doubt that, as he says, Metternich was right glad to have got rid of us as directors of public affairs in this country. It is true that latterly, and after the end of the struggles in Portugal and Spain, he found himself in the same boat with us about Turkish affairs, and was, on the whole, pleased with our proceedings; but he never felt confidence in us: he never knew what we might be at next, and he could never forget that the principles of political liberty which form the creed of our party, are tenets the practical application of which in any country on the Continent of Europe he dreads as a danger to Austria. He looked upon us as tamed wild beasts, whose natural waywardness might at any time break out again.

There can be no doubt that England does not now enjoy the same consideration and exercise the same influence abroad as in our time, for besides the low, submissive tone taken on all foreign questions by our Government at home, it is impossible that the great change which has been made in our diplomatic agents at the principal Courts of Europe should not have a most injurious effect. We had at all those Courts men of talent, energy, and enlightened views. The present Government has

¹ Lord William Russell, from Vienna, November 1, 1842:—'We have quite lost the position taken for us by the late Ministry. The low tone taken by Peel, the concession in America, the vacillation in India, and the distress in England, have led to the belief that we are in a declining state. However, there is no fear of war. Public opinion is against it, and no Government is strong enough to fly in the face of public opinion. The French alone could carry public opinion with them (in making war), yet they got such a lesson from Palmerston that they will not try it again. I said at the time, and told the King of Prussia, that Palmerston had secured to us ten years of peace, and so it will turn out if the Tories do not mar the matter.'

substituted for those agents a set of dotards and fools. Those who have not lost their understanding by age or infirmity have only escaped that loss by never having had any understanding to lose. Stratford Canning is an exception. He is certainly clever and active.

What you say of E—— confirms what I had heard of his underminings for some time past. But indeed it is no exception from his natural course. Cabal and intrigue are as natural to him as party spirit (or, as O'Connell said, eating and drinking) to the Corporation of Dublin. I believe that all parties in this country, and everywhere else, have been beset by intriguers; and therefore one ought not to regard as a peculiar grievance that which is a general dispensation. E——, however, has invariably bestowed upon me perhaps more than my proper share of his sapping and mining activity. What Wm. Russell says of Russia is equally true of him, 'He is always working like a mole underground, and no one knows where he will come up next.' He set out in the days of Durham's ambition to endeavour to turn me out of the Foreign Office, in order to get Durham in; and well punished he was for his treachery, by the bitter disappointment which he felt at its failure. He was furious, and has never forgiven me, and despite his wish to be captious, he even now, from time to time, exhales his wrath, by swearing on his honour that I shall never return to that office in the event of our party regaining power. I am not, however, much moved to anger by this hostility; because, thank Heaven, I know I am a stronger man than he is; and he knows that too, which does not make him love me the better.

It seems, however, according to what you say, that some of our party, Radicals and old Whigs, are disposed to take their views of our foreign relations from E——; God help them, say I. But they have a right to choose for themselves; only I must claim for myself equal liberty of judgment and of action. And I happen to think I understand our foreign relations better than he does. I conceive that, without any inordinate vanity, I may imagine myself to possess as much good sense and judgment as he does; and if for ten important years you set one to employ the whole of his time in gossiping and caballing in clubs and drawing-rooms and country-houses, and if you put the other to toil night and day in the practical and detailed administration of our foreign relations, the chances, I take it, will be, that the opinion of the latter upon our foreign affairs will be of more value than that of the former. Nor have events run counter to

this theory. For upon every great matter which we have had to deal with in our foreign relations while we were in office, he was strongly against me, and was always trying to get up a cabal to thwart me; and upon every one of those matters, whether in regard to Belgium, Portugal, Spain, India, Syria, or any other, he was proved by the result to have been wrong. Now one of his most approved methods of cabal is to write away every day to all the leading members of the Whig party, to instil into them or to extract from them opinions adverse to what he thinks my opinions to be. He practised this method very extensively, and with much momentary success, about the Syrian question. But several of those whom he misled for a time acknowledged afterwards that they had been wrong; and you cannot, I am sure, forget the very handsome and manly declaration to that effect which Spencer made in the House of Lords in 1841, when seconding the Address.

Now, as I have no respect whatever for E——'s opinions when coming straight from himself, I am not prepared to defer to them a bit the more because they come echoed back from others. But if those others choose to follow him in these matters, let them do it. I pretend to guide nobody, except as far as reasons which I may give in Parliament, and arguments which I may there employ, may influence the minds of fair and impartial men. All that I claim for myself is freedom of action according to the best judgment I can form of the interests of my country; and that freedom I shall always exercise as long as it may please Heaven to continue to me my faculties, whether Radicals or old Whigs are pleased or displeased with the line I may think it my duty to take. If I am right, I am quite sure that my arguments and reasonings will have weight in the country, even if not in the House of Commons. If I am wrong, I shall be proved to be so, and perhaps then I may alter my own opinions.

I quite agree with you that we ought not, as an Opposition, to provoke or irritate either America or France, or indeed any other foreign Power; but, on the other hand, I do not see why we should truckle to them. It seems to me that the straightforward course of an honest Opposition is to look to the real interests of the country in respect of its relations with foreign Powers, and to uphold those interests, whether by so doing it may support or attack the Government of the day. If the Government is doing its duty in this respect, it ought not to be thwarted by the Opposition; if it is neglecting or violating its duty, it ought to be rebuked or admonished.

With regard to the *Chronicle*, I am inclined to doubt the expediency of endeavouring to exercise too minute a control over a paper whose general tendencies are right. A horse sometimes goes the safer for having his head given to him. But I do not recollect having seen any articles in it about France to which fair objection could be taken; and while all the French papers are teeming every day with abuse of England, it cannot be surprising if now and then a newspaper writer's blood should boil over, and his indignation should vent itself in some few remarks; nor, I confess, does it appear to me that such little occasional raps on the knuckles, even if they were given, would have an injurious effect upon our international relations.

Brocket: December 6, 1842.

My dear William,—We have been here, except for a few days, ever since October 23, attending upon Melbourne, who, however, is now so well that it is only to keep him company till he is able to receive people as usual, that we are now staying here, and I trust that in ten days' time we shall be able to get back to Broadlands. A variety of untoward circumstances have kept us away from it the whole year, so that since January last I have been there only a week at Easter, a fortnight in September, and a week the other day. This has been a great privation to me, after having been kept away from it so much by public duties during the preceding ten years. But Lady Palmerston's company has been a great comfort to Melbourne during his illness, and of course all other considerations gave way to this.

December 8.

Since I wrote the above I have received your letter of the 22nd, and am glad to hear you are making some progress in the commercial negotiation, though you do not at present see your way to an arrangement about tariffs. It is strange that people should not everywhere understand that commerce is a transaction which must benefit both parties, or it would cease to be carried on. No nation would continue to carry on commerce with another solely for the benefit of that other; both parties must find their account in the transaction, for if one party lost by it, that party would, of course, soon leave off a losing game.

Our successes in India and China have produced a great effect in England, and must, I conclude, have done the same on the Continent. They show, that if now and then we suffer checks when our affairs happen to fall into the hands of weak

and incapable men, as seems to have been the case last year in Afghanistan, and as was to a certain degree the case at first in China, yet as soon as we put able and vigorous leaders at the head of our concerns, the energy of Englishmen and the power of England overbear all resistance and infallibly conduct us to triumph and success. As to China, all that has been done has been accomplished by the three men, Pottinger, Parker, and Gough, whom we appointed and sent out; has been the consequence of specific instructions given by us as to the nature of the operations to be carried on; has been effected by troops and ships ordered by us to the station, or prepared by us for that service; and has been concluded according to the particular conditions which, as far back as February 1840, we instructed our plenipotentiary to obtain. I shall take good care, when Parliament meets, to put all this publicly on record, in order that there may be no mistake in future on the subject.

He had an opportunity on the 1st of March, on Mr. Roebuck's motion for a committee to inquire into the causes of the war in Afghanistan, publicly to vindicate the conduct of the late Government. He said :—

The honourable and learned gentleman did not intend, I am sure, to have done that which I think he has done, that is, to speak in a complimentary manner of myself as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He stated a fact, and he coupled that fact with an epithet. In doing this, he certainly did not mean to be complimentary; but I throw the epithet aside, and look only to the statement of the fact, which I consider to be complimentary to anyone in the situation which I had the honour to hold. The honourable and learned gentleman accused me of a 'mischievous and restless activity' in the discharge of my official duties. Now, with regard to the term 'mischievous,' I must take the liberty of saying that the honourable and learned gentleman appears to me to have peculiar notions of what is, and what is not, mischievous; and, therefore, he will pardon me for saying, that his opinion that my official conduct was mischievous will not disturb the conviction of my mind that it was of a contrary tendency. That there was 'activity,' the honourable and learned gentleman declares; and we have his unequivocal testimony to the fact. I thank him for that compliment. He says, that my 'restless activity encircled the globe.' The sun never sets upon the interests of this country; and the individual whose duty it is to watch over the foreign

relations of this country would not be worthy of his position if his activity was not commensurate with the extensive range of the great interests that require his attention. That was my position; the honourable and learned gentleman admits my activity, and I thank him.

I shall not, after the admirable way in which my noble friend¹ near me has touched on the general course of the foreign policy of the late Ministry, proceed to any defence of myself, from the attacks which have been made upon me. I only say, that the policy of which I was the organ was, as my noble friend has stated, the policy of the Government of which I was a member. The labour, indeed, and toil, and restless activity attributed to me, belonged to the head of the department, and so fell to my share. But with respect to that policy, I will say, that in the ten years during which we held the seals of office, it was eminently successful. I say, sir (and I am glad to inform those honourable gentlemen, who will, no doubt, be greatly delighted at hearing this piece of historical information), that our foreign policy was eminently successful; that we engaged in many great and important transactions; that those transactions were invariably brought to a conclusion according to the views of the British Government; that although at many periods there was great danger of disturbance to the peace of Europe, yet we—endowed, as the honourable and learned gentleman has sneeringly said, with miraculous power of running near the brink of danger, but never into it—succeeded in maintaining the peace of Europe; and though we have not been so fortunate as to meet with the approbation of gentlemen opposite who are so loud in their cheers, yet I greatly suspect, that if the result of our policy had been the reverse of what it was—if we had supported and established despotism in Spain and Portugal—(Cries of ‘Oh, oh!’ from the Ministerial benches)—if we had employed a military force in crushing the independence of the Belgian people—though we might have been ashamed of the results of the policy, we should have been greeted by the acclamations of those who now heap on us their vituperation and censure.

C. T. : May 29, 1843.

My dear William,—I and my lady are both very well and prosperous, and we enjoy being out of office greatly, though this last year we have been much shackled by being obliged to spend a great deal of time at Brocket in consequence of Melbourne's illness.

¹ Lord John Russell.

Public affairs are in a strange state. Scotland is in a flame about the Church question; Ireland is in confusion about repeal; and all England is in a fury about the education clauses in the Factory Bill and the provisions of the Canada Corn Bill. The present Government thought they should have no trouble in managing the country, and they can neither keep the country quiet nor carry their measures through Parliament; and yet it is not the Reform Bill that stands in their way, for they have overwhelming majorities in both Houses. Their difficulties arise from their own want of dexterity in governing, or, as their friends complain, from their preference of dexterity to plain dealing. Still, though the Tories are furious and abuse Peel up and down and in all directions, they go on voting for him whenever there is any question that can involve the stability of the Government; and they are too wise to sacrifice their interests as a party to their personal resentments. Accordingly, I expect no change at present, nor for some time to come. It will take two or three years more to alter the feelings of the country, and I should be very sorry to have my holidays cut short before that time. We think of making an excursion into Germany this summer, but I fear that our time would not be sufficient to enable us to get down to Italy. But I should like to see Germany, the greater part of which would be quite new to me. I have not been at Munich since we passed through it on our return from Italy in our boyhood.

I have been busy reading books on agriculture and horticulture, and trying to acquire some knowledge on those matters, which are now become sciences. If one does not know something of them oneself, one can never hope to get one's estate or garden well managed. I have let all my farms at Broadlands that were out of lease, and tolerably well, in spite of the badness of the times. I had a shocking set of bad tenants, but have got rid of most of them, and have brought in people with skill and capital. Our new gardener does pretty well, and understands the theory of his department, but he is a Methodist and goes preaching about the country every Sunday, and I fear he thinks too much of his sermons to be very successful in his garden. I must try to put a stop to his preaching. Ilione, the mare I had last year, is to run at Ascot, and may perhaps win me a good stake there; that is to say about 400*l*. But Lord G. Bentinck puts all such trifling matters into the shade; he has a horse to run for the Derby next week, and if the horse wins, Lord George is to win upwards of sixty thousand pounds

how much he is to lose if his horse is beat I know not, but I presume he has hedged so as not to be a great sufferer even in that case.

About this time much discussion took place in the House of Commons on Lord Ashley's proposal for limiting the hours of labour in factories. Lord Palmerston, as we have seen, had two years before, with a generous sympathy for the welfare of the poor, supported Lord Ashley's bill for restraining the employment of women and children in mines and collieries, and he did not fail to enter warmly into this further question of protection to the unprotected. The following dramatic extract is taken from a 'History of Factory Legislation,' by Mr. Philip Grant, of Manchester, one of the delegates from the factory workers :—

It was now getting on for two o'clock, and, with cheerful hearts, the pair made off for Carlton Gardens, the then residence of Lord Palmerston. On arriving in front of the house, they observed the carriage standing at the door, and Lady Palmerston promenading the balcony. On presenting themselves at the door, the footman, in answer to their inquiry, said, 'His Lordship was not at home.' Their reply was, 'Not at home to visitors.' The man smiled, and was leaving, but they persisted. It was the last opportunity they might have before the division; and Palmerston was of great importance to their clients. They urged the footman to take in their cards, but he refused, saying, 'It is more than my place is worth.' Whilst the altercation was going on, the noble lord happened to be passing from his dressing-room to the dining-room, and seeing the two at the door, inquired who and what they were. The servant at once handed him their cards, and returned, smiling, bringing with him the gladful news, 'His Lordship will see you.' They were at once ushered into the large dining-room. They found the member for Tiverton in excellent temper, and as lively as a cricket. Without ceremony the subject was entered into, detailing some of the hardships to which the factory children were subject. The statements at first appeared to puzzle the noble viscount, and after a short pause the veteran statesman said, 'Oh, the work of the children cannot be so hard as you represent it, as I am

led to understand the machinery does all the work without the aid of the children, attention to the spindles only being required.' To carry conviction to a mind so strongly impressed with the ease and comfort of factory labour for a moment staggered the deputation, when a lucky expedient at once occurred to the writer, who, seeing a couple of large lounging chairs upon castors, called them to the rescue. Removing them into the centre of the large room, they were made to perform the operation of the 'spinning mule,' Mr. Haworth being placed, as it were, at the 'wheel handle,' and with arm and knee pushing them back to their destination, or to what is technically called 'the roller-beam,' whilst the writer performed the duties of the piecer, trotting from one side of the room to the other, following up the carriage, leaning over the imaginary advancing 'faller,' and piecing up the supposed broken ends. To complete the explanation of the mule, and to show the part the engine performed, they were about to explain by what power the carriage was caused to advance slowly, whilst the 'stretch' was being made, and the yarn twisted. The noble lord at once caught the idea, and ringing the bell, the footman was ordered into the room, and directed to run up one of the chairs slowly to its appointed place (or what is called the end of the stretch), whilst the noble lord catching hold of the other chair performed a similar office. Thus the imaginary spinning and piecing was carried on for several minutes. Lady Palmerston, who by this time had become impatient for her drive before dinner, entered the room, and appeared no little surprised to see her banqueting-room turned into a spinning-factory. Her Ladyship, however, appeared to enjoy the illustration. The veteran statesman, who appeared a little fatigued by performing the duties of 'Old Ned' (the engine), with a significant look and shrug of the shoulders, said, 'Surely this must be an exaggeration of the labour of factory workers.' Mr. Haworth, who had come fresh from the wheel-handle in Bolton, and bearing indelible marks of the severity of his daily toil, exhibited the large 'segs' upon his hands, at the same time pulling up his trousers, he said, 'Look at my knee, my lord,' pointing to the hard substance produced by 'putting up the carriage.' This victory over the mind of the great statesman appeared complete; the illustration given had deeply impressed his Lordship's mind, and he hastily exclaimed, 'If what you have shown me, and what you have stated, be a fair illustration of the labour of factory-people, and the statements you have made be

a fair detail of the hardships to which they are subject, I can no longer withhold my support from your cause, nor can I resist the belief that the children, as stated by Lord Ashley, have to walk or trot twenty-five or thirty miles a day. I will speak with Lord Ashley, on the points you have this day raised, and if your story be even half corroborated by his Lordship, you may rely upon my support.' A promise which that great man ever afterwards kept, and on all occasions when the subject was before Parliament, he diligently performed by speaking and voting in favour of the 'poor factory child.'

In the next few letters there are several allusions to the trial of O'Connell. After the Government had stopped the monster meeting which was to have been held at Clortarf, near Dublin, in support of the movement for the Repeal of the Union, they proceeded at once to prosecute O'Connell. He was charged with conspiracy to raise disaffection among Her Majesty's subjects, and to excite them to hatred and contempt of the Government and Constitution. At the trial the Crown prosecutor objected to all the Roman Catholics whose names were called as jurors, and it thus happened that the representative Catholic of his day was, in a Catholic country, tried by a jury exclusively Protestant. He was found guilty, and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. O'Connell appealed, and his appeal came before the House of Lords, as the final Court, in September 1844. The law lords by three to two pronounced against the judgment of the Court below, and O'Connell was set at liberty. Lord Denman, one of the majority, characterised the expedient resorted to in selecting a jury by the well-known words, that it was nothing but 'a mockery, a delusion, and a snare.' This decision was both just and wise. In its results it very much justified what Lord Palmerston foresaw, as is evidenced by one of the following letters, in which he points out how puzzled O'Connell would be what line to adopt when he came out of prison. The giant agitator's wings were from that moment, if not close shorn, at any rate greatly clipped.

Broadlands, December 25, 1843,

My dear William,—It is an age since I have either written to you or heard from you, and I cannot choose a better day than this to break this long silence and to send you from this house the warmest wishes that this returning season may often find you in the enjoyment of that health and happiness which, I trust, are now making your Christmas agreeable to you.

Our weather is remarkably mild. In hunting we have had several good runs, and we have generally a choice between the foxhounds, Assheton Smith's and a pack kept at Hursley by two sons of Cockburn, the Dean of York, the Castor and Pollux of this country. We have splendid fields with the Forest hounds under Sheddon, their new master; seldom less than fourteen or fifteen red-coats, and often more. I have a new keeper on the Yew Tree side who will get me up some game there; his name, Cross, indicates that he is not to be trifled with by the poachers. Our new little gardener, who has now been with us a year and a-half, is a clever, intelligent fellow, and when we have taught him the management of fruit and flowers, and how to plant trees, he will, I doubt not, prove an excellent gardener.

As to public affairs, the newspapers will tell you all I could say, and more into the bargain. . . . The great event which people are all waiting for is O'Connell's trial. Most men think that there will be evidence enough to convict him, and Catholic jurymen enough to acquit him, or, at all events, that there will be no verdict against him. If that be the result, the Government will be in a difficulty, because agitation will begin again, and they might as well hope to get a slice of the moon as laws of greater stringency. I think Peel will hardly venture to propose a grant of money as a provision for the Catholic priests, because a great many of his own supporters would be against it, and the Dissenters, as a body, including the Scotch Church, mean to set themselves against it. Perhaps he would be able to carry such a measure by the aid of the most devoted of his own friends, and of the most liberal and independent of ours, but I doubt his being bold enough to face such difficulties. The most likely thing is that he will propose some measure similar to that which I suggested last year, by which the Statute of Mortmain would be so far modified as to allow private individuals to endow Catholic parishes with land for glebe not exceeding for each parish a stated amount, perhaps thirty or forty acres. I believe that the Catholic priests would like this better than a

provision in money from the State, because such glebes would leave them more independent of the Government, and would give them a more secure provision than a grant of money, which might at any time be diminished or withdrawn by the same authority by which it would be granted. On the other hand, the Dissenters and high Protestants could make less objection to such an arrangement. Still, a direct payment by the State would be the best plan ; and though the Catholic bishops have objected to it, Peel ought to meet their objection by producing the consent and approbation of the Pope.

Broadlands : January 5, 1844.

My dear William,—We are staying on here till the meeting of Parliament. Melbourne left us yesterday ; I have had a great deal of hunting, and some very good runs both with the Forest hounds and with Assheton Smith, who hunts the country above Stockbridge.

The approaching session will be interesting and animated. O'Connell's trial comes on, and it is said that the evidence to be given on behalf of the Crown will disclose a systematic organisation or combination calculated to lead to the separation of the two countries. I have no doubt that the priesthood are the moving power, and that they think, and with some reason, that, if the union was dissolved, they should become the Established Church ; and however they may deny such a wish, it is impossible to suppose that they do not entertain it. If O'Connell should not be convicted, it is probable that the Government will prepare some more stringent law, and if that proposal is accompanied by measures of conciliation, it will most likely be carried. In fact, the Government have so great a majority in both Houses, that, as far as voting will carry a Bill through Parliament, they are certain of success. But then, the experience they had about the Irish Arms Bill, last year, must have shown them that a compact body of opponents, though few in number, may, by debating every sentence and word of a bill, and by dividing upon every debate, so obstruct the progress of a Bill through Parliament that a whole session may be scarcely long enough for carrying through one measure ; and of course the Irish members on our side, and all the English and Scotch Radicals, would sit from morn till eve, and from eve till dewy morn, to prevent any more stringent law being enacted. The line which the members of the late Government would take in such a case would depend upon the nature of the measure taken as a whole.

It would be a great thing for Peel if he was able to announce,

before the end of this session, an intention of allowing the Income Tax to expire with the three years for which it has been enacted. As to our foreign affairs, they go on as usual: we yield to every foreign State and Power all they ask, and then make it our boast that they are all in good humour with us. This is an easy way of making friends, but, in the end, a somewhat costly one.

C. T. : April 27, 1844.

My dear William,— . . . We are all much surprised at the recall of Ellenborough by the Court of Directors. It is a great slap on the face to the Government. People say that the immediate cause has been some insolent letters written by Ellenborough to the directors in reply to certain remonstrances made by them to him on his various proceedings. It remains to be seen whether he will have had time to conquer the Pundjab before his recall will reach him. If not, he will never forgive the directors for having deprived him of his expected laurels. I imagine that the directors disliked the heavy expense attending his military measures.

The Government is certainly going down fast in public opinion and esteem, but the country is not yet ripe for a change. As to legislation, they are not able to do much in that line, and this session is likely to be as barren in that respect as former ones have been.

Broadlands: May 30, 1844:

My dear William,—The way in which the House of Commons went to the rightabout upon the ten hours question took us all by surprise. I thought the Government would carry their twelve hours, because the moment they declared to their friends they should go out if beat it was quite sure that beat they would not be; but nobody expected they would have had such a large majority.¹

This result, however, shows that there is no likelihood of any change of Government at present, and, to say the truth, I am much inclined to think that even if Peel were to resign, and we were to dissolve, the result of a general election would not give us at present a majority sufficient to enable us to carry the government on, even if it did not leave us in a minority. There

¹ Sir James Graham, then Home Secretary, had introduced a twelve hours' Factory Bill. Lord Ashley had carried an amendment in Committee by a majority of 9 in a house of 349 members, virtually affirming the principle of ten hours. The Government then withdrew the Bill and introduced a new one, when the House of Commons reversed its former decision by voting for twelve hours by a majority of 138.

will not be much done in the way of legislation this year ; but the new arrangement about the bank is a good one, and will tend to make the value of money steady, which is a great advantage. As to O'Connell, I suppose he will at last be brought up for judgment, and, if so, he will infallibly be imprisoned. Probably, after some months' confinement, the state of his health will afford sufficient reason for letting him out again. The Government have carried their point ; they have put down agitation.

London, June 5, 1844.—I did not finish this the other day at Broadlands. You see O'Connell has been sentenced and imprisoned. The writ of error will be brought to a hearing in the House of Lords as soon as possible : the case in favour of O'Connell must be strong indeed if the decision is given in his favour. The Court will certainly be against him.

The Emperor of Russia is arrived, but stays here only till Sunday evening. Monday is fixed for the annual ball in aid of the Poles. That may decide him to go on Sunday ; but probably not, for Clanricarde offered him a ball on that night, which he declined on the ground that he had settled to go on Sunday. The Queen had only one day's notice of his coming. He has come at an unlucky time. The Queen is near her confinement, and the Court still in the deepest mourning for Albert's father ; so that there is nothing brilliant to look at, and little that is gay to do. They are now all at Ascot, and he was on the course to-day, and much cheered by the people, and he has given a large sum, they say 500*l.*, to be run for annually at Ascot races. I hope he will be pleased at his reception. It is important that he should go away with a favourable impression of England. He is powerful, and can do us an ill turn or a good turn upon many occasions, according as he is ill- or well-disposed towards us ; and if we can purchase his good-will by civility, without any sacrifice of national interest, it would be folly not to do so. I daresay, however, he will be very well received, for his person and carriage and manners are known to be prepossessing. I have not yet seen him. He arrived on Saturday night, and I went off on Monday to Windsor.

I send you 'Coningsby,' D'Israeli's novel, well worth reading and admirably written. The characters are, many of them, perfect portraits. You will recognise Croker in Rigby, Lord Hertford in Menmouth, Lowther in Eskdale, Irving in Ormsby, Madame Zichy in Lucretia, but not Lady Strachan in Countess Colonna, though the character is evidently meant to fill her

place in the family party. Sidonia is, I presume, meant as a sort of type of the author himself, and Henry Sidney is Lord John Manners, the Duke of Rutland's second son, Beaumanoir being clearly Belvoir.

We have had frequently to notice that the extirpation of the slave trade was one of the objects which Lord Palmerston had most at heart. He himself, towards the close of his life, declared that during the many years that he was at the Foreign Office there was no subject which more constantly or more intensely occupied his thoughts or more completely constituted the aim of his labours. He used to assert that of all the achievements he could boast of that which he looked back to with the greatest and the purest pleasure was forcing the Brazilians to give up their slave trade by bringing into operation the Aberdeen Act of 1845.¹ The present generation, thanks to the labours of men like Palmerston, are likely to remain ignorant of the extent and character of the horrors which were perpetrated on the unfortunate black race, in times past, by men belonging to what are called the civilised nations. To recall a few details, therefore, may be useful, if for no other purpose, at any rate as a warning to what length of inhumanity men may go in the unchecked pursuit of gain. These incidents of the slave trade were graphically described to the House of Commons by Lord Palmerston himself, in an eloquent speech on July 16, 1844, when he moved for certain returns, with a view to keep the Government and the country alive to the necessity for not relaxing their honourable efforts in the cause of humanity.

The West Coast of Africa was the chief hunting-ground of the slave captors. At the dead of night some peaceful African village was surrounded by armed ruffians, the huts were set on fire, and their inhabitants, roused out of sleep, rushed out and were overpowered. Those who resisted were killed at once, the rest were made prisoners. Then followed the selection. The

¹ To Sir J. Crampton, Feb. 17, 1864.

hale and healthy were set apart for the slave caravan; the aged, the infirm, and the infants were murdered. This was the one tribute to humanity which their destroyers were willing to pay, on the ground that it was a kindness not to leave them to the slow death of starvation. As soon as this was over the caravan started for the coast—the weak being urged forward by goad and lash—the strong being kept down by yoke and chain. Hundreds of miles they were driven over stone and sand to the place of embarkation. Multitudes perished by the way, some of them being abandoned, while yet alive, only to be released from their pain by the fangs of wild beasts. The march of these caravans could be traced by thousands of human skeletons bleaching on the ground.

When at last the survivors reached the sea coast they were cooped up in crowded huts called barracoons, waiting for the ship which perhaps might not arrive for some weeks. Badly fed and imperfectly cared for, many died there from disease, many more sickened; so that when the vessel, at length, appeared, and the captain proceeded to pick out those whose apparent strength gave promise that they would outlive the voyage and be saleable in the market, there was a large residue of weak and sickly, who were either put out of the way at once or left to perish. It was reckoned as a general rule that, whatever was the number of negroes embarked, an *equal* number had previously died in the seizure, the march, and the detention.

Then came the voyage. Then began a scene of suffering and horror even greater than anything that had gone before. Whatever the size of the slave-ship, the captain took on board a fourth or a third more negroes than it could properly contain. This was founded on a dry arithmetical calculation. He knew that, however careful might have been his selection, some of his negroes would have imbibed the seeds of diseases which would break out and prove fatal during the voyage—that others, quite sound when they em-

barked, would sicken and die before they reached the port. He, therefore, took in sufficient supernumeraries to ensure a full cargo on arrival at the market. But this very contrivance aggravated the evil. Sea-sickness, ophthalmia, fever, dysentery, and small-pox spread in the crowded hold, and a daily parcel of corpses was thrown overboard. But not dead bodies alone—often the living as well as the dead were consigned to the deep. The keen and experienced eye of the slave captain would foresee in the early stage of the malady of some poor negro that, though he might struggle on for a week or a fortnight, he must inevitably die or become unsaleable before the port was reached. He knew that during the interval the wretched slave would go on consuming provisions representing money's worth. Therefore overboard went the living sufferer. This was by no means an uncommon occurrence. To cite one case that was proved in a court of justice. In 1781, a ship called the *Zong*, commanded by a man named Collingwood, sailed from Africa for Jamaica. Her water ran short, and the negroes grew sickly. The captain bethought him that, if he could make it appear that a certain number were necessarily thrown overboard for the safety of the ship, their value might be recovered from the insurers. In three nights one hundred and thirty-two negroes were thrown overboard alive.

Sometimes calamities of a different kind occurred. The bottom of the ship's hold was filled with casks, containing the necessary water and provisions. Over these casks was spread a platform of rough boards laid loosely together, on which rough surface the naked negroes were compelled to lie. The distance between this platform and the deck was scarcely ever more than three feet and a half—sometimes barely two and a half. Into this black hole the negroes were thrust like so many bales of goods; linked two by two with fetters to prevent them from crushing each other by moving about; and so crowded together, that, as stated before

a Committee of the House of Commons, the negro in the hold of a slave ship had not as much room as a man has in his coffin. In order to mitigate somewhat the heat and pestilential effluvia which under a tropical sun must have resulted from this condition of things, the hatchways of slave ships were made larger than those of merchantmen, and were covered with open gratings. This did all very well in fine weather, but whenever a violent storm arose the hatchways had to be closed or else the ship would have filled with water and sunk. Then ensued a scene of horror, of struggle, of agony, and of death impossible to describe. In a pamphlet called 'Fifty Days in a Slaver' a description of such a scene is attempted. Fifty-two negroes out of four hundred on board the vessel died in one night suffocated or strangled in their struggle to get near to the small opening still left for the admission of air.

It was calculated that from all these causes about a third of the negroes that were embarked usually died during the passage, and if this third of those embarked be added to the half assumed to have died in the seizure, the march, and the detention, it will be seen that for every negro landed in the market two others would have perished in the previous stages of the slave-making process. When it is further remembered that for many years the consumption of slaves in the various markets of the world amounted to between one hundred and two hundred thousand annually, some idea may be formed of the mass of suffering and violence for which this traffic was responsible. Lord Palmerston's words in the House of Commons were surely no exaggeration when he said that if all the other crimes which the human race has committed from the creation down to the present day were added together in one vast aggregate, they would scarcely equal, and certainly would not exceed, the amount of guilt which had been incurred by mankind in connection with this diabolical slave trade.

Before the House broke up, Lord Palmerston

brought before it the general policy of the Aberdeen Government in its relations with foreign Powers. The implied contrast between the careful thought for the interests of foreign administrations on the part of the Tories and the sole care for the interests of England on the part of the Whigs was very effective in debate.

I am anxious to call the attention of the House and the Government to the inconvenient consequences which have arisen from the system of policy pursued by Her Majesty's present advisers—a system which appears to be one of resistance at home and of concession abroad. When the right honourable gentlemen opposite came into office, they adopted a course which they probably thought would lead to a state of tranquillity abroad, and secure to them the good-will of foreign Governments. I doubted at the time the success of that line of policy, and affairs which have arisen since must have convinced Ministers, as they have convinced the country, that it is not a system calculated to advance the interests or to uphold the honour of the country. They commenced by making a great concession to the United States, in the hope, no doubt, that by such means they would restore perfect harmony between the Governments of the two countries; but the result was, that after the cession of the greater portion of the disputed territory, another question arose, namely, that concerning the Oregon territory, which promised to lead to as many difficulties as that respecting the north-east boundary. Then there were the questions of the right of visit and the annexation of Texas to the United States, which are of great importance to the interests of England, and which yet remain to be resolved. In like manner with regard to France; the policy thus adopted towards that country was of the same character and tendencies. In Spain, shortly after their accession to office, there occurred questions of considerable difficulty, the embarrassments connected with which were fomented by French intrigue, and Ministers, out of deference to the French Government, counselled the Regent of Spain to submit to great indignity in the question which had arisen with M. Salvandy, the French Ambassador, and also in the affair regarding the conduct of M. Lesseps, the French Consul at Barcelona. The consequence of this was that the Spanish nation thought that the Regent had lost the moral support of this country, and his enemies were allowed to prevail. He

fell, and British interests, in my opinion, were sacrificed in his downfall. In Otaheite a question arose as to whether France should accept the protectorate of the island, which had been refused by England—which, indeed, had been twice refused by England; but, be it always remembered, that the former Government who had declined the offer, had assured the Government of Tahiti that England would always give it the support of her good offices in any difference which might arise between Tahiti and any foreign Power. When that question presented itself Her Majesty's Government again acquiesced, and that acquiescence in French aggression led that Power to take another step which may be productive of very serious consequences. No doubt that line of policy was undertaken for the purpose of obtaining temporary quiet, and without foresight or regard as to what the eventual consequences might be, putting aside all care for the ultimate sacrifices which must be made in following such a course. Ministers, in fact, appear to shape their policy, not with reference to the great interests of their own country, but from a consideration of the effect which their course may produce upon the position of foreign Governments. It may very well be a desirable object, and one worthy of consideration, that a particular individual should continue in the administration of affairs in another country, but it is too much that, from regard to that object, the interests of this country should be sacrificed, and that every demand of foreign Powers should be acceded to. The same course, indeed, was pursued by the party opposite on former occasions. In 1830, the French were allowed to obtain possession of Algeria. The right honourable gentlemen opposite were then in office; they remained quiescent, in order that the Ministry of Prince Polignac might be maintained in power, and we are all aware of the consequences which have arisen from their acquiescence on that occasion. No doubt it is for the interest of this country, it is for the interest of France herself, as well as for the interests of the world, that M. Guizot should remain Minister of France, but the Government of this country has no right to sacrifice either the honour or the interests of England in order to continue M. Guizot in power.

It seems to me that the system of purchasing temporary security by lasting sacrifices, and of placing the interests of foreign Ministers above those of this country, can never be other than a fatal one to the country, or to the Administration

which pursues such a course. Since the accession to office of the right honourable gentlemen opposite, no one can have failed to observe that there has been a great diminution of British influence and consideration in every foreign country. Influence abroad is to be maintained only by the operation of one or other of two principles—hope and fear. We ought to teach the weaker Powers to hope that they will receive the support of this country in their time of danger. Powerful countries should be taught to fear that they will be resisted by England in any unjust acts, either towards ourselves or towards those who are bound in ties of amity with us. But after the abandonment of Spain by Her Majesty's Government, what weak Power can retain any hope of moral support or of effective aid from this country? And after we have ceded and given up the disputed territory in North America, what powerful country can entertain any apprehension of our resistance to encroachment? Although Her Majesty's late advisers had sometimes the misfortune to be in a minority in the House of Commons, still in their foreign policy they had the good fortune always to be in a majority abroad. When the Dutch were untractable, we had the assistance of France and Belgium, and we controlled the Dutch; when afterwards the Belgians grew unreasonable, we had the support of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and we restrained the Belgians. In Portugal, when we wished to establish the constitution and Donna Maria, we had France and Spain on our side, and we carried our point. In Spain, when we were desirous of upholding Isabella and liberty, we had France and Portugal with us, and we carried our point. When we desired to effect an arrangement in the Levant, which we thought essential to the peace of Europe, as well as to the interests of England, we had Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey with us, and that arrangement was carried into execution. In all these great questions, Her Majesty's late Government had the concurrence and co-operation of all those Powers which were nearest to the scene of operation, and were, from their local position, the best informed upon the subject, the most able to co-operate, and the most interested in the policy pursued. What may be the interest of the present Government I know not; but while it is exercised upon the system I have pointed out, and where important and prominent interests are sacrificed for the temporary convenience of foreign Governments, it can never be exercised in a manner which can be satisfactory to this country. It is a system, of all others, the most likely

to lead the country into serious difficulties, and which has already produced occurrences which may involve us in war.

We have already noticed that during the Peel Administration, Lord Palmerston seemed to revel in being, for a time, free from the trammels of office, and, abandoning the taciturnity which formerly characterised him, spoke on a great variety of subjects. But it was by periodical reviews of foreign policy, such as the one just quoted, that he exercised most influence. This was not merely due to the weight of his experience, but was also owing to his practical good sense, by which, for instance, on one occasion he demolished a speaker who, in defence of a bombastic proclamation by Lord Ellenborough in India, compared it to one of Napoleon's bulletins. Lord Palmerston drily remarked that he had heard of those who hoped that by holding their heads on one side they would be thought as wise as Aristotle, or that by stuttering they would rival Demosthenes.

CHAPTER XV.

EXTRACT FROM JOURNAL OF CONTINENTAL TOUR—ENDOWMENT OF
MAYNOOTH COLLEGE: LETTERS—DISSOLUTION OF SIR ROBERT
PEEL'S ADMINISTRATION—LORD PALMERSTON GOES TO THE
FOREIGN OFFICE FOR THE THIRD TIME.

In the summer, Lord and Lady Palmerston went for the tour on the Continent referred to above.

Wiesbaden: August 29, 1844.

My dear William,—We have been here now a week. We shall start again the beginning of next week for Berlin, and thence continue the route we originally intended by Dresden, Prague, Vienna, and Salzburg to Munich. We were very graciously received at Brussels by King Leopold and his Queen, with whom we dined one day at Lacken, and the next day at their palace in Brussels. Railways much expedite travelling in these parts, and we got to Ems in three days and a-half actual travelling from London.

We have here the Lansdownes, Clarendons, Pollens, Orfords, Gosford, and several other English. In fact, every German bath becomes an English colony in summer, and the accommodation has in consequence become everywhere much better and much dearer also. The crops hereabouts, as well as in England, are good, but the grapes have not ripened, and there will be little or no wine made this autumn. This concerns us English but little, for we have almost all of us nearly left off drinking wine, and the greatest toppers are those who take half-a-dozen glasses. The great question which occupies all minds is that of peace or war between England and France; but I cannot believe that there will be war. Upon the affairs of Morocco the two Governments have no doubt come to a fixed agreement; and I conclude that we have agreed to let the French cannonade some of the Moorish seaports, and defeat some of the Moorish armies, on the condition that France shall not even for a moment occupy any portion whatever of the

Morocco territory. This matter is of such great and paramount importance to our interests that no Government, not even the present one, could give way one inch about it; and however much the French may covet Morocco, they would not risk all the inconveniences and certain evils of a war with England for the chance of making acquisitions in Morocco. It would indeed be grasping at the shadow and losing the substance, because the result of a war with us undertaken by France for the conquest of Morocco would infallibly be that they would lose Algiers, to say nothing of their ships, their colonies, and their commerce. Tahiti is a question more likely to lead to a rupture, because there is pique on both sides, and angry feeling, and we want France not merely to abstain from something, as in the case of Morocco, but actually to do something, and that something is to make an apology. However, an apology they must and will make, because they are quite and entirely in the wrong, and because our Government has pledged itself in Parliament to obtain one, and they cannot fly from their pledge. The French try to represent Pritchard as an intriguing agitator, but he is no such thing. I saw a good deal of him three years ago, in the winter of '41-42, when he was at home, and on a visit to Reynolds, the Dissenting minister at Romsey, and found him a quiet, well-conditioned, sensible man, but endowed with much firmness and energy of character, without which a man is wholly unfit to go as missionary to convert the savages and cannibals of the Pacific Islands. Even so long ago as then he warned Aberdeen of what the French were about, and foretold all the results that have since happened; but Aberdeen was deaf to his warning, and could not be persuaded to think that the French would do anything anywhere but what the English Government wished. In the meanwhile, there is an extreme degree of irritation against France spreading far and wide in the public mind in England. In proportion as people had persuaded themselves that the French liked us, and wished to be friends with us, in the same proportion are all men indignant at the undisguised hostility expressed by the French towards us, and at their systematic endeavours to undermine our interests in every quarter of the globe. We, the late Government, knew all this very well ever since 1835, when France began to change her policy towards England, and turned it from conciliation and friendship into enmity and aggression; but in our time, excepting always the Syrian affair in 1840-41, this undisguised war was carried on by them out of the public view; and the good

people of England were induced to believe that the burst of enmity against us in 1840-41 was occasioned by some discourteous proceeding of ours about the Treaty of July 1840. But now that the English people see that they have had for nearly three years a Government who have been constantly yielding on every point to France, and almost licking the dust before their French ally, and now that, in spite of all this, France becomes every day more encroaching, more overbearing, more insulting, and more hostile, even the quietest and most peaceful among us are beginning to look forward to a war with France as an event which no prudence on our part can long prevent, and for which we ought to lose no time in making ourselves fully prepared. In such a war the Government would receive the unanimous support of the whole nation, and any new burthens that might become necessary for the purpose would be cheerfully borne. However, I expect that the present dispute will be settled; but what has passed will leave a feeling of resentment in the mind of Peel, and in that of the nation at large, which it will require a long course of good conduct on the part of France to efface. Peel feels things deeply, and does not forgive quickly, and what he forgives least easily is an attack upon his dignity; and this Tahiti affair is a question of dignity more than of national interest.

There is a talk of the Queen going to Ireland in September, after her confinement, and it is said that O'Connell is to be let out, to smooth the way for her visit. I suppose that now that the Government have been compelled to look at a war with France as a possible contingency, they think they may as well turn over a new leaf in regard to Ireland, and try what conciliation will do for them in that country. I wish we could extend our tour, so as to get to see you at Naples, but we have not time for this; another year, perhaps, we may accomplish it. I should like of all things to spend a winter in Italy.

A short extract from Lord Palmerston's Diary during this tour may not be uninteresting:—

Em's, Tuesday, August 20.—Duchatel,¹ who was in the same inn, called. He said they had 100,000 men in Algeria, who cost them 100 millions of francs. Marseilles was strongly for occupation; but some of the adjoining French provinces not so, as they feared that corn and other produce from Algeria

¹ One of Louis Philippe's Ministers.

would come in and undersell them. The whole expense of the French army is about 12 millions sterling for 350,000 men. A contest is going on between the Government and the clergy about education in the higher colleges, which the clergy want to be confided to the Jesuits. The Government is in advance of public opinion on this and on other subjects. The Radical party in France are against free trade and freedom of education, and against the principle of carrying on railways and other public works by individual enterprise. They wish such works to be carried on by the Government. They inherit these doctrines from the Convention. The clergy have little influence over public opinion. They are ill-paid and chiefly drawn from the lower classes of society. Their education is bad and scanty. The subdivision of land goes on rapidly. The peasantry buy little bits whenever they have saved up money; and many people buy land from citizens and others who have lived beyond their income and got into distress, and they then make considerable profit by selling the land out in small lots. Open field cultivation is preferred, on account of the smallness of the lots, and because then there is no loss of land by fences. This subdivision renders land chiefly corn land, and cattle are imported in large quantities from Germany.

Frankfort, Saturday, 21.—Found General Jacqueminot in the railway carriage—an agreeable, intelligent man, Commander of the National Guard at Paris, and one of the Deputies for the capital. In course of conversation he said that no French lawyer had succeeded in Parliament: Berryer has nothing but a good voice; his speeches contain little matter; he works himself up to such excitement that he has sometimes been obliged to be helped out of the Chamber after a speech of much exertion. Odillon Barrot is so dull that people all leave the House when he gets up. His speeches are all the same; he has spoken nearly the same speech every year for the last seven or eight years. If any man had Berryer's voice and manner, with the matter of Thiers or Guizot, he would be irresistible.

This account of Berryer does not tally with what Peel told me when I met him at the Derby station last winter, when I was coming from meeting the Queen at Chatsworth, and he was going to meet her at Belvoir. I told him I had made acquaintance with Berryer, who passed a couple of hours at Broadlands on his way up from Portsmouth, and whom I afterwards met at dinner at Lady Holland's. It was during his visit to England to see Henri V., with regard to which he had

afterwards to defend himself in the Chamber, and broke down in doing so. Peel said he once asked Talleyrand who was the best French speaker whom he had ever heard. Talleyrand said the best decidedly was Mirabeau, and the next best Berryer.

Dined in the evening at Anselm Rothschild's. He was very anxious to know everybody's opinion whether there would be peace or war between England and France. I told him that the English were very angry, the French in the wrong, and that an arrangement would be sure to be made. He laboured to prove that such a war would hurt us, and only benefit Germany. I said that if we acted on such calculations there would never be war; that no nation in its senses would go to war with a strong Power in hopes of gaining by it; that with us it is a question of wounded honour, for which reparation is necessary. I told him that Lady Palmerston had yesterday received a letter from Lady Holland, fond of France and hating war, who said that everybody in England were making up their minds to war, and were prepared to endure even a 10 per cent. income tax—adding, what infatuation! what wickedness! I said she lived with Whigs and Liberals, and the peace party; and if such were their feelings, what must be those of the rest of the country? I said that the French Government, if they wanted peace with England, had made three great faults: First, in Spain, they had attacked our political influence; this few people understood, and, therefore, comparatively few cared about it. Next, they attacked our commerce by their operations in Africa and elsewhere; this was understood by all the manufacturing and commercial people, and caused extensive irritation. Lastly, they attacked our religion through our missionaries in the Pacific; this was deeply felt by all the middle classes and by all the Dissenters, and produced a burst of furious indignation. The French ought to have known that religion is a thing not to be meddled with with impunity. I said that, however this may end—and no doubt it will be settled amicably somehow—the deep exasperation which has been excited in England towards France will not soon or easily subside.

Fiquelmont was there. I complimented him on the great moral support which Austria had given us in regard to the Treaty of July 1840. He was aware that such support helped us, not only abroad but at home. He argued, erroneously, I think, that Russia cannot really desire to extend herself to the south, because her real strength, military and commercial, lies

to the north. The bulk of her nobles are in the north, and the distance from St. Petersburg to New York is not much greater than from Odessa to Gibraltar, and there her commerce is only half-way to its market ; besides which, the expense of transport in Southern Russia is so great that to carry grain more than 250 versts costs the whole value of the grain. All this is specious, but utterly fallacious. All Governments, and specially arbitrary ones, covet extension of territory for political more than economical considerations, and to say that Russia does not covet extension to the south, is to deny the records of history.

Berlin, Wednesday, September 9th.—Went at ten to call on Cornelius, the fresco painter, who introduced me to the German Minister of Instruction, a very intelligent man. Cornelius said that the English school of painting had a style which, though full of merit in itself, is not adapted to fresco, and is, indeed, the very reverse ; that we excel in the management of colours, and in chiaro-oscuro, and in density of effect, while fresco requires simplicity, grandeur, correct outline, and effect, to be produced by conception and composition. In short, he implied, though he did not say it, that which is true, that our painters are too fond of running before they have learnt to walk, and do not bestow thought enough upon their works, which are more the works of their hands than of their heads. He said that to form a good school of fresco painters is a work of time. He particularly urged that in executing frescoes each artist should have the whole of a side of a room, so that there might be unity of conception, style, and manner in that which is seen at the same time.

He showed me a magnificent design, which he is making for a fresco decoration of the interior of a camposanto which the King is going to build in the great square, on the site of a church which is to be pulled down. The subject is an illustration of the leading points of the Old and New Testaments. The execution of the work will take him, as he says, the rest of his life.

Mr. Bruggeman, the Minister of Instruction, walked out with me, and in our walk said that in Prussia national education is entirely directed by the Government, who do not permit any interference of the clergy, and that this is a fundamental principle. They find schools of Protestants and Catholics mixed do not answer, the parents being always fearful that their children will in such schools be brought over to the opposite

creed. That, in general, the schools are wholly Catholic or wholly Protestant, and that in each religious instruction is given by the clergymen of the respective creeds. Everybody in Prussia is obliged to go to school, and if the children do not go the parents are fined. But, in general, they are anxious for education; and thus all the common people can read and write and know the rudiments of arithmetic.

Wiesbaden: September 11, 1844.

My dear William,—Here we are still regularly *waterlogged*, for the waters have brought out divers pains and aches, and have given me a touch of gout, though a very slight one.

So at last our differences with France are amicably settled, but I do not think that Guizot will like the passage on this subject in the Queen's Speech. The Speech says that the events therein mentioned, which must be those at Tahiti, threatened for a moment to disturb the friendly relations between the two countries, but that the justice and moderation of the two Governments have averted that calamity. This is as much as to say that the French committed an outrage; that we demanded redress; that they refused to give it; that we threatened war, and that then satisfaction was afforded us. The ending of the O'Connell trial has surprised us all; but the man the most surprised is Chief Justice Tindal, who, having given the opinion of the majority of the judges in the House of Lords, thought the matter settled, and set off the same night for his summer excursion. Upon arriving at Frankfort the day before yesterday he met Bellenden Kerr, one of our commissioners for digesting the criminal law, who immediately made an experiment on his legal digestion by telling him the decision of the House of Lords. Tindal could hardly believe it possible. I agree with the 'Times' that it would only be fair by O'Connell to allow him to stay in prison a few days longer to consider what he is to do next. He will be in a considerable puzzle. Monster meetings are out of the question. To call a volunteer parliament in Dublin, as he announced his intention of doing last year, would be dangerous; to do nothing would be wholly unbecoming a great liberator who has just been himself liberated. He will be in the condition described by the poet:

What to avoid does no great knowledge need,
But what to follow is a task indeed.

But the Government have announced some very liberal intentions about Ireland, and O'Connell may tell the Irish to wait

to see how these intentions are carried out, and to employ themselves in the meanwhile in a liberal payment of the O'Connell and repeal rent.

I like very much what I have hitherto seen of the German character; the people are civil and obliging, good-natured and independent. There does not seem to be a single fence of any kind from one end of this duchy to the other, and anybody might take anything if they had any inclination to do so. They must be honest towards each other, though they do cheat travellers out of kreutzers when they can do so with success.

In the following letter, Lord Palmerston, with remarkable sagacity, describes the awakened mind of Prussia, and foretells her coming history.

Dresden : October 13, 1844.

My dear William,—We arrived here the day before yesterday from Berlin, having performed the journey in one day by means of railway, starting at half-past seven in the morning and arriving here at half-past seven in the evening. We stayed ten days at Berlin, which was longer than we intended; but the people there were so civil and kind to us, and we had so many invitations, that it was difficult for us to get away. We dined with the King, the Prince of Prussia, Prince Charles, and Bulow, and with several others; and nothing could be more courteous than the royal family were. They are really a very remarkable family, and would be distinguished persons in any rank of life. The King is a man of great acquirements, much natural talents, and enlightened views; and there can be no doubt that under his reign Prussia will make great and rapid advance in improvement of every kind. The greater part of the nobility in Prussia spend most of the year on their estates, and do not live much at Berlin. The King makes up for this by surrounding himself with men of science, literature, and art, and Prussia is accordingly making great progress in intellectual development. The late King endeavoured to keep everything stationary and stagnant; the present King is all for improvement. He was a great patron of Shinkel, the architect, and is himself full of taste in that way, and he is going to pull down an old ugly church in the great square before the old palace, and to build in its stead a camposanto for the royal family, to be ornamented in the inside by frescoes, for which Cornelius is making a magnificent design. They have already completed a

very fine composition in fresco in the Colonnade of the Picture Museum, the design by Shinkel, the architect, and the execution by some good painters working under the direction of Cornelius, who has been brought back to Berlin by the King, and permanently fixed in his service.

Nature has not been bountiful to Prussia, at least to the district round Berlin, as regards soil, and perhaps climate; but she has been more liberal as to mental endowments, and one cannot visit the country without being struck with the great intellectual activity which shows itself in all classes. There is scarcely a man in the country who cannot read and write. In short, Prussia is taking the lead in German civilisation; and as Austria has gone to sleep, and will be long before she wakes, Prussia has a fine career open to her for many years to come. One is the more struck with the activity of the people in these parts of Germany in intellectual development because they are so far behind in most of the mechanical arts connected with the habits of domestic life. In a country where the winters are very severe there is not such a thing as a window shutter to be seen; doors and windows never shut, locks are such as were made in England a century and a half ago, and all things of this kind are still a hundred years behind what exists now with us. Then, to be sure, their palaces are magnificent; but that is characteristic of imperfect civilisation: the middle ages and half-civilised countries have combined splendid palaces with comfortless habitations for private individuals; not, however, that the German houses are uncomfortable, for, on the contrary, we have met everywhere with very good inns. We dine to-day with the King at Pilnitz, and I think we shall then persevere in our original plan, and push on to Vienna. I shall be very glad to make acquaintance with Prince Metternich, and one shall of course see him more in his natural state and position at Vienna than at Johannisberg. If we do all we intend, we shall have made a tolerably complete tour of Germany, and a very interesting tour it is. They are making such progress in railways that English people will in future become better acquainted than hitherto with Germany.

October 14.

We had a very agreeable dinner yesterday at Pilnitz; all the royal family were there, and they were extremely civil and gracious. The Picture Gallery here contains nearly 2,000 pictures; many, of course, of little value, but many first-rate. They are ill-arranged, and in very bad order, and many much

damaged for want of hot-water pipes in winter to keep the rooms dry.

Brocket : November 10, 1844.

We arrived safe and sound in London on Monday last, the 4th, after a cold and tedious journey. We had, however, a good passage over to Dover, though we had to embark at three in the morning, having got to Calais at half-past seven the preceding evening through sleet and snow all the way from Lille. Here we have found much milder weather than on the Continent, and I am confirmed in a long-entertained opinion that there are few climates in Europe which, taken for the year round, are better than our own.

There is nothing much going on in regard to public news, except that Ellenborough is to have the Admiralty. I am glad of his appointment; it will be doubly advantageous. First, it will give us an efficient navy; and, secondly, it will render the Government unpopular. It is lamentable to think how low our naval force in commission had been reduced, at the moment when we were at the verge of a quarrel with France about Tahiti. If we had really come to a rupture, the French might have struck some very awkward blow before we could have been prepared to resist them.

In the debate on the Address at the opening of the Session of 1845, Lord Palmerston spoke on the Tahiti question and the treaties conceding the right of search, which had been concluded under his auspices. He owned that as to the Pritchard affair, there was no great ground for the country to complain as things turned out at last, although if we had had a stout frigate or two on the station, they would have passed in a manner more decorous; but as to the Commission appointed to examine the treaties of 1841, he felt it necessary to say something.

To appoint a Commission to inquire whether the right of search is essential for the suppression of the slave trade, is just about as rational as appointing a Commission to inquire whether two and two make four, or whether they make anything else. I know that some projects have been spoken of as substitutes for it; that we could have, for example, a foreign naval officer to cruise in our cruisers, and that there should be a British

officer on board every French cruiser; and then, I suppose, if it is to be done for one Power it must be done for another; so that there would be a perfect little Noah's ark sailing about—naval officers by pairs in these slave-trade cruisers! The idea is perfectly absurd, and any man who intends seriously to propose such measures as that means nothing less than to get rid of the treaty altogether.

The great Parliamentary controversy of the session, however, was not a foreign but a domestic question, namely, the proposal of Sir Robert Peel to increase the grant of public money to the Roman Catholic College of Maynooth for the education of priests. Lord Palmerston voted for the bill; and the following letter, addressed to one of his constituents who requested him not to do so, explains his reason for so doing. After saying that the measure was to be regarded first as affecting spiritual, and secondly as bearing upon temporal interests, he proceeds:—

Now in regard to the first point of view, it is alleged by the opponents of the measure that a grant of money to Maynooth tends to encourage the propagation of the religious errors of the Catholic Church, and thus is injurious to the spiritual interests of the Catholics, whom it may confirm in those errors.

Now, first of all, this is an objection resting, not upon principle but upon degree, as applicable to the present measure, because the principle of affording pecuniary aid to Maynooth has been sanctioned and carried into practice for the last fifty years by the Parliaments of Ireland before the Union, and by the Parliament of the United Kingdom since the Union. The first, an exclusively Protestant Legislature up to the end of its existence, and the second equally so up to the year 1829. The only question, therefore, now to be determined is, whether the sum allotted for this purpose is to be 9,000*l.* a year or 26,000*l.* But I fear that resistance to the bill upon this spiritual ground seems to have too much affinity to that most objectionable doctrine of the Catholic Church, held by the more ignorant, but disavowed by the more enlightened Catholics, that none can look with hope to an hereafter but those whose religious opinions shall in this world conform to a particular and prescribed creed. For if we were of opinion that the errors of the Catholic belief

are fatal to future hopes, then indeed we might perhaps determine that it is better for the Irish people to be left in the utter darkness of complete religious ignorance than to be led into paths which must bring them to certain destruction.

But I presume that no Protestant holds such an exclusive and uncharitable doctrine, and however important the spiritual errors of the Roman Church may be, I must venture to think that the points to which those errors relate are of infinitely less importance than the great and fundamental truths in regard to which both Catholics and Protestants agree. But still we who are Protestants think certain doctrines of the Catholics erroneous, and so thinking, we cannot wish to propagate an erroneous belief. But I do not consider this measure as calculated to do so. You will not have one Catholic priest the more or the less in Ireland whether this bill passes or is rejected, but the Irish priests will be better educated and more enlightened if it passes, and more ignorant and narrow-minded if it is rejected: and observation and experience show that the Catholic religion may be much modified by instruction and knowledge; that the most ignorant Catholic nations are the most bigoted, and that the most enlightened are the most charitable and tolerant.

Thus it is that while in Spain and some parts of Italy Protestants are still from time to time exposed to persecution, in Austria the Government, in some of its provinces, endows the Protestant ministers of Protestant parishes, and in Belgium the Catholic Congress votes in the annual budget stipends for Protestant chaplains at several Belgian cities where British subjects are in the habit of residing. Therefore I am of opinion that by affording to the Irish priests a better education, we shall lay the ground for an abatement of the superstitious bigotry which is at present too prevalent among the lower classes of the Irish people; and this, you may depend upon it, is the only way in which it is possible to work any change in the present religious condition of the Irish nation.

There is no use in entertaining delusive expectations and in aiming at impossibilities. To proselytize the Irish people, and to convert them to Protestantism, is in the existing state of things impossible. Our only choice is between leaving six millions of men in comparative ignorance, and in consequent bigotry and superstition, or endeavouring to enlighten them, and at least to make them good Catholics if we cannot make them Protestants; and in making this choice we must not forget, as some men in their zeal seem to do, that Roman Catholics are Christians.

Now as to the second point, namely, the bearing of the bill upon temporal interests. I can hardly conceive how any person who has attentively considered the state of public affairs can, in this respect, entertain a doubt of the propriety of the measure. For, first, let us consider its effect upon the Catholic Church in Ireland, viewed as a temporal and political organisation, and without reference to the spiritual considerations which I have already discussed. We can neither deny nor put an end to the existence of that organisation; we cannot prevent the Catholic priesthood from exercising an immense influence over six millions of the Irish people; but we may, by showing a kindly feeling and a liberal spirit, enlist that influence as an active auxiliary in the cause of good order and of submission to law; or we may, by harshness, by repulsion, and by a display of hostile feeling, render that influence at least motionless for good, if not occasionally active for evil. I cannot hesitate between those alternatives. But in the next place, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that a most mischievous and dangerous opinion has of late been extensively propagated in Ireland, that the English feel no kindness for or sympathy with the Irish; that we look upon them as conquered serfs; and that we are on all occasions ready to trample on their rights, and to insult and persecute their religion. They who think that a separation between the two countries would be fatal to the British empire, and that a civil war for the prevention of that separation would be a calamity less great only than the separation itself, must feel, as I do, the greatest anxiety to assist in carrying any proper measure which can tend to undeceive the Irish as to the true feelings of England towards them, and which may have the effect of cementing those ties which I trust may long, for the benefit of mankind, bind the people of the two islands together. I think this Maynooth Bill is well calculated to produce this effect; and on that account, as well as for the other reasons which I have mentioned, I feel it my duty to vote for it. In fact, the rejection of this bill would do more to forward the cause of repeal in Ireland than all the monster meetings for which O'Connell was brought to trial.

In conclusion, perhaps you will permit me to say that it is a source of much regret and pain to the Liberal party in the House of Commons to see the Dissenters on this occasion making common cause with, and unintentionally furthering, the schemes of that party who have invariably been the enemies of civil and religious liberty, and who, in this instance, have

conceived a hope that, by the aid of the Dissenting body, they may be able to expel from the Government the small infusion of liberality which it contains, and to reconstruct an Administration more entirely imbued with the bigotry and prejudice of the old Tory school.

C. T.: February 12, 1845.

My dear William,—Our session has begun *piano*, and is likely to go on so, excepting always the little civil war which will arise between Peel and some of his supporters about Irish education and his increased grant for Maynooth, and his new colleges at Cork and Belfast. Gladstone's resignation seems only a temporary retirement.¹ He will support Peel's Irish measures out of office, which he thinks he can do more decently than in office, and then, when the session is over, Ripon will probably retire into private life, and Gladstone will go to the Board of Control.

Sidney Herbert is an acquisition to the Cabinet, and I think higher of Lincoln² than people in general do. Knatchbull certainly goes out, and is live lumber thrown overboard. On the whole, I think Peel strengthening, because he is liberalising, his Government. If he would but shift Aberdeen to any other less important office, and put to the Foreign Office some man of more spirit, energy, and sagacity, it would be a great gain for the country, but that seems now hopeless.

C. T.: March 16, 1845.

I send you a circular from the Welsh Slate Company. We have, I believe, finally settled our loan, and I trust we shall get our affairs into good order, and possibly in 1847 we may be able to make a dividend. The rage for railways is in our favour, because railways create station-houses, and station-houses beget villages, and little towns are springing up everywhere upon the lines of railways. The number of schemes this year for railways amounted to about 240; more than half of these will be thrown over for the present, but as many will probably spring up again next year. The Irish are suddenly gone railway mad, and forget agitation for repeal in their speculations in shares, and, wonderful to say, Irish capital comes forth in great abundance to provide means for their adventures. There is to be one line from Dublin to Enniskillen, perhaps another from Dublin to Longford, and in all probability one from Enniskillen to Sligo by Bally-

¹ Mr. Gladstone had resigned on the Maynooth question.

² Afterwards Duke of Newcastle.

shannon, Bundoran, and Mullaghmore. This would be a grand thing for my little harbour at Mullaghmore, and for Sligo also; but Sligo is sure to have a railway either from Enniskillen or from Longford, and probably will have one from each of those towns.

We have had the most severe winter, at least as to duration, that I ever remember. The frost began in the early part of November, and it has gone on more or less, and on and off, till now. Four nights ago the thermometer was down at 13°, even upon the window-sill of this house, and I daresay it would have been four or five degrees lower if quite in the open and away from any house.

Reventlow told me yesterday that the Sound is frozen hard, and that they go over the ice to Sweden, and that there is a halfway inn established on the ice, and that they have not had such cold weather in Denmark for thirty years; but it did not begin there till February, so we are likely to have it here fresh and fresh from them.

The Government here are as strong as ever, in spite of the undisguised discontent of many of their followers; but these people fear us more than they hate Peel, and they know that by throwing him out to bring us in they would, in all matters of trade, monopoly, and bigotry, fall from the frying-pan into the fire, and so they abuse him with all their might, and vote for him steadily whenever they are really wanted.

We cannot here make out whether Louis Philippe means Guizot to stand or to fall: he will do whichever of the two his master may determine; and it seems of little importance to us which event takes place. Guizot is just as unfriendly to us in his heart as every other Frenchman is, and he is driven by the Opposition to give vent to his hostile feelings oftener and more strongly than perhaps other men might do. Louis Philippe wants the Queen to visit him at Paris this next summer, and offers to return the visit with his Queen the year after. He says that in the present state of the relations between the two countries the sovereigns ought to meet every year. The Queen, however, must go to Ireland this year, but she might take Paris afterwards if it was thought desirable and safe for her to do so.

C. T.: August 8, 1845.

Our session is at last at an end, in fact at about the usual time. It has been one of business. Several good measures have been passed: the Maynooth Bill, the Irish Colleges Bill, the Bill

for better care of Lunatics, the Bills taking off the glass duty and the duty off 340 small articles. Provision has also been made, though scantily, for increasing the defences of our dockyards, and beginning harbours of refuge. Most of these measures have been, at one time or another, suggested by us, and this will continue to be the state of things, that our measures will be carried into execution by our opponents. Well, if we can do good in this manner, we are content, and I do not from present appearances see any great likelihood of our being able to do good in any other way; for, to judge of the result of a general election by what happens from day to day, when single seats become vacant, we should not gain a majority by a dissolution, whenever it might happen; though probably Peel's majority may then be brought down from a hundred to fifty. I am not sure that I should like that state of things so well. Now that his majority is overwhelming, and any attempt to oust him hopeless, we, who are the sober part of the Opposition, are at liberty to support him when he proposes good measures, and to leave our violent partisans when they make bad motions; but when numbers approach nearer to equality, the whole party will become more factious, and the leaders will find more difficulty in holding a straight course.

The Queen embarks to-morrow afternoon, as soon as she has taken her fine clothes off, after proroguing Parliament. She will, no doubt, enjoy her tour of all things. The Ministers wanted her to appoint a Council of Regency, but she would not, I believe, because Cambridge must have been at the head of it, and probably she thought he would be making a parade of himself in her absence, and also she did not like there to be any Regency of which Prince Albert was not a member. Cases may arise which would render the want of a Council of Regency inconvenient. There was one in 1821, when George IV. went to Hanover; in fact, the only precedent for not having one is the visit of Henry VIII. to the Field of the Cloth of Gold, to meet Francis of France.

C. T.: September 6, 1845.

We are here in London for a day or two on our way to Ireland, having taken the Tiverton races in the way from Broadlands here. We shall be about a month in Ireland, and on our way back I shall visit our slate quarry, which is going on well.

On the whole, we shall have a plentiful harvest. The manufacturing districts are in great work, thanks to India and China, and in spite of all hostile tariffs in Europe, and the country in

general is in a flourishing condition. The only ground for uneasiness is the multiplication of railway schemes; there cannot be money for them all, and there must be some failures by-and-by.

Our Government is at last beginning to think that, in spite of all the friendly professions of France, it is as well that we should be able to defend ourselves, and they are going to fortify our dockyards. I believe the next year they will bring forward some plan for organising a militia force; and they are turning their attention in good earnest to the steam navy. '*Fidarsi è bene, ma non fidarsi è meglio*,' ought to be our maxim in regard to France. She is preparing most assiduously the means of invading us, and it is not enough for us to rely upon her assurances that she has no present intention of making use of those means.

Never was a Government apparently more strong than Sir Robert Peel's in 1845, when, unexpectedly to all outside observers, it suddenly dissolved. There was one cause for that dissolution, independent of public affairs, which had not been sufficiently counted upon. No two men could be more dissimilar than the two under whose joint auspices the Conservative Government had been formed. Lord Stanley, though his removal to the Upper House took him out of the immediate sphere of Sir Robert Peel's action, was antagonistic to his chief in every propensity derived from nature, habits, and position. Reckless in his language, aristocratic in his tendencies, rather courting than avoiding contention and strife; above all, haughty and domineering in character, though gay and playful in manner, it was impossible that he should move in comfort under the shadow of a leader circumspect, sprung from the middle classes, and having a certain sympathy with their thoughts and feelings, inclined to conciliate opponents, and accustomed to receive from his followers implicit obedience. But what was worse than all, was the eternal habit of quizzing, or, to use the modern word, 'chaffing,' which the inconsiderate noble indulged in, and which the somewhat prim and stately commoner could not endure. If private stories are to be believed,

the Premier, indeed, had determined—at a shooting-party, early in the autumn, and at which the dignified calm of his countenance had been unwillingly ruffled by a volley of bad jokes which he could neither tolerate nor resent—to take the first occasion of shaking himself free from a colleague whose familiarity had become insupportable to him. The immediate cause of events, however, which came so suddenly on the political world, was a scarcity of the Irish potato crop. The population of Ireland had to be provided for; and after two or three meetings with his Cabinet, and propositions made by him and rejected by Lord Stanley, the Prime Minister declared that he saw no satisfactory course to adopt, short of the total abolition of the Corn Laws, which it had been hitherto only proposed to modify, and the Administration broke up, Lord John Russell being entrusted with the construction of a new Ministry. This task, after a short effort to fulfil it, he resigned, giving as his principal reason for not forming a Government the refusal of Lord Grey to join it. If, as it was generally said, Lord Grey's refusal was because the Foreign Office was to be placed in the hands of Lord Palmerston, this would prove that all his former colleagues were not his friends, but that he still remained more powerful than his opponents. At all events, Sir Robert, exalted by the thought that he had a high duty to perform, once more sacrificed his past life to what he believed the future of his country, or perhaps (to speak more correctly) to the exigencies of the hour, and it was this disinterested conversion of an old and experienced statesman that gave the Manchester doctrines the unquestioned authority they have exercised from that time.

The appearance of Adam Smith's work was a great epoch in politics. People had been, generally speaking, so ignorant of the principles of political economy, that they were startled by their novelty, simplicity, and truth. The few became proselytes from admiration and conviction; the many, after a time, from vanity

and fear: vanity, in wishing to be thought before their age; fear, lest they should be thought behind it. But the fashion of the moment had, like fashion at all times, its exaggerations. The art of making a nation rich, which is what Adam Smith undertook to teach, is a great branch in politics, but it is not the whole of politics.

Adam Smith wrote on the wealth of nations, and laid down principles calculated to make nations wealthy. But the wealth of a nation is only one element in its greatness, content, and prosperity, and there are also a variety of circumstances that intervene between theory and practice, which disturb the general calculation of political economy, or introduce evils which destroy or counterbalance the advantages you are taught to expect from them.

It is easy to say that as the trade in one town is destroyed by competition, the capital invested in its ruined manufactures will migrate to another town, and be employed in a more productive industry; but the population, which cannot migrate, starves. Besides, unlimited competition in articles produced by labour must, after a time, depend in a great degree on the price of labour; you cannot undersell the manufactures of other countries but by making the men employed on your fabrics work harder or receive less wages than other men elsewhere. Peculiar advantages that you enjoy at starting may, for a time, enable you to surmount this consideration; but in the end it must prevail, and the amount of the goods that you sell and the profits you make depend greatly on the lowness of the wages you pay—a conclusion not gratifying to the artisan, who will not be satisfied by the assurance that a paltry compensation for his labour is necessary for the prosperity of his country; nor is it to be forgotten that whenever, by law, violence, or intimidation, any question of wages is settled without the free co-operation of both parties—the principles of your system are deranged, and the wheel of your theory no longer turns.

It is evident, moreover, that in going to markets which you can control, or with which you are thoroughly acquainted, there must be a greater regularity between demand and supply than there can be when you are speculating over the whole world for customers who may be affected by circumstances that you cannot always know or appreciate, and can never pretend to govern. But nothing generates discontent so much as fluctuation in profits and wages; for human nature is so constituted that a man will expect to have always what he has once receive.

It is usual to treat the doctrine of free trade as a general system, of which the abolition of the Corn Laws only formed a part, and to speak of that system as one which no one acquainted with the principles of political economy can dispute; but there is not above one individual in a thousand who has any opinion that he has not borrowed, without inquiry. As the country dandy has his clothes cut after those of a London acquaintance, the ordinary politician will take his political notions from some politician who is in fashion; and half the ignorant men who call themselves free-traders, do so because they are afraid of being thought ignorant. But the time is come, when a man, who has read and thought, and who respects himself, may assert that there are many questions embodied in the question of free trade, each of which requires more consideration than it has yet received.

There can be no doubt that if your sole desire is to make a nation *wealthy*, and if society will submit itself to be governed by general laws independently of temporary or individual convenience, there are no arguments capable of refuting the doctrines of Adam Smith. But if you consider the wealth of nations as not the only source of strength or happiness to nations; if you regard political economy as merely a part of political science; and if you find that people will not submit passively to temporary and individual inconvenience, in order to carry out a general law for the convenience or interest

of others, then there is more to say than many persons at present suppose on the opposite side.

There are other effects more indirectly and gradually produced by the axiom of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets, which escape the unthinking observer but which attract the attention of the reflective scholar or statesman. When you lay it down as a principle, that pecuniary interest should be the dominant motive power of a nation's life, you destroy many of the nobler emotions which should also preside over its vitality. To tell your fellow-townsmen that it should be indifferent to him whether he puts money into the pocket of his neighbour and friend, or into that of an unknown stranger in Kamschatka, lays the foundation for a series of ideas which tend to destroy a special feeling for his own country, and consequently for his own countrymen.

It is more especially necessary that an empire composed of various parts should be held together by habits and ties of a more intimate intercourse between its separate portions than are allowed between any of them and foreign states. Such particular relations, moreover, foster and extend general patriotism, as the destruction of national and imperial privileges tends to annihilate it. We have boundless territories, rich with every product, and situated in every clime—territories over which we could graft a superabundant population, to become, instead of a useless burden on our industry, useful consumers of our manufactures; and although it now became the fashion to preach the commercial independence of the mother country from the colonies, many considerable statesmen were inclined to believe that a great plan of emigration and colonial commerce might have been attempted, for which steam and electricity would have furnished every year new facilities.

The abolition of differential duties in favour of our colonies was a measure far more serious than the tax upon tea which produced the American war; and, in fact, we thereby exchanged throughout our vast do-

minions a system of assimilation and union for a system of division and individuality. It is telling an old story to say that people never sufficiently appreciate the advantages they possess, and over-estimate those they have lost; and the power and prestige which perhaps our generation negligently gives away to-day may be regretted by another generation to-morrow. At all events the code of Mr. Cobden and his disciples admits of exceptions and qualifications; but, at the same time, no men made a greater mistake than the landed proprietors as a class made when they sought to maintain, for their own interest, a tax which was held to be opposed to the interest of the great bulk of the community. The odium they thus incurred was no doubt unjust; the country gentlemen of England did not act more selfishly than the ribbon manufacturers of Coventry, or the glove-makers of Worcester, who asked protection for their manufactures quite as loudly as the country gentlemen asked protection for their grain; but the difference between the landed gentry contending for their interest, and any other more isolated body contending for theirs, was that the landed gentry formed a political body in the state and society, and had to maintain its popularity in order to retain its power. Its policy, therefore, was to make a timely sacrifice of what it could not keep, in order to preserve what it was ruin to lose. It was not Sir Robert Peel who destroyed the Conservative party—it was that party which destroyed itself by separating from him, and hence bringing on itself the imputation of being the poor man's enemy—an imputation which has ever since crippled its utility, slurred its prestige, and hung like a weight of lead about its heels whenever it has endeavoured to lift itself into power.

In the meantime the defection which Lord Stanley headed rendered the existence of the Peel Ministry for any length of time impossible; and in fact it had hardly carried its Corn Law measures when it received its death blow; for on the very night on which the Corn

Bill passed the House of Lords the Government were by a union of opposite parties defeated in the Commons on their Bill for the protection of life in Ireland. The work for which the existence of the Administration had been prolonged for another year having been accomplished, nothing remained for them but to resign. Accordingly, on the 29th of June, Sir Robert Peel in a memorable speech took leave of the country. In the course of his remarks he affirmed his opinion that there ought to be a complete equality of civil, municipal, and political rights between Great Britain and Ireland, so that no one on comparing Ireland and its franchises with Great Britain and its franchise should be at liberty to say that a different rule was established in the two countries. He also incidentally mentioned, that on that very day news had reached him that the Oregon Boundary question had been satisfactorily settled by the adoption of the 49th parallel of latitude.

Lord Palmerston had not taken much part in the excited discussions on the Corn Laws, which occupied the early part of the session, but on this occasion, Lord John Russell having been sent for by the Queen, he became the spokesman of the Whig party. Addressing the House he said that he thought that Sir Robert Peel had shown a proper deference to the House in thus bowing to its opinion, and that he had stated very correctly, that the present was not an occasion on which he could properly have recommended the dissolution of Parliament. He was glad to hear him announce the principles on which he thought the government of Ireland ought to be conducted in future.

Sir Robert Peel had well said that the success of the great measure just passed was not so much due to the Whigs on one side of the House or to the Tories on the other, as to the talents, perseverance, and eloquence of Richard Cobden. In the language which he had used, Sir Robert Peel had paid a deserved compliment to his honorable friend; but the House and the country would look beyond that compliment, and would see

in Mr. Cobden not only a great improver of our commercial code, but also a great result of parliamentary reform—that reform which was the source of Sir Robert Peel's recent power, and which had enabled him, though he had opposed it, to pride himself on having carried his present policy through the House of Commons.

When Lord John Russell's Administration was formed, Lord Palmerston went to the Foreign Office for the third time—Lord Grey's opposition to him not being repeated.

One of the causes for this change was this: There were many persons who, not understanding that the Minister who makes the power of his country respected is the Minister whom foreign Governments respect, imagined that the return of Lord Palmerston to the Foreign Office would endanger our peaceful relations with France. Lord Palmerston himself had none of these misgivings, but he felt that they existed in others, and that it would be well to show, before he came into power, that he should be on perfectly good terms with King Louis Philippe when he did so. One of his characteristics was, when he thought a thing should be done to do it. He went then to Paris during the Easter holidays of 1846, and the French Government being quite as anxious to be on good terms with one who was soon to be in office as he was desirous to be on good terms with the French Government before he came into office, a series of parties were arranged by mutual friends, at which he met and conversed intimately with the leading men of the Chamber. At Madame de Lieven's there was a dinner at which he met M. Guizot; at Lady Sandwich's, a dinner at which he met M. Thiers and M. Roger du Nord; and being presented to the King by Lord Cowley, he was naturally asked to dine at the Tuileries. People crowded round the Minister, whom they admired for not being afraid of them. Thus his gay and easy manners, not the less appreciated by being seen in combination with the grace and charm of the lady he was accompanied by, had in two weeks

rendered him the most popular man in Paris. And when he met M. de Montalembert, who had just been making a violent attack upon him, at Madame Delmar's, and crossing the room, went up to him, and holding out his hand, said, '*Je suis charmé de vous revoir*'—setting the hostess and her company, who had been fearing an awkward rencontre, perfectly at their ease—Paris rang with praises of his good-breeding, and '*ce terrible Lord Palmerston*' became '*ce cher Lord Palmerston*;' and before he returned to England all idea of there being anything to apprehend from his reappointment as Foreign Secretary had disappeared on both sides of the Channel.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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